EL SALVADOR CERTIFICATION- -INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT DATA PROVIDED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001604000015-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2007
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: July 28, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1604000015-0
JL -1111. L- I
28 July 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : El Salvador Certification--Intelligence Assessment
Data Provided to the Department of State
Responding to the request I note the following:
-- State requested the assessment from us by 28 July; that was the
date the certification was to be sent to Congress.
-- For unknown reasons, State, in fact, sent the certification on
27 July.
-- State received the first draft of the intelligence analysis on
22 July.
-- State participated (both INR and the regional bureau, ARA) in the
23 July meeting of NFIB representatives here at CIA.
-- State and the NFIB representatives received the final NFIB-
approved draft on 26 July for telephone concurrence by 1300 hours,
27 July.
-- On the morning of 27 July, the DCI decided to table. the draft at
the 1430 NFIB meeting where it was approved.
-- 28 July, the intelligence assessment is formally transmitted to
State.
J
Constantine C. Menges
CL BY 053945
RVW JULY 1988
Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1604000015-0
 Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049R001604000015-0
27 July 1982
Intelligence Community Assessment*
EL SALVADOR: Performance on Certification Issues - Summary
1. Although some abuses continue to occur, the monthly rate
of political deaths is down 45 percent from last year and the
Salvadoran government and military leaders continue to work
toward curbing human and civil rights abuses, and to respond to
the public's interest in participatory government as underscored
by the 28 March constituent assembly elections. Nevertheless,
their efforts continue to be hampered by the weaknesses of El
Salvador's unsophisticated body politic. These include an
inability to separate partisan and personal goals from common
national priorities and a failure to put aside ideological
conflicts that in the past have thwarted the democratic
process.
2. Despite the rigidity of the political system and the
myopia of certain of its key participants, the prospects for
continuing progress--while slow and arduous--seem generally
positive. The civilian government has so far been characterized
generally by pragmatic compromise, with the result that
political, economic, and social reforms are continuing and
violence has been reduced. This position has been reinforced by
the military high command, which distinguished itself as the
major moderating force during the fractious political
negotiations that followed the election. Led by Defense Minister
Garcia, the armed forces appear increasingly aware of the
psychological dimension of the war and cognizant that the
insurgents are the ultimate beneficiaries of any abuses.
*This assessment reflects the judgment of the intelligence
community following a meeting of the National Foreign
Intelligence Board representives on 27 July 1982 chaired by the
Director of Central Intelligence.
CF.C`RF.T
Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049R001604000015-0
 Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1604000015-0
I. HIuman Rights - "Making a concerted and significant effort to
comply with internationally recognized human rights."
3. We have no information
on El Salvador's civil and criminal justice system, but some
progress apparently has been made in strengthening the courts and
improving enforcement of existing laws that protect the
citizenry. The constituent assembly has, for example,
unanimously appointed an independent supreme court and is
preparing to write a new constitution. Political prisoners remanded to
civil authorities, meanwhile, appear to be well-treated and
reportedly are visited frequently by family members, church
organizations, international relief agencies, and foreign
diplomats. Persons are also held in facilities of the military
and the security forces; their treatment varies from reasonable
to harsh.
4. Although violence remains endemic, the number of political
killings is declining and is now at its lowest*Ievel since the
insurgents' "final offensive" of January 1981. The monthly
average of political deaths for that year was 510, while the 1982
rate stands at 285--a decrease of 45 percent. In our judgment,
this downward trend reflects:
-- The greater emphasis on large engagements
between bonafide combatants--more in rural than
urban areas--since January 1981.
-- Measures taken by government and insurgent
leaders to reduce indiscriminate violence in an
attempt to build greater popular support.
-- Extreme rightist death squads which have been
less active in 1982 than previously.
*The wording from the International Security and Development
Cooperation Act of 1981 will be excerpted at the beginning of
each section of the analysis. That Act in each case sets as a
criterion that the government of El Salvador is:
**"Political deaths", includes deaths of civilians and off-
duty military personnel with reports of circumstances which
conform to the following basic criteria: (1) not reported as
criminal deaths; (2) attributed to the extreme left or
government forces; (3) victim reported apprehended (that is,
taken from home or vehicle) and killed on the spot or later found
dead. In addition, "political deaths" takes into account the
modus operandi of armed forces of the extreme left and extreme
right. It is a partial interpretation since press reports--the
basis for US Embassy violence reports--do not attribute deaths to
"political violence." on occasion, criminal violence may be
intentionally disguised as political violence.
2
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1604000015-0 -
 Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049R001604000015-0
J LJ V L%J:J 1
-- Some potential victims on both
the extreme left
and right going underground or
into exile. =
25X1
25X1
5. Senior military leaders have repeatedly demonstrated
public and private concern over the need to improve the human
rights conduct of their troops. We believe they recognize that
official excesses alienate the civilian populace, damage the
government internationally, reinforce the position of the
insurgents, and most importantly jeopardize US military. and
economic assistance.
II. Control of the Armed Forces - "Is achieving substantial
control over all elements of its own armed forces."
6. The military leadership is continuing its efforts to
punish human rights violators within armed forces ranks and to
curb abuses by rightwing paramilitary forces. We believe this
resolve likely has been strengthened by recent indications that
the emphasis on human rights is aiding the effort against the
insurgents.
7. During 1980 and 1981, the Army and the security forces
reported they had remanded to civilian courts some 215 enlisted
men charged with assault, rape, or murder. Since January of this
year, an additional 50 personnel have been arrested for these
crimes and are in jail awaiting trial by civilian courts.
Moreover, several civilian members of rightist death squads have
been apprehended and charged with specific political killings.
8. The human rights doctrine that is now part of the
curriculum for new cadets in El Salvador's military academy
underscores the armed forces' growing sensitivity to the
political fallout of continued abuses. The military's decision
to modernize its policies and methods complements the efforts of
US trainers, who are schooling Salvadoran officers and enlisted
men to respect the rights of civilians and improve their
treatment of Prisoners and defectors,
25X1
25X1
9. Other military units, meanwhile, have begun using improved
human relations techniques to inspire defections among the
insurgents and enlist the confidence of the local population.
Although the number of defections appears modest so far--due
largely to the insurgents' strict control over their cadre and
support elements--some villagers are returning to their towns and
fields because of the improved image of the local armed forces.
In a few cases, Army commanders have ordered their troops to
spare settlements known to house guerrillas in order to provide
civilian refugees with a home to return to.
Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049R001604000015-0
 Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049R001604000015-0
10. The military's growing awareness of the psychological
aspect of warfare has been particularly pronounced in Cabanas
Department. Last year, this northern border region was the focus
of intense guerrilla activity, and government forces appeared as
politically isolated from the local populace as they were
militarily from the insurgents. Through humanitarian and
material support to peasant communities--combined with a new
strategy of small unit patrolling and stricter control over civil
defense groups--the department commander has all but eradicated
guerrilla operations in the region and has won the confidence of
the local populace.
11. Abuses continue to occur in all parts of the country, of
course, particularly with regard to taking prisoners, treatment
of non-combatant guerrilla supporters, and fire discipline in
populated areas. Nevertheless, on balance we believe the trend
toward improved control over the armed forces has continued this
year.
III. Progress on Reforms - "Is making continued progress in
implementing essential economic and political reforms,
including land reform."
12. Progress on political reforms clearly is evident in the
successful transition from a four-man civil-military junta to a
civilian government comprising a popularly-elected 60-man
constituent assembly, an independent civilian executive branch,
and a supreme court. In addition, banking and commercial
programs are being implemented. Implementation of agrarian
reforms has continued this year, with a full third of all land
titles under the two-year-old Phase III program having been
distributed since January. Phase I is on track, with
compensatory payments to a few former landowners beginning.
Nearly 180,000 beneficiaries of the program are preparing for a
third successful harvest in the fall.
13. Prospects are favorable for further advances in socio-
economic and political reforms--though with occasional lapses and
problems with implementation. Reform issues are subject to
heated disputes, almost as much within parties as among them.
Moderates and hardliners seek in varying degrees to maintain,
expand, limit, or reverse the process of all reforms.
Nevertheless, the final referee will continue to be the military,
whose leaders appear convinced that the agrarian and other
programs must continue if the government is to receive the
domestic and international support necessary to rebuild the
economy and defeat the insurgents.
14. The military has demonstrated its commitment on the
political front by honoring its pledge to initiate
democratization. Senior military officers were instrumental in
breaking the political deadlock in the weeks following the 28
March election. Their prescription for building a government of
national unity has resulted in securing a share of power for the
4
Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1604000015-0
 Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1604000015-0
25X1
liberal Christian Democrats and has helped reduce the influence
of far right groups in the government. The military recently
formed a six-man committee to help the executive over ma or
policy hurdles and to mediate serious partisan disputes.
15. The military's commitment to reforms seems borne out by
the strong response of the armed forces to the confusion caused
by the assembly decree of 18 May revising implementation of Phase
III of the agrarian reform. At that time, President Magana, in
an attempt to bolster sagging export production caused by
landowners' fears that renting their lands would be tantamount to
forfeiting them to tenant farmers, sent a proposal to the
constituent assembly. The proposal stipulated that peasants
seeking to cultivate new cash crop lands in the next growing
season would not be eligible to receive titles to those lands for
that time period. The conservative majority in the assembly,
however, expanded the proposal to include lands used for
livestock and basic food crops, thus effectively postponing new
claims by renters to most land available under Phase III.
Domestic and international reaction to what was viewed as a
potential rollback in'the whole reform process inspired immediate
action by the Christian Democrats, peasant organizations, the
military, and the Magana government to ensure that no such
rollback would take place.
whom landowners had illegally evicted.
16. Senior military officers thus pressed for an acceleration
of the land titling process. Since early June, members of the
high command--in tandem with leading government officials--have
distributed some 2,000 provisional and permanent titles to
peasant beneficiaries. Moreover, the armed forces have quickly
intervened to reinstate about half of some 3,800 peasant renters
largest peasant organization also serves on the committee.
five-man presidential committee that will oversee any further
legislative action on land reform. A top leader of the country's
17. Prospects for continued progress in the land reform seem
favorable. The recent appointment of an Army colonel to head the
government agency in charge of distributing titles to peasants
underscores the military's resolve to accelerate the process.
Moreover, a senior military officer has been appointed to the new
IV. Elections - "Is committed to the holding of free elections
at an early date and, to that end, has demonstrated its good
faith efforts to begin discussions with all major political
factions in El Salvador."
18. All political parties, including those allied with the
extreme left (FMLN), were invited to participate in the
constituent assembly elections of 28 March 1982. The 1.5 million
ballots cast constituted a severe political and psychological
setback to the far left. Though a few allegations of electoral
fraud have been made, little or no evidence has been produced to
25X1
25X1
25X1
5
Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1604000015-0
 Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1604000015-0
substantiate these, and we share the broadly held judgment that
the integrity of the electoral process was maintained. The
military showed professionalism in safeguarding the integrity of
the balloting by providing effective logistical support to the
elections commission, accommodating over 200 foreign observers in
their trips around the country, and protecting the voters against
insurgent attacks. 25X1
19. For months guerrilla leaders had said they would kill
anyone who participated in the elections. When it was evident
that the elections would occur as scheduled, Guillermo Ungo and
other political leaders of the extreme left coalition made
pledges that they would not hinder the balloting. Nevertheless,
the guerrillas launched a long prepared, major military campaign
to disrupt the electoral process. They succeeded only in pre-
empting the voting in certain eastern towns where they
concentrated their largest forces. 25X1
20. In our judgment, the massive turnout w s attributable to a
number of factors, including:
-- Unprecedented open registration, which enabled
participants to cast their ballots anywhere in
the country while reducing the chances of
reprisals by the extreme left and right.
-- Higher than anticipated public confidence in the
fairness of the proceedings.
-- Public anger and frustration over the economic
and social impact of two years of guerrilla
violence.
21. Fulfilling the mandate of the electorate, however, will be
difficult. Alleviating El Salvador's traditional socio-economic
disparities and political backwardness would prove challenging
even in the absence of a guerrilla war--and it is our judgment
that a protracted struggle will continue for some time, probably
into the period of the next elections. 25X1
22. Nevertheless, the government appears reasonably stable,
and we expect that elections will take place in either late 1983
or early 1984. The executive branch is headed by a widely
respected, non-partisan president with ties to virtually all
interest groups in El Salvador, including the far right and
left. The cabinet is divided equally among political
independents and members of the three major parties; on balance,
government ministers appear to be relatively professional in
their dealings with one another. Moreover, the administration is
generally cooperating with a military institution that seems more
united than at any time since the 1979 coup. 25X1
23. Because of its divisions and poor leadership, the
constituent assembly remains a problem. It has a major political
role to play and, given the rightist influence in its ranks, the
6
SFCRET
Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1604000015-0
 Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1604000015-0
capacity to impede efforts of the provisional administration to
govern and advance the reform programs. Nevertheless, the power
of its more extremist members has diminished steadily since the
election. For example, ultra-rightist zealots--having failed in
their initial attempts to control the government--have further
alienated the military and moderate conservatives by their
obstructionism, and their own unity is increasingly suspect. In
contrast, the Christian Democrats appear more committed to
reaching accommodation with conservative parties on specific
issues while also working to safeguard their influence over
policy. Significantly, the major parties are installing new
organizational headquarters in the countryside and are holding
fund raising and recruitment activities in preparation for the
national election.
V. Murders of US Citizens and Disappearance of John Sullivan -
"Good-faith efforts to investigate murders of six and bring
to justice those responsible for those murders."
24. We have no independent information on the investigations
of the murders of four US churchwomen or the two US land reform
advisers. Since the last certification, the five National
Guardsmen charged with killing the churchwomen have been remanded
to civilian authorities and are awaiting trial. Recent progress
by the new government commission investigating the American
Institute for Free Labor Development murders also raises the
prospects for a successful conclusion of that case. New
witnesses have come forward, and evidence is building which more
clearly implicates known former security force personnel and
wealthy civilians in the crime.
25. The disappearance of Mr. John Sullivan, a free-lance
reporter on assignment for a US magazine, remains a mystery.
Although US Embassy reports indicate the continued awareness of
the Salvadoran authorities about US interest in the case, no new
leads have developed. We have no independent intelligence
information that would shed any light on Mr. Sullivan's
disappearance.
7
gv.rRF.T
Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1604000015-0