THE TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION EFFORTS OF THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001403390009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2007
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: June 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
? Central
Intelligence
The Technology Acquisition
Efforts of the Soviet
Intelligence Services (v)
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
2 13:3 r
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THE TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION
EFFORTS OF THE SOVIET
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (U)
Information available as of 25 May 1982 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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CONTENTS
PREFACE ................................................................................................................... 1
SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW ................................................................................ 3
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 7
Soviet Scientific and Technical Collection Efforts:
Trends and Historical Context ........................................................................... 7
Soviet Acquisitions of Militarily Significant Western Technology ..................... 7
Soviet Tasking in the Technology Acquisition Effort .......................................... 9
Military-Industrial Commission ......................................................................... 10
State Committee for Science and Technology ................................................. 10
The Soviet and East European Intelligence Services: Organization and
Operational Methods in Acquiring US and Other Western Technology ... 15
The Committee for State Security (KGB) ......................................................... 15
The Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) ........................................................ 16
S&T Collection Methodology of the Soviet Intelligence Services ................... 17
Soviet Technical Collection: Communications Intelligence ............................ 20
East European Services ...................................................................................... 21
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PREFACE
This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum addresses the key role
of the Soviet intelligence services and their surrogates in acquiring
advanced US and other Western (including Japanese) technology. This
particular focus of the Memorandum is not intended to overshadow the
significance of acquisitions by other Soviet and East European organiza-
tions and the consequent need for stringent US export controls. Indeed,
the continuing Soviet acquisition of technology from the West using all
means at Moscow's disposal is one of the most complex and vexing issues
confronting US policymakers.I
The term "technology transfer" connotes a wide range of scientific
and technical, economic and industrial, and trade and communications
activities; there is no single definition. When viewed in terms of their
national security implications, the means by which technology transfers
occur take on even greater significance. These means range from open-
source publications through legal trade and illegal trade diversions to
traditional clandestine operations. In certain instances, transfers not
normally considered cost-effective in the usual commercial sense (such
as reverse engineering) may be used by actual or potential adversaries
that otherwise would be denied such technology
This Memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the
National Intelligence Council by the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
National Security Agency, the DCI's Community Counterintelligence
Staff, and the intelligence components of the Department of State, the
Department of Energy, the Customs Service of the Department of the
Treasury, and the Air Force, Army, and Navy. It was reviewed by and
coordinated with the intelligence components of the Departments of
Commerce and the Treasury. This Memorandum was approved by the
DCI's Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee and, on 25 May
1982, concurred in by the National Foreign Intelligence Boar
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SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW
The USSR is engaged in a well-organized, centrally directed, and
growing worldwide program to acquire US and other Western military
technology, embargoed equipment, and manufacturing technology to
satisfy its military and defense-industrial needs. The Soviet intelligence
services and their East European surrogates play a major role in this
worldwide program through a broad range of clandestine, technical,
and overt collection operations. Although these intelligence operations
constitute a small part of the overall Soviet technology acquisition
effort, we believe these operations are responsible for acquiring the
overwhelming majority of the militarily significant Western technol-
ogy t that finds its way into the Soviet Union
Acquisitions of Western technology by the Soviet intelligence
services and their surrogates have afforded the Warsaw Pact significant
military and industrial benefits. These include:
- Increasing the pace of indigenous development of weapon
systems and reducing military research and development costs
and risks.
- Developing effective countermeasures against US and other
Western military systems.
- Modernizing and broadening critical sectors of the Warsaw
Pact defense industrial and support bases.
These and other acquisitions of Western technology by nonintelligence
organizations have contributed substantially to the growth of Soviet
military power and the steady erosion of the technological superiority
on which US and allied security currently is based. In turn, this has
stimulated the United States and its allies to make even greater efforts
to overcome or defend against these enhanced Soviet capabilities=
The Soviet and East European intelligence services employ a vast
array of methods to acquire US and other Western technology. The
most effective of these collection methods include:
- Recruiting agents-in-place from business, government, military,
and academic sectors both in the United States and overseas.
' As used here, militarily significant technology is defined as that equipment, material, and technology
having direct and immediate impact on Soviet military research, development, and productiol I
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Arranging illegal trade diversions through third countries to
evade US export controls.
Using Communist-country-owned but locally chartered firms
to acquire controlled technology and to support clandestine
collection operations.
Intercepting US and other Western telecommunications to
acquire proprietary and controlled industrial technology and
unclassified but sensitive defense program information.
- Exploiting official scientific and technical exchanges and inter-
national organizations.
- Collecting large amounts of open-source S & T information
available in Western countrielI
The technology acquisition efforts of the Soviet and surrogate
intelligence services have become more systematic and effective in the
past 10 to 15 years. Their collection efforts-both legal and illegal-are
well coordinated on a global scale to maximize the total effect of the So-
viet acquisition effort. Their collection activities are closely tailored to
the changing security practices of Western governments and their
industrial, commercial, and academic sectors. Among the trends we
have noted over time in the Soviet intelligence services' efforts are the
following:
- Weapon-related acquisitions increasingly are more selective,
focusing on critical components and materials necessary to
achieve greater performance.
- Greater emphasis is being placed on acquiring Western produc-
tion technology and equipment, reflecting Soviet needs to
increase the efficiency of large-volume production for the
Warsaw Pact; much of this technology and equipment is
subject to export controls, and its acquisition often is accom-
plished through intelligence-directed trade diversions.
- Commercial and emerging technologies are becoming priority
targets in their own rights, indicating the military value placed
on them by the USSR as well as their greater vulnerability to in-
telligence service acquisition methods.
- Acquisitions of US technology are being stepped up abroad,
reflecting a relatively freer operational environment overseas
than in the United States.
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- The role of the East European intelligence services has been
increasing steadily over the years, and the Soviets are providing
them with an ever expanding set of collection requirements; the
rate of increase has risen recently as a result of Western
embargoes on technology transfers to the USSR in the wake of
Afghanistan and Poland.
0
As the vast array of the Soviet and East European intelligence
services' scientific and technical collection activities suggests, neither
the US export control community nor the Intelligence Community
separately can respond adequately to this mounting threat to US
national security. Furthermore, the Soviet intelligence services and their
surrogates have acquired a large majority of US export-controlled and
government-classified technology overseas through illegal trade diver-
sions and intelligence operations. Thus, only a concerted and multi-
faceted approach to this problem-combining both effective export
control policies and vigorous counterintelligence programs-by the
United States and its allies can counter the broad-based Soviet and East
European technology acquisition effort
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DISCUSSION
Soviet Scientific and Technical Collection
Efforts: Trends and Historical Context
1. The USSR traditionally has placed a high priority
on and devoted large amounts of resources to the
acquisition of Western technology by all means-legal
and illegal. The primary objective of these efforts is to
support Soviet and Warsaw Pact military programs,
particularly in developing new weapon systems, im-
proving existing ones, or developing countermeasures.
The secondary aim of these acquisition efforts has
been to reduce costs and increase efficiency in Soviet
defense-industrial production, including those civilian
sectors of the Soviet economy that support the USSR's
defense effort=
2. The Soviets assign the highest priority to obtain-
ing and exploiting US and other Western militarily
significant technology. This effort began in the 1930s
and continued throughout World War II as the Soviets
reproduced US weapon systems that were provided to
them under Lend-Lease auspices. The effort reached a
high point in the immediate postwar period with
clandestine Soviet acquisition of US atomic-weapons-
related technology. From the late 1940s through the
early 1960s, the Soviets continued to acquire and copy
US and other Western military technology, often
duplicating entire weapon systems. In a few instances,
they have even tolerated short-term military depend-
ence on foreign technology in order to incorporate
designs and features not available through indigenous
Soviet research and development, or to speed the
development of high-priority weapon systems
3. Since the mid-1960s, however, the Soviets in-
creasingly have been more precise in their search for
military technologies in the West. Having developed a
capable technological base and an evolutionary design
philosophy suited to their military doctrine, they now
evaluate foreign military technologies more carefully,
seeking to acquire and assimilate only those Western
design elements, engineering features, and production
technologies that best fit Soviet military requirements
and industrial capabilities. F I
4. The Soviets' well-coordinated, high-level effort
to acquire US and other Western technology has
enabled the USSR and the Warsaw Pact to increase
their military capabilities and spurred the United
States to commit even greater resources to its defense
effort. In addition to their traditional emphasis on
acquiring Western military technologies, and their
more recent emphasis on industrial production know-
how and equipment, the Soviets now appear to be
targeting new, emerging technologies under develop-
ment in the West. These technologies-including
adaptive optics, very-high-speed integrated circuits,
superconductive systems, state-of-the-art computer de-
vices, and genetic engineering and recombinant
DNA-generally are the most advanced and least
protected technologies in the United States and other
Western countries. This focus is intended by the
Soviets both to satisfy their military and industrial
objectives and to prevent "technological surprise"-
that is, a situation in which the USSR is caught
unaware of the military applications of hitherto basic
scientific research.I
Soviet Acquisitions of Militarily
Significant Western Technology
5. The USSR is engaged in a well-organized, cen-
trally directed, and growing worldwide program to
acquire Western technology to satisfy its military and
defense-industrial needs. (See table 1.) The Soviet
intelligence services and their East European surro-
gates play a major role in acquiring US and other
Western military technology, embargoed equipment,
and manufacturing technology required to meet Sovi-
et military objectives. This effort complements the
overall Soviet program for legally acquiring such
technology and equipment for their military and
defense-industrial needs. Although Soviet and East
European intelligence services' acquisitions of militari-
ly significant Western technology 2 constitute a small
2 As used here, militarily significant technology is defined as that
equipment, material, and technology having direct and immediate
impact on Soviet military research, development, and production.
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Selected Soviet and East European Legal and Illegal Acquisitions
From the West Affecting Key Areas of Soviet Military Technology
Computers ........................................ Illegal and legal trade acquisitions of complete systems, hardware and software, including a wide
variety of Western general purpose computers and minicomputers, for military applications;
clandestine acquisitions of proprietary information; exploitation of captured avionics and fire-control
systems.
Microelectronics ............................... Complete industrial processes and semiconductor-manufacturing equipment through legal and illegal
trade channels; if combined, this equipment probably is enough to meet 100 percent of the Soviet mili-
tary requirement for high-quality microelectronics.
Signal Processing .............................. Illegal trade acquisition of seismic streamers and associated computers and of acoustic spectrum
analyzers for antisubmarine warfare (ASW).
Communications .............................. Illegal trade acquisition of low-power, low-noise, high-sensitivity receivers.
Production ........................................ Legal and illegal acquisitions of automated and precision manufacturing equipment for electronics,
materials, and possibly optical and laser weapons components; clandestine acquisition of documenta-
tion on production technology of weapons, ammunition, aircraft parts, turbine blades, computers, and
electronic components.
Directed Energy .............................. Metal foils for e-beam lasers and optical components acquired through legal and illegal channels.
Guidance and Navigation ............... Legal and illegal trade acquisitions of loran and other navigation receivers; illegal and clandestine
acquisitions of advanced inertial guidance components, including miniature and laser gyros; captured
US equipment, including terrain-following radars, antiradiation missiles, and fire-control systems;
clandestine acquisitions of air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles and of ASW cruise missile and tactical
ballistic missile guidance subsystems; legal acquisition of precision machinery for ball bearing
production.
Structural Materials ......................... Legal purchases and intelligence acquisitions of Western titanium alloys and welding equipment.
Propulsion ......................................... Missile case filament-winding technology through legal and illegal trade; some ground propulsion
technology through illegal and legal trade (diesels, turbines, and rotaries); submarine nuclear
propulsion plant designs by clandestine means; legal and illegal purchases of advanced jet engine
fabrication technology and jet engine design information through clandestine means; captured jet
engines from Vietnam.
Nuclear Weapons ............................. Design of various bombs, warheads, and reentry-vehicle-related data through clandestine means.
Chemical Explosives ........................ Clandestine acquisition of manufacturing details of advanced high explosives for nuclear weapons.
Acoustic Sensors (ASW) ................... Clandestine acquisition of underwater navigation and direction-finding equipment; seismic streamers
acquired through illegal trade diversion.
Nonacoustic Sensors (ASW) ............. Clandestine acquisition of selected equipment and technology.
Radar ................................................ Exploitation of captured terrain-following radar and airborne intercept radar; clandestine acquisition
of radars for fighter aircraft, air defense radars, and antenna designs for US surface-to-air missile
systems.
Electro-Optic Sensors ....................... Clandestine acquisition of information on US satellite technology; illegal trade acquisitions of laser
rangefinders for tanks.
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portion of the overall Soviet effort, we believe that the
overwhelming majority of worldwide Soviet acquisi-
tions of militarily significant Western technology is
obtained through their collection operations-clandes-
tine, technical, and overt. The amount of classified
technology acquired is believed to be relatively small,
and the vast majority of that has been acquired outside
the United States
6. In addition tot a significant clandestine acquisi-
tions of US nuclear weapons technology that led to
Soviet nuclear bomb capabilities earlier than anticipat-
ed, the Soviet intelligence services clandestinely ac-
quired over the past two decades details of several US
nuclear warheads; US and British manufacturing de-
tails of advanced high explosives required for the
production of nuclear weapons; and designs of nuclear
propulsion systems, all of which have benefited Soviet
military programs
7. Other clandestine acquisitions of Western tech-
nology, equipment, and systems by the Soviet and East
European intelligence services that have been copied
in their entirety or used in designing or manufacturing
new Soviet weapons include:
- The US Sidewinder missile, which, when copied
in its entirety, gave the Soviets their first heat-
seeking air-to-air missile, the Atoll.
- The US Redeye, which aided the Soviets in
developing their first shoulder-fired surface-to-
air missile, the SA-7.
In addition, the Soviet Bloc services clandestinely
acquired:
- Data on the guidance subsystem of the US
Minuteman ICBM.
- Technical data on more than 200 gyros from a
subsidiary of a US high-technology firm in
Germany.
- Data on solid-propellant missiles, an area in
which the Soviets considerably lag US develop-
ments, especially for use aboard submarines.
- Data on radars used on US F-14, F-15, and F-18
fighter aircraft that are likely to be used in
developing similar Soviet radars.
- Data on the TOW and MILAN antitank weap-
ons, probably to develop countermeasures.
- A German Leopard tank engine, probably for
modification and use on the newest Soviet ad-
vanced tank.
Although it is likely that there have been many other
significant acquisitions of which we are unaware, these
clandestine acquisitions by the Soviet and East Euro-
pean intelligence services have permitted the Soviets
to develop military capabilities much sooner than
otherwise possible, and they have enabled the Soviets
to reduce the qualitative edge of some Western weap-
1 :1
8. The Soviet and East European intelligence serv-
ices also use overt collection operations quite effective-
ly to acquire Western scientific and technical (S&T)
information. Their overt collections against US and
other Western technologies have contributed to Soviet
military systems. These acquisitions range from data
on US ICBM silos (used by the Soviets in developing
silos for their first solid-fuel ICBM, the SS-13), to
technical data drawn from NASA's research on super-
critical wing designs (which helped the Soviets to
design and to build a new transport aircraft), to
technical documentation on US and other Western
military systems and their associated training and
maintenance procedures
9. The Soviet intelligence services and their East
European surrogates also collect much Western S&T
information through technical collection means, main-
ly communications intercepts in the United States and
abroad. We believe that the USSR has acquired
technical data and design concepts on a number of
Western missile, aircraft, and naval systems in this
manner, and that this information is valuable to the
Soviet Union's military and defense industries.
Soviet Tasking in the Technology
Acquisition Effort
10. The Soviet Union's effort to acquire US and
other Western technology is a massive, well-planned
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and well-financed national-level program. Overall ap-
proval for the Soviet acquisition effort is given by the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU), which is the final authority for
all policies of the USSR. CPSU directives concerning
Soviet technology acquisition activities are implement-
ed by the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which is
the highest level of government in the Soviet Union
and coordinates the official policies of the Soviet state.
(See figure 1.Cl
Military-Industrial Commission
11. The high priority the Soviets assign to the
acquisition of US and other Western technology is
reflected in the dominant role played by the Military-
Industrial Commission (VPK) of the Presidium of the
Council of Ministers. The VPK's primary role is to
coordinate the development and production of Soviet
weapon systems. The VPK also plays the key role in
developing requirements for both legal and illegal
acquisitions of military and advanced dual-use West-
ern technology. The VPK directly oversees the partici-
pation of the nine key Soviet defense industries in
acquiring and exploiting foreign technology. (See fig-
ure 2.) Requests from these and the defense-support
industries for Western technology are consolidated
and validated by the VPK. The VPK also centrally
directs the end use of design and production technol-
ogy for the Soviet defense-industrial complex, and
coordinates the technical examination and exploitation
of foreign weapon samples in industrial research and
development organizations. Finally, the VPK provides
policy guidance for Soviet technology acquisition ac-
tivities abroad
12. VPK requirements are issued formally and in
great detail. (See table 2.) The complete VPK require-
ments list resembles a book, containing some 400 to
500 pages of requirements encompassing a broad
spectrum of military hardware and related production
technologies and technical data. The VPK require-
ments list probably is revised and updated annually,
reflecting changes in collection priorities and target
availability. The VPK requirements list includes the
items sought; their collection priorities; how long each
requirement is valid; which Soviet ministry levied the
collection requirement; the most likely sources of the
technology to be acquired; and the budget for each
acquisition. Provisions are also made for ad hoc,
13. The VPK requirements list is levied directly on
the Soviet intelligence services. In those Western
countries with extensive S&T collection targets, the
residency of the GRU (see paragraph 25) probably has
the entire requirements list. In most GRU residencies
in the Third World, only those items likely to be
available in country are specified for collection pur-
poses, probably in an abstract from the larger require-
ments list. The KGB (see paragraph 18) works from the
VPK requirements list in much the same fashion, as its
S&T collection effort includes supporting Soviet de-
fense-industrial production.
State Committee for Science and Technology
14. The VPK requirements list is coordinated with
the State Committee for Science and Technology
(GKNT) of the Council of Ministers, which supports
the VPK in both legal and illegal Soviet efforts to
acquire foreign technology. The GKNT's scientific
and technical information gathering and processing
activities are vital to the generation of Soviet require-
ments for foreign technology acquisitions. These
GKNT activities reside in a nationwide, centrally
directed system that comprises some 100,000 individ-
uals and 11,000 information departments affiliated
with Soviet research institutes, design bureaus, and
production facilities. The GKNT also collects technical
information through a vast, complex network of scien-
tific and industrial agreements and exchange programs
with other countries and multinational corporations.
The GKNT's All-Union Institute of Scientific and
Technical Information (VNIITI) collects, translates,
and disseminates scientific and technical publications,
industrial patents, and technical journals from at least
117 foreign countries. Through VNIITI Soviet scien-
tists, engineers, and technicians are kept abreast of
foreign scientific, technical, and industrial develop-
ments
15. The GKNT, in conjunction with the Ministry of
Foreign Trade, also exerts substantial control over
legal purchases of US and other Western technology
through its control over hard currency expenditures.
This control helps to ensure that all proposed pur-
chases are justified in terms of defense priorities
before they are executed. It also serves to prevent
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Figure 1
Key Organizations Contributing to Soviet Military R&D,
Manufacturing, and the Acquisition of Western Technology
^ Technology Requirements, Evaluations, R&D, and Manufacturing
^ Western Technology Acquisitions
Central
Committee
Secretary for
Defense Affairs
Council of
Ministers
Defense
Council
Ministry of
Defense
Main Intelligence
Directorate (GRL)
Technical
Directorates
of Operational
Forces
? S trptegie
Rockets
? Air Defense
? Naval
?Air
-Ground
Military-
Industrial
Commission
(VPK)
Defense-
Industrial
Ministries
? Aviation
? General Machine
$uilding(Missites)
? Defense
-Shipbuilding
? Radio
-Medium Machine
Building(Nuclear)
-Machine Building
I M unition ,)
? Electronics
*Communications
Equipment
Committee
for State
Security
(K(;B)
East
European
Intelligence
Services
State
Committee
for S&T
1(;KST)
Academy
of
Sciences
Ministry of
Foreign
Trade
Other
Industrial
Ministries
?:Autonl of ice
?I leave Trmspon
?Electricel
?I051 rll me nI
?Poacr
?Clteminil
? I rector and
Machine Building
? Petroleum
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Figure 2
The Soviet Requirements, Collection, and Acquisitions Cycle
Requesters
^ Collectors
^ Targets
Military-
Industrial
Commission
(VPK)
Defense-
Industrial
Ministries
Aviation
General Machine
Building(Missiles)
Defense
?Shipbuilding
? Radio
? Medium Machine
Building(Nuclear)
? Machine Building
(Munitions)
Electronics
!? Communications
Equipment
Requests for
Technology
Other
Industrial
Ministries
=Automotive
?lleavy Transport
-Electrical
? Instrument
?Power
-Chemical
-Tractor and
Machine Building
? Petroleum
Committee
for State
Security
(KGB)
Main
Intelligence
Directorate
(GRU)
Ministry of
Foreign
Trade
East
European
Intelligence
Services
United States
Western Europe
Japan
Others
Targeted
Technology
CKNT Must A
From Other In
Academy
of
Sciences
pprove Requests
dustrial Ministries
? Classified
? Embargoed
? Proprietary
? Emerging
? Open-Source
Technology acquired
by all collectors is
returned to the USSR
for evaluation,
exploitation, and
application.
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a
Excerpts From Early 1970s VPK Requirements List
Requirement
No., Priority,
Period of
of Validity
Subject of Requirement
and Quantity
T062-0467
B-I
1971
T020-0164
B-II
1971
TRO20-0163
B-II
1971
photo- and radiotechnical re-
connaissance of ground targets
Automatic assembly line for
manufacturing noncontact fuse
XM596, with integrated cir-
cuits, for 40-mm grenades fired
from M75 rapid-fire recoilless
launchers, 1 set of technical
documentation
System of antisubmarine guided
weapon "Asroc"-"ship-to-sub-
marine" type.
1 set of scientific and technical
documentation
The system of the antisubmar-
ine guided missile "Malafon" of
the ship-to-submarine type
1 set of scientific and technical
documentation
Maximum
Ruble Cost
Known Characteristics and
Features or the Nature
and Content of the
Country, Firm
per Unit
Documentation
(date of production)
5,000
Scientific information and technical
USA
documentation:
- Photographic equipment-resolution of
the camera in relation to altitude and
distance of the object:
- precision matching of the pictures
Customer
AF SAMSO
Los Angeles
AF Station,
California
2,000
received to the terrain;
- film supply;
- design of the recovery capsule con-
taining the exposed film
1. Folder of working blueprints of the
Firm
Lockheed
Aircraft
Corporation
USA
assembly line.
2. Technological process of assembling the
fuse on the automatic assembly line
Source: "Electronic News" 1968, No. 676,
pp. 4-5
Harry Diamond
Laboratory
Universal Instru-
ments and Feder-
al Tool Co.
2,500
Scientific information:
USA
- research in the area of development of
new systems of antisubmarine guided-
Honeywell
(1960-62)
2,500
missile defense;
- reports of test results on the missile
"Asroc";
- methods used to evaluate the effective-
ness of antisubmarine weapons
I. Scientific information:
France
- research in the area of development of
new systems of antisubmarine guided-
missile defense;
- reports on the results of testing
the antisubmarine guided missile
"Malafon";
- method of evaluating the effectiveness
of antisubmarine weapons.
"Societe
Latecoere"
II. Technical documentation:
- blueprints of the general configuration
of the missile, individual units of the
engine, warhead, hull, and other units;
- technical description of the antisubmar-
ine guided missile "Malafon";
- technical materials on the guidance de-
vice and on searching and detecting of
the target;
- description of the guidance and homing
systems;
- blueprints and description of parachute
and other braking systems in the above-
water zone of the trajectory.
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Table 2 (Continued)
Excerpts From Early 1970s VPK Requirements List
Requirement
No., Priority,
Period of
of Validity
S015-0238
Maximum
Subject of Requirement Ruble Cost
and Quantity per Unit
Aviation hydroacoustic station 5,000
with lowered acoustic antenna
for a flying boat
Known Characteristics and
Features or the Nature
and Content of the
Documentation
Technical documentation:
- report with respect to the development
of the acoustic station;
- technical description of the complete
station and its individual instruments (in
the first place, the hydroacoustic
antenna);
- a set of the basic and functional
diagrams;
- operational instructions
Source: 1. "Flux Revue Flugwelt nation-
al," 1968, No. 9, p. 31
2. U.S. Naval Institute Proceed-
ings, 1968, vol. 911, No. 2, p.
125
A042-0116
A-I
1972
Kh039-0311
B-II
1970
K022-0019R
Effectiveness of various destruc-
tive agents against space, aero-
dynamic, and ground targets
and methods of protecting
them.
Communications and telemetry 3,000 Technical documentation: description, dia-
systems of the "Apollo" grams, drawings
spacecraft
0
1. Scientific information (analyses, reports)
on:
- high-velocity collision of bodies;
- factual data on the distribution and
characteristics of micrometeorites as a
function of distance from the Earth;
-effect of meteor particles on space
objects;
2. Technical documentation:
- description of mechanisms for acceler-
ating bodies of various materials to ve-
locities exceeding 2-3 kilometers per
second
2,500 Ultraviolet and infrared spectra of free
radicals in irradiated polyethylene
Country, Firm
(date of production)
Japan,
"Oki Electric"
(1968-1971)
USA
"Langley
Research
Center,"
"Eglin" Air
Force Base
"Carnegie
Institute of
Technology"
"Armor"
Research
Foundation
Chicago
"AF Cambridge
Research
Center"
USA
"Northwestern
University
Evanston"
(1969)
USA
Massachusetts
Institute of
Technology,
"Convair Co.,"
"Martin Co."
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duplication of effort across the full range of acquisi-
tion methods available to the Soviet Union.=
16. The GKNT also manages efforts to acquire
Western technology through the collection activities of
Soviet scientists and engineers in academic, commer-
cial, and official science and technology exchanges,
including those sponsored by the Soviet Academy of
Sciences. In addition to overseeing Soviet participation
in these exchanges, the GKNT serves to coordinate
technology acquisitions through them by levying col-
lection requirements on officially sponsored Soviet
scientists, engineers, and academicians. This GKNT
collection effort is closely coordinated with that of the
Soviet intelligence services to minimize overlap and
duplication of effor
17. Finally, the GKNT also levies collection re-
quirements on the Soviet intelligence services when US
and other Western technology sought by the USSR
cannot legally be obtained under its auspices. The
GKNT also provides scientific and technical guidance
and support to the collection activities of these serv-
ice
The Soviet and East European Intelligence
Services: Organization and Operational Methods
in Acquiring US and Other Western Technology
The Committee for State Security (KGB)
18. The First (foreign operations) Chief Directorate
of the Committee for State Security (KGB) is responsi-
ble for a major portion of the Soviet clandestine
science and technology collection effort. KGB empha-
sis on S&T collection has existed since well before
World War II, but has increased steadily in the
postwar years in direct response to pressures from the
highest levels of the Soviet Government to intensify
the acquisition of US and other Western science and
technology
19. Organizationally, the increased importance of
S&T collection in the KGB was reflected in the
upgrading of the former 10th (S&T) Department of
the First Chief Directorate to directorate status in
mid-1963. It was known as the Scientific and Techni-
cal Directorate until 1968, when it was redesignated
Directorate T. Then, in May 1971, the Central Com-
mittee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the
USSR, after careful review, adopted a resolution spe-
cifically designed to strengthen further the work of
Directorate T. The resolution stressed that a scientific
and technical revolution was taking place and that, in
the interests of national defense and development of
the national economy, it was necessary for the Soviet
Government to obtain timely information on scientific
and technological plans and trends throughout the
world.
20. The KGB was encouraged to focus on the
consequences of military and industrial application of
these developments, and particularly on the possibility
that there would be qualitative changes in the devel-
opment of armaments and technology in enemy coun-
tries. The resolution noted that it was particularly
important to obtain information on works of applied
military significance being carried out in the United
States, the other NATO countries, and Japan
21. Directorate T intensified its efforts, as a direct
result of the 1971 CC/CPSU resolution, and developed
a plan with expanded operational objectives. The KGB
also expanded Directorate T's Scientific Research In-
stitute. This institute collects, reviews, and analyzes all
S&T information available to the KGB, and it also
prepares requirements for the operational components
of the KGB. To accomplish these tasks, the institute
was expanded in 1971 from approximately 450 to
nearly 600 employees, about 50 of whom were KGB
staff personnel and the rest civilian workers with
various technical backgrounds.
22. Within the First Chief Directorate of the KGB,
primary responsibility for conducting S&T collection
operations rests in Directorate T, which has nearly
1,000 officers on its staff in the USSR and abroad.
KGB foreign residencies with S&T missions have a
component that goes by the name of Line X, manned
by Directorate T specialists. Line X officers conduct
the majority of clandestine S&T operations. There are
250 to 300 Line X officers serving abroad at present.
In all instances, these a icate
&T officers are assisted by other intelligence assets.
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23. Directorate T/Line X officers in the West are
concentrated largely in North America, Japan, and
Western Europe. There are, however, significant Di-
rectorate T operations run against S&T targets of
opportunity in other countries. These include those
Third World countries that may be developing indig-
enous technological capabilities and/or obtaining them
from the West as well as spotting, assessing, and
recruiting US citizens abroad and foreign students who
may study in the United States.
24. The best available insight into specific KGB
tasking is contained in the long-range work plan for
Directorate T, covering the period 1972-76, which
outlined both operational and informational objec-
tives. An analysis indicates that this plan remains
valid. Among the most important of these objectives is
the penetration of the leading scientific research cen-
ters, firms, and government institutes in the United
States, Western Europe, and Japan for the purpose of
obtaining scientific and technical information, data,
and documents. The KGB
was, and continues to be, interested in basic research
and development efforts having potential military
applications. This is particularly true if such efforts
have the potential to upset the strategic balance. Thus
the KGB has targeted a wide range of basic research in
such fields as lasers, weather modification, earthquake
and tsunami wave inducement, and antigravitation.
interest.
The Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU)
25. The Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the
Soviet General Staff has put a high priority on collect-
ing military S&T information since the earliest days of
Soviet military intelligence. Before 1953 there was a
Scientific and Technical Department within the GRU,
responsible for the S&T collection program. It appar-
ently was decided that this represented an unnecessary
degree of specialization in a military intelligence
organization, and the department was abolished in
1953. Since then, there has been no single component
within the GRU responsible for clandestine S&T col-
lection. Rather, the responsibility has been given to the
GRU's four geographical directorates as one of their
basic and integral functions. Most of the S&T collec-
tion work is done by the First Directorate (Europe)
and Third Directorate (North and South America).
Except for Japan, the Directorates for Asia and Afri-
ca/Near East have fewer S&T targets of priority
26. The GRU differs from the KGB in that the
GRU has no dedicated cadre of career S&T specialists.
Instead, most GRU officers have technical back-
grounds and educations, and all of them include S&T
collection as an integral part of their responsibilities.
his operations
27. As in the KGB, GRU residencies in the West
operate on the basis of an annual plan, sent from the
GRU center each year, which outlines the priority
collection requirements for the following year in the
country in question. These requirements are drawn
primarily from the VPK requirements list. The plan
covers such things as the military policy of the host
country, specific requirements on its armed forces,
similar information concerning neighboring countries
of interest, separate requirements on weapons and
other specialized areas of technology, and, in a sepa-
rate section, military-economic requirements. This is
the framework in which the GRU resident conducts
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These targets include American businessmen and gov-
ernment officials; officials of foreign governments, for-
eign firms, and foreign subsidiaries of US firms; repre-
sentatives of international organizations having access
to advanced and/or proprietary technology; and West-
ern scientists, academicians, and students I
30. Illegal Diversions. Illegal diversions of tech-
nology fall into two general categories. One is the
illegal diversion of controlled US technology from
legitimate trade channels to proscribed destinations.
This is done through foreign firms willing to engage in
profitable impropriety, agents-in-place in foreign
firms or foreign subsidiaries of US firms, Communist-
country-owned but locally chartered firms, and for-
eign purchasing agents (including arms dealers
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S&T Collection Methodology of the
Soviet Intelligence Services
28. In conducting S&T collection operations, the
KGB and the GRU use all of their normal operational
methods, with a few refinements that seem particular-
ly suited to S&T operations. Although the United
States is the primary S&T target, both the GRU and
the KGB have long believed that it is a comparatively
difficult place in which to operate. For this reason, US
technology is more easily acquired abroad. Conse-
quently, third-country operations have been stressed,
both against Americans abroad and against foreign
firms affiliated with American companies of S&T
interest
29. an es ine Operations. The basic clandestine
activities of the Soviet and East European intelligence
services involve the use of recruited agents-in-place to
commit espionage. These services have focused their
recruitment effort on both Americans and foreign
nationals with access to controlled US technology.
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diversions are accomplished through the use of forged
shipping and licensing documents employed by dum-
my firms either established by or having close ties with
the Soviet intelligence services or their East European
surrogates. In one example, East Germany's Ministry
for State Security established dummy firms in Vienna
for the sole purpose of acquiring advanced microelec-
tronics technology illegally. The Soviet intelligence
services and their surrogates are in the mainstream of
this illegal trade flow. The other category is in-place
diversion in which legally acquired technologies are
put to illegal end uses and/or used by unauthorized
end users. Both types of illegal diversions are extreme-
ly difficult to detect and monitor.
31. The USSR has been the dominant force behind
illegal trade diversions of Western technology, with
Poland and Hungary apparently being major East
European participants. The principal entities responsi-
ble for illegally diverted Western technology have
been located in West Germany, France, and Japan.
The principal third-country intermediaries through
which US technology has been illegally diverted in-
clude West Germany, France, Austria, Switzerland,
and Japan. Illegal trade diversions are also reported to
have taken place in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain,
South Africa, India, Canada, the United Kingdom,
Italy, Sweden, and some Middle Eastern and Southeast
Asian countries
32. Communist-Country-Owned, Locally Char-
tered Firms
These firms provide an excellent
base for Soviet Bloc intelligence service activities
within the United States; a forward base for mounting
"legal traveler" intelligence operations in the United
States; an effective means for overt acquisition of
controlled US technology; and an operational mecha-
nism to acquire illegally US technology in high-
priority sectors (electronics, precision machine tools,
and complete industrial processes) subject to export
controls.
33. Most West European countries have at least 20
Communist-country-owned, locally chartered firms
each, with some having as many as 50. The location of
these firms abroad (both legitimate and dummy firms)
facilitates the acquisition of US technology because US
oversight overseas is sharply limited.)
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34. Over the past few years there has been increas-
ing evidence of the use of Communist-country-owned
firms by Soviet and East European intelligence serv-
ices in the United States to acquire controlled technol-
ogy. These firms can legally purchase controlled US
technology and study it without actually violating US
export controls unless they attempt to ship the equip-
ment or related technical data out of the United States.
Such activity is difficult to assess because these com-
panies are formed under state laws and are not
required to incorporate with the US Government.3
Furthermore, because representatives of Communist-
country-owned but US-chartered companies are not
obligated to identify themselves as agents of foreign
governments, there is a great risk that joint ventures
between such firms and US corporations could result
in serious technology losse I
35. Exploitation of Scientific and Technical Ex-
changes. Efforts by the Soviets and East Europeans to
acquire US technology are extensively abetted by the
overt (and essentially legal) collection activities of their
scientists and engineers who participate in academic,
commercial, and official S&T exchanges. The Soviets
believe that their scientists participating in these ex-
changes are able to acquire Western technology of
considerable S&T and military benefit. Soviet and East
European students and technical delegations visiting
the United States are generally of high quality, and we
suspect many of them are associated with classified
work in the country from which they com
intelligence services seek to satisfy these requirements
and to assess their American colleagues for potential
intelligence operational purposes. On their return to
the USSR, these scientists are debriefed by Soviet
intelligence officers seeking to glean any S&T infor-
mation of potential use to the Soviet military effort.
These visits and various arrangement
permit direct Soviet access to US companies are
considered to be among the more important sources of
technology loss because of the "hands-on" experience
and collegial working relations with US counterparts
gained by Soviet participants.II
36. The Soviet intelligence services play a major
role in overall Soviet S&T collections in the exchanges.
Soviet participants in this program are briefed on
desired S&T intelligence collection targets before leav-
ing for their assigned placements in the United States.
Once in the United States, these co-optees of the Soviet
There are statutory requirements for registering various forms of
foreign investment in the United States. However, these are limited
to entities that issue stock or securities. The degree to which even
this information may be made available to US intelligence and law-
enforcement officials is strictly limited by law.
37. The Soviet intelligence services also use the
exchange program to facilitate their overall S&T
collection effort. This is done in a number of ways,
including supporting other clandestine, technical, and
overt operations in North America.
38. Exploitation of International S&T Organiza-
tions. Examples of such organizations include the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(IIASA), the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), and various S&T offices associated with the
UN. The Soviets and East Europeans have taken
advantage of their positions in these organizations to
acquire Western S&T information and proprietary
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technology. All Soviet personnel in such organizations
are obliged to acquire such information. There also
have been instances where these positions have been
used to facilitate the acquisition of controlled Western
technology and to mount traditional clandestine intel-
ligence operations
39. Overt Collection Activities. The Soviet intelli-
gence services are engaged heavily in acquiring open-
source scientific and technical information. Thus, So-
viet intelligence officers frequently attend S&T fairs,
exhibitions, and conferences. They then send written
reports to their headquarters recounting the lectures
and briefings they have heard, and attaching the
brochures and other documents they have collected. In
addition, Soviet intelligence officers subscribe heavily
to S&T periodicals and other literature. These may be
relayed to their headquarters simply for translation
and analysis, or residencies may extract information
on particular subjects over time and then write reports
based on this open research. Finally, Soviet Bloc
intelligence officers have been engaged in exploiting
US and other Western data bases. This activity has led
in the past to massive Soviet purchases of unclassified
and occasionally declassified US Government techni-
cal documents through the Department of Com-
merce's National Technical Information Service, a
practice that was ended in 1981; the East Europeans,
however, continue to have access to this source of
technology. The Soviets also have gained access to
Western commercial computer data bases through
IIASA, including the Lockheed data base Dialog, the
European Space Agency's data base Diane, and the
International Patent Documentation Center. The Sovi-
ets also subscribe to at least one privately owned US
microfilm information management system containing
more than 7,000 unclassified documents published by
various US Government agencies, including training
manuals of the armed forces. Finally, although we
have no evidence of Soviet Bloc intelligence service
use of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to
acquire US technology, the FOIA does provide the
potential for such acquisitions to the extent that useful
information not subject to FOIA exemptions is con-
tained in federal records. These overt collection activi-
ties afford the USSR broad access to unclassified S&T
information, some of which may be export controlled.
Soviet Technical Collection:
Communications Intelligence
40. The USSR has mounted an extensive communi-
cations intelligence (COMINT) effort to acquire US
and other Western technology. Through this effort, the
Soviet intelligence services have been able to acquire
sensitive S&T information-proprietary, export con-
trolled, and even government information which in
the aggregate clearly is classified'-of value to the
' Although US Government regulations require the transmission of
classified R&D information via secure means, these regulations are
not always strictly observed. Moreover, because of the extensive use
of telecommunications by US defense contractors and other high-
technology firms (often via facsimile), large amounts of export
controlled and proprietary S&T information are vulnerable to the
Soviet COMINT threatl I
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Warsaw Pact's military and defense-industrial capa-
bilities. The Soviets regularly monitor the communica-
tions of US defense contractors. Assessments made
with the help of such contractors revealed that acquisi-
tions by this means enable the Soviets to gain signifi-
cant information on key defense programs, including
strategic and tactical ballistic missiles, new military
aircraft, ships and submarines, and space and recon-
naissance systems; some of these programs are still
under development. In addition to its direct use in
acquiring Western S&T information, COMINT can
also be used by the Soviet intelligence services to guide
their other collection efforts.
the area from Norfolk, Virginia, to the Florida Keys),
and periodic presence off the US west coast near the
western test range. Collection of technical intelligence
is likely in view of the vulnerable emanations in those
areas. Surveillance of sea trials, missile testing, space
operations, and shore-based naval and military signals
offers the Soviets a wealth of R&D technical data with
direct military application.^
Complex at Torrens, Cuba
42. COMINT Sites in the USSR. The KGB cur-
rently has at least 10 intercept facilities in the USSR
that have a mission of monitoring foreign communica-
tions satellites. These facilities are probably used to
monitor commercial traffic, which would include
scientific and technological data, transmitted over the
INTELSAT network
43. The GRU COMINT effort is the responsibility
of the Sixth (Radio and Radio-Technical Intelligence)
Directorate. This directorate is tasked with collecting
intelligence derived from foreign military communi-
cations and electronic emissions, primarily from the
military forces of the United States, the West Europe-
an countries, and China. The GRU effort also includes
monitoring the INTELSAT network
44. Auxiliary General Intelligence Vessels. The
more than 50 AGI vessels in the Soviet and East
European inventory are charged with monitoring both
communications and noncommunications electromag-
netic emanations via such missions as area patrols
along coastal regions, surveillance of US and NATO
fleet exercises and ship transits, surveillance of sea
trials, missile tests, and space operations. Established
AGI patrols include one off the US east coast (covering
East European Services
48. Many Soviet requirements for the acquisition of
Western technology are closely coordinated among the
East European intelligence services. This coordination
is achieved in three general ways. The first is through
a priority list of general requirements supporting
economic development in the member states of the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA).
This CEMA list is approved by the chiefs of the
various East European intelligence services and guides
the general Bloc efforts to acquire Western technology
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through illegal and/or clandestine means. The second
is through direct Soviet tasking of an East European
service. These special requirements are levied by the
KGB and the GRU in support of Soviet military
and/or economic priorities. The Soviets delegate these
special assignments to particular surrogate services on
the basis of their collection capabilities against specific
Western technological targets. Finally, individual East
European intelligence services may apprise their Sovi-
et counterparts of collection opportunities outside the
scope of the CEMA priority list and direct Soviet
tasking. 1 771
49. The Soviets value highly the S&T collection
activities of their East European satellites, and often
will offer them preferential treatment in return for
their acquisitions of US and other Western technology.
In many instances, this preferential treatment may
take the form of increased military and/or economic
assistance. =
50. In the past two years, the USSR has made
increased use of its East European surrogates to ac-
quire Western technology. This stems primarily from
the Western post-Afghanistan embargo on technology
transfers to the USSR but not to Eastern Europe, and it
coincides with an overall increase in Soviet and East
European efforts to acquire Western technology early
on in the research and development cycle before it is
classified or protected by proprietary controls.0
51. The principal East European intelligence ser-
vices tasked by the Soviets for acquisition of Western
technology appear to be those of Bulgaria, Czechoslo-
vakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland.,' Each of
these services is discussed below.
52. Bulgaria. In 1980 the Bulgarian Directorate of
State Security (DS) reorganized its First Chief Direc-
torate (foreign intelligence) to upgrade the S&T com-
ponent to directorate level. This reorganization reflect-
ed a high-level Soviet request that the chief target of
the Bulgarian service be S&T collection abroad. Bul-
garian intelligence officers have said that they will do
anything to get this type of information and that the
specific field is not important. The prime mover
behind this reorganization is Ognyan Doynov, the
5 Reporting indicates that the Romanian and Yugoslavian intelli-
gence services generally are not responsive to Soviet tasking for such
collection activities.
Bulgarian Politburo member in charge of industry.
53. As part of the new S&T program many more
Bulgarian scientists and engineers will be sent on visits
to the West to acquaint themselves with the latest
developments in their fields of specialty as well as to
develop information and access to S&T targets of
interest. In addition, many more science attaches, all
of whom are DS officers, will be assigned to Bulgarian
embassies in the West. The number of science attaches
will be more than doubled in the near future to about
25. All are said to be technically well qualified and
are, or will be, targeted against specific technical areas
in their countries of assignment
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54. While there is no evidence that the Bulgarian
military intelligence service (RUMNO) has been di-
rected to collect S&T intelligence, it stands to reason
that any S&T information that would have military
application would be of concern to the GRU and
hence RUMNO, which is under GRU tutelage ~8
55. Czechoslovakia. For more than 20 years there
has been a department in Sprava I (foreign operations)
of Czechoslovakia's Federal Ministry of Interior
(FMV) responsible for scientific and technical oper-
ations. By the beginning of the 1980s, about 200
people were assigned to this department. Between 50
and 60 serve at FMV headquarters, with another 60 to
70 assigned to the Ministry for Technological and
Investment Development and various Czechoslovak
foreign trading companies. The remainder are sta-
tioned abroad in various Sprava I residencies.
56. In recent years the S&T department of Sprava I
has increased in both size and importance. It is free to
expand its budget and staff in order to carry out its
mission, and it operates within the context of an
executive agreement between the FMV and the KGB.
The S&T department receives specific requirements
from the Ministry of Technological and Investment
Development and from Czechoslovak military re-
search institutes)
57. There is no current reporting on the S&T
operations of the Czechoslovak military intelligence
service (ZSGS). We assume, however, that the ZSGS
works closely with the GRU
58. East Germany. The primary point of contact
for Soviet coordination of Bloc technology acquisition
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efforts in East Germany is that country's Ministry for
State Security (MfS). The MfS executive management
is responsible for cooperating with the KGB in support
of the military and industrial sectors of the Soviet
economy. Within the MfS, the Science and Technol-
ogy Sector (SWT) of the Main Administration for
Intelligence has the primary responsibility for collec-
tion against Western technological targets.
59. The core target of the SWT acquisition effort is
military-related technology held in the NATO coun-
tries, particularly in the United States and West
Germany. The most important of these technologies
are those involved in the development, production,
and planned combat use of nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapon systems. The SWT is also tasked to
collect intelligence information on new, emerging
high-technology developments in fields-such as mi-
croelectronics, energy (including nuclear), materials
and production, and biochemistry-with potential for
both military and industrial applications.
end users.
60. The SWT is tasked by the KGB to collect
scientific and technological intelligence in the United
States and Western Europe. This collection effort is
coordinated in two ways. First, the director of the
SWT meets at least annually with his KGB counter-
part. The thrust of these Moscow consultations prob-
ably is to discuss particular collection requirements
and problems. These meetings are complemented and
given continuity by the presence of a KGB liaison
officer on permanent assignment to the SWT. This
officer is in a position to levy both written and verbal
requirements on the East Germans, and selects the
SWT acquisitions for distribution by the KGB to Soviet
61. Hungary. There is increasing evidence that
Hungary is actively engaged in operations involving
technology transfer and illegal trade diversions. These
efforts are undertaken largely at the behest of the
Soviets, who levy the requirements and provide the
money. Although there is little available information
concerning the extent to which the Hungarian intelli-
gence services are involved in this activity, they
obviously play a role. The III Main Group Directorate
of the Ministry of Interior, Hungary's civilian intelli-
gence service, uses its officers and co-optees stationed
abroad in commercial positions not only to negotiate
trade deals with Western companies but to obtain
covertly from Western businessmen S&T information
and embargoed items. Intelligence officers with tech-
nical backgrounds work under cover in Hungarian
foreign trade enterprises concerned with specialized
fields such as electronic equipment and computers,
and it must be assumed that they also are involved in
illegal trade diversions
62. It is not known to what extent the Hungarian
military intelligence service (VKF-II) is involved in
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technology transfer activities, but its officers stationed
abroad at military attache offices are engaged in the
collection of overt information in the S&T field as well
as in military-related fields.1
63. Poland.6 The major Focal point io Poland for
KGB coordination of efforts to acquire Western technol-
ogy is the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW). The
MSW's major external intelligence functions include the
collection, evaluation, and dissemination of scientific,
technological, and industrial information and materials.
This effort is complemented by the Second Directorate
(Z-II) of the Polish Army's General Staff, carried out
with GRU coordination. The external functions of Z-II
include collecting, analyzing, and disseminating scien-
tific and technological information related to the capa-
bilities and intentions of NATO.
6 The activities attributed to the Polish intelligence services in this
section have been reduced in the wake of Poland's continuing
political and economic difficulties
64. The Soviets reportedly have been impressed
with the success of Polish efforts to acquire Western
technology and have agreed to subsidize them by
direct contribution to the Polish budget. In 1979 this
subsidy reportedly amounted to $15-20 million, or
roughly 30 percent of the total planned Polish expend-
iture of $50 million for acquisition of Western technol-
ogy
65. The MSW is under constant pressure from the
KGB to procure Western production know-how in the
fields of microelectronics and computers, aircraft
mainframes and engines, avionics, and military-relat-
ed technologies. These emphases probably reflect
mounting Soviet concerns about rapidly increasing
costs in both military and civilian production, as well
as projected manpower shortages in the Soviet labor
force, together with more traditional Soviet problems
such ductivity and resource
waste.
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IMPLICATIONS AND OUTLOOK
The acquisition of Western military technology and
industrial production equipment by the Soviet intelli-
gence services has saved the USSR's defense establish-
ment valuable time and resources in its effort to keep
pace with military developments in the West. Weap-
ons designs and technical documentation have pro-
vided proven approaches and technologies thus reduc-
ing technical risks and R&D costs. Engineering insights
gained from the exploitation of acquired Western
military technology have permitted the Soviets to gain
improved weapon performances by copying Western
designs and incorporating effective countermeasures
into their new systems development. Western produc-
tion equipment and industrial technology-much of
this acquired by illegal means-have been used to
manufacture critical military components years before
the Soviet defense industries could develop their own.
Furthermore, the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies,
often with direct assistance from their intelligence
services, have been able to acquire much defense-
related equipment, material, and technology through
open and legal means. Finally, as a consequence of
these and other acquisitions of Western equipment
and technologies, the Soviets have been able to allocate
more resources to the support of their war-fighting
capabilities. F-1
The acquisition and effective use of Western tech-
nology has had a detrimental effect on US national
security in at least two ways. First, through acquisi-
tions of Western technology the Soviets have been able
to field a greater variety of more sophisticated and
effective weapons in a shorter period of time. This has
permitted them simultaneously to improve military
capabilities and to devote more resources to the
development of advanced weapons concepts such as
directed-energy weapons, antisatellite programs, and
titanium hull attack submarines. Second, infusions of
Western technology and equipment have lightened
the burden of continuing growth in Soviet R&D and
defense spending. As a consequence, the United States
and its allies must devote even more of their own
resources to offset these increases in Soviet military
power.II
The operations of the Soviet and East European
intelligence services continue to pose the most serious
and immediate threat to the security and protection of
militarily significant Western technology. Their orga-
nization and central direction for the collection of
Western technology have been developed to a high
degree of precision over the last 10 to 15 years in order
to meet the changing needs of Soviet weapons design-
ers and defense manufacturers. At the same time they
have developed appropriate clandestine, technical,
and overt collection operations tailored to the chang-
ing security practices of Western governments and
their industrial and private sectors. Taking advantage
of the openness of Western research centers and
inadequate commercial security, Soviet and East Eu-
ropean intelligence services have moved quickly to
exploit these sources of new and emerging technologies
for their military needs.
The task of stopping Soviet intelligence operations
aimed at Western military and industrial technologies
already poses a formidable problem, both in the
United States and abroad. This task is likely to become
even more difficult in the future as several trends
identified in the 1970s continue into the 1980s:
- First, since the early 1970s, the Soviets and their
surrogates among the East Europeans increasing-
ly have used their national intelligence services to
acquire Western civilian technologies-for ex-
ample, automotive, energy, chemicals, and even
consumer electronics.
- Second, since the mid-1970s, Soviet and East
European intelligence services have emphasized
the collection of manufacturing-related technol-
ogy, in addition to weapon technology.
- Third, since the late 1970s, there has been in-
creased emphasis by these hostile intelligence
services on acquiring new technologies emerging
from Western universities and research centers.
The combined effect of these trends is a heavy focus
by the Soviet intelligence services on the commercial
sectors in the West-sectors that normally are not
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protected from hostile intelligence services. In addi-
tion, the security provided by commercial firms is no
match for the clandestine operations of such intelli-
gence services. The most alarming aspect of this
commercial focus by the Soviet intelligence services
and their surrogates, however, is that as a result of
their operations they have access to those advanced
technologies that are likely to be used by the West in
its own future weapon systems.
The Soviet intelligence services' S&T collection
units have grown in both the numbers of highly
qualified scientific officers and technical collection
capabilities. These services' S&T collection efforts
today are worldwide, focusing first on the United
States, Europe, and Japan, and secondly on those less
developed countries that possess or have access to
advanced Western technology. Through the use of its
East European allies' intelligence services and other
surrogates such as Cuba, the USSR's collection efforts
pose a multifaceted threat to the West. The satisfac-
tion of the Soviet Union's national-level requirements
for Western equipment and military technology serve
as the common denominator for the direction and
coordination of this multifaceted and multinational
collection program
We estimate that uture oviet and East European
intelligence service S&T acquisition efforts-clandes-
tine, technical, and overt-will be concentrated world-
wide on the following types of Western technology:
- Weapons designs and related defense produc-
tion technology, particularly against US technol-
ogy both in the United States and abroad with
some increased emphasis given to the technology
of US allies.
- Embargoed equipment, goods, products, and
material, and associated technologies, especial-
ly dual-use items obtained through the clandes-
tine efforts of the Soviet and East European
intelligence services.
Company proprietary technology necessary to
manufacture advanced commercial components
and systems, using clandestine and illegal means
to acquire these for future military and defense
industrial applications; intelligence efforts
against these types of technology are as likely to
be concentrated in other Western countries as in
the United States.
Government-generated S&T information and
unclassified but defense-applicable technology
produced largely by the United States, acquired
mainly by overt Soviet and East European collec-
tors and through multinational open-source doc-
ument procurement, organized and directed by
Soviet Bloc intelligence.
Emerging technology from Western govern-
ment research centers and universities, using
visiting Soviet and East European scholars and
researchers and commercial delegations targeted
and supported by Soviet Bloc intelligence; since
the post-Afghanistan sanctions, these activities
have declined in the United States and increased
abroad, especially in West Germany and Japan.
In the United States, a trend noted is that Soviet
and East European visitors increasingly have
made use of unofficial, non-government-spon-
sored exchanges to avoid US Government con-
trols associated with official exchanges.
To counter the general Soviet technology acquisition
effort, and in particular the collection activities of the
Soviet intelligence services and their surrogates, the
United States and its allies must develop a multina-
tional program combining improved export control
and enforcement policies with vigorous counterintelli-
gence actions. Only such a concerted and multifaceted
approach to the technology loss problem can oppose
successfully the broad-based Soviet and East European
acquisition agenda
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