DCI WORLDWIDE BRIEFING--LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001002490030-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2007
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: December 16, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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16 Dec 81
DCI WORLDWIDE BRIEFING--LATIN AMERICA
Overview
More than 350 million people live in the 50 nations and soon-to-be
independent ?territories of Latin America (including the Caribbean). Presently,
two entirely different sets of historical forces are competing. On the positive
side there is the return to constitutional government in four nations (Dominican
Republic, Peru, Ecuador, Honduras)-.and steps toward continued political
liberalization in others such as Brazil, along with two decades of overal
economic growth and rising living standards for many despite a doubling in the region's
population since 1960.
The destructive trends include the severe economic pressures posed by past
oil-price rises and possible future jumps, mounting inflation, underemployment,
and the recent slowdown in economic growth rates along with a resurgence of
Cuban-supported terrorism, propaganda, and political destabilization by the
extreme left with a corollary increase in counterterror by the extreme right.
Despite US efforts at normalization from 1974 to 1979, Cuban actions continue
to pose serious risks.
I. Cuba
Cuba threatens the interests of the United States in two different ways:
as a heavily-armed military ally of the Soviet Union and as a willing partner
of the Soviet Union and other anti-Western forces in a process of political-
paramilitary warfare being waged in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East.
Soviet improvements in Cuban military forces--by far the strongest in Latin
America (with more than 200 jet fighters)--along with the expansion of naval
facilities, pose an increasing military threat which would 25X1
divert scarce US military assets during any period of mobilization ,or open warfare.
Soviet arms shipments to Cuba doubled since 1975 when Castro intervened in
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Angola and in 1981 amounted to about 61,000 metric tons--the highest level since
1962. The militarization of Cuba is illustrated by comparison with Mexico, a
country with a population 11 times that of Cuba, which has armed forces less than
half as large as those in Cuba and far less well equipped.
In this hemisphere, renewed and expanded Cuban support for the revolutionary
left has brought success in Grenada and Nicaragua while threatening the rest of
Central America with a communist takeover which in turn could "bring the
revolution to Mexico raising the risks of internal destabilization?' (NIE,
9 September 1981). In Africa, terns of thousands of Cuban troops help maintain
new communist; regimes in power while Cuba works with Libya and other extremist
forces against Morocco, Zaire, and the Union of South Africa.
In the Middle East, Cuban armed forces and terrorist training cadres
cooperate with the KGB, with various Palestinian terrorist groups and Libya in
the continuing but often invisible effort to intimidate or destabilize moderate
or pro-Western regimes into the radical posture shared by Libya, Syria, and
Iran.
At present, Nicaragua is rapidly becoming a base for Cuban-supported
action against the rest of Central America, and both. Grenada and Nicaragua are
beginning to serve as proxies and partners for other Cuban-encouraged subversion
in the Caribbean basin area.
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II. Central America/Caribbean
A. In E1 Salvador we expect neither a guerrilla victory nor a negotiated
solution any time soon. The March 1982 elections are still scheduled,
bu~_we expect the extreme left to make a concerted effort to derail
them.
1. The guerrillas continue to be well-supplied and trained by Cuba
and Nicaragua and engage in effective, demoralizing campaigns of
destruction and disruption.
2. The government, nonetheless, retains the ability to contain the
guerrillas and could almost certainly contain a stepped-up offensive.
3. The counterinsurgency effort, however, seriously strains the
security forces' logistics and supply capabilities and a renewed
guerrilla offensive could make the security forces vulnerable to
subsequent guerrilla step-ups--particularly if Cuba and Nicaragua
later intervene even more aggressively.
4. Civilian-military frictions appear to be at a Tow ebb; but, given
the long history of mutual suspicions, such difficulties always
offer the potential for difficulty; the land reform continues to 6e
implemented.
B. In Nicaragua, the Sandinista Directorate continues to build its
dictatorship and further threaten its neighbors by exporting subversion.'
1. Sandinista support for the revolutionary left in E1 Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras is strong and now includes covert action
in Costa Rica as well.
2. The Nicaraguans continue their own armed forces buildup--threatening
nearby Guatemala, Honduras, and the Salvadoran Government.
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a. Current military strength is about 50,000 including about
25,000 active reserves with an announced eventual goal of
some 250,000--including militia forces.
b. The Nicaraguans are preparing for and probably will receive
' shipments of MIG fighter aircraft.
3. In time, Nicaraguan military power may intimidate its neighbors
and might prevent Honduras from cooperating with El Salvador and
Guatemala insurrection_in the region.
C. Guerrilla activity in Guatemala remains a major factor.
1. Though full operational unity continues to elude them, the
country's principal insurgent groups are more active than ever
and have little difficulty maintaining cadre and acquiring
materiel.
a. The guerrillas number about 2,200 combatants compared with
600 in 1978.
2. The security forces are becoming more effective, but the tide is
by no means turned.
a. Anew, more competent army commander has pursued more effective
counterinsurgency tactics.
b. Recently, there have been fewer instances of outright repression
against the populace--a trend which, if sustained, could
enormously aid the government and potentially weaken the
guerrillas recruitment ability.
D. The recent successful election in Honduras is probably the most
promising single development in recent months.
1. Liberal Party candidate Suazo will replace Provisional President
General Paz.
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2. The election can be seen as a setback for the extreme left in
Honduras and elsewhere, and it may spur revolutionaries to redouble
their efforts.
a. There may still be attempts to disrupt the passage of power.
? b. Insurgents in E1 Salvador will take it as a signal that they
must scuttle their country's upcoming elections lest an
electoral "trend" be seen developing.
E. Recent events beyond Central America itself may have a bearing on how
major regional states, Mexico and Venezuela, respond to the regional
insurgency problem, and could greatly sharpen concern Latin America-wide.
T. In Venezuela, a long inactive domestic insurgent group, Bandera
Roja, has become more active domestically and appears to have been
behind the December 1981 hijacking of three Venezuelan jets to
Colombia, Central America, and, finally, Cuba. A hidden supply
weapons for guerrillas eras found in December 1981..
2. Colombia's most virulent insurgent group--the M~19--also 1s becomi.ng
still more active with 600 guerrillas in active combat.
3. 1"he terrorist acts in Venezuela almost certainly will hel'ghten that
country's already existing fears about the renewed Cuban support
for insurgency in Latin America.
a. The Venezuelans, already supportive of US policy in Central
America, may be inclined to become even more s:o.
4. The growth of the insurgent problem and the consequent growing
concern of many Latin American countries may yet prompt Mexico,
which has consistently supported the far left in E1 Salvador, at
least to rethink the logic of its stance.
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a. In November the OAS voted overwhelmingly (22 to 3) to support
the electoral process in E1 Salvador--only Mexico, Nicaragua,
and Grenada opposed.
b. This followed the September 1981 action by 15 Latin American
? countries to explicitly condemn the Mexican-French endorsement
of the revolutionary left in E1 Salvador.together with the
OAS vote and demonstration that the Mexicans are virtually
isolated in their current position on Central America.
c. The Christian Democratic Parties in Europe and Latin America
along with the international independent trade unions and
their federations (ICFTU, GRIT) have consistently supported
the E1 Salvador government and condemned the revolutionary
left as well as the extreme right.
III. South America
A. Brazil. Recent moves by the Fig.ueiredo government have raised questions
in the minds of many Brazilians about the future of the political
liberalization process under way for some time.
1. The government announced measures that could, in effect, "rig" the
1982 congressional, state, and local elections.
2. These elections would constitute the most serious test yet of
Brasilia's commitment to liberalize.
3. Given opposition party successes in other recent balloting, the
regime worries that the opposition could wrest control of the
national legislature and even the presidential succession process
later on--since the elections would determine the composition of
the electoral college that chooses Figueiredo's successor late
in 1984.
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4. The political leadership has spoken out forcefully against the
annaunced measures and may yet gain concessions from the government.
5. The prospect of heightened political tension comes at a time of
high inflation and growing unemployment--factors which add to the
frustrations and anger of a recently more activist labor movement.
B. Argentina. The replacement of the conciliatory President Viola could,
over time, have effects on several fronts.
1. The advent of the tougher Galtieri appears to be taken by rival
Chile as a sign its long-standing border disputes with Argentina
will sharpen.
2. Moreover, there is a good chance that Argentina's very modest
political "normalization" will be scaled down further with potential
for renewed civil-military discord.
3. In the short term, economic decision-making may become somewhat
more efficient than under Viola, but over time the economy may
suffer if Galtieri is obliged to devote increasing amounts of
time to political problems and to assuring his own position vis-a~
vis his own potential military rivals.
4. There are unconfirmed but disturbing reports about the Argentine
nuclear program and possible weapons applications.
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