CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING TALKING POINTS: USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001002490026-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2007
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: December 16, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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16 December 1981
Congressional Briefing Talking Points: USSR
Opening Remarks:
Will spend a few minutes giving you in general terms our views on some of
the more important developments in the last year.
(For Armed Services Committees only)
Will then ask Lawrence Gershwin, NIO for Strategic Programs, to present
our latest assessment of Soviet nuclear forces.
(For all Committees)
You will, of course, want to go more deeply into some of the topics I
touched on. Would rather do this by responding to your questions than a long
series of presentations. For this purpose, I have with me a group of my
senior experts (Gates, Gershwin, Atkeson, Waterman, Cowan, Menges, Gries.)
I. Soviet leadership pursued foreign, military, and domestic goals during
past year with stolid single-mindedness characteristic of Brezhnev's
seventeen years in power.
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A. Looking back, Brezhnev team doubtless feels methodical efforts have
B. Somber tone of Brezhnev's major addresses to party faithful last
year, however, suggests Soviet leadership concerned about
durability of achievements.
II. Economic situation deteriorating. This factor increasingly conditions
both Soviet policies and political maneuvering for post-Brezhnev
succession. Problems of 1981 led leadership in November to project
even more dour economic outlook than that presented last spring at
party congress.
A. Overall economic growth last year was -- for third year in row --
less than 2%; prospect is for little improvement on average in
1980s.
B. Overall primary energy production growing much more slowly,
industrial output down, and third consecutive disastrous harvest.
1. While Soviet workers and consumers far from venting
dissatisfaction like Poles, their resigned, pessimistic mood
undercuts productivity gains, the key factor Soviet leaders are
counting on for future economic growth.
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2. Growing social malaise marked by alcoholism, high labor,
turnover, worker unrest, corruption, black market activities,
and nationality frictions.
3. With traditional props of terror, ideology, and control over
information all weakened, regime depends more on rising living
standard to alleviate these ill effects -- and yet these social
problems make achievement of that goal all the more difficult.
III. In face of increasingly serious domestic problems, top Soviet
leadership shows almost total absence of interest in innovative or
radical shifts in economic policy.
A. Leadership itself static: party congress last spring was first in
decades not to make any leadership change; Brezhnev unable or
unwilling to translate authority into effective action on domestic
problems.
B. Despite continuity -- likely to mark near future -- pressures for
policy change building.
C. Succession and policy change likely to unfold in two stages:
first, debate over options that becomes entangled with struggle for
power, then attempt to resolve policy muddle following outcome of
power struggle.
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IV. Economic factors now play bigger role in Soviet foreign policy.
A. Oil exports to most of Eastern Europe being cut to sustain hard-
currency-earning oil exports to West, thus weakening one prop of
European Communist regimes.
B. Western technology sought for economic modernization, direct
military advantages, and to free resources for military programs.
C. Huge grain purchases required.
D. Both need hard currency.
E. Economic pinch notwithstanding, Soviet foreign goals remain
ambitious. But cost of maintaining empire and expanding influence
is rising: in last ten years, annual cost of aid to other
Communist countries has gone from less than $2 billion to $23
billion; now equivalent to 1.5% of Soviet GNP.
V. Yet USSR will continue to be major force acting widely and with
determination against US interests.
A. Military power remains for Soviets foundation of relationship with
US and key instrument globally, and momentum of military buildup
through next decade indicated as defense plant floorspace and
military R&D efforts continue to grow.
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B. But economic burden of military spending in fact growing; Soviets
are at a minimum maintaining traditional, Brezhnev -- era 4% annual
growth rate in face of GNP growth rate less than half that.
(Chart)
VI.. Moscow also continues to press for resumption of arms control dialogue.
A. Soviets desire to restrain costs of arms competition while
maintaining gains of Brezhnev era and hindering US countermeasures.
B. Soviets have abided by basic terms of SALT II (though not reducing
to levels envisaged) while positioning themselves for dialogue on
strategic arms issues in wake of President's November speech and
start of INF talks.
1. One major objective is to prevent or limit the deployment of
new US missiles in Europe (their version of a "zero" level
solution).
2. They have tried hard to influence West European attitudes, but
they have given NATO little cause to believe they are willing
to lessen military capability significantly.
C. Outlook is for serious, but mainly exploratory Soviet approach to
INF and START talks, accompanied by unrelenting public polemics
aimed above all at West European government and public opinion.
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There has been in fact a worrisome growth in neutralist sentiment
in Europe.
VII. Moscow's main challenge to the US in 80's will be continued
exploitation of instability in Third World and probing with variety of
diplomatic, military, and subversive tactics to erode Western positions
and influence.
A. Soviet assessment of opportunities -- and capability to pursue them
-- has not diminished, though use of surrogates reduces risk of
direct confrontation.
B. Continued Soviet refusal to accept notion of "linkage" has been so
steadfast that they seemed at outset of this administration to
believe improved relations possible despite their actions and
despite clear signals of new US concern about bilateral reciprocity
and Soviet global behavior.
VIII. Not surprisingly, given continuity of leadership and policy in Brezhnev
era, our assessment of directions of Soviet policy is similar to our
presentation last year.
A. Soviets see significant advantages from their arms programs and
will match new US programs, regardless of cost.
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B. Will attempt to modulate own costs and restrain US programs through
arms control measures. Will also try to improve bilateral
relations with US to ensure access to grain and technology.
C. But will be reluctant to temper assertive activities in Third World
to gain this end: unable to forego efforts to stimulate and
capitalize on troubles for West.
1. Difference, however, is that cost of these activities is
getting higher, causing strains and policy adjustments.
2. Will work through surrogates and allies as much as possible to
IX. Foremost among our immediate problems in the Third World are the
Soviet-Cuban challenge in our backyard, Central America, and Libya's
continued role as a destabilizing element.
A. In the last two years the Soviets have shifted toward an active
policy of supporting leftist revolution in Latin America, and
particularly in Central America.
1. Their policy is based primarily on collaboration with Cuba,
although the East Germans, Vietnamese, and some radical Arabs
are also involved. Cuba has become the strongest military
power in Latin America, as well as supplying proxy forces in
Africa. More important for the present, it is also the base
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for political and paramilitary warfare throughout the Caribben
2. The first success of this offensive was the Sandinista victory
in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas are strengthening their control
by repression of the democratic opposition. At the same time
they are building armed forces far beyond those of their
neighbors. And they in turn are working with the Cubans to
provide a base and extensive support for guerrilla warfare in
Salvador and Guatemala.
3. In Salvador, the guerrillas are able to maintain great pressure
on the government, but are not yet within reach of victory.
Conversely, the government is stretched to its limit simply to
contain them. In Guatemala a roughly similar balance prevails
at a less extensive but growing level of violence and counter-
violence.
4. Elsewhere in the Caribbean basin, the Soviets and Cubans have
been turned back in Jamaica. They have had a success in
Grenada, made a start in Honduras and Costa Rica, and there is
an emerging guerrilla threat in Colombia and signs of activity
in Venezuela.
B. Libya's troublemaking rests on a number of factors:
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2. Its extremely large purchases and stockpiling of advanced
weaponry from the Soviet Union. Closer ties may follow,
despite Qadhafi's devotion to Islam.
3. Its unprecedented usage of terrorism and assassination,
including potentially against US leaders, as a regular
instrument of national policy.
4. Qadhafi's volatile nature and his willingness to support a wide
range of revolutionary organizations.
5. The Tripartite Pack signed in August by Libya, Ethiopia and
South Yemen and focused against the regimes in Egypt, Sudan,
Somali and North Yemen. The treaty has promoted Soviet
interests as well as Libyan ones both in Africa and the Middle
East.
X. Turning to Africa first:
A. Libyan activity continues:
1. Libyan efforts to remain in Chad -- a move particularly
threatening to Sudan -- have been frustrated for the moment.
2. Efforts at destabilization of African regimes by Libya have
become more evident. All the West African states are seriously
concerned about the Libyan threat of terrorist activity and
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financial subversion. Libyan activities extend as far south as
Uganda and Mauritius and the Angolan government is reported to
have signed an economic aid agreement with Qadhafi.
3. Libya is increasingly complementing Algeria as the leading
backers of the Polisario guerrillas against King Hassan of
Morocco. Hassan's position has been weakened by six years of
inconclusive war and by popular unhappiness over economic
developments.
B. There are other serious problems in Africa that provide openings
for the Soviets and their surrogates.
1. Continued South African raids in Angola and South African
support for the insurgent movement in Mozambique have created
greater anxiety on the part of black southern African states.
In turn they have begun to rely in greater degree on Soviet,
Cuban and North Korean security assistance and on Soviet arms
supplies.
2. The African countries continue to suffer economic difficulties
in trade and food supplies, the effects of which create
instability and provide further opportunity for Soviet
meddling.
XI. In the Middle East our primary areas of concern are the Israeli-
Palestinian impasse, the security of the Persian Gulf, and Afghanistan.
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A. Any progress toward Arab-Israeli peace remains blocked by:
1. The political intentions of the Begin government: annexation
of the Golan and ultimately of the West Bank, tacit occupation
of Southern Lebanon, and a belligerent attitude toward Saudi
Arabia. (May need update).
2. Syrian intransigeance, abetted by the USSR.
3. Syria and Israel between them have effectively derailed Prince
4. In Egypt, Mubarak has moved effectively to restore stability,
but economic problems that could destroy him remain unsolved.
He would like to restore relations with the moderate Arabs,
notably Saudi Arabia, but is temporarily paralyzed on this
front until Israel returns the Sinai in April.
B. Security of the Gulf is a function of many factors: Internal
stability in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States; containment of the
leftist threat to North Yemen and, resultantly, to Saudi Arabia;
development in Iran of a neutral government not susceptible to
Soviet control; and development of a credible capability to project
Western power into the region, and deter any Soviet thrust
southward.
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.1. While the indicators are mixed, we judge internal stability in
pertinent areas as reasonably well-assured.
2. A leftist insurgency, however, continues in Yemen accompanied
by increasing Soviet influence through arms sales.
3. Political events in Iran remain unpredictable and may well
provide Moscow with openings for exploitation.
4. Regional states are not ready to cooperate fully with the US in
developing a military deterrent to the Soviets while in their
eyes the US is identified with Israel.
C. Afghanistan is a relatively bright spot.
1. The Soviet have made no progress in containing the insurgency;
they have been forced to bring in additional small units and
may plan substantially larger forces. (Update)
2. We are still concerned, however, that they may bring greater
pressure against Pakistan.
XII. Finally, I should note that nuclear proliferation continues as a
serious and growing threat to global stability.
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A. A near-term case is Pakistan where President Zia could be in a
position to order a nuclear explosion as early as a year from now,
but more likely in an additional year or so.
1. India's serious concerns about such a prospect are likely to
lead it to resume nuclear testing in response.
2. More drastic Indian action could be taken later this year when
Pakistan is expected to begin producing significant quantities
of weapons-usable material.
B. :[n the Middle East, Iraq is pressing ahead with its nuclear
research despite the substantial setback from the Israeli attack
'late last spring.
1. And Qadhafi continues to get substantial aid from the Soviet
Union, including enriched uranium, for his nuclear center near
Tripoli.
C. Elsewhere, South Korea and Taiwan continue development of
substantial nuclear power industries although weapons development
work continues suspended.
1. Argentina and Brazil are keeping open their options to pursue
nuclear explosives development.
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2. South Africa does not appear ready to resume preparations for
testing a nuclear explosive device, although such a test is
almost certainly within their capability.
D. As for the global proliferation regime, one of its key components,
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, faces
serious problems arising from growing doubts about the
effectiveness of its safeguards system.
1. Unless countries of proliferation concern are made more
accountable for their nuclear activities, confidence in the
effectiveness of the IAEA will continue to erode.
Conclusion:
This is not a cheerful presentation. Despite the serious problems that
this or a new Soviet regime will face, it is highly unlikely that the Soviet
challenge will lessen in the next few years. And, of course, many sources of
instability and trouble for the US exist quite independently of the East-West
struggle, and these will, if anything, worsen.
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In East Asia the areas of greatest concern are PRC-US relations, including
arms sales to Taiwan, the resistance in Kampuchea, trade problems with
Japan and large scale North Korean'military exercises.
A. Deng Xiaoping is restoring PRC institutions damaged during the
Mao era.
1. Key leaders have reservations about Deng's reform program.
2. US arms sales to Taiwan remain a contentious issue.
B. Although the Vietnamese control the Kampuchean government, the
resistance sputters on.
1. Non-Communist resistance forces are seeking US support.
2. ASEAN wants US participation.
C. Against the back drop of growing trade inbalances, our economic
relationship with Japan remains troubled.
U. North Korea stages a large-scale military exercise that underscored
their readiness posture, while continuing their efforts to establish
bilateral contacts with the US.
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