PROSPECTS FOR IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000802130034-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2007
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: September 2, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of Secret
Central
Intelligence
Prospects for Iran
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Secret
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PROSPECTS FOR IRAN
Information as of 1 September 1981 was
used.in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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STAT
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PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
The Islamic Republic Party (IRP) now controls the formal reins of
government in Iran, but has yet to consolidate power fully. Differences
of approach and emphasis, as well as personality clashes exist in the IRP,
but they do not now seem open to Western exploitation.
The IRP, its armed supporters-the Revolutionary Guard and
fundamentalist thugs-and the revolutionary committees have effec-
tively limited widespread dissidence beyond specifically targeted ter-
rorist actions. Any effective move to unseat them would require both
extensive internal popular support and military action. Despite the
IRP's obvious and major problems, no leftist or moderate group is yet
able to mount such a challenge.
Khomeini maintains his personal hold over the urban masses and is
central to IRP legitimacy. If he dies before the consolidation of
fundamentalist power, competing groups will attempt to manipulate
the succession and thereby weaken the ruling clique. It is unlikely,
however, that this weakening process would lead to an immediate
collapse of fundamentalist rule.
Currently, the chief internal opposition group is the strongly
nationalistic and leftist Mujahedin, which is being undercut by the
government's harsh repression. Despite recent tactical moves to broaden
its support base, the Mujahedin is unlikely to moderate its basically
Islamic radical leftist orientation. The Mujahedin has approximately
12,000 organized members, mostly present or former students. Because
its terrorist tactics have openly challenged the regime, the Mujahedin
has gained some sympathy among other disaffected Iranians who
Note: This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum is issued by the Chairman, National Intelligence
Council. It was produced under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South
Asia.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation and coordination of the
Memorandum: the Central Intelligence Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security
Agency; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Department of the Treasury;
and the intelligence components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.
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disagree with its leftist ideology. In seeking a stronger foundation for its
activities, the Mujahedin might seek common cause with:
- The Exiles. Any alliance between the Mujahedin and exiles
would be tactical. Both sides would submerge their differences
only until the fundamentalists fell.
- Other Revolutionary States and Groups. The Mujahedin has
good credentials with Algeria as well as links to Libya and the
PLO, and once in power might turn to them for assistance and
support.
- The Soviets. Although the degree of Soviet influence within
the Mujahedin is debatable, there is evidence of both direct and
indirect contacts. Mujahedin publications consistently attack
the United States but generally avoid mention of the USSR. The
organization probably shares a number of Soviet positions and
could turn to Moscow for assistance if it took power. Its stated
preference, however, is for independent policies.
The pro-Moscow Tudeh party remains small and is having prob-
lems recruiting members because it cannot dispel the image of being
foreign controlled. Tudeh is, however, relatively well organized and
liberally funded by the Soviets. It supports the IRP while working hard
to infiltrate the government and military. We do not believe it is
currently capable of assuming power even during a rapid disintegration
of the fundamentalist government.
Various non-Persian minorities-most of which are armed-are
hostile to the central government and may be open to outside manipula-
tion. The minorities' willingness to cooperate with any opposition
movement depends on their belief that parochial desires for local
autonomy would be advanced. None of these groups plays a major role
in the political dynamics of Tehran itself.
Most of the Iranian military is engaged in the war with Iraq and
consequently is far from Iran's center of power. Some officers may
maintain contacts with exile groups and opposition forces inside Iran,
but exile claims of support are unverified and probably exaggerated.
The services have personnel, morale, command, and logistic problems.
Fundamentalist control is strengthened through the presence of the
Revolutionary Guard and pro-Khomeini informants. We know of no
military heroes emerging from the Iran-Iraq war. The regime has
always been deeply suspicious of military loyalties. The war, however,
has delayed implementation of fundamentalist plans to Islamicize the
Army. Otherwise, the border fighting has had little political impact in
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Tehran, and the fundamentalists do not seem to feel any pressure to end
the conflict soon.
The traditional Iranian power brokers-leading bazaar merchants,
secular politicians, and moderate clerics-have been intimidated by the
IRP. They hope for a strong leader to emerge to offer a viable
alternative to fundamentalist rule.
The Iranian exile leadership has been ineffective and unwilling to
unite. Many exiles are discredited by past associations with the Shah or
the Iraqis. Former Navy Commander Admiral Madani appears to have
fewer liabilities than other exile leaders. An outside moral and financial
supporter and manipulator would be required to force some cohesion
upon the exile community and to organize any aggressive development
of its potential assets inside Iran. Unification of the exile leadership
would be a small first step with limited advantages. Such unification
would not necessarily have much immediate political impact on
internal politics in Iran but could result in:
- A realistic inventory of their actual contacts and
organization in Iran.
- A coordinated propaganda strategy.
- Some hope in Iran that an opposition focal point
had been established.
The Soviets are unlikely to attempt a power play merely because
the exiles are being supported by a Western power and, so long as Iran
is not pro-West, Moscow is unlikely to intervene militarily. Neverthe-
less, the Soviets would seek to exploit any Western backing of the exiles
to ingratiate themselves with the fundamentalists. If Western-backed
elements seemed to be mounting a successful attempt against the
regime, Moscow would intensify support for its clients.
The Soviets possess some key advantages in Iran. Geographic
proximity, ongoing economic and military aid, diplomatic representa-
tion, covert intelligence activity, and a radio station all offer opportuni-
ties for Soviet exploitation. Additionally, the present focus of the Iranian
revolution continues to be more anti-American and anti-Western than
anti-Soviet.
Several possible developments could lead the Soviets to consider
military intervention in Iran. These include:
- Serious threat of a preemptive US military move.
- Seizure of power by a leftist coalition explicitly calling for
Soviet assistance.
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- Collapse of the government in Tehran with no clear successor
regime emerging.
There are also major disincentives for the Soviets' use of overt
military force in Iran. Paramount in such a decision would be the risk of
political events in Iran threatened the possible reemergence of a strong,
centralized pro-US regime in Tehran, it might use the threat of military
intervention as a tool. Any US attempt to intervene militarily in Iran
greatly increases the prospect of a Soviet counterintervention.
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