THE U.S. RESPONSE TO SOVIET-SUPPORTED INSURGENCIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000701960003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 23, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/06/18: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701960003-1
23 October 1981
SUBJECT: The U. S. Response to Soviet-Supported Insurgencies
As the Administration considers alternatives for countering Soviet- and
Cuban-supported insurgency in Central America, it is essential to bear in mind
that this is but one part of the much larger problem of Soviet support for
insurgencies and radical regimes throughout the Third World.
Beginning in 1974 and 1975, the Soviets undertook a new, much more aggressive
strategy in the Third World (1) based on their perception that the U. S. President's
hands were tied in that arena because of the Vietnam experience, (2) taking
advantage of a series of events and developments in the Third World itself which
made intervention attractive and relatively risk free, and (3) a completely new
element--exploiting the availability first of Cuba and subsequently of other
countries to serve as Soviet surrogates or proxies (thereby limiting the political,
economic and military costs to the USSR). The Congressional defeat of assistance
for UNITA in Angola in the spring of 1975--following the U. S. evacuation of
Saigon by only weeks--bolstered Soviet confidence that the U. S. would not react
to this aggressive strategy.
In the ensuing six years the Soviets have supported, directly or indirectly,
radical regimes or insurgencies in virtually every part of the Third World:
1975 Angola Soviet support and Cuban troops enable MPLA to
take and subsequently maintain power.
Mozambique Soviets provide military assistance to newly-
independent government led by Machel and enable
it to combat continuing insurgency of National
Resi'stance Movement (supported by South Africa).
Laos After DRV conquest of RVN, DRV moves to assert
control in Laos with support of Soviets (military
materiel and at least several hundred advisors).
Soviets have provided military assistance through
South Yemen and Iraq to the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Oman. During the most active
phase of the insurgency in 1974-75, the Soviets
supplied it with significant amounts of weapons.
Even after collapse of the insurgency in November
1975, USSR reportedly has continued to supply
arms and assistance.
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1977 Ethiopia Soviets have supported Mengistu government since
its assumption of power in 1974. In 1977 they
organized its victorious campaign against the
Somali-supported insurgency--Soviet leadership
and material, Cuban troops transported by the
Soviets.
Zaire Angola-based rebels move into Shaba but are
defeated. No evidence of Soviet involvement
at that time but indications of Soviet military
support to the Angola-based front for the
liberation of the Congo since 1980.
Zimbabwe Soviets use Angola base to funnel increased
support to Nkomo, whose defeat in 1980 settle-
ment leaves Soviets in weak position.
1978 Kampuchea DRV moves into Kampuchea with the costs under-
written by the Soviets.
Namibia Soviets use Angola base to significantly increase
support of SWAPO (which they have been backing
since early 1970s).
Afghanistan After a coup carried out with at least Soviet
complicity, Soviets greatly increase assistance
to newly-installed communist government and
eventually (Dec. 79) move in their own combat
troops to help maintain the government in power.
PDRY A coup brings an outright pro-Soviet government
to power and Soviets increase their presence to
maintain government in power. East Germans and
Cubans take responsibility for security.
1979 Yemen Arab
Republic Using PDRY as base, Soviets back insurgents (NDF)
while simultaneously maintaining ties with and
providing support to YAR government.
After remaining aloof from earlier Libyan sub-
version, Soviets approve and give some support
to Libyan military take-over (apparently once
it becomes clear that other African states will
do no more than register unhappiness over Libyan
invasion).
Nicaragua Having remained aloof from anti-Somoza insurgency,
Soviets move in quickly to help Sandinistas
consolidate power. They provide military materiel
and some advisory and support personnel.
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El Salvador Encouraged by Sandinista success in Nicaragua,
Soviets back Cuban efforts in support of
insurgency. Soviet arms and equipment are
channeled through Cuba.
Polisario Although Moscow has not directly supported
the insurgency against Morocco for fear of
disrupting political and economic ties, Soviet
arms reach the group via Libya and Algeria and
Moscow has sought to suggest sympathy for
Polisario aims.
1980 Guatemala Moscow provides financial assistance and para-
military training to communist rebels and urges
the creation of a broadly-based revolutionary
front.
In Central America, Southern Africa, North Central Africa, the Arabian Penin-
sula, and Southeast Asia the Soviet pattern seems to be to move quickly when
local circumstances favor success and then try to use a successful insurgency/
new radical regime as a base of operations against neighboring territories. Local
circumstances, of course, still determine the ultimate outcome and some victors
may eventually turn on the Soviets or run into unexpected resistance (e.g. Angola,
Afghanistan). But key to the strategy is establishing a firm base from which to
conduct regional operations. Moreover, in nearly all of the above cases, the
United States has confronted a situation in which the Soviets have been able to
provide significant quantities of arms on a prompt basis directly or through
proxies/surrogates either to insurgent forces, to friendly governments supporting
We must realize and sooner or later deal with the fact that it iq m h easier
and cheaper for the Soviets to 25X1
support an insurgency than i is to resist one. 25X1
2 A11
25X1
3
Approved For Release 2007/06/18: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701960003-1
 Approved For Release 2007/06/18: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701960003-1
Approved For Release 2007/06/18: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701960003-1