INF INITIATIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000701860005-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: MEMO

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NSC REVIEWED 8/2/07 NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: INF Initiative
Ambassador Paul Nitze has recently developed, with his Soviet
counterpart, a proposal for moving INF negotiations to a rapid
conclusion. It calls for major changes in the US and USSR
positions. This preliminary evaluation is designed to assist
you in deciding whether the proposed package should be
abandoned, or pursued to see if-it can be the basis for an
INF agreement.
Status of the INF Negotiations
At your direction, the US has proposed elimination of the
Soviet SS-20 missiles and older SS-4s and SS-5s in return for
cancellation of our plans to deploy the Pershing II and the
ground-launched cruise missile in Europe. The US,"zero/zero"
proposal would prohibit all such missiles wherever located
globally. It would not limit aircraft or sea-based systems,
and would not include or compensate for third-country systems.
.The Soviet approach has been much different. They propose a
prompt moratorium, which would prohibit deployment of the PII
and GLCM, but would permit the Soviets to maintain their
present INF forces in Europe. This would be followed by a
reduction in the aggregate number of medium-range missiles and
aircraft in Europe on each side to 300. British and French
forces would be included, as would US carrier-based aircraft.
The net effect of the Soviet proposal would be to prevent
deployment of the US PII and GLCM. It would also reduce our
tactical aircraft in Europe to a token level, with little or
no constraint on the SS-20 and other modern Soviet forces in
and near Europe, and no cpnstraints in the eastern Soviet Union.
As.a result of the negotiations since November 1981, each side
now understands the other side's approach and underlying
rationale. Our allies are content with our position at this
time, although pressures for progress are expected to mount
in 1983 as actual GLCM and PII deployments begin.
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Proposed Package
The present question is whether to seek a package that could
result in an agreement in the near term. We should not make
any substantive change in our zero/zero position at this time
except in the context of Soviet commitment to prompt agreement
on an overall package. Otherwise, the US would simply weaken
its bargaining position with nothing in return. The Soviets
may hold to their present position for similar reasons.
Ambassador Nitze and Ambassador Kvitsinskiy have discussed the
possibility of such a package for an INF agreement. In response
to Soviet signals of interest in a compromise solution, Nitze
discussed a possible draft package with Kvitsinskiy on July 16.
Following revisions based on Kvitsinskiy's comments, the two
representatives agreed to_x ecommend an approach to their
governments.
The key elements of the package are:.,
-- A ceiling of 225 medium-range missile launchers
and aircraft in Europe by 1987, of which no more
than 75 can be missile launchers.
-- The Soviet Union would reduce its SS-20s in
Europe from 225 to 75, and reduce its Backfire,
Badger, and Blinder aircraft in Europe from
more than 450 to 150.
-- SS-20s in the Far East would be frozen at the
present level of 90.
-- The US would give up its Pershing II deployment
program in Europe and reduce the planned GLCM
deployment in Europe from 116 launchers to 75.
We would reduce our F-111 aircraft in Europe
(165) plus FB-111 aircraft in the US (63) from
228 to a maximum of 150.
-- The Soviets would keep 75 SS-20s with 225
warheads in Europe; the US could have 75
GLCM launchers with 300 missiles and warheads
in Europe.
-- No constraints on British and French forces,
or US sea-based forces or air-launched cruise
missiles (ALCMs).
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There. are a number of important supplementary provisions
(Tab A). 'Several ambiguous provisions need clarification
(e.g., could the US deploy GLCM.and PII to Asia? Could
excess aircraft simply be withdrawn from Europe or would
they have to be destroyed?) In addition, elements such as
duration of an agreement have not been addressed.
Military Assessment
While the proposal is more equitable than the provisions of
the Soviet Draft Treaty, it falls short of meeting the military
needs of the United States in several areas:
-- The United States foregoes deployment of the Pershing II
ballistic missile, the system perceived by the Soviet Union to
be the most threatening and by the United States to be militarily'.
more effective than our cruise tnissile (GLCM). The Soviet Union,
retains in being a potent force of SS-20 missiles with 225
warheads with a much shorter time of flight and greater
survivability than the cruise missiles permitted the United States.
-- If the United States must destroy over fifty F-ills
in Europe to meet the ceiling of 150 aircraft, loss of these
aircraft would sacrifice certain capabilities that, taken
together, are unique: all-weather, radius of action, payload,
and multiple role at longer ranges. To be sure, the Soviet
Union would have to destroy several hundred more than the
United States would be required to destroy, but these would be
older aircraft (Badger and Blinder). The current Backfire
.deployments would be essentially protected.
There are certain 'advantages to be gained by the United States
through this proposal:
-- The Soviet side is limited to 225 RVs on missiles and
150 nuclear capable aircraft, a reduction of about 750 missile
RVs on SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles, and 200-300 nuclear
capable aircraft by most conservative count.
-- The United States retains the capability to deploy up
to 300 cruise missile RVs
7J.
-- Sea-based and Al1'1eid systems are not included in the
agreement.
Considerations which would make the proposal militarily more
acceptable include:
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-- a ban on refires, as in our current INF proposal.
GLCM has no refire capability; SS-20 has a rapid reload/refire
capability:
-- additional examination of where the line of withdrawal
should be placed is required in light of the difference between
the Soviet-asserted SS-20 range of 4000 km, and the CIA-DIA
estimates of 4400-5000 km. The distance between the inner-
German border and 80 degrees East is about 4600 km.
-- to protect the F-ills which would be above the aircraft
ceiling in Europe, the proposal should make explicit that aircraft
may be withdrawn to reduce to the permitted level, while medium
range missiles in Europe above the limit of 75 (SS-20s, 4s and
5s) must be destroyed.
-- inclusion of FB-111 re4uires further study. Inclusion
may establish an unwarranted precedent.
Political Assessment
Allied Interests
A zero/zero outcome would be.p;referable to the NATO allies,
since it would further reduce Soviet forces and eliminate the
need to base US INF missiles in Europe, but many of our allies
are skeptical that this is a plausible outcome.
The proposed package would fulfill our commitment to negotiate
an agreement that reduces the SS-20 threat. It would require
Soviet dismantling of about two-thirds of the SS-20s now
deployed opposite Western Europe, and all of the older SS-4s
and SS-5s. While the remaining SS-20s and Soviet strategic
forces would continue to threaten Europe, the agreement would
represent a substantial reduction in the most destabilizing
missiles in Europe.
An agreement with the Soviets permitting 75 US GLCM launchers
in Europe would cause a dramatic shift'in the debate in Europe
over our INF deployment plans. Although there would be some
criticism of movement from, the high ground of the zero/zero
position, NATO allies would ,probably welcome an agreement along
the lines of the proposed package. The Germans, for example,
have indicated they favor finite limits in the 75/75 - 150/150
range. In the absence of a zero/zero solution, they are
determined to follow through on deployments but do not want
to be the only INF basing country on the continent. (Allocation
of the reduction of the 41 GLCM launchers would require complex
discussions with the five basing countries.) Without an
agreement, many of these basing countries face formidable
opposition to deployment. Since missiles and launchers will
begin arriving in Europe in the late spring of 1983, an
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agreement or the clear prospect of one by next spring should
help overcome this problem.
The impact on our Far Eastern interests has to be seriously
considered. China, Japan and South Korea must not perceive
that we are simply transferring our European imbalance to
them. Under the proposed package, SS-20 deployments in the
Far East would be frozen at 90., but Soviet aircraft (above the
150 limit) could redeploy to the Far East (unless required to
be destroyed). We should preserve options for US deployment
to the Far East to offset Soviet INF in that region and consider
other changes in the package to make this problem manageable.
Even if the Soviets reject the Nitze-Kvistinskiy approach, we
will have established that we have negotiated seriously.
Domestic Interests _x .1
The heart of the Administration's argument against the
freeze movement is that we are negotiating arms control agree-
ments that would be better than a freeze. While not reaching
the ideal goal of zero/zero, this agreement would demonstrate
that substantial asymmetric reductions in Soviet forces to
equal levels are feasible and practical. Such reductions are
clearly preferable to a freeze which would continue the present
high and unequal levels.
While some opposition is inevitable, an agreement along the
lines proposed, providing for substantial reductions to equal
ceilings, should command broad support in the Congress.
Given the controversy surrounding Soviet compliance with other
arms control agreements, special attention must be given to
the verification measures in the agreement. The current INF
proposal is difficult to verify, and moving from zero/zero
will further complicate this problem. The specific measures
we need for verification must be part of any settlement on a
package.
Impact on START
The proposed agreement would establish a number of positive
precedents for START -- asymmetric Soviet reductions to equal
levels, focussing the most meaningful reductions on the most
destabilizing systems, substantial progress on the medium-range
land-based missile and aircraft issues, and refusal to compensate
for British and French forces. While the US would reserve the
right to pursue Backfire further in START, acceptance of Backfire
as a medium-range system will complicate obtaining its inclusion
in START.
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Next Steps
If you decide to pursue this approach further, a number of
substantive. and procedural questions need to be addressed:
1. What is our position on the package?
We should await a Soviet indication of interest in
pursuing this approach. While the Soviets appear to be deeply
concerned about PII, it is by no means assured that they will
accept this package without substantial modifications. We
expect that Kvistinskiy will contact Nitze with a Soviet
response to the package, or Gromyko will raise it with
Secretary Shultz in September. At that time, the US will need
to be in a position to state whether or not we wish to pursue
this.approach and what specific changes we require.'* The exact
timing and procedures will;reggire further analysis.
2. What organizational arrangements should be made?
To date, all discussion of this subject has been
between Nitze and Kvitsinskiy. Initially, the exchanges should
continue in this channel until an agreed package covering all
of the elements of a deal is worked out. Then the full
delegations would work out the text of a treaty. This should
also be discussed by Shultz and Gromyko in late September.
(If there has not been progress by then, the regular negotiating
round, which begins on September 30, should proceed with its
currently planned agenda.)
To date, only a handful of officials. in Washington are aware
of the elements of the proposed package, (in order to minimize
the chance of a serious leak while Moscow and Washington are.
considering their response). If you decide to pursue this
approach, we recommend that the National Security Planning Group,
supported by a small interagency group, evaluate this proposal
and make specific recommendations to you. The number of staff
people involved will-be held to the minimum necessary to give
each element of the package the detailed analysis that this
important subject requires, in order to minimize public dis-
closure until we know whether or not we have the basis for an
agreement.
3. When to inform our-Allies
The NATO allies, especially the basing countries,
have a major political interest in knowing the prospects for
an agreement prior to deployment of US INF missiles. If we
receive a positive Soviet response, US officials, on a close-
hold basis, should brief selected officials in the basing
countries on the basic outlines of the package solution. Our
objective would be to avoid their first hearing of this effort
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from the Soviets or the press. We should guard against
generating excessive optimism until we know whether or not
the basis for an agreement exists. As the exchanges proceed,
we should continue to keep the leadership in NATO countries
informed, as well as Allies in the Far East.
4. When to inform the Congress
The Congress will have similar interest. Once the
Soviet response has been evaluated and a decision made to
negotiate on this basis, key Congressional leaders should be
informed on a close-hold basis.
We recommend that you proceed with the plan outlined above.
APPROVE DISAPPROVE
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Attachments
Tab A - Nitze Proposal
Tab B - Summary of the INF Balance
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