FLOGGERS IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000701750028-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2008
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: January 20, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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L..W,-* &... I
THE COUNSELOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
NSC review completed
January-20,-1982
TO: Admiral Inman
Assistant Secretary West
General Gorman
Admiral Nance
Mr. Fontaine
SUBJECT: Floggers in Cuba
Attached is the revised draft-.incorporating
changes agreed to in yesterday's meeting. Please
provide comments directly to Bob Blackwill (secure
phone #5232) by 2:00 pm this afternoon. We will
be distributing this paper to Principals this
evening.
Attachment:
As Stated.
OSD review completed
State Dept. review
completed
EGRET
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
OSD review completed
THIRD DRAFT
Subject: Responding to Floggers in Cuba
Renewed Soviet shipment of Flogger fighter aircraft to
Cuba is a serious act in and of itself. It also is represen-
tative of a Cuban military buildup which is increasingly
threatening our interests. We must respond on both accounts.
This memorandum seeks your approval of a series of political,
economic, and military measures which take account of the
Flogger issue in the context of our broader strategy to
counter Cuban interventionism and to meet the global chal-
lenge posed by the Soviets and their proxies.
Background
The arrival of eight Flogger crates is the first shipment
since twelve MiG-23 ground attack fighter aircraft (Floggers)
were delivered to Cuba in 1978. This recent delivery includes
four trainers-.which.-may- be _a precursor to _a._signif icant__up-____
grading of Cuba's offensive threat to the region. When
Secretary Vance raised the MiG 23 issue with Dobrynin at the
time of the 1978 deliveries, the Soviets insisted that the
Floggers in Cuba could not carry nuclear weapons and had
nothing to do with the 1962 Understandings.
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The last Administration responded that if the planes
were not nuclear-capable, and if the quantity were limited,
it would not regard them as constituting a threat. It added,
both in Washinqton and Moscow, that an increase in the number
of ground attack Mig-23s in Cuba would have.a seriously
adverse effect on US-Soviet relations.
Implications of Renewed Flogger Shipments
Military. The second shipment of Floggers in itself will
not significantly enhance Cuban military capabilities. Al-
though this model of aircraft can be quickly equipped to de-
liver nuclear weapons without detection by the US, we have no
evidence that there are nuclear weapons in Cuba or that the
Soviets intend to deploy nuclear weapons to Cuba. Considered
in this light, we do not now face a crisis resembling the 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis.
If the renewed shipment of Floggers is,viewed as part of
a continuing process of Cuban military modernization and expan-
sion, however, the military implications are grave and go far
beyond the immediate capabilities provided by these new aircraft:
? A Cuban Air Force modernized with multi-mission aircraft
such as the Flogger could force us to upgrade substantially air
defense capabilities in order to defend targets in the South-
eastern United States and Central America, including the Panama
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Canal. In addition, Cuba's enhanced anti-ship capability
would threaten a substantial portion of US reinforcements
which would go to Europe from Gulf coast ports in a NATO
contingency.
? De facto US acceptance of additional Flogger deploy-
ments could open the door to further Soviet qualitative
improvements in Cuban military capabilities (e.g., Foxbat
aircraft, modern submarines, amphibious forces).
In sum, this Cuban military buildup already represents
a substantial threat to US interests in the area and, if
unchecked, would develop into an unacceptable capability to
complicate our crisis management across the board. It could
also lead to the Cubanization of Central America. Thus, we
must take actions to try to reverse Cuba's military moderni-
zation, not least because if we eventually have to go to the
source, each additional Soviet arms shipment to Cuba will make
that definitive action on our part ever more costly in US blood
and treasure.
Political. Whether or not-it was intended as a direct
Soviet challenge, the renewed shipment of Flogqers -- after a
40 month hiatus and despite repeated US demarches about the
arms buildup in Cuba -- almost certainly was a purposeful,
premeditated act which the Soviets took in full recognition
of the risks of a US reaction. Indeed, the USSR shipped to
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Cuba in 1981 more military equipment than in any year since
1962: inter alia, besides the MiG 23s, some 20 MiG-21s, 4
air transports, 33 T-62 tanks, 30 armored personnel carriers,
16 medium artillery pieces, 100 anti-tank guns, a frigate, 2
torpedo boat hydrofoils, 2 missile attack boats, 3 minesweepers,
as well as radars, missiles and guns for a major upgrade in
Cuban air defenses. But whatever the Soviet motive in the
latest Flogger shipments, the absence of an effective US
response could be regarded by Moscow -- and by certain Latin
American governments -- as American acquiescence .in continuing
Soviet augmentation of Cuban power projection capabilities to
threaten our fundamental interests in the region. Such mis-
calculation about US strength and determination also could
increase Soviet willingness to take aggressive actions against
US interests elsewhere in the world.
1962 US-Soviet Understanding on Cuba. This refers to a
series of US-Soviet diplomatic exchanges -- both oral and
written -- which occurred in the wake of the 1962 Cuban mis-
si-le crisis= No-formal agreement was ever -concluded. --
There are two basic elements. First is a US understand-
ing that the Soviets would withdraw and would not reintroduce
"offensive weapon systems." Following that understanding, the
Soviets withdrew not only their ballistic missiles, but also
the IL-28 nuclear-capable bombers (which had a mission simi-
lar to that now performed by Flogger).
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Second is a Soviet understanding that the US "had no
intention of invading Cuba." However, the two conditions
upon which our no-invasion pledge rested -- UN supervision
of Soviet missile withdrawals and adequate safeguards against
their reintroduction -- were never satisfied because of
Castro's objections. It can be argued, therefore, that the
US is not bound by the no-invasion pledge it made as part of
the 1962 Understanding. (Additional background on the 1962
Understanding is attached.)
The Floggers appear to fall into a "gray area" of the
1962 Understanding. On the one hand, the Flogger model can
be quickly and covertly converted to carry nuclear weapons
(whether or not the specific aircraft delivered to Cuba pres-
ently are nuclear configured). The Flogger can also perform
in an offensive mode using conventional weapons. On the other
hand, the Carter Administration (as the Soviets would be likely
to remind us) accepted Soviet assurances that the Floggers in
Cuba were not nuclear-capable and were not covered by the 1962
Understanding (although the Carter Administration's 1978 marker
on the consequences of additional Flogger deliveries would
facilitate a new US demarche on the issue). In any event, con-
tinued Soviet modernization of the Cuban Air Force with aircraft
such as Flogger seriously undermines the value to the United
States of the 1962 Understanding, which has been a principal
facet of US policy toward Soviet activities in Cuba.
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There are three broad options for our treatment of the
1962 Understanding in light of the new Flogger shipment: 1)
renounce the Understanding; 2) say nothing about it to the
Soviets but take actions indicating we might now consider the,
Understanding inoperative; and 3) ask the Soviets to clarify
their actions, making clear our view that the Flogger shipment
seriously erodes the Understanding, and saying (if asked) that
our attitude toward the Understanding is under review and will
depend upon subsequent Soviet actions. We recommend the third
option.
US Objectives
We want to respond to renewed Soviet deliveries of Flog-
gers to Cuba -- and to the broader Cuban military threat they
represent -- in a manner which will contribute to our longer-
term efforts to counter Cuban intervention in the region and
will support our broader strategy of meeting the challenge
posed by the Soviets and their proxies. Our response must be
clearly distnguishable- from the-Carter Administration Is 1978
acceptance of-unverifiable Soviet assurances on Flogger. It
should not, however, provoke a US-Soviet confrontation in the
Caribbean which would divert attention from Poland and feed
Allied suspicions that we were over-reacting to Castro.
Finally, an agreement with Moscow which was limited to the
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Flogger would be a tangible success, but it would not address
the broader. problem of an increasingly dangerous Soviet build-
up of the Cuban armed forces.
In NSDD-17, you authorized a series of measures to counter
the Cuban export of revolution in the hemisphere. The Flogger
shipments provide both the need and the opportunity to supple-
ment and accelerate that program, i.e., to use the Flogger
shipment to try to begin to reverse the across-the-board Cuban
military buildup. In doing so, we can attempt to:
? increase Soviet concerns about US intentions,. and
Soviet willingness to limit further modernization/
expansion of Cuban military capabilities;,
? exacerbate Castro's sense of isolation and doubts
about the depth of the Soviet security commitment
to him;
? increase significantly US pressure on Castro--economi-
cally, politically, and militarily--both in the Carib-
bean and in other areas where there is a Cuban pres-
ence, arrest the arms buildup in Cuba, and end Cuban
export of revolution; and
? build support at home and in the region for our strategy.
In pursuing these objectives, we must recognize that Castro's
reaction will undoubtedly be to ask urgently for even more
Soviet military assistance and that Moscow may well give it.
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Thus, we could be confronted with an even greater challenge
as we proceed. But to do nothing would eliminate the possi-
bility (however small) that we can affect Soviet behavior;
would embolden both Moscow and Havana; and would make the
inevitable day of reckoning that much more costly to us.
Possible Responses
Military and Intelligence. An increased program of in- It
telligence collection and air surveillance (SR-71, U-2, P-3,
RC-135 flights) already is underway. Other options include:
? Increasing the readiness of our defense capabil-
ities 71n the South Eastern United - Stuat-es, ' - -
? Initiating a program to increase a sense of threat to,
Cuba and raise Castro's anxiety level regarding_ US
military preparedness for military actions against
the island, to include an invasion. This program is
referred to as ELASTIC FENCE and includes communica-
tion exercises and increased naval presence in the
.Caribbean. _ .(Foz: further--details- see_.belo
? Deploying tactical fighter aircraft to the Western
Caribbean. The Colombian island of San Andres
(midway between Colombia and Nicaragua), Howard AFB
in Panama, and airbases in Honduras are possible
sites;
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? Devoting 25 million dollars in the DoD budget to
improve selected airfields and ports in the Western
Caribbean;
? Accelerating the timetable for beginning Radio
Marti broadcasts; and
? Refining our contingency planning toward the Caribbean
al_so__in.cluded_in _the__plans. __FulL-scale__opexations,
Basin. We have the capability to commence deployment
operations in short order should you decide to do so.
For operations against Cuba, plans have been prepared
for the conduct of an oil quarantine and/or neutrali-
zation of Cuba's offensive military power. Due to the
large number of forces involved, operations against
Cuba would begin within ten days of alert. Military
planning toward Nicaragua ranges from evacuation of US
citizens to air and sea quarantine to blockade. Air
strike operations against the possible introduction of
Cuban combat aircraft or additional heavy weapons are
against Nicaragua would 'commence within eight days of
notification.
Diplomatic. Walt Stoessel already has made a demarche to
Dobrynin. Amb. Hartman will be following up in Moscow in the
context of a presentation of our concerns about Cuba and Central
America.
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We would also press the Soviets for a clarification of the
1962 Understanding which would encompass dual-capable weapons
systems such as Flogger, making clear that in any event contin-
uation of the Soviet military modernization of Cuban armed
forces must be arrested. If we pursue this course, we would
reject any Soviet efforts to raise issues which would restrain
our actions against Castro by making clear that our demarches
did not signal any willingness to reopen the 1962 Understanding
for renegotiation or to enter into any necotiation concerning
US or Soviet arms transfers. We can use the same opportunity
to put the Soviets on notice about the consequences of ship-
ping MiGs to Nicaragua.
Finally, we could consider a number of diplomatic and
legislative measures to increase the pressure on Castro.
These might include:
? Closing the Cuban Interest Section at an appropriate
time;
? Making an all out effort to repeal the Clark Amendment;
? Increasiing assistance-'to-- Somalia (DoD has`-just bud-
geted $30 million for military construction in
Somalia);
? Curtailing the activities of Cuban representatives
at the UN; and
? Initiating visible consultations with countries in the
region about the deteriorating security environment and
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about cooperative measures tc improve the prospects
for peace and stability in the area.
Security and Economic Assistance. The Caribbean Basin
Initiative (CBI) is a comprehensive strategy for countering
Cuban intervention by improving economic conditions in the
region. A budget supplemental to fund the CBI is now being
prepared. We also are planning major security assistance in-
creases for El Salvador and Honduras. A $50 million grant
security assistance supplemental for the Caribbean also may
be desirable.
Economic Sanctions. We can further increase the pressure
on the Cuban economy by blacklisting ships which call in Cuban
ports, curtailing tourism, and other measures to improve the
effectiveness of the embargo. We also can decrease Nicaragua's
access to trade and credit. A separate interagency study has
addressed Cuban economic vulnerability. This effort is being
accelerated.
Impleriierntat-idn Strategy
We want to select and move'forward with individual re-
sponses in an integrated political, military and economic
fashion and on a schedule which will steadily increase the
pressure on the Soviets and Cubans (short of provoking a crisis
which diverts attention from Poland), and will build support
for our longer-term program to counter Castro. The near-term
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actions we choose, therefore, should increase our leverage
over the Soviets and the Cubans and put us in a better
position--diplomatically, militarily, and politically--to
take more forceful actions in the event that our concerns
are not satisfied.
Timetable. During January, you could use your State of
the Union address to describe our concerns about Cuban activ-
ities in the context of describing the challenges posed by the
Soviets and their proxies around the globe. In that address,
you can announce the CBI, the $300 pillion supplemental for
emergency economic assistance to the region, the $50 million
grant security assistance supplemental, and steps for accele-
rating the start of broadcasts by Radio Marti. As a separate
but related action, we will shortly forward to you a request
to use your Section 506(a) authority to increase security
assistance for El Salvador and Honduras.
During their meeting next week, Secretary Haig can make
a demarche to Gromyko about the Floggers in the context of our
determination-to address the continuing--Soviet modernization---
and expansion of Cuban power projection capabilities. 'Secretary
Haig can press for Soviet clarification of the 1962 Understand-
ing to encompass offensive systems such as Flogger, and hint
that the US may have no alternative but to reconsider its
position on the Understanding -- and the no-invasion pledge if the Soviets do not satisfy our concern about the erosion of
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the limits it contains. He also could warn about the conse-
quences if MiGs are delivered to Nicaragua and indicate that
we intend to continue to discuss the Cuba problem in diplomatic
channels.
If you so decide, we could rapidly implement ELASTIC FENCE,
as noted above, a program designed to increase Castro's appre-
hension and uncertainty regarding the possibility of US
military operations against Cuba. The program capitalizes on
previously scheduled military training exercises using a wide
range of comparatively low-cost actions. Selected examples
include:
? linking RDF Southwest Asia exercises and designated
forces to US Forces Caribbean Command at Key West;
? orientation visits of key personnel from designated
military units to Guantanamo;
? immediate exercises by USAF and USN forces in response
to selective Cuban exercises;
? logistic surveys of Gulf ports and potential staging
? unconventional warfare forces communications nets in
the Caribbean; and
? a visit by Strategic Air-Command's (SAC) B-52 strike
force liaison team to the US military command in Panama.
During the same time period, you could give a major foreign
policy speech focusing on the situation in the Caribbean and
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Central America. Depending on the circumstances, you could
use the occasion to announce additional economic sanctions
against Cuba, defensive military measures (e.g., reinforcement
of Guantanamo, orders to challenge Cuban/Soviet military air-
craft approaching US airspace), and/or political progress
in Central America (e.g., Central American Reqional Grouping,.
security consultations with selected regional governments on
cooperative measures to deal with the changing security
environment).
The choice of, and schedule for, specific subsequent ac-
tions (e.g., accelerated timetable for CVBG exercises, deploy-
ment of aircraft to Honduras, further diplomatic exchanges
with the Soviets, reconsideration of the 1962 Understanding)
would depend on developments over the coming weeks and months.
All, however, would be part of our longer-term regional strategy.
Congressional Strategy. As we did with respect to Libya,
Congressional briefings in the near-term should be confined to
the leadership and to the chairmen and ranking minority
members of appropriate committees. They should describe the
Flogger problem and the broader challenge posed by Cuba's
military buildup, outline our objectives and broad approach in
general terms, and describe the kinds of near-term measures and
NSDD-17 initiatives we are taking. We should be particularly
circumspect about discussing the prospect of any diplomatic
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exchanges with the Soviets regarding the 1962 Understanding.
The presentations also will have to be made in such a way as
to avoid any impression that we were conducting consultations
under the War Powers Act.
Public Affairs. We want to increase public awareness of
the situation in the region and public support for the measures
we will be taking in response. At the same time, we want to
avoid raising unrealistic expectations or stimulating a sense
of crisis, either of which could force our hand before we were
ready and jeopardize our broader objectives.
Our public posture leading up to your State of the Union
address therefore should be low-key. We should acknowledge .
the second shipment-of Floagers to Cuba, state that we consider
this development to be serious, and say that we have raised
our concerns with the Soviets at a high level (making clear
these are diplomatic exchanges and not negotiations). We
should avoid raising the 1962 Understanding, but should say
if"-asked; that the Floggers may` touch-on that undertaking.
As noted above, by February, the time should be ripe for
a speech by you which would lay out our integrated approach
to the region. Such a speech would qive a major boost to our
efforts to sensitize the Congress and the American people, as
well as the international community, to the danger that Moscow
and Havana, working together, represent.
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Recommendation
That you approve the general approach described above.
Approve Disapprove
Additionally, that in the context of this approach you
approve:
- The announcement of the economic and security assist-
ance supplemental and other measures in your State of
the Union address.
Approve Disapprove
- The continuation of a stepped up program of increased
air surveillance over and around Cuba.
Approve Disapprove
- A demarche by Secretary Haig to Gromyko in
Approve Disapprove
- Operation ELASTIC FENCE to increase a sense of direct
Approve Disapprove
- An approach to the Colombians on deploying US aircraft to
bases on their territory, and an approach to the Hondurans
on preparing for possible deployments to their facilities.
Approve Disapprove
- A refinement of contingency plans concerning going to
the Cuban source and to respond to delivery of MiGs to
Nicaragua.
Approve Disapprove
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- The Congressional consultation strategy described above.
Approve Disapprove
- The initial public affairs strategy described
above.
Approve Disapprove
- The concept of a major foreign policy speech
in February describing additional diplomatic, economic,
and military measures we are taking in the region.
Approve Disapprove
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Background on the 1962 Understanding
The 1962 Understanding, as embodied in the exchange of
letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev, was never formalized
because Castro refused to permit verification that offensive
weapons would not be reintroduced into Cuba. Kennedy made
clear to the Soviets that a formal US non-invasion commitment
would, in addition, have to be conditioned on responsible
Cuban behavior. When he announced the lifting of the naval
quarantine (November 20, 1962), Kennedy stated:
"As for our part, if all offensive weapons are re-
moved from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in
the future, under adequate verification and safe-
guards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of
aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace
in the Caribbean."
Indications that the Soviets were building submarine facil-
ities at Cienfuegos led to a subsequent series of diplomatic
exchanges in 1970 and 1971 which broadened the 1962 Understand-
ing to include a ban on "servicing in or from Cuba of nuclear
submarines and submarines carrying offensive weapons."
In expressing US concern over Soviet naval activities at
the Cuban port of Cienfuegos in 1970, Kissinqer called atten-
tion on the record to Kennedy's November 20, 1962 statement,
noting "this, of course, remains the policy of this Government."
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To our knowledqe, the Carter Administration did not make
a definitive public statement regarding the 1962 Understanding.
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