CHAD: ORIGINS AND IMPACT OF FACTIONAL STRIFE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000200400079-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2007
• Sequence Number: 79
• Publication Date: December 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Chad:
Origins and Impact of
Factional Strife (u)
Secret
ALA 81-10046
December 1981
415
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National Secret
~ Foreign
Assessment
Center
Chad:
Origins and Impact of
Factional Strife (v)
Information available as of 28 December 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
The author of this paper i~
of African and Latin American Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be addressed to
the Chief, West and East Africa Division, ALA, on
This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations, the Offices of Near East-South Asia
Analysis and Central Reference, and the National
Intelligence Officer for Africa
Secret
ALA 81-10046
December 1981
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Chad: Major Ethnic and Regional Power Bases
Libya
Niger
"Northern" Chad
(90% of country geographically)
Chad
.Ati
_crm_
Unclassified
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Factional Strife
Chad:
Origins and Impact of
Chad's factional strife has made the country an exploitable target for
Libyan adventurism that threatens neighboring states and Western inter-
ests in the region. Although Libyan troops left Chad in late 1981,
longstanding ethnic, regional, and social tensions continue to fuel bitter
factional rivalries and political instability. Prospects for preventing new
turmoil and for limiting opportunities for foreign meddling seem poor.
More than two years after coming to power, President Goukouni's feeble
coalition government has had little success in containing the quarrels
among competing groups and is showing new signs of unraveling as a result
of personal rivalries. Chad is less a nation than a convenient geographic ex-
pression for an arena where hostile armed bands wage an age-old power
struggle with few if any ideological pretentions.
Chad in modern times has known relative stability only during periods of
foreign military occupation-first by France and for the past year by the
Libyans, who entered in force in October 1980 to reverse the Goukouni re-
gime's waning military fortunes against rebel Defense Minister Habre.
Peacekeeping forces that have been sent to Chad by the Organization of
African Unity are an uncertain substitute for the Libyan troops who
maintained relative calm. In any event, no occupying power has been able
to do more than postpone a new upheaval.
Another round of major fighting in Chad's 16-year-old civil war could soon
erupt and might ultimately lead to a formal partition between the Muslim
north and the Christian and animist south. The south is more cohesive
ethnically and on a firmer footing economically than the north and
probably could make a go of it alone. The north, however, would remain
torn by factional feuding and probably would be subject to heavy Libyan
influence.
Secret
ALA 81-10046
December 1981
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Chad:
Origins and Im act of
Factional Strife
Again on the Brink
As 1982 begins, Chad's factional struggle is intensify-
ing. President Goukouni's beleaguered coalition gov-
ernment faces an increasingly serious threat in central
Chad from insurgent leader Habre, whose forces in
recent weeks have moved west from their eastern
stronghold in a series of successes that could cause the
regime to split apart and full-fledged civil war to
resume. OAU troops could soon face their first test as
a neutral buffer intended to separate Chad's feuding
factions. The peacekeeping force is reluctant to fight
the insurgents, however, and it might stand aside if
there is a major confrontation.
Habre probably still hopes to trade on his growing
strength to regain a government role, but the relative
ease of his recent victories could embolden him to try
again to seize power. Meanwhile, President Goukouni
faces mounting criticism from other government fac-
tional leaders for his decision last November to
dispense with Libyan troops. He seems increasingly
desperate and might ask Libya to return if his position
deteriorates much more. The Libyans pulled out of
Chad partly to show Goukouni that he could not
survive his country's chronic factional strife without
them, and Tripoli probably would come to his aid
again if his government were to make a formal
request
Civil War: A Way of Life
Political factionalism is the single biggest obstacle
to stability and centralized rule in Chad. At least
16 prominent leaders-some with sizable armed fol-
lowings-command varying degrees of support among
the country's 4.5 million people and 200 distinct
ethnic groups. Disputes are frequent and are seldom
settled peacefully. Some groups try from time to time
to reconcile their differences and work together-such
as the current effort by the larger factions to form an
integrated national army to keep order-but resent-
ments are so deep that agreements invariably collapse.
Chad's factions are largely the result of geography
and sociology, and they illustrate the problems caused
by territorial boundaries arbitrarily established dur-
ing the French colonial era. The country stretches
from the heart of the Sahara Desert in the Arab-
influenced north to the savannas of equatorial black
Africa in the south and is at the crossroads of
powerful competing cultural and religious influences.
Chad-like many African countries-is less a politi-
cal entity than an awkward patchwork of countless 25X1
small and unintegrated ethnic groups, many with
sharply different traditions, lifestyles, and beliefs.
Four broad groups of peoples predominate in Chad. 25X1
The largest grouping-the black Sara-is a culturally
cohesive people who reside in the south below the 10th
parallel and account for a quarter of Chad's popula-
tion. North of the Sara belt, in an arc stretching from
Nigeria to Sudan, live a number of fragmented Arab
clans which together total 14 percent of the popula-
tion and form the second-largest group. Cohabiting
the central and eastern regions are a jumbled assort-
ment of Islamized non-Arab peoples-especially the
Maba, a collection of strong-willed and xenophobic
mountain tribes which have long made eastern Chad a
hotbed of resistance to central rule. Finally, in the
sparsely populated desert and mountain wastelands 25X1
above the 14th parallel live the fiercely independent
Toubou, a loose network of mutually feuding, semino-
madic, non-Arab warrior clans that make up less than
4 percent of the population but have been in the
forefront of the country's civil war since 1968.
Chad's history since the 14th century has been 25X1
marked by a bitter struggle for dominance between its
northern and southern groups. The Maba and other
Muslim peoples held sway during the precolonial
period and terrorized the Sara-dominated south with
frequent slave raids. After France began to colonize
Chad in the late 19th century, the Sara quickly
adapted to French culture and exploited opportunities
for education and advancement, while the northerners
spent their energies in armed resistance to the French.
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Although the north was never fully subdued, France
by the I 950s had brought the region under some
semblance of control, setting the stage for the south's
rise to political dominance shortly before Chad gained
independence in 1960.
French colonial rule did not, however, result in nation-
al integration or foster a sense of national identity.
Although the French fought hard to conquer Chad,
once it was theirs they largely neglected it. Chad
consequently stagnated during some 60 years as a
French colony, with its internal cleavages essentially
"frozen" while French troops maintained the peace.
The economy-outside the south, which became a
center of cotton cultivation for export-remained
undeveloped, and traditional ethnic and regional ani-
mosities continued to fester even as new ones
emerged.
When the postcolonial Sara-government of Francois
Tombalbaye took power in 1960 and cracked down
harshly on Muslim leaders accused of subversive
activities, the illusion of national unity was shattered.
Resentment and discord culminated five years later in
a spontaneous peasant uprising in the east that
marked the beginning of major conflict. By 1968, the
Muslim rebellion had spread west and then north. The
Toubous-loosely allied with several other Muslim
groups in a guerrilla movement called the Front for
the National Liberation of Chad (FROLINAT)-
nearly toppled Tombalbaye before French troops,
which withdrew from Chad in 1964, returned in 1969
to push them back to isolated desert outposts.
For a time it seemed the south would finally impose
its will on the north, but the FROLINAT factions
regrouped and again set their sights on the capital,
N'Djamena. After French domestic pressure forced
Paris to withdraw most of its forces from Chad in
1970, fighting resumed and gradually helped fan
discontent among southern military officers. Mean-
while, Libya began to provide arms and funds to
northern insurgent groups and in 1973 took advantage
of Chad's political paralysis to occupy the Aozou
strip, a narrow band of purportedly mineral-rich
territory along the Chad-Libya border.
In 1975, young southern officers seized power, in-
stalled General Malloum-a weak and uninspiring
Sara leader-as President, and tried unsuccessfully to
make peace with the insurgents. In March 1979-
after a desperate attempt by the Malloum regime to
divide the rebels by bringing some of them into the
government-N'Djamena fell to Toubou forces loyal
to guerrilla leader Goukouni, bringing full circle the
age-old struggle between north and south.
After months of political infighting among the victori-
ous Muslim factions, Goukouni became head of the
Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT),
a provisional regime that grew out of OAU efforts to
reconcile the ever-growing number of northern splin-
ter groups with others that had begun to emerge in
the south. Quarrels quickly paralyzed the coalition,
however, and led to new fighting in March 1980 when
Defense Minister Habre-a brilliant but ruthless
Toubou factional leader and at one time Goukouni's
right-hand man-tried to defeat the other leaders
militarily and take control.
Goukouni and other government forces suffered sub-
stantial casualties, and after Habre-outnumbered 4
to 1-began to gain the upper hand, the Chadian
President was forced to ask Libya for direct help.
Libyan troops intervened in force in October 1980,
and two months later finally pushed Habre's rebels
out of N'Djamena and key population centers in the
northern half of Chad. The Libyans kept order until
Goukouni asked them to leave, and Tripoli-motivat-
ed in part by international pressure-ordered its
forces to withdraw in late 1981.
The Major Contenders
As Chad teeters once more on the brink of civil war,
four major factional leaders-three of them high-
ranking government officials-seem to hold the key to
the country's future: President Goukouni, Vice Presi-
dent Kamougue, Foreign Minister Acyl, and rebel
leader Habre.
Goukouni. Chad's figurehead President controls the
People's Armed Forces (FAP), a once powerful faction
drawn from the Teda, who form the larger of the two
branches of the Toubou people. Goukouni's armed
following has weakened considerably in the last two
years-FAP now has only about 500 troops-and he
25X1
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probably could not stay in power without the contin-
ued political and military support of Vice President
Kamougue.F_~
Goukouni has long had a record of close Libyan ties,
but since last summer he has moved toward the
West-especially France. Paris began to send him
military aid in November 1981 following his call for
Libyan troops to withdraw from Chad by the end of
the year. The Chadian President considers himself a
nationalist and has often urged other factional leaders
to set aside their differences and help rebuild the war-
ravaged country. In reality, however, he still refuses,
like the other principal government factional leaders,
to come to terms with rebel leader Habre
Kamougue. Colonel Kamougue-the brains and
brawn behind the palace coup that toppled President
Tombalbaye in 1975-heads the Armed Forces of
Chad (FAT), which he formed when fellow Sara
members of Malloum's shattered National Army
regrouped to protect the south after N'Djamena fell
to FROLINAT insurgents in 1979. FAT is Chad's
second-largest faction with some 3,500 men under
arms, but they are poorly trained and equipped and
are not inclined to fight outside the south.
As Vice President, Kamougue maintains an uneasy
alliance with GUNT's northern Muslim factions and
faces some political opposition in the south. He has
long opposed Libyan influence in Chad, but was
unwilling to set aside his hatred for Habre and join
the rebel leader in an anti-Libyan insurgency before
Tripoli withdrew its troops.
Kamougue appears to be backing Goukouni for now
against Foreign Minister Acyl's behind-the-scenes
efforts to undercut the President's influence, but the
southern factional leader is reluctant to get involved
in the north's fratricidal feuding. He might decide to
sit on his hands if Acyl tries to seize power in
N'Djamena or if Habre's insurgency makes dramatic
gains and threatens to topple Goukouni.
Figure I. President Goukouni (1) and Vice Presi-
dent Kamougue (r): How long will their alliance
Acyl. Chad's pro-Libyan Foreign Minister is an ethnic
Arab who draws his support from the various Arab
clans in the central regions. He controls the Demo- 25X1
cratic Revolutionary Council (CDR), Chad's second-
largest armed faction-about 2,500 troops-and the
biggest northern Muslim group. Acyl probably could
not have assembled so large a fighting force without
Libyan help to recruit and train followers.
25X1
Acyl has limited leadership skills and only nominal
control of Chad's foreign policy, but he hopes eventu- 25X1
ally to become president with Libya's help and may be 25X1
planning a power grab. During the last year his men
in eastern Chad took the brunt of the fighting against25X1
Habre-whom he hates bitterly and sees as his only
obstacle to dominating the north-and CDR troops
presently comprise most of the government force
trying to stem new rebel forays toward the central
regions. The latest fighting thus continues to lock
Chad's two most ambitious and powerful northern
factional leaders in an increasingly tense struggle that
ironically buys Goukouni some time and allows Ka- 25X1
mougue to postpone the decision he inevitably must
make about his role in the growing crisis. F____-] 25X1
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 Figure 2. Foreign Minister
Acyl: Planning a power grab?
Habre. Chad's tenacious guerrilla leader heads the
Northern Armed Forces (FAN), which he formed in
1977 after breaking with Goukouni, his Toubou
brother and former mentor. Habre draws his support
largely from the Daza branch of the Toubous-
especially the Anakaza clan, a small but fierce group
of nomadic warriors. His forces have consistently been
better organized and disciplined than those of other
factions, and in the closing weeks of 1981 they have
made a strong showing in eastern Chad, where they
continue to advance westward against government
troops.
Habre has many bitter enemies and will not be able to
unite Chad politically. In recent years he has dis-
played pro-Western sympathies, but the decision last
November by Egypt and Sudan-his last remaining
foreign benefactors-to cut off military aid will prob-
ably force him to look elsewhere for support. He
might even turn back to Libya. Tripoli gave Habre
and other northern guerrilla leaders some aid in the
1970s during their struggle against the south and
might see some advantage to having him keep Chad in
turmoil and thus vulnerable to new Libyan meddling.
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Figure 3. Rebel leader Habre:
Brilliant but ruthles~
Bleak Prospects for Stability
After a year of relative calm, Chad again threatens to
become the scene of a violent, free-for-all power
struggle. Habre is on the move, Goukouni is strug-
gling to survive, Acyl is working against both, and
Kamougue is carefully weighing his next decision.
Meanwhile, numerous lesser leaders (see chart) are
jockeying for position and looking for ways to weather
the coming storm.
OAU peacekeeping forces in Chad have slowly start-
ed to take up positions outside N'Djamena, but they
are reluctant to engage Habre's rebels or to get
involved in quarrels between government factions.
The OAU units thus are likely to prove ineffective if
major fighting continues to spread westward. Similar-
ly, there seems to be little that France or other
Western nations can do through diplomatic pressure
or economic enticements to halt Chad's latest drift
toward renewed widespread fighting.
A return to full-fledged civil war could set the stage
for formal partition. The south is politically and
ethnically more cohesive than the north and its agri-
cultural-based economy could enable it to survive
without the rest of the country. The north, however,
would remain inherently unstable and the deep resent-
ments among the various Muslim groups would make
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it an attractive target for new meddling by Libyan
leader Qadhafi, who clearly still has designs on the
area.
What hope there is of containing factional tensions
and preventing another upheaval rests largely on how
the Chadian Government handles Habre. Goukouni,
Kamougue, and Acyl-despite their professed unwill-
ingness to negotiate with the rebel leader-know that
if they cannot stop him militarily, they will have to try
to accommodate him politically. Bringing Habre back
into the government, however, could be as dangerous
as keeping him out. He probably would not sit still in
a subordinate position for long if he concluded once
again that his prospects for seizing control of the
government were good.
If the Goukouni regime were somehow to defuse the
threat of renewed civil war by making peace with
Habre, its next order of business would be to try to
integrate all the various factional forces into a truly
impartial national army. Following that, the Chadian
factions would have to focus on devising a more
effective form of central government. One option
might be a federal structure, featuring regional ad-
ministrators with considerable authority over local
affairs, which could help mollify separatist sentiments
and preserve some semblance of national unity. Pros-
pects for such developments seem remote, however,
and factional violence is likely to remain Chad's
preferred method of political discourse for some time
to come.
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