COMMENTS ON NIC MEMORANDUM "SS-20S AND CUBA"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000200400002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 19, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/08/04 :CIA-RDP84B00049R000200400002-9
~~~/Sov~
19 ~'~b~u~cry 398
MF.~.ORA~~Ut~s Ctamments can NIA M~~ttc~r~.nda~,r~ "~~-~fla ~ ~uta"
i. Tt~er~ is no e~ric~ex~ce that ffi3-r2'~ m,i~sil~~ haa..~~:
or arm being mbdif3.ec~ frsr tx??~aical ~~se.
~ . The r~t~aer e~vid~nce~ ~:i~ed in ~:hc m~morara~tz~ .~s nor
related t.c~ ~5-2t9s or ~.ny tsthe~: m~ss~.le~. }
3. The Sbvi~:ts ~:~~ c~sxrent~.~r c~bz'c~.sinc~ bt~.er pc~l~.cy
d ~ ~ptic~ris t4 upset, CTS TNT' plarx~. S~7t't~ b~ thEtF3f: iO~a~ gyzo~nis~.a~~
to them now, and if their a~+geared ~.ess so in ~rhe future,
r~thex~ counterxneespares ~ntaa.l~.s~g fay' ~,ess risk are r~~s~.~.ab1~
to them. They fu~.ly recaa~xzae that p~.aainr~ SS-20~ i..~x tuba,
e~ould invfte US actions a~a~.nst a c~.aGnt they' could zaat
protect . ?
~ . ~ Th~.s 21T.G m~moran4i.um could g~rhags be ~e'bated.
internally w~.th;..sa CIA car the int~l~.ge~ace c~ama~~a3sity, but
3.t i~ clearXy nc,t auitab3.e fear preaea~t~.ti.on by ~,he ~3~I
betbr~: t:he National :;ecux~ity Cauncii.
Approved For Release 2007/08/04 :CIA-RDP84B00049R000200400002-9
 Approved For Release 2007/08/04 :CIA-RDP84B00049R000200400002-9
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2007/08/04 :CIA-RDP84B00049R000200400002-9
 Approved For Release 2007/08/04 :CIA-RDP84B00049R000200400002-9
CONFIDENTIAL
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Wenry ~ Rowen
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2007/08/04 :CIA-RDP84B00049R000200400002-9
National Intelligence Council
DDI #1339-82
17 February 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT SS-20s and Cuba
As a first step in evaluating the thesis propounded in the attach-
ment, I am soliciting your views. Unless dissuaded by~your reactions,
my next step will be to propose it as a Watch Committee agenda item
and thereby initiate interagency deliberations.
 Approved For Release 2007/08/04 :CIA-RDP84B00049R000200400002-9
? i ul' StCRET~
~~
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM
SUBJECT
C. Military Developments in Cuba: Over the last year the Soviets
have upgraded their military representative to a 3-star ener
vice 2 stars)
IRBMs from Europe
SS-20s and Cuba
16 February 1982
1. Thesis.
I believe that the Soviets are positioning themselves to be able to
deploy SS-20s to Cuba on short notice. The primary purposes of such a move,
should they decide upon it, would be to prevent US INF deployment in Western
Europe and to weaken the Atlantic alliance.
2. Supporting Evidence:
A. SS-20s. They have been or are being modified for tropical
climates, i.e., for deployment outside the-USSR.
B. Political Preaaration: In discussions (most recently on ABC TV,
Sunday, 4 February Sov~~t representatives have been arguing
that the 1962 Cuban missile crisis was resolved by having the
USSR withdraw its missiles in exchange for a withdrawal of US
v a so increase eir
m~ nary e iveries o t e Cuban forces, and given particular
emphasis to Cuban air defense capabilities (inter alia by the
ccelivery of SA-6 and additional MIG-23s, which improve the Cuban
air defense capability no matter what their primary mission is.
3. Analysis of Evidence.
The evidence does not point to a definite decision but suggests a
pattern of actions designed to create the deployment capability. The
modification of the SS-20 speaks for itself while the Soviet presentation of
the alleged 1962 missile deal provides justification for reintroducing Soviet
missiles into Cuba if the US proceeds with INF modernization. In Cuba, Soviet
command and communications changes