LAW OF THE SEA

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000200290010-3
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• Content Type: NIE

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C& ,.f o ential
Central
Intelligence
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CONFIDENTIAL
NIE 2/1-81
LAW OF THE SEA
Information available as of 7 December 1981 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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0
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Treasury, and
Energy.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ............................................................................................................
1
DEPARTURES FROM EARLIER ESTIMATE ......................................................
2
BASIC CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................
3
KEY JUDGMENTS ....................................................................................................
5
DISCUSSION ..............................................................................................................
9
1. The Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea:
Background and Perspective ........................................................................
9
II. The World With a Comprehensive Treaty ................................................
11
A. With Accession by the United States .....................................................
11
Coastal State Claims and Navigation ...................................................
11
Seabed Mining ........................................................................................
11
Other Issues ............................................................................................
12
B. Without Accession by the United States ................................................
13
Coastal State Claims and Navigation ...................................................
13
Seabed Mining ........................................................................................
14
Other Issues ............................................................................................
14
C. Without Accession by the Industrial Democracies ...............................
14
Coastal State Claims and Navigation ...................................................
14
Seabed Mining ........................................................................................
15
Other Issues ...........................................................................................
17
III. The World Without a Comprehensive Treaty ...........................................
17
Coastal State Claims and Navigation ...................................................
17
Seabed Mining ........................................................................................
18
Other Issues ............................................................................................
18
IV. Potential for Global Polarization .................................................................
19
A. North-South Relations .............................................................................
19
B. Relations Among Industrial Nations ......................................................
20
Annex A: Key Groups in UNCLOS III ................
................................................ A-1
The Group of 77 ...................................
................................................ A-2
The USSR and Its Allies .......................
................................................ A-2
Naval and Maritime States ...................
................................................ A-3
Coastal States .........................................
................................................ A-3
Seabed Miners .......................................
................................................ A-4
Land-Based Producers ..........................
................................................ A-9
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Page
Annex B: Recent Trends in Jurisdictional Claims .............................................. B-1
Motives for Jurisdictional Claims ........................................................ B-1
Annex C: Summary of Seabed Mining Texts of Draft Convention ................... C-1
The International Seabed Authority .................................................... C-1
System of Access ................................................................................... C-1
Technology Transfer ............................................................................ C-1
Subsidies for the Enterprise ................................................................. C-2
Production Controls .............................................................................. C-2
Revenue Sharing ................................................................................... C-3
System of Governance .......................................................................... C-3
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CqNFIDENTIAL
SCOPE NOTE
The United States is currently at a critical decision point in its
participation in the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III). The recently completed review of US policies on the law
of the sea found the provisions covering navigation, coastal state
jurisdiction, scientific research, and pollution control generally accept-
able, but the treaty's provisions for the exploration and exploitation of
the deep seabeds fundamentally unacceptable. In determining its
position for the UNCLOS III session in New York City in March 1982,
the United States needs to evaluate whether continued participation in
the treaty negotiations serves its national interests. This Estimate looks
at four possible outcomes to these negotiations and assesses their
implications for US interests.
The outcomes are:
? Achievement of a comprehensive treaty with US accession.
? Achievement of a comprehensive treaty without US accession.
? Achievement of a comprehensive treaty without accession by all
industrial countries.
? A no-treaty world.
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DEPARTURES FROM EARLIER ESTIMATE
The 1977 estimate on law of the sea (NIE 2-1-77) was the first at-
tempt by the Intelligence Community to assess the utility of a
comprehensive LOS treaty and the possible consequences of its failure.
In the intervening years, law of the sea issues and our perception of
these issues have changed. The changes are most notable in five areas:
Navigation. In the course of years of negotiation, a negotiated text
covering transit rights through straits and archipelagoes has gained
widespread acceptance. In view of this, we now judge the risks of losing
important navigation and overflight freedoms under any of the treaty
outcomes as somewhat less than previously stated.
Customary International Law. The earlier estimate was silent on
the importance of customary international law. We are now more
aware that, in the absence of a treaty or without accession to a treaty, a
nation can still seek to protect its navigation interests by relying on the
principles of customary international law, supplemented when neces-
sary by timely and purposeful exercise of its power. The degree of
stability and predictability in the navigation regime, therefore, is
somewhat greater than we previously believed.
Seabed Mining Regime. The disincentives to commercial seabed
mining created by the proposed treaty regime are now more clearly
understood, as are the objections to it of both the private sectors and the
governments of leading industrial democracies.
Undesirable Precedent. There is more concern now that accept-
ance of Third World ideological principles in a seabed mining treaty
would establish a negative precedent for other future global negotiations
on matters such as outer space, the radio spectrum, and Antarctica.
North-South Dialogue. We are more sensitive in the current
Estimate to the political content and implications of North-South
relations and more aware of the diversity of economic interests that
limits the cohesion of the Third World.
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BASIC CONCLUSIONS
Navigation
In spite of the few remaining ambiguities in the treaty language, a
comprehensive treaty has the advantage of codifying a set of interna-
tional rules that will, for some time, inhibit the extension of coastal state
jurisdiction-a development viewed as highly beneficial by all the
maritime powers. Even without acceding to it, however, the United
States would benefit from the treaty's navigational provisions. In the
absence of a treaty there would be doubt whether the United States
could maintain certain navigational rights by relying on customary
international law. A successful treaty process, therefore, is in the United
States' interest whether or not it is a signatory.
Seabed Mining
Given a more realistic appraisal of the resources likely to be
generated by seabed mining in the foreseeable future, the focus of
Third World interests in the mining regime has increasingly empha-
sized the politics of control. At the same time, the industrial countries
are more sensitive now to the importance of not having a treaty regime
that adds to the risks and costs of seabed mining. This dichotomy
between North and South in seabed mining goals poses an impasse not
likely to be resolved. Most industrial countries, however, would prefer
to prolong the negotiations indefinitely rather than join the United
States in walking out of the negotiations and developing an alternative
minitreaty. In the meantime they are showing an increasing willingness
to work with the United States to develop an interim reciprocating
states regime.
Seabed mining could occur under any of the treaty outcomes if
economic conditions permitted. Under some outcomes, however, there
would be distinct limitations:
? If the United States acceded to a comprehensive treaty requiring
mandatory transfer of technology to the proposed International
Seabed Authority, most US firms would find such a mining
regime unattractive.
? If the United States does not accede to a treaty, US seabed
mining claims would be legally shaky. Investors would then be
deterred from supporting US mining ventures. In that event, US
firms could mine the seabed under foreign registry, but this
would constrain development of a US-flag industry.
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? If all the industrial countries interested in seabed mining were to
abstain from the treaty, or if there were no treaty, an alternative
seabed mining regime that would meet the needs of the private
sector would probably evolve.
Foreign Relations
None of the outcomes of UNCLOS III considered in this Estimate
would seriously impair the United States' ability to carry on its relations
with its defense and industrial partners or with the Third World. An
abrupt US abandonment of the negotiating process would cause some
adverse political repercussions, but these effects would be short lived.
For most countries, law of the sea has become a relatively low priority
issue except for its ideological impact. Some Third World countries
view law of the sea as an important symbol of political solidarity among
the Third World "Group of 77" (G-77). For a few countries, notably
Indonesia, specific ocean jurisdictional issues provide important oppor-
tunities for furthering their national interests. Major industrial countries
are concerned about unfavorable Third World reactions to a failure of
UNCLOS III. But relations between North and South are founded on
concrete matters of trade, investment, and other bilateral interests that
would not be ruptured in the event of a no-treaty outcome.
There is an alternative view 1 which holds that the major industrial
countries are concerned that a failure of UNCLOS III would represent a
potential setback to the institutionalization of peaceful settlements of
international disputes. Furthermore, the EC Ten may be motivated to
accelerate their current tendency to pursue an independent European
foreign policy on issues of vital interest to the United States.
' The holder of this view is the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
LOS in the Foreign Policy Context
? Nearly all foreign governments believe that the time and intellec-
tual energy already committed to UNCLOS III are too great to
warrant walking away from the bargaining table and deserting
what has been accomplished to date.
? On the other hand, most states accord the LOS negotiations low
priority relative to other foreign policy issues, although for some
countries of special importance to the United States, such as
Indonesia, Australia, Japan, and Canada, the negotiations have a
position of higher visibility.
? Uses of the oceans will intensify, as will the likelihood of conflict
over ocean issues. While the LOS treaty would establish a
generally shared legal. framework covering activities in the ocean,
its entry into force would probably not eliminate conflicts. Some
parts of the Draft Convention are ambiguously worded, and
disputes could arise over certain aspects of the treaty language.
? LOS-related incidents occasionally flare to a high level of
international visibility, but such events are frequently rooted in
longstanding antagonisms or involve broader issues of prime
national concern. Such incidents will continue to occur with or
without a comprehensive treaty.
? Hence, even if a collapse of the treaty effort were perceived to be
a direct result of US actions, we doubt that the ability of the
United States to pursue its long-term foreign policy interests
would be significantly impaired. The costs of achieving some US
objectives, however, might be increased, and confidence in US
negotiating consistency diminished.
The World With a Comprehensive Treaty-With Accession
by the United States
? A comprehensive treaty would, for some time, inhibit the large-
scale expansion of geographic claims. The 12-mile limit for the
territorial sea and the 200-mile limit for the exclusive economic
zone would probably satisfy present needs of most coastal states.
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? Most coastal states would comply with the treaty provisions on
navigation and overflight in straits and archipelagoes.
? In the longer run, if the provisions of the treaty no longer satisfy
coastal states and they seek to expand their jurisdictions, the
United States would have a clear basis under the treaty for
rejecting claims that exceed the limits authorized by the treaty.
? None of the treaty provisions would obviate the need for the
United States occasionally to exercise its rights to ensure that its
interpretation of the treaty's navigational and jurisdictional
provisions were indeed accepted by other nations.
? If, even after substantial revision, the deep seabed mining
provisions of the treaty required private firms to share technol-
ogy with the mining subsidiary of the proposed International
Seabed Authority (ISA), most US firms would find such invest-
ments unattractive.
? Even if a favorable legal regime is crafted for corporate seabed
miners, the state of the world economy and the future pace of
technological change would be the principal factors determining
the scope of seabed exploitation. However, some governments
with a strongfelt need for access to strategic minerals might be in-
clined to subsidize their firms.
? One consequence of acceding to an LOS treaty close to present
terms would be the negative precedent it sets for the United
States and other industrial countries in future negotiations, such
as exploitation of the resources of outer space, allocation of the
radio spectrum, and the governance of Antarctica.
A Comprehensive Treaty-Without Accession by the United States
? The navigational and jurisdictional impact of the treaty would be
essentially the same whether or not the United States acceded to
the treaty.
? The US ability to affect the interpretation of the treaty would be
reduced if the United States were not a party. US industrial allies
and the Soviets, however, being treaty parties, could be expected
to protect their own navigation interests under the treaty-which
are similar to those of the United States.
? Where the new treaty defines rights in great detail-as in the
case of permitted activities under innocent passage in the
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territorial sea-US ability to benefit from these rights might be
impaired. The United States might have to rely on the less
specific customary international law, which is subject to restric-
tive interpretation by coastal states.
? US-sponsored seabed mining would have to be conducted under
the traditional high-seas principle that the resources of the deep
seabed are res nullius (belong to no one). This would reduce
opportunities for reciprocal mining agreements with other indus-
trial countries that would be tied to the LOS treaty regime.
? Without internationally recognized guarantees of security of
capital and tenure, the private sector would be unlikely to invest
significantly in US seabed mining ventures. US firms, however,
could register under foreign flags and mine the seabed under
their jurisdictions. This would constrain development of a US-
flag industry.
A Comprehensive Treaty-Without Accession by the Industrial Democracies
? Such a situation would not come about quickly. It could arise,
however, if the negotiations bogged down, ratifications were slow
to accumulate, and seabed mining opportunities outside the
treaty became strongly attractive.
? Under this scenario, the major maritime powers would seek to
ensure that the jurisdictional and navigational provisions of the
treaty are respected as customary international law. But lacking a
widely accepted treaty, these navigation rights for both military
and commercial ships and aircraft would be vulnerable to
modification by state practice.
? Economic conditions permitting, the United States and other
seabed miners-West Germany, France, the United Kingdom,
Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan-could begin site-
specific development under a reciprocating states agreement
which could take place under any scenario.
? While the G-77 and the USSR would severely criticize such an al-
ternative regime, physical reprisals against it are unlikely. Legal
challenges and financial threats could be mounted by developing
countries against corporations participating in such ventures, but
would risk costly reprisals by their sponsoring governments.
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The World Without a Comprehensive Treaty
? In a nontreaty world, confrontations and conflicts are likely to be
fewer than suggested by the rhetorical statements in UNCLOS
III. Most maritime disputes will arise less from the absence of a
treaty than from longstanding political rivalries and the growing
diversity and intensity of ocean use.
? If UNCLOS III fails, its last treaty draft will strongly influence
the evolution of customary international law. Its provisions, other
than for seabed mining, would survive as an authoritative
statement of international law.
? Economic conditions permitting, the seabed mining states could
be expected to initiate commercial operations under an expanded
reciprocating states agreement within the next decade or two.
? For the developing countries, UNCLOS III has been a bellwether
of progress in the North-South dialogue. The seabed mining
provisions embody some key principles of the "new international
economic order."
? Failure to reach a seabed mining accord seen as equitable in
Third World eyes would evoke recriminations by South against
North. Beyond the rhetoric, however, the developing nations
would continue to nurture their vital economic and political ties
with the industrialized countries.
? A unilateral decision by the United States to withdraw from the
negotiations would not elicit parallel action by other industrial
countries. They would prefer to prolong the negotiations while
giving at least the semblance of trying to reach an accord. The
majority of other industrial countries would probably be pre-
pared to sign the Convention, even without the United States,
though ultimate ratification would be in question.
? Because of their greater sense of North-South interdependence,
other industrial nations would prefer to have the United States
continue to seek some manner of accommodation in UNCLOS
III. If the impasse over seabed mining continues, and in the
unlikely event that the stalemate could be attributed to G-77
intransigence, the industrial countries might be more inclined to
join the United States in an alternative mining regime.
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DISCUSSION
1. The Third UN Conference on the Law of the
Sea: Background and Perspective
1. The international law of the sea has undergone
considerable change in the last few decades. Until the
1940s, it was essentially customary law, a body of rules
and regulations based on widely accepted practices
and customs. As long as major users of the sea
continued to be interested primarily in near-shore
fishing and navigation, this state of affairs was
adequate.
2. Once nations appreciated the potential of the
sea's resources and developed efficient long-range
fishing fleets, however, they began to harvest fish off
foreign shores. Traditional rules quickly became out-
dated, and nations with rich fishing grounds off their
coasts responded by extending their maritime jurisdic-
tions. The United States claimed the natural resources
of the adjacent continental shelf in 1945. Chile and
Costa Rica did likewise in 1947 and 1949, respectively,
and both states also claimed exclusive jurisdiction over
fisheries out to 200 miles.2 Peru claimed a 200-mile
territorial sea in 1947, and a variety of other offshore
claims followed. These claims forced a critical reas-
sessment of legal principles governing international
maritime relations.
3. The First and Second United Nations Confer-
ences on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sought to
eliminate the evolving confusion through the develop-
ment of widely acceptable treaties governing the uses
of the oceans. The first conference was held in 1958,
with 86 delegations in attendance. It produced four
general conventions dealing with fisheries, the conti-
nental shelf, the high seas, and the territorial sea, but it
did not reach agreement on a maximum limit for
territorial sea claims or set a precise seaward l:,mit to
coastal state jurisdiction over the resources of the
continental shelf. Two years later, 88 delegations
reconvened for the Second UNCLOS, chiefly to stand-
ardize the breadth of the territorial sea, but once again
failed to reach agreement.
4. In the mid-1960s, the United States and the
USSR initiated efforts to secure international agree-
ment on standardization of maritime claims. Their
objective was to protect their interests in sailing
through and flying over distant coastal waters and
straits. Both nations hoped to limit territorial sea
claims to 12 miles and to preserve navigation rights in
broader resource zones. These events, plus the increas-
ing awareness of the economic potential of seabed
minerals, led in the late 1960s to the establishment of a
UN committee to study the peaceful uses of the seabed
and, finally, in 1970 to a resolution to convene a third
law of the sea conference. Concurrently, the develop-
ing countries pushed a resolution through the UN
General Assembly that declared seabed resources be-
yond areas of coastal state jurisdiction "the common
heritage of mankind." The United States voted in
favor of both resolutions, although it made clear that it
was not bound by the "common heritage" resolution
and that the precise meaning of that resolution would
have to be elaborated in a comprehensive treaty. The
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS III) was convened in December 1973.
5. The conference has since reached substantial
agreement on a Draft Convention text in most areas,
notably on the principles of the 12-mile territorial sea,
200-mile exclusive economic zone, definition of the
continental shelf, and freedom of transit through
straits and archipelagoes. The conference has been less
successful, however, in reaching agreement on a deep
seabed mining regime. The failure to achieve an
acceptable compromise on this issue at UNCLOS III,
after no fewer than 13 major negotiating sessions, is
telling.3
6. The agreements on the extent of national juris-
diction over coastal fisheries and continental shelf oil
and gas (which have already been implemented
through unilateral state practice in the interim) greatly
reduced the negotiating leverage of the major industri-
alized nations, whose initial opposition to the principle
3 The key groups of nations involved in UNCLOS III are discussed
in annex A.
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of the 200-mile economic zone had been their main
bargaining chip.' Settlement of this, the primary dol-
lars-and-cents issue, left relatively few nations with an
economic stake in the outcome of the seabed mining
controversy. The developing countries, aside from the
few whose mineral exports might be affected by large-
scale seabed mining, were therefore free to consider
the issue in terms of supposed self-interest and general
ideology concerning North-South relations.
7. As a result, a speculative and high-risk nascent
industry has become the focus of a legal and political
negotiation ill equipped to deal with it. No procedural
device yet tried at UNCLOS III has produced results
on mining acceptable to the United States. The seabed
issue graphically demonstrates the difficulty of trying
to establish a legal regime or code for private entrepre-
neurs in global forums and the obstacles to redistribut-
ing wealth through global negotiations.
8. National interest in law of the sea negotiations
tends to vary from region to region, but most nations
generally accord it a relatively low priority vis-a-vis
other foreign policy issues. For most countries, LOS
ranks below such issues as trade and aid policies,
balance-of-payments problems, access to private and
official credits, critical imports, and terrorism. While
Latin American states are, by and large, somewhat
more interested in LOS matters, the subject is still
clearly subordinate to events related to old boundary
disputes and other bilateral animosities, and to broader
issues of economic development. Archipelagic states,
such as strategically located Indonesia, probably have
a greater interest in the success of UNCLOS III than
any other group. With its claim to archipelagic status
being the most tenuous of the new jurisdictional
concepts addressed by UNCLOS III, Jakarta is unique-
ly sensitive to any event that threatens to derail the
Draft Convention.
9. While LOS-related incidents are occasionally
accorded top priority consideration by states, such
events are usually rooted in historical antagonisms that
will persist long after UNCLOS III is terminated. The
Greek-Turkish dispute in the Aegean Sea and the
Argentine-Chilean argument over the Beagle Channel
' The trends and motives of the various jurisdictional claims are
discussed in annex B.
are examples of this type of incident. Even such highly
emotional events as the Icelandic-UK "cod war" and
the breakup of the tanker Amoco Cadiz off the coast
of France were painful incidents, but ones for which
the international system found acceptable adjust-
ments.
10. Thus, if there were to be no law of the sea
treaty, and the United States were to be held responsi-
ble for scuttling the conference, we seriously doubt
whether that would make it significantly more diffi-
cult to pursue any of the major foreign policy interests
facing the United States. Nor would it have more than
a transitory effect on the conduct of bilateral relations
with the broad range of states with which the United
States maintains diplomatic relations. However, it
would tend to erode confidence in the United States as
a reliable negotiator in other multilateral forums.
11. Entry into force of a law of the sea treaty on
present terms-which requires ratification by 60
states-would certainly not eliminate conflicts in the
ocean. Some critical parts of the treaty-including
some dealing with national security-are ambiguously
worded and disputes could arise over interpretation of
treaty language. Thus, in certain instances, a treaty
would merely shift the form of the debate from one
over rules of customary international law to one over
interpretation of ambiguous treaty terms.
12. The Law of the Sea Conference should not be
viewed as an isolated, static occurrence, but rather as
part of a process of evolving customary law for the use
of ocean space and exploitation of ocean resources.
Even without a treaty, this process will continue to
evolve along the present track of state claims and
counterclaims coupled with bilateral and regional
arrangements that serve the interests of states sharing
common problems or opportunities.
13. The United States, if it were to become a party
to an LOS treaty on present terms, would still be
required to take some occasional action to ensure that
its own interpretation of those navigational freedoms
were indeed accepted by other nations. This would
entail the development of interpretive statements and
positions'and, in extreme cases, the insertion of naval
and air forces to ensure that the claimed treaty right
was in fact available to it.
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II. The World With a Comprehensive Treaty ...
A. With Accession by the United States
14. Although it is difficult to envision the resolution
of the North-South impasse over the form and sub-
stance of a proposed seabed mining regime, we assume
for the purpose of this Estimate that some middle-of-
the-road compromise is struck that will put the Draft
Convention in a form acceptable to the United States,
its Western allies, the Communist Bloc, and a majority
of the developing states comprising the Group of 77
(G-77). The seabed regime that emerges would prob-
ably still contain various principles associated with the
"new international economic order" (NIEO), but they
would be substantially watered down from their pres-
ent formulation in the draft treaty.'
15. Coastal State Claims and Navigation. If such
a treaty came into force, its provisions would, for some
time, inhibit a large-scale expansion of geographic
claims. The 12-mile limit for the territorial sea and the
200-mile limit for the exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
would probably satisfy the present needs of most
coastal states. However, some expansion of geographic
claims could result in the near term from the improper
use of straight baselines for drawing offshore bound-
aries and from claims for historic waters, as, for
example, in the case of the Libyan claim in the Gulf of
Sidra.
16. A treaty on present terms, however, might not
serve to stem the expansion of all coastal state func-
tional claims within the 200-mile economic zones. The
terms of the Draft Convention on the juridical status
of the economic zone are somewhat cloudy. It will
take some time before the status of high-seas rights of
navigation inside the zone are clarified through state
practice.
17. All or most states would comply with the treaty
provisions on navigation and overflight, including the
right of transit passage through straits used for interna-
tional navigation and through archipelagic sea lanes.
18. The United States and other major maritime
states would have a basis in conventional international
law for not recognizing foreign claims to offshore
zones that exceed the limits authorized by the treaty
and for opposing any efforts to impede transit within
straits and archipelagoes. Further, the jurisdictional,
navigation, and other nonseabed provisions of the
treaty generally favorable to US interests would also
serve as the best evidence of customary international
law and therefore would be binding on nonparties as
well.
19. The entry into force of a broadly supported
LOS convention would not, however, assure that all
the jurisdictional and navigational provisions of the
treaty would stay in place over a long period. As uses
of the oceans intensify and coastal states acquire a
greater technical capability to exploit and control their
offshore resources and zones there will be a greater
tendency for states to seek to impose controls on
navigation in the territorial sea, straits, and archipela-
goes, and to extend their jurisdiction over coastal
resources.
20. Most future claims that exceed the limits im-
posed by an LOS convention would probably occur as
isolated incidents, reflecting specific national or re-
gional economic or strategic needs. Most of these
incidents are local or regional in nature and, thus,
might not directly involve the United States. Some
new functional claims would probably be advanced in
such a way as to be difficult to comprehend or too
petty to protest and challenge.
21. The degree to which such creeping jurisdiction
takes hold, however, would largely depend on the
response of the major maritime states to those claims
and, occasionally, on the decisions of the treaty's
dispute settlement mechanisms. Should the maritime
states' responses be timely and purposeful, exercising
the required degree of naval, legal, or political power,
most claims would be blunted. If, on the other hand,
maritime states acquiesce or are indecisive, such
claims would stand and perhaps proliferate, with
adverse impact on the naval and commercial interests
of the United States.
22. Seabed Mining. The exploitation of the
seabeds beyond the limits of national jurisdiction
would be conducted under the parallel system wherein
private firms and state enterprises would share avail-
able minesites with the Enterprise, the mining subsid-
iary of the proposed International Seabed Authority
(ISA). Some, but not all, of the private consortiums
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would be willing to operate under the treaty and fulfill
the consequent obligations to share their revenues with
and sell their technology to the seabed authority. Some
firms, as well as selected equipment manufacturers,
would be likely to balk at the ISA's terms and decide
against investing the $1-billion-plus necessary to en-
gage in full-scale seabed mining.
23. Even if the legal regime provided by the treaty
appeared attractive to the private sector, the scale of
commercial mining activity would still depend on the
economics of the marketplace. The markets for nickel,
cobalt, copper, and manganese are likely to be such
that the scale of output would be below the ceiling
imposed by the treaty. Given long-term market expec-
tations for nickel and copper, revenues derived from
seabed production of these metals would not be
enough to attract investment away from land-based
alternatives. The prospects for manganese would be no
better, in view of the high costs of separation and the
resulting noncompetitiveness of this seabed product.
The attractiveness of seabed mining as an investment,
therefore, would hinge critically on cobalt. The cobalt
market, however, could easily be flooded by only a
handful of seabed minesites. The resulting price col-
lapse would make additional seabed mining unattrac-
tive.' Hence, unless some governments were prepared
to subsidize seabed mining, it is unlikely that more
than a few sites would be developed.
24. There is an alternative view' which holds that
insufficient evidence exists to support the conclusions
in the above paragraph, particularly since seabed
mining is unlikely to occur before the 1990s. The
markets for these commodities are highly volatile and
the situation could change completely by that time.
25. A possible consequence of adoption of an LOS
treaty could be the precedent it might set for possible
resolution of other global issues, such as exploitation of
the resources of outer space, allocation of the radio
spectrum, and perhaps even the governance of Antarc-
tica. It is evident that one of the principal goals of the
throughs greatly reduced costs of production)
Group of 77 in UNCLOS III has been to establish
legitimacy for the NIEO concept of a system of
ownership and management of resources of the global
commons under the rubric of "common heritage of
mankind." If the Draft Convention enters into force
on present terms, the "common heritage" concept:
would, in the view of most states, have taken on the
meaning that the seabed resources beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction are owned in common by the
international community and cannot be exploited
without the consent of that community through a
decisionmaking process of the International Seabed
Authority that would be heavily influenced by the
developing countries.
26. Thus, a comprehensive law of the sea treaty
could be used as a precedent for further incursion of
the NIEO into Western economies and political sys-
tems. This is already evidenced by the copying of the
"common heritage of mankind" language and concept
in the so-called "Moon Treaty," which itself closely
tracks the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea.
27. Other Issues. Marine scientists would conduct
research in foreign EEZs and on foreign continental
shelves under a regime that obliges coastal states to
respond to a foreign researcher's request within four
months-absence of a reply would permit the research
to proceed-and which permits the coastal state to
withhold consent only if the projected research is
related to resources, involves drilling into the conti-
nental shelf, uses explosives or harmful substances, or
requires the construction and use of artificial islands,
installations, and structures.
28. A treaty on present terms, if it entered into
force, would establish a regime for marine environ-
mental protection against pollution from land-based
sources, continental shelf activities, dumping, and
ships by requiring states to adopt internationally ap-
proved standards and to adopt domestic laws to
implement them. Against ship-source pollution the
treaty would institute a cooperative enforcement re-
gime, together with appropriate safeguards, dividing
responsibility among flag states, port states, and coastal
states, permitting enforcement against ships that pol-
lute, while limiting interference with freedom of
navigation to cases of willful or flagrant pollution.
29. The outer limit of coastal state jurisdiction over
the continental shelf would be determined by any of
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several options based on a combination of distance,
thickness of shelf sediment, and water depth, allowing
relatively precise establishment of the outer edge of
the shelf (technically the continental margin) which
constitutes the boundary with the area of the seabed
under the jurisdiction of the International Seabed
Authority. The outer limit would not exceed 350 miles
from the coastal baselines, or 100 miles beyond the
2,500-meter isobath. Submarine ridges, however,
would be limited to 350 miles, except for those that
are natural components of the margin such as plateaus,
rises, caps, banks, and spurs. Parties to the treaty
would be required, after the first five years of mineral
or energy production from a site located on the shelf
beyond 200 miles, to make payments to the Interna-
tional Seabed Authority of a percentage of value or
volume of production; this would average 2.2 percent
of the value of production over the 20-year producing
period of a typical installation.
B. Without Accession by the United States
30. There are two basic assumptions involved in this
scenario. The first is that the navigation provisions of
an LOS convention entering into force would be those
of the current Draft Convention: there would be a 12-
mile limit for the territorial sea, a 200-mile limit to the
exclusive economic zone, and regimes for transit pas-
sage of straits used for international navigation and for
archipelagic sealanes passage. Similarly, the juridical
status of the economic zone would be identical to that
established in the present draft treaty. That is, the
coastal state would enjoy various sovereign rights in
the zone while the international community would, by
and large, retain high-seas rights of navigation. It is
inconceivable that the Soviet Union, the European
states, and Japan would settle for anything less.
31. The second assumption is that the United States
finds itself isolated from its major commercial partners
on the seabed mining issue-that is, that the G-77 had
agreed to changes in the seabed texts sufficient to
assuage West European and Japanese concerns but not
to meet the minimal needs of the United States.
32. Coastal State Claims and Navigation. In this
situation, the claims of coastal states to extended
geographical and/or functional maritime jurisdictions
would be very similar to what they would be in a
situation where the United States was a party to a
comprehensive treaty. The treaty would serve to
inhibit any large-scale expansion of geographic claims,
at least for the short run. Deviations from the treaty in
state practice would occur gradually, often as a result
of incidents unrelated to the United States, and would
be subject to the usual claims and counterclaims and,
occasionally, dispute settlement.
33. What if the developing coastal states and straits
states were to construe the treaty provisions on straits
or high-seas freedoms in the EEZ in a way that would
limit the freedoms sought by the United States and
other maritime powers? Without being party to the
treaty, the United States would have a sharply reduced
capacity to affect the interpretation of the treaty. The
industrial allies, however, as well as the navigation-
conscious Soviets, would still be parties to the treaty,
and they could be counted on to be as diligent in
protecting the rights they had negotiated for straits,
the EEZ, and archipelagoes as would the United States
if it were a party to the treaty. Accordingly, insofar as
the rights regarding navigation are concerned, the
United States ought to be able to obtain most of the
benefits whether it were a party to the treaty or not.
34. Technically speaking, the United States could
not accuse a particular nation of breaching an interna-
tional treaty obligation toward the United States,
should that nation try to impair straits or EEZ naviga-
tional rights granted by the treaty. In the navigational
realm, however, the United States would take the
position that the treaty provisions are consistent with
customary international law. Hence, the United States
would not be without a basis for asserting a breach of
international law.
35. Thus, where the law of the sea treaty provides a
regime favorable to US interests, the United States
would still be able to obtain most of the benefits of
such a regime without becoming a party to the treaty.
This is particularly true where treaty provisions reflect
existing rules of customary international law.
36. On the other hand, where the new treaty
defines rights in great detail-as it does, say, in the
case of permitted activities under innocent passage in
the territorial sea-it could be argued that the United
States would be restricted to the traditional customary
international law principles, which contain less precise
definitions and which could be subject to restrictive
interpretations by a coastal state.
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37. Seabed Mining. It is in the area of deep seabed
mining beyond the limits of national jurisdiction that
the most difficult problems arise in a situation where
the United States is the only major state not participat-
ing in a law of the sea treaty. US-sponsored seabed
mining would have to be conducted on a unilateral
basis under the traditional high-seas principle that the
nodules are res nullius (belong to no one) and subject
to title by those who first use or take them. There
would be a reduced opportunity for entering into
reciprocal mining agreements with US industrial allies
because they would be parties to the comprehensive
oceans treaty.
38. Without internationally recognized guarantees
of security of capital and tenure, banking houses and
investors would be unlikely to commit large funds to
US seabed mining firms. US firms could, of course,
register in foreign countries that are parties to the
treaty and mine the seabed under their jurisdictions.
To the extent this occurred, it would tend to constrain
development of a US-flag seabed industry.
39. If the United States were to opt out of the treaty
before or at the time of the signing of the final act, it
would not be able to participate in the work of the
Preparatory Commission, which is to be established to
draft the provisional rules, regulations, and imple-
menting procedures for the ISA pending the entry into
force of the Convention. Consequently, the United
States would thus lose an avenue of influence on the
operating rules for seabed mining under the treaty.
40. Other Issues. If the United States were alone in
turning its back on UNCLOS III and an LOS treaty,
US marine scientists might find it difficult to obtain
permission to conduct nonresource research off the
coasts of some developing countries. Some states might
be piqued at US nonaccession and publicly deny US
scientists permission to operate in their waters while
other states could, as in the past, deny research simply
by refusing to answer US requests. However, research
related to resources of the EEZ and the continental
shelf would still be conducted by private US groups
and energy companies under contract to coastal states.
41. The United States, with a strong domestic re-
gime for the control of pollution from vessels within
the territorial sea, will have adequate protection for its
coasts because 90 percent of the vessels passing within
200 miles of US coasts visit US ports. Harmonization of
US port state enforcement with that of Canada and
Mexico could provide almost total protection for the
US coasts. The United States, however, would lose a
degree of protection for its commercial navigation
interests because it would not be able to demand
respect for the treaty provisions on enforcement by
foreign states of regulations on vessel-source pollution.
42. As regards the continental shelf, existing con-
ventional as well as customary international law con-
fers upon coastal states exclusive rights to the natural
resources of the seabed and subsoil throughout the
natural prolongation of the continental landmass. This,
added to the fact that the treaty's criteria for deter-
mining the outer limit of jurisdiction over the shelf
meets US needs, assures the United States rights to its
offshore deposits of oil and gas. By standing outside
the treaty, the United States would not have a duty to
share with the ISA any revenues from exploitation of
the shelf beyond 200 miles.
C. Without Accession by the Industrial Democracies
43. For the purpose of this discussion, we assume
that a treaty emerges from UNCLOS III that is
unacceptable to the United States and other Western
industrialized states but which is accepted by many
developing countries and the Soviet Union and its
allies. Implicit in this assumption is that the seabed
mining provisions of the draft treaty are so onerous tc
the United States and its allies that the latter are
willing both to withstand the ire of the Third World
and to rely on customary international law as the legal
underpinning for their navigation interests. In this
situation, the jurisdictional and navigation provisions
of the treaty are likely to be much as they are in the
current Draft Convention; for the USSR would not
accede to a convention that does not limit the terri-
torial sea to 12 miles and provide for unimpeded
passage of straits and archipelagoes.
44. Coastal State Claims and Navigation. As in
the previous treaty situations, the terms of the conven-
tion would serve to inhibit any large-scale expansion of
geographic claims by developing coastal states, at least
in the short run. Gradually, however, and with intensi-
fied uses of the oceans and with technological growth,
a number of states would begin to claim broader
geographic and functional jurisdiction over both navi-
gation and resources.
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45. Were the United States and its major Western
allies not to be party to a comprehensive treaty, their
capacity to affect the interpretation of the treaty
would be reduced. Technically speaking, they could
not assert that a particular state was breaching an
international treaty obligation toward them should
that state try to impair straits or EEZ navigational
rights in a manner inconsistent with the treaty. Never-
theless, because of pressures from both the Soviet
Union and the Western industrialized countries, all or
most states would regard the navigation provisions of
the treaty as being applicable to nonparties as well as
parties to the treaty. Also, when the navigation regime
is consistent with existing customary international law,
the United States and its Western allies would not be
without a basis for asserting a breach of international
law.
46. Thus, as in the previous situation, where the law
of the sea treaty provides a regime favorable to US
interests, it should still be possible to obtain many of
the benefits of such a regime without becoming a
party to the treaty. Such an outcome would, of course,
require strong assertion of rights by the major mari-
time powers. As noted earlier, this would be particu-
larly true where those provisions are reflective of
existing rules of customary international law.
47. However, on such issues as permitted activities
under innocent passage in the territorial sea (outside of
straits), where the new treaty might (or might not) go
into great detail, it could be argued that the states
outside the treaty would be restricted to the traditional
customary international law principles, which contain
less precise definitions and which could be subject to
restrictive interpretations by a coastal state.
48. Seabed Mining. Seabed mining by the United
States and other industrialized states outside the
framework of a comprehensive treaty would probably
occur only if the West European states and Japan can
ease their way out of a current predicament. They
share many of the US misgivings about the seabed
texts of the Draft Convention but are reluctant to
offend the developing countries by rejecting the texts
at this time. However, if the industrialized states could
participate in the work of the Preparatory Commission
without having to become a signatory to the treaty,
they could postpone their decision on ratification until
the time when the emotional climate would be more
favorable and the detailed mining rules and regula-
tions of the International Seabed Authority were in
hand. The issue of the "ticket of admission" to the
Preparatory Commission, though, is still unresolved, as
the G-77 declares that only signatories to the treaty
should be eligible to participate, while the United
States and other industrialized states argue that signing
the Final Act of the Conference (which does not oblige
a nation to adhere to the treaty) should be sufficient to
allow a state to participate in the workings of the
Commission.
49. Assuming their participation in the Preparatory
Commission on the terms sought above, the United
States and other nations interested in sponsoring
seabed mining firms would, when the Commission's
work is completed, be faced with the decision of
ratifying the LOS treaty or remaining outside and
conducting seabed operations under the terms of an
alternative seabed mining regime. That decision
would be based on an evaluation of the worth of the
ISA's future rules and regulations, assessment of the
economic feasibility of seabed mining, and the priori-
ties accorded LOS in each nation's array of foreign
policy concerns. In any event, there will be a need for
a stable interim regime under which the firms could
continue to develop seabed mining and processing
technology.
50. To this last concern, the United States, the
United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Italy, and Japan are negotiating to
develop an interlocking series of interim bilateral
arrangements, or a reciprocating states agreement, by
which each such nation would agree to recognize the
licenses granted by any other state party to the
reciprocal arrangement. The United States, the United
Kingdom, West Germany, and France have enacted
supporting domestic legislation, while Italy and Bel-
gium have legislation in process. Japan is developing
the technology to mine the seabeds. It has postponed
legislative action for fear of offending developing
countries. At the same time Japan has expressed
concern that its interests will not be adequately pro-
tected in the interim reciprocating states agreement
nearing completion.
51. The United States, the United Kingdom,
France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Belgium would probably be the initial partners in a
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cl
reciprocating states agreement on seabed mining. Ja-
pan would follow suit if it felt that, by not joining such
an agreement, it would fall behind other industrialized
states in the development of a new high-technology
industry promising great benefits. It is doubtful at this
stage whether any of the Nordic states would partici-
pate, inasmuch as they have accepted the notion that
the resources of the seabed are the "common heritage
of mankind" and can be exploited only with the
consent of the entire community of nations. Canada,
being a land-based producer of metals found on the
seabeds and anxious to preserve its market position,
must also be considered, at this juncture, as being
opposed to the concept of a reciprocating states agree-
ment. However, such advanced Pacific-rim countries
as Australia, South Korea, and Taiwan are possible
adherents to an agreement among seabed mining
states.
52. Such an arrangement forged among leading
industrialized states would create an atmosphere nec-
essary for seabed mining development activities to
continue. The massive investment required to establish
commercial-scale seabed operations is too far down the
road to be a subject of current negotiations. Willing-
ness to invest would depend, in part, on how many
reciprocating states are in the system. The reciprocat-
ing states regime at the outset would be a somewhat
loose arrangement, but with adroit political and diplo-
matic maneuvering it could mature into a more formal
pact open to all. Such formality would become more
important as the commercial production phase neared.
With accession by 15 to 20 states of the right eco-
nomic/geographic/political mix, there would be little
question concerning the investment climate.
53. There is little doubt that the Group of 77, the
USSR and its allies, and such Western states as the
Scandinavian nations would severely criticize any
alternative seabed mining regime. However, to the
extent that only the United States and other like-
minded nations were to engage actively in mining
deep seabed resources, a rule of customary interna-
tional law standing against it would be unlikely to
arise. This is so simply because seabed mining by the
United States and like-minded states would be the
"only game in town." Opponents of seabed mining
under an alternative regime are very unlikely to
develop the technology necessary to mine the ocean
depths or to raise the large sums of capital required.
54. The issue then becomes one of where and how
seabed mining rights under an alternative regime
might be challenged. First, some have argued that the
Group of 77 nations could take physical reprisal
against seabed mining operations. We consider this
highly unlikely. If seabed mining were to occur 201
miles off the coast of a militant developing country,
anything could happen, but such a location would not
be selected. The first generation of seabed miners
would probably be operating in the region of the
Clarion and Clipperton fracture zones in the northeast
central Pacific Ocean, 1,000 miles or more from
land-which, in that case, would be the Hawaiian
Islands. However, if interference were threatened,
naval protection might be necessary for a time.
55. A second means of challenging seabed mining
might involve economic reprisals against corporations
that have assets or franchises in developing countries.
The expropriation of assets and the canceling of leases
or operations comes to mind as an immediate form of
economic retaliation. We think the likelihood of this
course of action is small, particularly inasmuch as it
could precipitate costly counterretaliation by govern-
ments sponsoring the affected seabed miners.
56. Finally, legal actions might be instituted chal-
lenging title to the nodules and seeking a declaration
that the resources of the deep seabed were in fact the
"common heritage of mankind" and that the miners of
such resources under a reciprocating states agreement
would have to account to the international community
for such resources. It is conceivable that such an action
could be brought by a foreign country in a US Federal
District Court if seabed nodules were transported to
the United States for processing. The possibility of a
US Federal District Court holding in favor of the
Group of 77 on this issue would appear to be extreme-
ly remote. Another possibility is a suit brought in the
International Court of Justice by a developing country
against the United States, West Germany, or other
states challenging the right to mine seabed resources.
The outcome in that forum would be considerably less
certain than in a US Federal District Court, but if the
United States felt that the outcome was likely to be
unfavorable it could refuse to adjudicate the case on
the basis that the matter was of essentially domestic
concern to the United States and thus not within the
compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court.
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57. Other Issues. In this situation, the effect on US
interests in marine scientific research, protection of
the marine environment, and jurisdiction over the
continental shelf would be similar to what they would
be in the situation where the United States alone
remained outside the treaty.
III. The World Without A Comprehensive Treaty
58. A comprehensive law of the sea treaty is per-
ceived by many as valuable in terms of promoting
world order, avoiding conflicts, ensuring stability, and
encouraging orderly resolution of disputes. The ab-
sence of such a treaty, however, does not necessarily
lead to opposite results. Though there would be disap-
pointment and some political aftershocks following a
failure of UNCLOS III, customary law of the sea
would continue to evolve and the direction of that
evolution would depend on states' practice over time.
59. Coastal State Claims and Navigation. Actions
and claims by states in a nontreaty world are likely to
be more restrained and fewer in number than is
indicated by the rhetorical statements in UNCLOS III.
To the extent the past is any indication, the number of
ocean-related conflicts to be expected in the near
future is likely to be small. Conflicts in the ocean will
stem less from a failure to have an agreed treaty than
from longstanding political rivalries and from the
increased diversity and intensity of the uses of ocean
space.
60. Even if UNCLOS III does not adopt a formal
treaty, the last draft treaty presented to the con erence
by its president is apt to have considerable influence
on the direction of the customary international law
process. The provisions of the Draft Convention, ex-
cluding the seabed mining texts, would probably
survive as an authoritative statement of international
law. Thus, it would be incumbent on the United States
and other major maritime states to continually re-
affirm their support of the navigation provisions of the
draft treaty regardless of the outcome of the LOS
Conference.
61. A draft treaty on present terms that fails to
enter into force will deter national claims that exceed
its norms and will also create a basis for protests
against the exercise of excessive national jurisdiction
by coastal states. Individual portions of the draft treaty
could he eroded as certain states pick and choose
among articles, accepting those which they support,
and rejecting those they would claim failed to gain a
genuine consensus at UNCLOS III. The degree to
which draft treaty articles were or were not accepted
as norms of international law, however, world come as
a result of state practice on navigation and overflight
as evidenced by declarations and counterclaims, and,
occasionally, dispute settlement.
62. The majority of territorial sea claims will be
within the 12-mile limit, but a number will continue
to exceed that figure. A 200-mile fishing zone will
continue to meet the needs of most coastal states, but
such states as Canada and Argentina will press to
manage fish stocks that straddle the 200-mile limit.
Although 200-mile resource zones are now a part of
the body of customary international law, the more
comprehensive notion of an exclusive economic zone
with detailed rights and duties is not yet firmly
established in international law. Accordingly, there
will be grounds for claiming that waters more than 12
miles from the coast are high seas and subject to the
traditional freedoms of the high seas.
63. Some states will, over time, try to give a more
"territorial" orientation to their economic zones, and
attempt to create such special-purpose areas as secu-
rity zones, nuclear-free zones, and zones of peace, but
these will not be widely recognized, and in some
instances will be directly challenged.
54. Innocent passage v.?ill prevail in the territorial
sea, but some states will continue to declare that this
right exists for warships only upon prior notification to
and with the consent of the coastal state. Nuclear-
powered ships, those carrying dangerous cargoes, and
large tankers may be subjected to additional limita-
tions, perhaps the requirement to notify the coastal
state of their approach or special routing, but there
would be no impairment of the basic right of innocent
passage. Sovereign immunity would still be respected
for warships, however.
65. Transit through straits used for international
navigation will generally not be subject to interference
by bordering states, although there may be efforts in
certain instances to impose limitations not specified in
the draft treaty. Certain straits states, such as Oman,
South Yemen, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and
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Spain, may invoke domestic laws for the safety of
navigation, regulation of marine traffic, and pollution
control, statutes which, if acquiesced in, could hamper
commercial traffic.
66. If the 12-mile territorial sea becomes a widely
accepted norm of international law, then many exist-
ing international straits, which currently have high
seas running through them and thus free passage,
would become overlapped by territorial waters and
might well be subject to a regime of "innocent pas-
sage" only (which does not permit overflight and
submerged passage). Additionally, the coastal state
could claim the right to insist upon conformance to
national standards regarding such items as the safety
of traffic and pollution control. This could be used to
control the size, cargo, and system of power of ships
transiting the straits. In countering such contingencies,
however, the maritime nations would be able to
argue-though not necessarily sustain-the point that
a regime of free passage would still exist on the basis of
customary law, in straits overlapped by territorial sea
extensions.
67. If UNCLOS III fails to produce a treaty, the
concept of archipelagic sea lane passage through the
internal waters of archipelagic states could be threat-
ened. Like transit passage in international straits,
archipelagic sea lane passage would permit continu-
ous, expeditious, and unobstructed transit. In the
absence of a treaty, archipelagic states such as Indone-
sia might ignore provisions in the Draft Convention
for unimpeded passage of military and commercial
vessels and aircraft. Indonesia's interest in the LOS
Conference has been particularly intense. Its primary
aim in UNCLOS III has been to secure international
recognition of its archipelagic definition of sovereign
territory. Without a treaty, Indonesia will continue to
assert vigorously its right to receive prior notification
of foreign warships and aircraft transiting the archi-
pelago, threatening severe and lasting political conse-
quences whenever this is contested.
68. Seabed Mining. In the event UNCLOS III
cannot reach agreement on a treaty or the LOS
convention does not garner enough ratifications to
enter into force, the United States, the United King-
dom, West Germany, France, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, and Italy would be quick to upgrade to treaty
status their reciprocating states agreement on seabed
exploitation. Japan and other developed states would
also accede to such a treaty, ending most questions
concerning the adequacy of the investment climate.
69. There could still be political tensions concerning
areas claimed on the seabed, particularly if UNCLOS
III ended in an acrimonious North-South Split. There
would be little likelihood of any direct physical repri-
sals against seabed mining operations occurring in the
region of the Clarion and Clipperton fracture zones
southeast of Hawaii. However, corporations participat-
ing in the seabed mining consortiums might be sub-
jected to harassment or threats. It is even conceivable
that firms with assets or franchises in militant develop-
ing countries might face threats of expropriation of
their properties or termination of their leases.
70. In the absence of a competing, widely accepted
comprehensive treaty, there would be a reduced basis
for instituting legal challenges to commercial seabed
mining conducted under a treaty crafted by and for
the industrialized states. Any legal challenges would
have to be based solely on the questionable argument
that the developed states were violating the concept
that the seabed resources were the "common heritage
of mankind" rather than on the claim that such
mining was in violation of conventional international
law.
71. Other Issues. Without a treaty, marine scienti-
fic research in the economic zone would be subject to
a discretionary consent regime. Developing coastal
states would be likely to claim control over non-
resource-related research as well as over research
related to living and nonliving resources, as provided
for in the Draft Convention, and might claim a full
consent regime for the entire continental shelf. Access
to foreign waters for research would be based increas-
ingly on political criteria, and the coastal states would
demand more say in whether and how the results of
the research are published.
72. In the absence of a treaty, there would be only
an implied duty to cooperate in preventing pollution,
and none to develop uniform international pollution
control standards and evenhanded enforcement proce-
dures. Developing countries, in particular, would be
content to avoid the costs which might have been
incurred by adherence to an international agreement
to regulate pollution. As noted earlier, however, the
United States, with a strong domestic regime for
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pollution control, would have adequate coastal protec-
tion, but commercial navigation interests would not
enjoy a treaty's tempering effect on coastal states'
enforcement of their pollution regulations.
73. The United States and most of the other states
with broad continental shelves would follow the crite-
ria of the Draft Convention in establishing the outer
limits of jurisdiction over the shelf where it extends
beyond 200 miles. Boundaries between opposite and
adjacent states would be established, as at present,
through bilateral negotiations. There would, of course,
be no obligation to share any revenues from exploita-
tion beyond 200 miles.
74. The law of the sea negotiations-especially
those on seabed mining-encompass some of the more
important goals of the "new international economic
order" sought by the developing countries. Their
involvement in seabed mining, on the present terms of
the Draft Convention, would enable them to extract
modern technology from seabed mining companies as
a condition for corporate access to minesites in the
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. It
would also enable them to establish upper limits on
seabed output of manganese, nickel, copper, and
cobalt to protect developing countries that are land-
based suppliers of these metals. Also, if the interna-
tional Seabed Authority could succeed in mining and
selling these seabed metals, the profits could be distrib-
uted among the Third World states.
75. Hence, for the developing countries the out-
come of UNCLOS III is a bellwether for measuring
progress in the North-South dialogue. The desire for
such progress in the Third World is great and the
effort to bring it about, persistent. The developing
countries as a group feel that they have to succeed in
the one forum where they are strongest-the United
Nations-before they can force any meaningful
changes in direction of power in such institutions as
the IMF and IBRD, where they are a voting minority.
76. Even the least sophisticated of the developing
countries is aware that, by articulating the concept of
the "common heritage of mankind," they have more
or less succeeded at UNCLOS III in creating a political
climate in which their participation is felt to be
necessary to develop a legal regime for seabed mining.
They have successfully bargained navigation provi-
sions against seabed mining provisions in the Draft
Convention, and have sought to mold a nascent seabed
industry into a working example of the type of system
the Third World considers just and equitable.
77. The developing countries' patience with the
treaty process and their tenacity on the seabed issue
may also be explained by the plenipotentiary nature of
UNCLOS III. In other recent North-South forums the
developing countries also constituted a majority and
could pass measures or resolutions at will, but such
statements have had no legal force; the industrialized
nations could ignore them. In the LOS Conference,
however, some of the decisions will be binding on
much of the international community and could have
a precedent-setting effect on future UN-sponsored
negotiations that might seek to manage other global
commons.
78. If pressed by the United States and other indus-
trialized states interested in mining the seabeds,
the G-77 will agree to limited concessions on the
seabed texts in the Draft Convention. The G-77
leadership would probably accept changes that would
assure a seat on the ISA Council for the United States,
better guarantee access to minesites for qualified
corporations, ease requirements for the forced transfer
of technology, and liberalize the proposed controls on
the output of seabed metals. Such alterations are likely
to be viewed as changes in degree, not kind, since the
philosophic underpinnings of the seabed texts, particu-
larly the common heritage concept, would remain
unscathed.
79. There would be strong resistance, however, to
US insistence on changes that would clearly under-
mine the common heritage concept. The G-77 would
strongly resist changes that would reject:
- An International Seabed Authority with powers
to govern the exploitation of seabed resources.
- A functioning Enterprise.
- The parallel system of exploitation with provision
for the reservation of prospected minesites.
- Arrangements for the transfer of technology to
the Enterprise, production controls, and revenue
sharing.
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80. With or without a comprehensive LOS treaty,
North-South discussion about an NIEO would con-
tinue along much the same track that would be taken
if the seabed issue and UNCLOS III had never existed.
However, if the treaty process fails or the industrial-
ized states fail to accede to a comprehensive treaty,
the Group of 77 would raise the issue again and again
in international forums as proof of the North's unre-
sponsiveness to the Third World's "just and equitable"
claims. The South, as a group, would continue to
demand concessions from the North and to try to
wrest control over international institutions. The G-77
would probably view the absence of a treaty as a
setback, but one that would not require changing
either the goal of a "new international economic
order" or the confrontational, rhetorical methods used
to gain it.
81. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that
failure to adopt an LOS treaty would seriously impair
relations between industrialized countries and the
developing countries. The latter are not homogeneous
on either LOS or North-South issues. On most seabed
issues, official statements of the developing countries
are remarkably uniform; yet there has been sporadic
dissension within the G-77. The divergent interests
and economic performance of the developing coun-
tries weakens the South's ability to make serious
threats. So long as the LOS treaty is up in the air and
seabed mining only a distant possibility, the cost to
individual developing countries of maintaining a
seemingly united negotiating front on this and other
North-South issues is small. Meanwhile, the developing
states would continue to make their necessary eco-
nomic transactions with and foreign policies toward
the industrialized countries as usual through bilateral
negotiations and dealings with multilateral organi-
zations.
B. Relations Among Industrial Nations
82. Attitudes of the major developed nations toward
law of the sea in general, and the question of seabed
mining in particular, are a complex amalgam of broad
foreign policy concerns, parochial national interests,
and pragmatic economic considerations. Each of the
states potentially interested in sponsoring seabed con-
sortiums-West Germany, France, the United King-
dom, Japan, Belgium, Italy, Australia, and the Nether-
lands-is motivated by different historical legacies
and economic necessities.
83. In most developed countries, law of the sea is
not a high-visibility subject. In West Germany there is
little public scrutiny of the subject. Bonn believes that
the present Draft Convention offers the nation few
benefits. The treaty's award of near-total jurisdiction
over fisheries to coastal states discriminates against
Germany's distant-water fishermen. Further, the
seabed mining texts have shortcomings that the Ger-
mans have been pointing to for several years.
84. In Japan the LOS treaty is not a high-profile
political topic, being handled chiefly by technicians in
the bureaucracy. The Japanese share some of the US
reservations on seabed mining. They see a powerful
movement, however, toward adoption of the treaty in
1982, and they will not stand alone with Washington
in opposing that movement.
85. France, on the other hand, has shown a height-
ened interest in the subject. French interest was
greatly stimulated by the destructive consequences of
the breakup of the tanker Amoco Cadiz off the coast
of Brittany in 1978. The resultant damage to their
coast sensitized the French to the threat of marine
pollution and, indeed, turned Paris into a vigorous
advocate of expanded coastal state control over tanker
traffic passing close to shore.
86. The British also have shown a greater interest in
the effort to fashion a new oceans treaty than have the
Germans and Japanese, but the treaty has not become
a major public issue. The United Kingdom has impor-
tant interests at stake in the negotiations because of its
large continental shelf oil and gas deposits, and it
would prefer to see the talks wrapped up soon. Like
the other major industrialized states, however, the
United Kingdom hopes that the treaty can be revised
to make it acceptable to the United States.
87. Law of the sea is also a relatively low-visibility
topic in the other three states comprising the "like-
minded" group of potential seabed miners. Neither
the public nor the governments of Belgium, the Neth-
erlands, and Italy accord high priority to the workings
of UNCLOS III. The only strong emotion that emerges
is Belgium's concern over the inadequacy of the
seabed mining texts, because Belgian industry wants to
diversify its sources of industrial ores by gaining access
to seabed resources.
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88. In spite of their strong reservations about the
seabed mining provisions of the draft treaty, the
industrialized states will not desert the LOS Confer-
ence as long as there is some prospect that negotiations
could yield improvements in the texts. Even if it
became clear that the Group of 77 was unyielding, the
West Europeans and Japanese would be very reluctant
to withdraw from UNCLOS III while negotiations
were still alive. If the United States were to abruptly
withdraw before the 11th Session in March 1982, it is
most unlikely that any of the "like-minded countries"
would follow its lead. While some might state pri-
vately that they understood the US position, they
would not publicly support the US stand. Some might
even be openly critical.
89. Because of their sensitivity to world opinion and
domestic criticism, their commitment to North.-South
negotiations, and their view that the Draft Convention
does have certain redeeming features, the like-minded
nations would want the United States to remain in the
Conference and continue to seek acceptable revisions.
Rather than withdraw, they would prefer prolonging
the negotiations indefinitely while giving at least the
semblance of trying to reach an accord.
90. Recent statements by Western diplomats and
foreign ministry officials expressing sympathy for the
current US position on LOS may not be indicative of
the positions their governments would take should
they be faced with a near-term decision that would
carry a heavy political price. The willingness of several
governments to promote seabed mining legislation,
and their consultations with the United States on
developing an interim reciprocating states agreement,
should not be construed as reflecting a shared view
that the Draft Convention is generally unacceptable or
that they are set to desert the treaty process. These
initiatives are largely precautionary measures in-
tended to ensure that their own economic interests will
be protected while the treaty issue remains undecided.
91. The reluctance of like-minded states to abandon
the UN treaty process is rooted in various national
needs. Some of these states place a high value on the
navigation, fisheries, continental shelf, and marine
pollution features of the Draft Convention. They are
concerned that a sudden collapse of UNCLOS III
could result in an unraveling of favorable texts on
these subjects. As architects of some of these provi-
sions, they are loath to forfeit the fruits of many years
of negotiations in which they have invested heavily.
92. The major developed states also do not wish to
disturb their extensive economic ties with the Third
World over a relatively low priority issue like LOS.
Dependent as they are on the fuels, raw materials, and
agricultural products of developing countries, the
West Europeans and Japanese are anxious not to
offend these supplier countries, which also serve as
important markets for their manufactured goods.
93. Perhaps more important, some among the like-
minded group are strongly committed to assisting the
Third World. The United Kingdom has its long tradi-
tion of post-empire Commonwealth relations. France
thinks of itself as a "privileged interlocutor" of the
Third World, and seeks to preserve its francophone
relations with its former colonies, particularly in
Africa.
94. Even West Germany, which has a far more
arm's-length relationship with developing countries,
sees events in the Third World as posing a potential
threat to European economic interests and as an
invitation for superpower intervention.
95. Japan firmly believes that its stability and pros-
perity depend upon an uninterrupted flow of energy
and raw materials from developing countries, particu-
larly those of the Middle East. Recognizing its vulner-
ability to instability there, Tokyo is committed to
promoting economic cooperation, both private and
public, as the most effective means of strengthening
the political, economic, and social fabric of the devel-
oping countries. Moreover, Japanese leaders consider
trade, aid, and foreign investment as the most effec-
tive bulwark against Soviet expansionism.
96. The Netherlands seems to have a genuine con-
cern for the needs of the developing countries and
encourages other industrialized states to increase their
developmental aid to the Third World. Belgium's
interest is largely confined to aiding Zaire, its former
colony, while Italy has only a modest interest in
providing aid to Third World countries.
97. None of the possible outcomes of UNCLOS III
would seriously impair long-term relations between
the United States and its major defense allies and
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II
industrial partners. As previously noted, LOS is but a serious split on LOS, the impact on the broad eco-
small segment of US relations with Western Europe, nomic, military, and political linkages among these
Australia, and Japan. Even in the unlikely event of a states would be minimal.
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ANNEX A
1. The eight-year-long participation of 154 nations
in the 13 negotiating sessions of UNCLOS III attests to
the belief of many states and blocs of states that some
of their long-range interests, LOS or otherwise, will be
served by a comprehensive oceans treaty. Although
governments realize that the talks are deadlocked over
the seabed mining issue, they feel that too much time,
money, and intellectual energy have been committed
to UNCLOS III to warrant walking away from the
bargaining table and deserting what has been accom-
plished to date.
2. Most of the problems that the conference has
encountered in trying to reach agreement on major
issues have been attributed to fundamental differences
between the developed and the developing nations-
the so-called North-South dialogue. Without minimiz-
ing this very important aspect of the conference, it
must be recognized that because of such factors as
geographic location and economic requirements, there
are many conflicting national drives operating on
individual countries within such seemingly homoge-
neous groups as:
- The Group of 77, the caucus of 121 developing
nations.
- The Soviet Union and its allies.
- The Organization of African Unity.
- The Latin American Group.
- The Group of Five, representing the major indus-
trial/maritime powers (the United States, the
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, and
Japan).
- The Coordinating Group of Five, representing
the major Western industrial/maritime powers
(the United States, the United Kingdom, West
Germany, France, and Japan).
- The Group of 17, representing the leading mari-
time nations.
- The Group of 22, the caucus of states favoring
the use of the median and equidistant lines for
delimiting overlapping national maritime claims.
- The Group of 29, representing the states that
favor "equitable principles" as the major guide-
line for delimiting overlapping maritime claims.
- The European Community.
3. Frequently cutting across the objectives of such
major regional or special interest groups are other
interests shared by countries normally not considered
allies, but finding common purpose at UNCLOS III
because they happen to be:
- Major naval and maritime states.
- States with long coasts and/or broad
continental shelves.
- Landlocked or geographically
disadvantaged states.
- Distant-water fishing states.
- Straits states.
- Potential seabed mining states.
- Archipelago states.
- Oil-producing states.
- Mineral-producing states.
4. With such an admixture of interests, it is difficult
to construct a definitive matrix of just where all of the
150-odd participants stand on all of the various issues
involved and harder yet to determine now whether a
state will, upon termination of the conference, find the
Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea acceptable
enough to ratify. Cuba is a case in point. Havana is a
member in good standing of the Group of 77, but it
must be in synchronization with the USSR, remain
mindful of its Latin American interests, and try to
protect its nickel exports through participation in the
group of land-based mineral producers.
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5. What follows is an analysis of those key group-
ings of countries that will play a significant role at this
stage of the negotiations. Alliances not explicitly dis-
cussed-for example, the Organization of African
Unity-have concerns that are addressed in the com-
ments on other interest groups.
The Group of 77
6. The major political reality of UNCLOS III is its
domination by more than 120 developing countries.
These nations have generally questioned the universal
application of oceans concepts fashioned in the past by
the major maritime powers, some of which were their
colonial overlords. The developing-countries caucus,
the Group of 77, has adroitly managed to avoid
discussion of issues that would divide its member-
ship-issues such as fishing rights within 200-mile
economic zones-and has concentrated its energies on
fashioning a seabed mining regime tailored to the
"new international economic order." The cohesion of
the G-77 on this single, unifying theme over eight
years has been remarkable.
7. Many developing countries do not have a large
national stake in the LOS Conference apart from their
interest in securing control over near-shore resources.
Most do not possess a navy, have little industry to
speak of, and do not produce metals that are also
found on the seabed. They feel, however, that they are
part of a historic effort to create a precedent-setting
mechanism-the proposed International Seabed Au-
thority (ISA).
The USSR and Its Allies
8. UNCLOS III has presented a difficult negotiat-
ing environment for the USSR, as Moscow has simulta-
neously attempted to pursue two conflicting goals. It
has aligned itself with the Western maritime states to
forge provisions that protect its navigational interests,
while at the same time trying to appear sympathetic to
the needs of the developing countries.
9. The Soviet Union has emerged as one of the
strongest proponents of retaining the traditional high-
seas rights of navigation. Indeed, navigation is the key
LOS issue for Moscow. To that end, the Soviets joined
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and
Japan in the caucus called the Group of Five, the
major industrial/maritime powers. The USSR has also
seen to it that its allies, in Eastern Europe and
elsewhere, support the concepts of a 12-mile territorial
sea and freedom of navigation in straits.
10. The convergence of Soviet interests with those
of the United States and other Western nations, how-
ever, has frustrated the USSR's desire to promote itself
as the friend of the developing countries. The Soviets
realize that over the course of the LOS negotiations the
G-77 states have tended to identify the USSR and the
United States as kindred superpowers, each solely
concerned with its own interests. Moscow feels that the
United States is currently isolated on the seabed
mining issue, but it is finding it difficult to exploit the
situation and is not able to build for itself an image as
the protector of the Third World from capitalist
exploitation.
11. In the negotiations on seabed mining, Moscow
has played a complex game. Like the United States,
the USSR wants all states to have guaranteed access to
the seabed resources on an equal legal footing with the
Enterprise. But Moscow has sat back and relied on the
United States to do battle with the G-77 over who will
be permitted to mine the seabed. The Soviets, how-
ever, oppose unlimited access by Western firms and
support a quota/antimonopoly system that would allo-
cate access to minesites. Actually, Moscow sees little
merit in the creation of a seabed authority, but it is
pleased with the three-seat representation the USSR
and its allies have been accorded on the ISA's execu-
tive organ, the Council.
12. In the 1981 Geneva session of UNCLOS III, the
Soviet Union and the East European states pushed for
the approval of the Draft Convention as it stands.
They fear that reopening negotiations on the seabed
mining issue might jeopardize their hard-won gains on
navigation matters. They fear, in particular, that the
Latin Americans would retaliate by reopening negotia-
tions on such sensitive issues as the legal status of the
exclusive economic zone and navigation in territorial
waters.
13. The Soviets will continue to emphasize support
for adoption of the Draft Convention by consensus. As
a second-best alternative, they will accept a vote on
the text as a whole. They will, however, strongly resist
an article-by-article vote on the document. If the
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USSR were to ally itself with the G-77 and attempt to
force the adoption of the Draft Convention over the
objections of the United States, it would be only on the
condition that negotiations not be reopened on settled
issues.
14. The Soviet Union, of course, would try to
exploit the situation to gain as much capital as possible
with the developing countries, alleging that the United
States intended to grab for itself the resources of the
seabed that the United Nations declared were the
"common heritage of mankind."
15. All indications point to support of the Draft
Convention by the East European states. Hungary,
speaking for the group in Geneva, commented that the
landlocked /geographically disadvantaged states are
the real losers at UNCLOS III but that, nevertheless,
Budapest can accept the overall package of compro-
mises found in the Draft Convention. Cuba and
Vietnam would also accept the present text.
16. The major maritime states of Europe, North
America, and Asia have collaborated to protect tradi-
tional concepts of freedom of navigation and over-
flight on the high seas in the face of vastly increased
ocean usage and spreading coastal state territorial and
resource claims. From the outset of the LOS undertak-
ing, the naval and maritime states have sought to
maintain navigation rights in the territorial sea as well
as navigation and overflight rights in all areas beyond
the territorial sea, in archipelagoes, and in internation-
al straits that are overlapped by 12-mile territorial
seas. None will adhere to a treaty that would restrict
military and/or commercial navigation and overflight
in these realms.
17. Since coastal nations, under normal circum-
stances, are unlikely to interfere with international
commercial navigation and overflight in their coastal
zones, archipelagic sea lanes, and straits, it is the
military navigation and overflight rights in these three
areas that become the key concern of the naval and
maritime group. Moreover, of the three areas, straits
pose the most critical problem (figure A-1 shows
selected world shipping lanes and straits).
Coastal States
18. The overriding objective of developing coun-
tries that fall in this interest group has been to extend
their jurisdiction over offshore resources and to control
and benefit from scientific research conducted in their
waters. Accompanying this is a strong source of nation-
al pride in extending the reach of national jurisdiction
over adjoining seas. The United States, Japan, and the
Soviet Union were initially opposed to the principle of
the 200-mile economic zone, but they were over-
whelmed by weight of numbers in the conference, the
inclusion in the Draft Convention of such a zone
having become the sine qua non at the conference for
the large number of developing coastal states. Early
support for the 200-mile zone among developed states
came only from Iceland, Norway, and Canada, largely
because of their interest in controlling Japanese and
Soviet exploitation of fish stocks along their coasts.
19. The coastal resource and scientific research
aspects of this group's LOS objectives, however, are no
longer at issue. About 70 percent of the world's coastal
states have already claimed jurisdiction over the re-
sources and control over the conduct of marine scien-
tific research within 200 miles of their coasts. More-
over, these claims are now generally recognized by
other states and are rapidly becoming part of custom-
ary international law.
20. The attitudes of the various members of this
group toward the navigation and overflight provisions
of the Draft Convention are, however, germane to this
NIE. The Draft Convention calls for high-seas free-
doms of navigation and overflight beyond the terri-
torial sea, a form of unimpeded military and commer-
cial navigation and overflight rights in international
straits and through archipelagic sea lanes, and the
right of innocent passage for both military and com-
mercial ships in the territorial sea. The Draft Conven-
tion's provisions for military ships and aircraft, how-
ever, have never set well with some coastal states, and
recently at the conference a group of them (Argentina,
China, Ecuador, North Korea, the Philippines, Malta,
Pakistan, Libya, Papua New Guinea, Romania, and
Indonesia) drafted an informal proposal that would
restrict military navigation in the territorial sea by
requiring prior coastal state authorization. Of these 11,
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Argentina and Ecuador claim 200-mile territorial seas.
The Argentine law, however, allows free navigation
and overflight beyond a 12-mile coastal zone. Ecuador
has been the staunchest defender of the 200-mile
territorial sea, to the point where it now may have
become isolated. Recent statements by Ecuadorean
officials and in the local press, however, give strong
indications that, within the context of a comprehensive
oceans treaty, Ecuador will bring its maritime claim in
line with the Draft Convention. The remaining states
claim 12-mile territorial seas, but Libya and North
Korea claim jurisdiction over navigation and overflight
beyond: Libya throughout the Gulf of Sidra, and
North Korea for 50 miles. Libya made its claim
originally to gain control of offshore resources in the
pre-200-mile EEZ era (1973), a claim that the entire
gulf is internal waters. The Korean claim, made in
1977, was promulgated entirely for security reasons.
Neither country, for reasons of national pride, is likely
to roll back these claims to the limits proposed in the
Draft Convention.
21. Indonesia, which sits astride several important
international straits, probably does not want to change
the Draft Convention's transit passage regime, having
said in the past that it could live with the straits regime
in the context of an oceans treaty that recognizes the
archipelagic state concept. Its motive for wanting to
restrict foreign warship passage in the territorial sea,
like that of the Philippines, is rooted in a desire to
defend against perceived internal and external se-
curity threats and to protect its asserted sovereign
rights. China wants to keep foreign warships at arm's
length from its coast and to protect its broad and
longstanding claims to the continental shelf and the
islands of the China seas.
22. Morocco and Oman, coastal states that border
other important straits, have accepted the transit
passage regime in the context of an operative, compre-
hensive oceans treaty after having been assured that
the Draft Convention permits them to designate sea
lanes and traffic separation schemes and allows for
establishing liability for damages resulting from colli-
sions and pollution. Spain's position on transit passage
is unclear at this point. Madrid indicates that it can
accept the regime if minor cosmetic changes are made
in the Draft Convention's language listing coastal state
rights in setting pollution control rules for straits. What
Syria intends in its newly declared 35-mile territorial
sea is unclear. A Syrian official has stated that "inter-
national shipping" will not be affected. He did not.
mention military navigation and overflight.
23. The United States, Japan, and the states of
Western Europe are heavily reliant on imports of'
minerals in general and particularly of those to be
found on the seabed (see figure A-2). From 1976
through 1980, US mines supplied none of the cobalt or
manganese and less than 10 percent of the nickel
consumed in the United States.' Moreover, although it
is the world's largest copper producer, the United
States imported more than 10 percent of the copper it
consumed during those years. The cost of 1979 imports
of these four metals into the United States exceeded $2
billion. However, there are many land-based suppliers
of these ores, and there is little likelihood that effective
producer cartels will be formed.
24. A key concern underlying the current interest
in seabed mining is the growing anxiety about African
suppliers of critical metals. The uncertain future of
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zaire, and other mineral-
producing states in southern Africa raises the possibil-
ity of supply interruptions. These countries are major
producers and exporters of metals found on the
seabeds-manganese, cobalt, and copper-as well as
such nonseabed metals as chromium and the platinum
group, and the United States and other Western
industrial nations are highly dependent on imports
from them. For instance, approximately 58 percent of
US cobalt supplies come from Shaba Province in Zaire.
an area of chronic instability. South Africa, believed to
possess close to half the world's reserves of manganese
and responsible for 39 percent of non-Communist
world production in 1976, is also potentially unstable.
25. A handful of international consortiums (see
table) have been formed to develop deep ocean mining
systems capable of lifting manganese nodules from
depths as great as 6.5 kilometers below the ocean
surface. The membership of the consortiums has
changed little since their creation in the late 1960s and
' In this paper, references to metal production, consumption, and
trade are in terms of metallic content unless otherwise specifically
noted.
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 Strait
Strait of Dover
The Sound
Store Baelt
Strait of Gibraltar
Dardanelles/Bosporus
Strait of Tiran
Bab el Mandeb
Strait of Hormuz
Strait of Malacca
Selat Lombok
Narrowest width
(nautical miles)
17.5
2.1
4.1
7.6
each