TRUCK PRODUCTION IN THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00853R000100160002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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nirartnrota of ecre
Intelligence
Truck Production in
the Soviet Union
Secret
SOV 82-10133
September 1982
Copy 4 0 9
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Directorate of I ecret
Intelligence
I
Truck Production in
the Soviet Union
was repared by
-his pager I of the Defe
Office of Soviet Analysis, with contributions from
I lof the Defense Industries Division,
Comments and queries are welcome and may
be directed to the Chief. Defense Industries Division,
SOVA,
Secret
SOV 82-10133
September 1982
25
25)
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Overview
Information available
as of I August 1982
was used in this report.
0
As a result of its 15-year truck manufacturing expansion program, the
Soviet Union ranks third behind Japan and the United States in truck
production. Although this production is only about half that of the United
States, the USSR produces almost 20 times as many trucks for the military
as does the United States. Soviet truck manufacturers build more for the
military because of a larger armed service, a heavy reliance on trucks for
logistic support, and shorter truck service lives.
Approximately 98 percent of the almost 800,000 trucks built in the USSR
during 1980 were produced in seven plants. These plants-excluding the
Kama River Plant, which began operation in 1976-were expanded mainly
during the 1970s. By 1980 the seven plants had an estimated capacity of
880,000 units. The expansion and modernization program has been aided
substantially by Western financing and technology. The value of equip-
ment and technology imported from the West since 1965 for this program
is estimated to be at least $2 billion in 1980 prices. Most of the Western
equipment and technology was used in building and equipping the Kama
River Plant. Expansion is continuing at three of the plants, and the
capacity of the truck industry is scheduled to increase to more than a
million trucks a year by 1985.
The rate of growth in truck production for military use in the USSR has
exceeded that of civilian truck production, with procurement of trucks for
the military growing at an estimated average annual rate of nearly 5
percent a year in 1971-80 compared with a growth rate of 3 percent for
trucks slated for civilian sectors. If the rate of military truck production
continues to outpace civilian truck output, truck shortages in the civilian
sectors will be exacerbated. The rate of growth in overall truck production
has been slowing, and in 1981 output did not increase at all.
Secret
SOV 82-10133
September 1982
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II
ability of controlling such transfer.
At least $2 billion in Western truck manufacturing equipment and
technology has been transferred to the USSR since the mid-1960s as part
of a major program to modernize and expand truck production in the
USSR. Because trucks-often the same models-are used in both the
military and civilian sectors, this "dual use" aspect has frequently been on
the frontier of controversy in public discussions and disputes concerning the
transfer of Western truck technology to the USSR, especially the advis-
This research paper is designed to provide the reader with basic facts about
the production of trucks in the USSR, the recent 15-year plant expansion
program, the role played by Western technology in that program, and
finally the rapid growth in deliveries to the military. The production of
other military vehicles is not discussed, although they may be produced in
the truck manufacturing plants mentioned in the paper.
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the Soviet Union
0
Background
Over the past 50 years, Soviet truck production
increased from under 10,000 vehicles a year to almost
800,000 (figure 1). Foreign capital, technology, and
equipment were critical to the development of the
Soviet motor vehicle industry before and following
World War II. After a lull in plant construction and a
slowdown in the growth of truck production in the
1950s and early 1960s, a 15-year transportation mod-
ernization plan was adopted. The Soviet truck indus-
try entered into a period of steady growth that
continued throughout the 1970s. The centerpiece of
the program was the Kama River Motor Vehicle
Plant, the world's largest single facility (in floorspace)
for producing trucks. This plant obtained the latest
tooling and manufacturing processes from the West,
particularly the United States.
Major Truck Producers
Approximately 98 percent of the roughly 800,000
trucks built yearly in the Soviet Union are produced
in plants belonging to seven major associations. They
Figure 1
USSR: Production of Trucks and Jeepsa
I IAI I I . I I I I I I , I I I I I I 25
0 19.30 40 50 60 70 80
a Production figures include Jeep-like vehicles built by Ul'yanovsk Motor
Vehicle Plant (UAZ). Official Soviet figures excluded these until 1973.
assemble trucks for both civilian and military end use.
These plants are:
? Gor'kiy Motor Vehicle Plant (GAZ).
? Likhachev Motor Vehicle Plant (ZIL).
? Ul'yanovsk Motor Vehicle Plant (UAZ).
? Kama River Motor Vehicle Plant (KaMAZ).
? Ural Motor Vehicle Plant (UralAZ).
? Minsk Motor Vehicle Plant (MAZ).
? Kremenchug Motor Vehicle Plant (KrAZ).
All of these facilities are in the western USSR (figure
2). They vary considerably with respect to capacity,
employment levels, and size
Four other facilities-the Belorussian, Kurgan, Ku-
taisi, and Mogilev Motor Vehicle Plants-build spe-
cialized trucks for agriculture, construction, and min-
ing.
The
other 40 or so plants involved in Soviet truck manu-
facturing perform a variety of functions that include
the production of spare parts and the assembly of
specialized chassis for such vehicles as fuel tankers
and cement mixers.
Truck Types Produced
Analysis of open literature and truck specifications
indicate Soviet facilities produce about 90 truck mod-
els, but diversity is more apparent than real. Only 20
models account for over 90 percent of all output. The
remaining models are built in small numbers for
specialized tasks such as mining and agriculture. For
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Figure 2
Major Truck-Producing Plants in the Soviet Union
Gn Naberezhnyye Chelny
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
--- .l - UI'yanovskfip Miasswp
)f Ul'yanovsk Motor Ural Motor Vehicle Plant
Vehicle,Plant
Vehicle -Plant
~ pon
~. Liar, of Cnrtrul
Pakistan" _1? India
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the most part, specialized trucks consist of special-
purpose bodies joined to a standardized chassis. There
is little choice of alternative engine sizes and trans-
mission gearings, or of most of the other optional
features that characterize truck production in the
West. On the contrary, the Soviets strive for the
manufacture of standardized models with standard-
ized components over long production runs. This
approach tends to lower costs to producers through
economies of scale and the "learning curve" effect,
but it raises ownership costs to truck purchasers since
they must operate trucks that may not meet their
specific needs.
Each manufacturer produces only two or three basic
models (figure 3). Two plants, GAZ and ZIL, produce
the two models that are in greatest demand-the 2-
ton GAZ-66, an all-wheel drive truck for off-highway
use that has been in continuous production since 1964,
and the ZIL-130 (figure 4), a 5-ton highway truck
first produced in 1964.1
In figure 5, major models, arrayed in descending
order of production shares, are shown for three cargo
capacity tonnage classes: light (less than 2 tons),
medium (2 to 5 tons), and heavy (over 5 tons).' All-
wheel drive models are also distinguished from models
that do not have this capability. This figure shows
that virtually all Soviet output of trucks with a cargo
capacity of 5 tons or less is from three plants-UAZ,
GAZ, and ZIL. UAZ produces most of the light
trucks, and GAZ and ZIL are the main producers of
medium trucks. MAZ, UralAZ, and KrAZ historical-
ly have produced the bulk of the heavy trucks-
mainly all-wheel drive vehicles-but KamAZ heavy
truck output has been growing rapidly and will even-
tually exceed that of the other plants. All-wheel drive
vehicles account for a relatively large share of produc-
tion because they are required to provide all-terrain
mobility for military operations and for agricultural
use in regions where good roads are scarce.
'The definitions of light, medium, and heavy cargo capacity
tonnage classes in this paper are those commonly used in the
USSR; they differ from those used in the United States.r
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Figure 3
USSR: Selected Truck Production
by Plant, 1980
ZIL
130
131
157K
133
UAZ
451
469
452
KamAZ
5320
5410,
Ural
375
377
4320
MAZ
503
500
516
5 10 15
Share of total output (percent)
Western Assistance
A particular feature of the 15-year (1966-80) expan-
sion plan was the extensive use of Western technology
and capital. A significant portion of the capital that
was needed to expand existing plants, build a new
complex, install modern tooling, and import Western
manufacturing processes was provided by Western
financial institutions backed by government guaran-
tees. Western technology and expertise enabled the
Soviets to adapt Western manufacturing processes to
their plants and to improve their automotive designs
and management techniques in truck manufacturing.
We estimate that from 1965 to 1980, the Soviet
Union spent at least $2 billion (1980 prices) on
Western truck manufacturing equipment and technol-
ogy, including known imports of about $1.5 billion for
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Table 3
USSR: Imports of Western
Machinery and Tooling for
Truck Plants Since 1965 a
the Kama River Truck Plant. The truck manufactur-
ers spent at least $700 million for US equipment
alone. Some of the other truck manufacturers that
benefited from Western equipment and technology
were ZIL, GAZ, UAZ, MAZ, and the Bryansk
Motor Vehicle Plant (BAZ).Z The figures in table 3
indicate a total of about $1.7 billion, but we believe
this substantially understates the actual amount.
Western trade data frequently are not disaggregated
sufficiently to identify specialized equipment such as
that used for truck manufacturing. Moreover, export
regulations in most Western countries do not require
the identification of the final destinations of goods
exported. Consequently, the data are incomplete, both
with respect to total value of the equipment imported
by the USSR and the end users of the Western
equipment.
The United States equipped almost the entire Kama
plant's iron, steel, and nonferrous foundries and its
diesel engine assembly facility. West Germany fully
equipped the transmission plant. The other leading
Western suppliers-France, Italy, the United King-
dom, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland-provided
equipment that was installed in portions of the truck
assembly plant, the press and stamping plant, the
forge plant, and in the tool and repair plant.
Similarly, the United States and other Western na-
tions provided equipment and technical support to
other major plants, but not on as large a scale.
Estimated Value Estimated
of Imports Share From
From West United States
(million (percent)
1980 dollars)
Total
1,736 43
Kama River Motor Vehicle
Plant (KamAZ)
1,500 40
Likhachev Motor Vehicle
Plant (ZIL)
140
Gor'kiy Motor Vehicle Plant
(GAZ)
80
Ul'yanovsk Motor Vehicle
Plant (UAZ)
8
Minsk Motor Vehicle Plant
(MAZ)
1
Bryansk Motor Vehicle Plant
(BAZ)
7
100
25
Specific instances include:
? Expansion of ZIL's capability through a US com-
puter-controlled assembly conveyor system and a
Japanese spot welding robot line for truck cabins 25
(see figure 6).
? Improved engine and drive train components by US
firms and the design of an air-cooled engine by
Porsche for GAZ.
? Purchase of US gear-cutting machine tools for the
UAZ plant.
Current Production'
As a result of the expansion and modernization of
production plants, output of trucks increased more
than one-third during the 1970c
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Figure 5
USSR: Selected Truck Production as a Share
of Total Output, 1980
GAZ 66
ZIL-130
ZIL-131
GAZ-53
ZIL-157 K
GAZ-52
KamAZ-5320
Ural-375
KrAZ-255B
ZIL-133
MAZ-503
KamAZ-5410
MAZ-500
Ural-377
KrAZ-257,258
Ural-4320
Less than
2 tons
2-5
tons
More than
5 tons
Some modernization continues, and by
1985 truck manufacturing capacity is scheduled to
exceed 1.2 million units. We estimate truck produc-
tion in all Soviet plants to have increased from
380,000 in 1965 when the 15-year expansion plan was
initiated to 787,000 in 1980, bringing the USSR to
third place in the world behind Japan and the United
States in total trucks and first in trucks exceeding 2
tons' capacity.1
' Total production figures given here include Jeep-type vehicles
built by UAZ. Official Soviet figures excluded these vehicles until
1973
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In addition to increasing total production, the Soviets
changed the mix of trucks they produced. Between
1965 and 1980 the manufacture of light and heavy
trucks increased relative to that of medium trucks
he increased share of heavy truck
production was primarily related to greater output of
heavy trucks at the KrAZ and Ura1AZ plants and the
start of production at the Kama River Plant in 1976.
The large increase in heavy truck production was
caused by the demand for more long-distance hauling
capacity by the civilian sector and a doubling of heavy
trucks in military fleets since 1970. (Figure 7 shows a
convoy of heavy KamAZ trucks in Kabul, Afghani-
stan.) Although the share of production devoted to
medium trucks declined by more than 20 percentage
points between 1965 and 1980, the Soviet Union still
produced more of this type than any other. Increased 25
production of light trucks was attributable to Jeep-
type vehicles for the military. The civilian market for
light trucks is relatively small, mainly because of the
underdeveloped Soviet service sector.'
' US manufacturers supply the needs of a more advanced service
industry. Consequently, 80 percent of US truck p roduction consists
of light pickup trucks and vans. 25
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Production for the Military
The military establishment in the Soviet Union has
first claim on the output of the truck manufacturing
industry.
t itary output was less than
Soviet truck manufacturers build more trucks for the
military because of the substantially larger size of the
Soviet armed forces, a heavy reliance by ground
forces on trucks for logistic support, and shorter
service lives.
oviet mi itary
trucks normally are replaced to about eight years. US
military trucks often are operated for longer peri-
ods-up to 20 years in some cases for tactical vehi-
cles. The Soviets nonetheless have been able to replace
older trucks and increase the size of their military
fleets as well.
percent ot the 1.6 million trucks built in the United
States in 1980. The Soviets thus bqilt almost 20 times
as many trucks for their military.'
6 Rough estimates indicate that the Soviet military maintains an
inventory of nearly 800,000 trucks-about one out of every five
trucks in the USSR
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The rate of growth in military trucks produced for the 25X
military in the Uri ded that d liv d
the civilian secto 25X
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I Continued growth in
military truck production may exacerbate truck short-
in the civilian sectors if, as it now appears,
ages
overall truck production continues to level off.
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