SOUTH AFRICA: THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING OPPOSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83S00855R000100170003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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n-rectnrate of
Intelligence
South Africa:
The English-Speaking
Opposition
Confidential
ALA 82-10127
October 1982
311
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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
South Africa:
The English-Speaking
Opposition
This A vsssment was written b
Office of African and Latin American
Analysis. It was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council and the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief. uthern Africa
Division, ALAF777 f
Confidential
ALA 82-10127
October 1982
25X1
25X1
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South Africa:
The English-S eakin
Opposition
Key Judgments South Africa's English-speaking opposition parties favor significant re-
Int(ormation available forms of the country's racial policies, but since 1948 these parties have
as of 15 September 1982 been unable to challenge the control of the government by the Afrikaner
was used in this report.
National Party (NP). The major reason for the English opposition's
impotence has been the political cohesion of the Afrikaners, who account
for 60 percent of South Africa's whites. We believe, however, that voting
trends among Afrikaners may eventually allow the English speakers to
regain a more influential role in the South African Government after more
than 30 years in the political wilderness.
If the Afrikaners continue to split their votes among competing parties, the
NP, which is now proposing moderate racial reforms, may over the long
term be compelled to seek support from English speakers. In such an event,
the English parties might be able to press the government into implement-
ing more extensive racial reforms.
The Progressive Federal Party (PFP) is the largest and most important
English political group. Under the leadership of Frederick van Zyl
Slabbert, an Afrikaner, the PFP has formulated a coherent alternative to
the policies of the NP.
The PFP advocates a national convention of representatives of all races to
negotiate a new constitution for South Africa. The PFP maintains that it
would uphold two nonnegotiable principles during such a convention:
? Full citizenship for all South Africans with participation in all levels of
government.
? Constitutional and other safeguards for the rights of minority groups.
The other English opposition group, the New Republic Party (NRP), is a
declining force in South Africa's national politics. Its weakness, in our
view, is that its racial reform proposals differ little from those of the NP.
The NRP's political influence is limited to Natal Province, where it
attracts the support of conservative English speakers who prefer not to vote
for the NP.
Confidential
ALA 82-10127
October 1982
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Confidential
Introduction 1
Factors Affecting the Strength of the English Opposition 1
The Progressive Federal Party 2
Reactions to the President's Council 5
The English Opposition's Future 5
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Confidential
Preface This paper, one in a series of basic studies of South African politics, is
based almost entirely on public information. For 30 years, the English-
speaking political parties have been unique for their openness in an
otherwise closed society, and they have been examined in detail by South
Africa's aggressive English-language press and by foreign journalists and
scholars. This has produced a consensus that the parties are powerless,
devoid of practical solutions to South Africa's problems, and represent a
shrinking constituency. As Afrikanerdom's political solidarity has begun to
fray, however, these parties appear to have been handed some new
opportunities.
vii Confidential
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South Africa:
The Englisb-Sneaking
Opposition
Introduction
Since 1948, when the Afrikaner National Party (NP)
gained control of parliament, the English-speaking
opposition parties have been unable to challenge
Afrikaner rule and have had virtually no influence
over policymaking within the South African Govern-
ment. Although the NP has increased its parliamenta-
ry majority from 51 percent in 1948 to 69 percent in
1982, it has suffered two potentially serious setbacks
during the past year that could eventually benefit the
English-speaking opposition:
? In the 1981 national elect tions, the NP lost votes, not
only to the major English opposition group, the
Progressive Federal Party (PFP), but to two conserva-
tive Afrikaner parties. Although these Afrikaner
parties won no seats in parliament, they received over
15 percent of the total vote and about 30 percent of
the Afrikaner vote.
? In March 1982 some NP parliament members left
the party because of their opposition to Prime
Minister P. W. Botha's racial reform program. They
formed the new Conservative Party of South Africa
(CPSA), which has become the first Afrikaner
parliamentary opposition to the NP
This trend among Afrikaner voters to divide their
loyalties among several competing parties, we believe,
could lead to parliamentary deadlocks in which the
English opposition would hold the balance of power.
The potential for the English parties to influence
governmental decisionmaking would be further en-
hanced if they were to begin ca turin substantial
numbers of Afrikaner votes
Factors Affecting the Strength of the English
Opposition
The two parties that now represent the political
interests of the bulk of South Africa's English speak-
ers are both of relatively recent origin. The PFP,
which is the largest and the only English party with a
national following, is the current heir to the long
Figure 1
South Africa: Whites-Urbanized by
Language Group
English
Speakers
Afrikaans
Speakers
25X1
tradition of progressive, modern liberal views in the
more cosmopolitan English-speaking community. The
NRP, which is more or less the lineal descendant of
the United Party that governed in the first half of the
century, is little more than a regional party in Natal
Province] I 25X1
English-speaking parties have been out of power for
three and a half decades for good reason206ito-
graphically, the odds have long been against English
speakers, and the higher birth rate among Afrikaners
has ensured that their numerical margin would con-
tinue and even widen. English speakers have also had
to buck the remarkable cultural unity of the Afrika-
ners, which has been exploited b Afrikaner politi-
cians to mobilize the vote] 25X1
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Before 1948 there were several English-Afrikaner
governing coalitions; the most successful were the
United Party governments led by Afrikaner Gen. Jan
Smuts, who served as South Africa's Prime Minister
from 1919 to 1924, and again from 1939 to 1948.
English-Afrikaner political cooperation was undercut
by the emerging force of ,Afrikaner nationalism, and
in the elections of 1948 the National Party and
another small Afrikaner group gained control of
parliament. The United Party never recovered from
its defeat, and, by the elections of 1958, the National
Party had gained the support of over 55 percent of the
electorate.
Finally, the English-speaking opposition has failed to
overcome its reputation as a group incapable of more
than moral outrage over apartheid. Since 1948, Eng-
lish political parties have failed to develop comprehen-
sive alternatives for dealing with the country's "black
problem" that could compete with the NP's increas-
ingly sophisticated apartheid policies.
The Progressive Federal Party
The PFP, formed in 1977, has been painfully aware of
the failings of the English opposition and has tried
aggressively to overcome these obstacles. In five years,
the PFP has become the most important English
political party. The PFP gained 26 parliamentary
seats in the 1981 elections, compared with the 18 it
won in the 1977 campaign, wheq it became th
official opposition in parliament.
South African political observers attribute much of
the PFP's recent success to the leadership of its
national chairman, Frederick van Zyl Slabbert. Slab-
bert, a young, articulate Afrikaner academic, was
elected PFP leader in 1979. Since then Slabbert has
won raves, even from the Afrikaans-language press,
for his skill as opposition leader in parliament
Proposals for Reform. We believe that the PFP-
unlike previous English-speaking parties-has suc-
ceeded in formulating a coherent political program
that offers an alternative to the policies of the Nation-
al Party. Slabbert hopes that the PFP's political
platform will attract not only English-speaking voters
but those young, urban, white-collar Afrikaners who,
according to public opinion polls, are increasingly
receptive to racial reforms of significance in South
Africa, such as the limited inclusion of blacks in the
national government 25X1
Slabbert has long argued that Pretoria's racial poli-
cies, no matter how well intentioned, are doomed from
the start because government officials fail to consult
with nonwhite leaders as the policies are being devel-
oped. The PFP is cool toward the President's Council,
a multiracial advisory body established by Pretoria,
because most Colored and Asian political leaders have
refused to participate in the group, and, most im25X1
tant, because the Council excludes representatives of
South Africa's 22 million blacks. The key element in
the PFP's plan for change is its proposal for a national
convention of representatives of all races to ne otiate
a new constitution for South Africa 5X1
The PFP has stated that it would uphold two nonne-
gotiable principles during such a national convention:
? Full citizenship for all South Africans with partici-
pation in all levels of government. 25X1
? Constitutional and other safeguards for the rights of
minority groups.
The PFP has also announced the proposals it would
advance at the convention: a federal government with
regional decentralization, a universal franchise, the
dismantling of discriminatory laws, a national assem-
bly with minority veto on some issues, and an exc3mvi
tive council with representatives of all races. The National Party publicly condemns the PFP's
proposals on the grounds that they deprive whites of
the opportunity to determine their own future. Slab-
bert, argues the NP, cannot guarantee whites that an
equitable constitution would emerge from the national
convention. Slabbert contends that it is shortsighted
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Confidential
the party was nevertheless encouraged by the signifi-
cant support within the electorate for changes in
racial policies.II 25X1
Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, PFP leader. Grand-
father was a United Party member and his father
belonged to the NP. Studied at Stellenbosch
University and has a Ph. D. in sociology. Was a
university professqr [s first parlia-
ment seat in 1974.
Splits in the PFP. Although the PFP has reunited
much of the English-speaking opposition, the public
record shows it still has problems maintaining unity
among its members and supporters, and there is wide
for whites to believe that they can indefinitely contin-
ue to make unilateral decisions that affect all of South
Africa's peoples. Slabbert maintains that Coloreds,
Asians, and especially blacks will become more radi-
cal and unforgiving in their demands if whites do not
hasten to include them in government deliberations.
Growing Local Strength. In March of 1981, the PFP
narrowly missed an opportunity to put some of its
ideas to work at the local government level when it fell
one seat short of winning majority control of the
Johannesburg City Council. One of the party's major
weaknesses is that it has never been in power, and
managing the Johannesburg area, where about one-
seventh of South Africa's whites live, would have
afforded the PFP an opportunity to dispel voters'
doubts about the party's abilities and intentions. At
the same time, however, PFP strategists wanted the
Johannesburg elections to provide the party with a
clear mandate for its reforms, and thus its candidates
did not seek to tone down their campaign rhetoric.
The PFP's uncompromising reform platform-which
included calls for the desegregation of many munici-
pal facilities-probably accounted for its defeat, but
disagreement within the party on severa256tds
The PFP's "left wing," for example, has become
particularly critical of the South African Govern-
ment's increasing use of force, not only against its
black insurgent foes, but against neighboring African
states. During the PFP's party congress last Novem-
ber, the group's more liberal members sought to pass
a resolution condemning South African cross-border
operations "which appeared to extend beyond de-
fense." Harry Schwarz, the PFP's spokesman on
defense and economic issues and the leader of the
party's "right wing," led the fight to defeat the
resolution, but milder motions were carrR(5Mling for
the option of alternative service for conscientious
objectors and recommending that the PFP not support
Pretoria automatically on all defense issue
On economic issues, PFP liberals believe that South
Africa's capitalist system is partly to blame for the
development of apartheid. Industrialists, they argue,
have benefited significantly from the labor surpluses
and low wage structures that the apartheslem has
fostered. Other PFP members, however, contend that
South African businessmen, particularly English
speakers, are a progressive force for change. Apart-
heid, they argue, has forced businessmen to resort to
uneconomical and inefficient practices. This debate
over the relationship between capitalism and apart-
heid is particularly touchy for the PFP leadership
because English-speaking businessmen are important
financial supporters of the party.
The most fundamental question that divides the PFP,
and one which will become even more pressing during
the next few years, is how the party should respond to
Prime Minister Botha's reform initiatives. Although
the party has applauded some of the changes, such as
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reforms in the labor laws, the PFP has condemned
most of Botha's proposals, particularly his efforts to
grant some political participation to Coloreds and
Asians but not blacks. Not all PFP adherents, howev-
er, have been equally critical of the Prime Minister,
and one member left the party last year because of the
PFP's refusal to participate in the Presider;t's Council.
As Botha introduces still more changes, we believe it
will become more difficult for the PFP to decide
whether his reforms constitute the first steps in a long
process of evolutionary chin e or whether they
amount to too little, too late
The New Republic Party
The NRP, which for the most part draws its member-
ship from the more conservative former United Party
stalwarts, is, in our view, a declining force in South
Africa's national politics. It has a narrow political
base centered almost exclusively on the predominantly
English-speaking white population in Natal Province.
Seven of the NRP's eight parliament members repre-
sent districts in Natal and the party heads municipal
and provincial governments there. More than two-
thirds of Natal's whites are English speakers, and
many public opinion polls indicate that Natalians are
more conservative on political and race issues than
most other South Africans of English extraction
Under the leadership of Vause Raw, a veteran United
Party politician, the NRP has attempted to occupy
the middle group between what it describes as the
"dangerously conservative" National Party and the
"dangerously radical" Progressive Federal Party.
Prime Minister Botha, however, is now casting the
NP as the party of moderate reform, and the NRP's
policies are increasingly indis from those
advocated by the government
The NRP's plans for sharing political power at the
local level call for close formal cooperation with the
province's Colored and Indian populations, and for
consultations with Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, leader of
the 5 million Zulus whose homeland is in Natal. The
proposals, however, do not include blacks as full
partners, and the party does not advocate equal black
participation in the national government. The NRP's
policies thus differ little from National Party propos-
als that call for the inclusion of Coloreds and Asians
Most Afrikaners probably:
? Grew up in the country or in a small town.
? Work for the government, a parastatal corporation,
or on the land.
? Are members of one of the Dutch Reformed
Churches and read the Bible daily.
? Usually vote for the National Party.
Most English speakers probably:
? Grew up in a city.
? Work in private industry, commerce, or their own
business.
? Are Anglicans, Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians,
Catholics, Jews, or atheists.
? Usually vote for the PFP or NRP.
' Derived from the statistical surveys published in South Africa:
The Prospects for Peaceful Change.
25X1
in government at all levels, but which limit black
participation i h national government to the home-
land structure 25X1
Many South African political observers predicted last
year that the NRP would soon lose much of its
political clout in Natal because of the party's increas-
ingly close identification with National Party policies.
In the elections last year, however, the NRP lost only
one parliament seat and strengthened its control & WO
the Natal provincial government. As long as Natal's
whites prefer to support a conservative English party
instead of the Afrikaner-dominated NP-no matter
how similar their policies are-the NRP will remain
an important political force at the provincial level. We
believe, however, that it will remain unable to attract
support from more liberal English speakers in Cape
and Transvaal Provinces. 25X1
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Confidential
Reactions to the President's Council
In May, the President's Council recommended a
series of constitutional changes for South Africa,
which the NRP has moved quickly to support. The
Council's recommendations for the inclusion of Col-
oreds and Asians in local governments coincide with
the NRP's own views. The suggested changes at the
national level-Colored and Asian participation in the
cabinet but the retention for the time being of an all-
white parliament-also dovetail with the NRP's more
conservative approach to multiracial government at
the national level.
Other English speakers, particularly in the PFP, have
been less sanguine about the Council's recommenda-
tions. The PFP, however, has so far not condemned
the Council's suggestions outright. Because of its own
commitment to reform, the PFP leadership has a
difficult choice:
? Reject the proposals completely, even though the
changes could in time lay the groundwork for more
fundamental racial reform.
? Support the Council's recommendations and thus
risk associating the party with incomplete reforms
that may only serve to anta onize further the
country's black population.
parties-believe, however, that a powerful president
could eventually usurp most of parliament's powers.
The PFP fears that such a diminution of parliamenta-
ry authority is the real intention behind the proposal
for an executive presidency. If the parliament did
evolve into little more than a rubberstamp organiza-
tion, PFP gains in the legislature would become
meaningless. Slabbert, in fact, has stated that he
would leave the legislature rather than condone a
situation in which "parliamentary opposLtrgX limply
became decorative extension of executive control."
25X1
Whether or not the PFP chooses to support the
President's Council's recommendations, Prime Minis-
ter Botha almost certainly will be able to get the
reform package through parliament. Constitutional
amendments require only a simple majority. In our
view, however, the National Party would prefer to
have the support of the PFP because its backing
would enhance the reform proposals' international
credibility. 25X1
Whatever the PFP's final decision, we anticipate in
the next few months some intense political bar aining
among the government, the National Paphf oppo-
sition groups, and Colored and Asian leaders. We
In his public and private statements so far concerning anticipate that the PFP will seek to trade its support
the Council's recommendations for a multiracial gov- for the President's Council's proposals for guarantees
ernment, Slabbert has avoided committing himself that the role of Coloreds and Asians in the govern-
and his party to either course. Slabbert and other PFP ment will be expanded and, most important, for
spokesmen, however, have been openly critical of the assurances that blacks will eventually be brought into
Council's proposal that South Africa modify its par- the reform process. Without those guarantees, we
liamentary system to include a strong executive presi- doubt PFP will back the Council's ro osals.
dent. According to the Council's recommendations, 25X1p
such an executive president would be chosen by an
electoral college composed of parliament members,
but once in power the president would be able to
appoint and dismiss his cabinet members without
having to seek parliament's approval. The president
the power to dissolve the legislature.
Prime Minister Botha has publicly argued that South
Africa's racial problems need the attention of a strong
executive president who can rise above the political
infighting of parliament. The PFP and other critics of
the government-including the rightwing Afrikaner
The English Opposition's Future
Assuming the NRP stays a regional anomaly, we
believe the PFP will remain the primary national
political vehicle for English speakers. If the parlia-
mentary system gives way to a strong executive, the
PFP, by Slabbert's own admission, could Gas rluch of
its potential for influencing South Africa's racial
policies. This would be true unless Prime Minister
Botha or his successors chose to bring PFP members
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Figure 2
South Africa: Election Results, 1948-1981
Percent of Votes Percent of Seats
in Parliament
Percent of Votes Percent of Seats
in Parliament
nom: En
Percent of Votes Percent of Seats
in Parliament
NP -National Party
UP -United Party
PFP -Progressive Federal Party
^ NRP -New Republic Party
? HNP-Herstigte Nasionale Party
Percent of Votes Percent of Seats Percent of Votes Percent of Seats
in Parliament in Parliament
Percent of Votes Percent of Seats
in Parliament
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Percent of Votes Percent of Seats
in Parliament
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into the national government. The President's Coun-
cil, in its proposals for a new, cabinet-level executive
committee, recommended that this committee be non-
partisan. The appointment of someone such as Slab-
bert to lead an important government ministry would
do much toward gaining credibility outside the n-
try for South Africa's racial reforms
The PFP leadership would at that point have to decide
whether an invitation to join the cabinet was intended
to co-opt the party into supporting the government's
limited reform policies or whether it was an indication
of Pretoria's genuine interest in fundamental reform.
We believe that PFP participation in a national
cabinet would in the short term provide the party with
its best opportunit to influence South Africa's racial
reform policies
Barring a move toward a strong executive presidency,
the PFP will continue to attempt to transform itself
from an ethnic-based party into a legitimate competi-
tor for national political power. The recent signs of
division in the Afrikaner electorate have encouraged
the PFP leadership, but the party still faces an uphill
task in wresting a significant number of seats from
the NP.I
The PFP thus will probably have to attract a signifi-
cant number of Afrikaner votes to challenge the NP
at the national level. According to postelection polls,
however, the PFP won only 5 percent of the Afrikaner
vote during the 1981 balloting. To date, t3Xiinifi-
cant movement by Afrikaners away from the Nation-
al Party has been in a conservative directp
The NP's success in structuring South Africa's elec-
toral system to favor Afrikaner candidates poses the
single most difficult obstacle for the PFP. Rural
constituencies, which are defined as those districts
with less than 13,000 eligible voters, elect over
40 percent of the members of parliament. These rural
districts are populated almost exclusively by Afrika-
ners. In the 1981 elections, the PFP won less than
3 percent of these rural seats, and the party leadership
realizes that it stands little chance of increasing its
support in these conservative, Afrikaner strongholds.
The PFP did much better in urban electoral districts,
winning about 30 percent of these seats in the 1981
elections. The National Party, however, still won
about 60 percent of the urban electoral districts. Even
in urban regions, the NP has succeeded in drawing
many of the electoral districts along ethnic lines, thus
forcing the PFP to compete with the National Party
in man laraelv Afrikaner suburbs and urban areas.
We believe, therefore, that the PFP's long-term pros-
pects depend upon developments within the National
Party and that some sort of formal or informal
cooperation with the Nationalists offers the most
realistic chance for South African's English speakers
to regain national political influence. This analysis
derives from our judgment that the factionalism in the
Afrikaner political community is more than a passing
phenomenon and that the NP will contint~ose
Afrikaner votes to the new conservative parties. If so,
the PFP and the people it represents will increasingly
be courted by moderate NP politicians interested in
maintaining their control of the government. While
Botha is obviously too much the Afrikaner to embrace
PFP politicians in the near future, we also believe he
would be unwilling to abandon completel25X1nodest
reform proposals in order to halt the loss of Afrikaner
votes to the conservative parties.
The NP, however, probably will not have to turn to
the PFP for support soon. The NP is unlikely, for
example, to lose control of parliament in the next
national election, which does not have to be held until
1986. The NP would retain an absolute majority even
if it lost an additional 31 seats to opposition parties.
25X1
Perhaps the most serious obstacle to PFP politicial
influence is the possibility that the NP's policies will
gradually be accepted by enough nonwhit s o on-
vince many English speaking voters to su he
NP. In such an event, which could be in the back of
Botha's mind, the NP would attract enough English
votes to compensate for its losses among Afrikaners.
Such a development would be a political setback for
the PFP, but it could, in our judgment, result in real
gains for English speakers. Their support for the NP
would essentially transform it from an Afrikaner
party into a centrist white party 2511
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