NATIONAL SECURITY AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002700130007-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2007
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 7, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL SECURITY AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION
by
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
American Association for the
Advancement of Science,
Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C.
7 January 1982
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This symposium is an appropriate place'. I believe, to lay out some
thoughts that all of us--scientists and public servants-should consider.
These thoughts, as well as the ensuing dialogue today and later, will help
us recall how much we have in common and also* help us remember that national
security and scientific interests can"best be advanced through a joint effort.
The fact is that we do have a substantial amount of common ground and experi-
ence--both in our separate fields, and in our joint work, to protect this
nation and to further science.
Throughout the world today, every nation's progress and security are
tied up with science and technology. Some would say that fact is a curse
of the modern age; others would say it is our salvation. Technical information
has given us the means to destroy civilization or, at least, revert it to the
Dark Ages. At the same time, science and technology have made life safer and
bountiful, given us tools to understand better the universe in which we live,
and provided the weapons and intelligence systems to help us defend our
nation.
There is an overlap between technical information and national security
which inevitably produces tension. This tension results from the scientist's
desire for unconstrained research and publication, on the one hand, and. the
federal government's need to protect certain information from potential
foreign adversaries who might use that information against this nation. Both
..are powerful forces, thus it should not be a surprise that finding a workable
and just balance between them is quite difficult. But finding this balance
is essential, for we must simultaneously protect the nation and protect the
individual rights of scientists.-both as academicians and citizens.
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This tension is accentuated when scientists are employed by the federal
government directly, or work for the government indirectly in their own
offices with federal research funds. Some of this work is done on subjects
which directly affect the nation's security--sago, its defense, diplomacy,
and intelligence efforts. The federal government has always conducted these
activities on behalf of our society for several reasons, It is far more
convenient for the federal government to provide for the common good.
Irreversible and. significant harm-to the nation as.a whole, and to its
citizens--often-is threatened and this fact is a stimulus for the-
,federal-government to act.
There are cases where interplay has occurred between science and the
national security. interests. One of the most'obvious, of course, is the
Manhattan Project of World War II in which the first nuclear weapons were
created and tested. Another is the development of MnatIbnal technical means`s
to monitor foreign compliance with international arms control accords. Science
and national security have a symbiotic relationship--each benefitting from the
interests, concerns, and contributions of the other. In light of the long
history of that relationship, the suggestion is hollow that science might
(or should somehow) be kept apart from national security concerns, or that
national security concerns should not have an impact on "scientific freedom,,
The need in today's world for protection of some information, for secrecy
is clear--I believe--to any fair observer. Protection of the information
necessary 'to safeguard our'society,'and to conduct our-international affairs,
must occur. '-Within.:the.federal -'governmerrt,'':.there is a system established by
Executive Order to. assess the expected damage, should certain information come
into the hands of foreign enemies, and--based on that assessment-to control
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access to that information so as to prevent any such exposure. This exposure
potentially could occur through public release of the data, or from the
successful. clandestine activities of the agents of foreign intelligence
And we should make no mistake, foreign intelligence services..amohg
other entities of foreign governments-are--collecting all types of information
in the U.S. Specific-data on technical subjects is high on the wanted list
of every major foreign intelligence service and for good reason. The U.S.
is a leader in many-if not most-technical areas, and technical data can
enhance a nation?s international strength. In terms of. harm to the national
interest, it-makes little difference whether the data is copied from technical
journals in a Tibrary or given away by a member of our society to an agent of
a foreign power.
A different source of tension arises when scientists, completely separate
from the federal government, conduct research in areas where the federal
government has an obvious and preeminent role for society as a whole. One
example is the design of advanced weapons, especially nuclear ones. Another
.is cryptography. While nuclear weapons and cryptography are heavily dependent
on theoretical mathematics, there is no public business market for nuclear
weapons. Such a market, however, does exist for cryptographic concepts and
gear to protect certain types of business communications.
Research into cryptography is an area of special ,?long-standing concern
`'to `fnee. -When 1-'was-Director of the National Security Agency, I''started.?a < ..._ ... ..
diaTcguo to find' a common ground regardi rig cryptography - between-'sci enti fT -
freedom and national security. Considerable effort has gone into that dialogue,
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by both scientists and public servants, and I think the results so far have
been reasonable and fair. Cryptologic research in the business and academic
arenas, no matter how useful, remains redundant to the necessary efforts of
the federal government to protect. its own corm unications? I still am concerned
that indiscriminate publication of the results of that research will come
to the attention of foreign governments and entities and, thereby, could cause
irreversible and unnecessary harm.to? U?S? national security' interests.
There are, in addition, other fields where publication of certain' technical
information could affect the national security in a harmful way. Examples
include computer hardware and software, other electronic gear and techniques,
lasers, crop projections, and manufacturing procedures.
I think it should also be pointed out that scientists` blanket claims of
scientific freedom are somewhat disingenuous in light of the arrangements that
academicians routinely make with private, corporate sources of funding. For
example, academicians do not seem to have any serious difficulty with restrictions
on publications that arise from a corporate concern for trade secret protection.
The strong negative reaction from some scientists, over the issue of protecting
certain technical information for national security reasons, seems to be based
largely on the fact that the federal government, rather than a corporation, is
the source of the restriction. Yet this would presume that the corporate, -
commercial interests somehow rise to a higher level than do national security
concerns. I could not disagree more strongly
"Scientists and engineers' have 'served our society spectatta1ar?ly:.an peace
and:ware Key features?of science-unfettered='research, and; the-PubLlication of
the results for validation by ' others arid 'for 'use by all, mankind?-are essential
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to the growth and development of science. Both our national security and our
economic development rely heavily on these features. Restrictions on science
and technology should. only be considered for the most serious of reasons.
But nowhere in the scientific ethos is there any requirement that
restrictions cannot, or should not--when necessary, be placed"on science.
Scientists do not immunize themselves from social responsibility'simply
because they are engaged in a scientific pursuit. Society has recognized
over time that certain kinds of scientific enquiry can endanger society as a
whole and has applied either directly, or through scientific/ethical constraints,
restrictions on the kind and amount of research that can be done in those areas.
The fact is that restrictions exist today on science and technology; for example,
in conducting medical experiments on human subjects, in safeguards on handling
and storing radioactive materials, in controlling some research on gene-splicing,
in protecting proprietary manufacturing processes, and'-in requiring peer review
before publication of the results of scientific research. Some of these
restrictions are common sense, some are federal requirements, some are simply
good business, and some are good science.
Moreover, in 1952 Congress gave an example of its willingness to act
when it passed the Patent Secrecy Act. This law directs procedures to ensure
that public disclosure of inventions, which would-be detrimental to the national
security, does not occur. Such inventions are secret and are afforded appropriate
protection. Equally important, this law is not totally one-sided in favor of
goverrhent: =The; law?,establisheds appeal procedures and a mandatory review process,.,..:
Little-'use -of-?this:' law?:hasnbeen?-necessary, except in the last-few years--and :then. ; - ..:
"not for long.--','The' law - is obviously not popular with all whom requlates,:,,.~ut
it has for thirty years now provided a precedent fora legislative solution to
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the question of private versus public interest.
One sometimes hears the view that publication shculd.not be restrained
because the government has not made its case," almost always referring to
the absence of specific detail for public consumption. This reasoning is
circular and unreasonable. It stems from a basic attitude that the govern-
ment and its public servants cannot be trusted. Specific details about why
information must be protected are more often than not even-more sensitive
than the basic technical information itself. ,Publishing examples, reasons,
and associated details would certainly damage the nation?s interests. Public
review and discussion, of classified information which. supports decisions, is
not feasible or workable.
In contrast, it is a fact that in today's world Congressional reviews
of sensitive Executive Branch decisions are feasible and workable. The existence,
and the processes, of such reviews are intentional. I.-do not think it is harmful
to recognize that the federal government--particularly its intelligence agencies
have in fact made mistakes in the past on occasion, and suspicion of the actions
of-the federal government in this regard is understandable if not always
supportable. The dominant fact of this new decade is that there now exists
in the Congress a forum where assertions by the government of secrecy needs
can and have been challenged and examined in a properly secure environment.
I recognize that there is concern in some circles that the suspension
of publication of some information,for national security reasons, means that
sudh-iniormation'wiII-,never--bey- published .The- fact is; however, that national..---.:.-?,:
security concerns--to-,protect information will' not-,"arid. do .not. @last forever;d ,:.n:...:..
?he'federaT government's structure-and procedures, though conservative and:? ~..:,-,..
imperfect, do work. Sensitive information does get released in due courses
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The Executive Order I mentioned earlier, which requires protection of information
through classifications also requires the eventual declassification of that same
information. For examples voluminous classified data from World War II has been
declassified and released--including intelligence materials which had extraordinary
sensitivity when they were acquired. Much of the stimulating effort for computer
science in this country came from government sponsored and controlled classified
activity. There is in our society a legitimate need and desire which I accept
that history, whether political or scientific, will be served eventually--even if
national security-requires that public disclosures and personal recognition,.have
to be postponed.
Rather than a confrontation between national security and science, I believe
--that a wiser course is possible and that our joint search for that course ought
to be one of our goals, A potential balance between national security and science
may lie. in an agreement to include in the peer review process (prior to the start
of research and prior to publication) the question of potential harm to the nation.
The details of such a system would have to be resolved, of course,. but cooperation will
be better for all of us than confrontation. Included in such a system should be goals
to simultaneously preclude harm to U.S, national security and to impose no unreason-
able restrictions on scientific research, publication, or the use of the results.
And when restrictions are judged necessary, speedy procedures for appeals, review,
and appropriate compensation should be included. One example of this type of
process is that recommended in the Public Cryptography Study Group. It is not easy
to create workable and just solutions that will simultaneously satisfy the wide-
ranging needs of national security and science, but I believe it is necessary before
significant harm does occur which could well prompt the federal government to
overreact.
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