CLASSIFYING SCIENCE: A GOVERNMENT PROPOSAL . . .

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002700130005-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 8, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
Oil PAGy LQ__ .. 8 February 1982
! ssIfy Science
A Government Pro osal.. .
Adm. Bobby R. Inman, USN, Deputy Director
.. There is an overlap between technical information
and national security, which inevitably produces tension.
This tension results from the scientist's desire for uncon-
strained research and publication, on the one hand, and the
federal government's need to protect certain information
from potential foreign adversaries who might use that
information against this nation. Both are powerful forces,
-thus it should not be a surprise that finding a workable and
just balance between them is quite difficult. But finding this
balance is essential, for we must simultaneously protect the
nation and protect the-individual rights of scientists-both
as academicians and citizens.
This tension is accentuated when scientists are employed
by the federal government directly, or work for the govern-
ment indirectly in their own offices with federal research
funds.* Some of this work is done on subjects that directly
affect the nation's security--e.g., its defense, diplomacy and
intelligence efforts.
There .are eases where interplay has occurred between
science and the national-security interests, One of the most
obvious, of course, is the Manhattan Project of World War
2 in which the first nuclear. weapons were created and
tested. Another is the development of "national technical
means" to monitor foreign compliance with international
arms control accords.
Science and national security have a symbiotic relation-
ship-each benefitting from the interests, concerns and
-contributions of the other. In light of the long history of that
relationship, the suggestion is hollow that science might (or
should somehow) be kept apart from national security
concerns, or that national security concerns should not have
an impact on "scientific freedom."
The need in today's world for protection of some informa-
tion, for secrecy is clear-I believe-to any fair observer.
Protection of the information necessary to safeguard our
society, and to conduct our international affairs, must
occur. Within the federal government, there is a system
established by Executive Order to assess the' expected
damage, should certain information come into the hands of
foreign enemies, and-based on that assessment-to control
access to that information so as to prevent any such
exposure. This exposure potentially could occur through
public release of the data, or from the successful clandestine
activities of the agents of foreign intelligence services.
And we should make no mistake, foreign intelligence
services-among other entities of foreign governments-are
collecting all types of information in the U. S. Specific data
on technical subjects are high on the wanted list of every
major foreign intelligence service and for good reason.
The U. S. is a leader in many-if not most-technical
areas,.and technical data can enhance a nation's interna-
tional strength. In terms of harm to the national interest, it
makes little difference whether the data are copied from
technical journals in a library or given away by a member of
our society to an agent of a foreign power.
A different source of tension arises when scientists,
completely separate from the federal government, conduct
research in areas where the federal government has an
obvious and preeminent role for society as a whole. One
example is the design of advanced weapons, especially
nuclear ones. Another is cryptography. While nuclear wean-
ons and cryptography are heavily dependent on theoretical
mathematics, there is no public business market for nuclear
weapons. Such a market, however, does exist for crypto-
graphic concepts and gear to protect certain types of
business communications. -
Research into cryptography is an area of special, long-' I
concern to me. When I was director of the
National Security Agency, I started a dialogue to find a
common ground regarding cryptography between scientific
freedom and national security. Considerable effort has gone
into that dialogue, by both scientists and public servants,
and I think the results so far have been reasonable and fair.
Cryptologic research in the business and academic arenas,
no matter how useful, remains redundant to the necessary
efforts of the federal government to protect its own commu-
nications. I still am concerned that indiscriminate publica-
tion of the results of that research will come to the attention
of foreign governments and entities and, thereby, could
cause irreversible and unnecessary harm to U. S. national
security.interests.
There are, in addition, other fields where publication of
certain technical information could affect the national
security in a harmful way. Examples include computer
hardware and software, other electronic gear and tech-
niques, lasers, crop projections and manufacturing proce-
dures.
I think it should also be pointed out that scientists'
blanket claims of scientific freedom are somewhat disingen-
_ uous .in light of the arrangements that academicians rou-
tinely make with private, corporate sources of funding. For
example, academicians do not seem to have any serious
.difficulty with restrictions on publications that arise from a,
corporate concern- for trade' secret protection.' The strong.
negative reaction from some scientists; over the issue of
protecting certain technical information for national securi-
ty reasons, seems to be based largely on the?fact that the
federal government, rather than a corporation, is the source
of the restriction. Yet this would presume that the corpo-
rate` commercial interests somehow rise to a higher level
than do national security concerns. I could not disagree
?more strongly. -
Scientists and engineers have served our society spectacu-
larly in peace and war. Key features of science-unfettered
research, and the publication of the results for.validation by
others and for use by all mankind-are essential to the a
growth and development of science. Both our national
security and our economic development rely heavily on
these features: Restrictions on science and technology
should only be considered for the most serious of reasons.
But nowhere in the scientific ethos is there any require-
that restrictions cannot or should not, when necessary, i
ment
be placed on science. Scientists do not immunize themselves
from social responsibility simply because they are engaged
in a scientific pursuit. Society has recognized over time that
certain kinds of scientific inquiry can endanger society as a
whole and has applied either directly, or through scien-
tific/ethical constraints, restrictions on the kind and
amount of research that can be done in those areas.
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One sometimes hears the view that publication should not
be restrained because "the government has not made its
case;' almost always referring to the absence of specific
detail for public consumption. This reasoning is circular and
unreasonable. It stems from a basic attitude that the
government and its public servants cannot be trusted.
Specific details about why information must be protected
are more often than not even more sensitive than the basic
technical information itself. Publishing examples, reasons
and associated details would certainly damage the nation's
interests. Public review and discussion of classified informa-
tion which supports decisions is not feasible or workable.
In contrast, it is a fact that in today's world congressional
reviews of sensitive Executive Branch decisions are feasible
and workable. The. existence and the processes of?such
reviews are intentional. I do not think it is harmful to
recognize that the federal government-particularly its
intelligence agencies-have in fact made mistakes in the
past on occasion, and suspicion of the actions of the federal
government in this regard is understandable if not always'
supportable.
The dominant fact of this new decade is that there now
exists in the Congress a forum where assertions by the
government of secrecy needs can and have been challenged
and examined in a properly secure environment.
I recognize that there is concern in some circles that the
suspension of publication of some information, for national
security reasons, means that such information will never be
published. The fact ? is,? however, that national security
concerns to protect. information will not-and do not--last
forever. The federal government's structure and procedures,
though conservative and imperfect, do work. Sensitive infor-
mation does get released in due course. .
. The Executive Order I mentioned earlier, which.requires
protection of information through classification, also
--requires the eventual declassification of that same informa-
tion. For example, voluminous classified data from World
War 2 have been declassified and released-including intel-
ligence materials that had extraordinary sensitivity when
they . were acquired. Much of the stimulating effort for
computer science in this country came from government-
sponsored and controlled classified activity.
There is in our society a legitimate'need.and desire which
I accept that history, whether political or scientific, will be
served eventually-even if national security requires that
public -disclosure, and personal recognition, have; to be
postponed.
Rather than a confrontation between national security
and science, I believe that a wiser course is possible and that
our joint search for that course ought to beone of our goals.
A potential balance between national security and science
may lie' in an agreement to include- in the peer review
process (prior to the start of research and prior to publica-
tion) the question of potential harm to the nation. The
details of such a systerd would . have to be resolved,. of
course, but cooperation. will be..better.for all of us. than
confrontation.
Included in such a' system should be goals to simulta-
neously preclude harm to. U. S. national. security and to .
impose no unreasonable restrictions on scientific research,
publication or the use of the results. And when 'restrictions
are judged necessary, speedy procedures for appeals, review
and appropriate compensation should be included. -
One example of this type of process is that recommended
in the Public Cryptography Study Group. It-is not easy to-
create workable and just solutions that will simultaneously
satisfy the wide-ranging *needs of national security' and
science,.but I believe it is necessary before significant harm
does occur which could well prompt the federal government
to overreact. ' Il :
. And a Scientist's Objection
William D. Carey, Executive Officer .
American Assn. for the Advancement of Science
Adm. Bobby Inman, whose public service credentials are
second, to 'none, has tossed a hot potato at the American
scientific community and by doing so has opened a breach
between scientists and the national security establishment
that will be difficult to repair. .
He has asked that research scientists submit voluntarily
to open-ended censorship by the CIA or face the likelihood
of being forced to do so by Congress. Even in wartime such
a demand would be an extreme one, and in the absence of a
national security emergency it is incongruous. It raises
troubling questions involving both scientific freedom and
the force of constitutional protections" against arbitrary
government. -.,
Adm. Inman's job as deputy "director of the Central
Intelligence Agency is to conduct intelligence and counter-
intelligence activities within the bounds of statutory and
constitutional lava. CIA's adversaries presumably are the
Soviets, their mercenaries and assorted terrorist groups out
to create trouble. .
To be sure, it is within the agency's brief to worry about
unfriendly penetration and shoplifting of scientific' and
technological assets. On the other side of, the. street. the
KGB is no less anxious to conceal Soviet progress. In both ?
situations, the incentives run to overprotection and hyper-
anxiety.
- Unrestricted censorship is a draconian measure that can
be justified legally and morally only in extremity. It is the
first refuge of frightened or authoritarian regimes, of which.
the Soviet and current Polish ruling powers furnish ready
examples. It is an explicit interdiction of civil and human
rights, and in a constitutional society its acceptability is
challengeable 'in the absence of a clear and present dan-
ger.
-The contrast between the Soviet and American environ-
ments for scientific research is sharp and unmistakable.
Scientific. work in the USSR operates within a strict
reward-and-punishment system administered by agencies of
the state. American scientists, while shuddering at the
constraints imposed on their Soviet counterparts, neverthe-
less acknowledge That the quality of Soviet science in some
instances is high.
But it is evident that the controls and oversight that are
applied in the Soviet Union discourage the creativity and
spontaneity that produce great science, hence the notable.
absence of Soviet scientists when Nobel honors are Landed
out.
Censorship, secrecy and the heavy presence of the police
state all contribute to limiting Soviet science to something
less than world class productivity.
It comes as no surprise that Soviet science is imitative
and predatory, nor that it must play continually at follower-
ship. If the Soviets were less passionately interested in what
we are doing it would be time to start worrying about the
quality of our own research.
If the objective were to reduce American scientific
research to parity with the Soviet variety, censorship would
be a fine prescription. But an anxiety neurosis accompanied
by secrecy and censorship will not assure U.S. superiority
in science or in technology.
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 M best, secrecy retards the e a w ich knowledge
spreads. It does not' E rRvP p= . & r 102
scientists are very good because security agencies do not tail
them or blue-pencil their scientific papers and journals.
They are good, too, because the First Amendment assures
them of the right to publish and exchange ideas in the open
literature and in symposia. American science is good
because it can be challenged universally, tested and verified
or shown to be mistaken. Finally, it is good because it
thrives on competition that is at times ferocious, and it is
the competition that produces winners.
Adm. Inman plainly wants American science to show its
heels to our adversaries. At the same time, according to
press accounts, he proposes that U. S. scientists submit their
work "prior to the start of research and prior to publica-
to intelligence agencies that can censor research they
tion"
consider potentially relevant to national security.
As stated, without limit or qualification, this could cover
the whole spectrum of the scientific disciplines and all
scientists in both academia and industry. Censorship on this
scale has no precedent in peacetime, and it conjures the
ultimate nightmare of thousands of scientists, outstanding
and mediocre, queuing before a court of summary justice
whose competence to understand and assess science is
unimpressive.
The likelihood is that the CIA's functionaries would
search proposals ?for'key words and, finding them, would
issue a secrecy order on that basis alone. The smothering
effects on both academic and industrial science are only too
evident, and it is difficult to see how our own national
security interests would be well served.
Imposing secrecy or censorship discipline on scientific
research, if it must be done at all, .should be a last-resort
decision and limited strictly to open-and-shut categories of
research. Such an exception has been with us for 35 years in
the case of weapons-related basic fission and fusion
Tesearch. which is, treated under the Atomic Energy Act as
"born classified." While it has not stopped other countries,
friendly and unfriendly, from discovering how to make
nuclear weapons, it has served our own security purposes
reasonably well.
"If there is a case for defining cryptology research as a
new candidate for the "born classified" treatment, the case
should be presented and argued before Congress on its
merits. But it is not reasonable to attempt to throw a vast
security net over the spectrum of basic and applied research
in an undiscriminating effort to embargo the circulation of
Something is very wrong in the CIA's comprehension of {
how science progresses. It is seldom a point-to-point process,
and rarely predictable. In a very true sense science is a I
search and discovery process. Luck and inspiration, helped
along by fortuitous accident and surprise, count for almost
as much as the rigor of the scientific method. Besides,
knowledge breeds promiscuously. It is the clue of one
scientist, caroming off the thinking and clues of another,
that fashions a new piece to fit into the puzzle of informa-
tion. Without this open circulation' of thought, without this
?colliding of ideas and what-ifs, science would spin its
wheels.
A subordinate but not insignificant worry raised by the
CIA's proposal is the possibility that once the agency is
given the information it seeks, that. information may be
handed off to unknown parties without the knowledge or
consent of the scientists or their industrial employers, thus
compromising both their professional and economic rights.
After all, if the information is deemed to be of national
security value, logic dictates that it belongs in the national
Scientists will not deny that 'our .published scientific
C1Pforce of the
research enterprise, can be a prize vehicle for reinforcing
Soviet science. But it does not follow that all our sensitive
breakthroughs are advertised zealously. American scientists
who work at the leading edges of theoretical or applied
mathematics, physics or microbiology are certainly bright
enough to know when their ideas touch upon national
security interests, and they are better equipped than CIA
functionaries to make those judgments. -
No responsible scientist needs to lean on a security agent
to know when to keep his mouth shut, and this is especially
true of applied researchers in the high-technology industries
which trouble Adm. Inman the most. . ' '
The question is how one perceives the degree of security
risk that goes with publishing or reporting unclassified
research. To judge by Adm. Inman's remarks, the CIA
considers the risk to be high. The scientific community
disagrees strongly, believing that the greater risk is the
ultimate high cost to national security and scientific growth
of suppressing the circulation of knowledge. -
Scientists hold fast to belief in the superiority of "security'
by achievement" over "security by concealment" in any
contest with our adversaries. They will not easily accept the I
shame of prostrating their minds and their work at the
doors of the intelligence community. -
Whatever maybe the case for front-door classification of
certain areas of research, and for denying-
enying our adversaries
'access to high technology that has reached the stage of final
design, the rationales do not extend to censoring scientific
research at its points of origin. To-impose such censorship is
to Jay a crushing burden.on science and to import into our'
practices the discredited methods of our adversary. D
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