SNIE 70/2-82: CRITICAL ISSUES IN NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R001900230122-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 122
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007
2 August 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Africa
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence.
SUBJECT: SNIE 70/2-82: Critical Issues in Namibia and Angola
1. In reading. the draft, on Namibia and Angola I found what seemed to be
considerable redundancy, perhaps because there is so little to say that most of
it becomes clear in the Key Judgments. The way it's. structured we read time
after time about each party's attitude to those 5 to 10 to 20 Cubans and about
each party's.requirement and attitude on UNITA, etc.
2. It's also short on factual detail. Anything that can be done to bring
in specifics would give it more value -- even dispositions of South African,
SWAPO and Cuban-Angolan fo.rces-on which there is photography.
3. Another probability would be to spell out some of the various scenarios
indicated inthe footnote at page 8. Detail on the Angolan "social and economic
situation" which is merely referred to and on the. cost to Angola of SWAPO support
and hard currency to Cubans and Soviets would provide useful substance. Also more
detail on SWAPO and UNITA forces and supply needs and sources.
4. What is Soviet presence in Angola - East German?
5. What is nature and extent of Luanda's support to African National Congress
mentioned on page 14?
6. Is more detail available on Angolan defenses against UNITA (page 13)?
7. What is degree of Soviet support of Luanda regime (page 20)?
8. Finally, how do you see the value of this estimate as a matter of timing
on at least two counts:
i) prospect of South African military action.
ii) the August 15 deadline or target set by South Africa and
impending talks in New York.
9. Another thing that troubles me some is that the draft may have too much
of the flavor of.a"report on diplomatic negotiations about which readers will
know more. than we'and not enough. the. flavor of an intelligence as"sessment. I'd
like to get your reactions to these reactions of mine and alk about how we can
fix it and establish. the most useful availability.
William J. Casey
2X1