STRATEGIC WARNING STAFF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300160007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: MEMO

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WI ULUU1.1
Strategic Warning to
Washington, D.C. 20301
14 November 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution List
SUBJECT: Strategic Warning Staff
Attached is a draft Special Report prepared by the Strategic Warning Staff.
This draft is circulated for comment. Your formal coordination, however,
is not solicited. Direct contact with the analysts aged. The Gray
phone number is Recipients are
requested to respond as early as possible and no later than 1200 17 November
1 Attachment
TOP SECRET
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DISTRIBUTION LIST
D/National Foreign Assessments
NIO/W
NIO/USSR
NIO/GPF
Director/OSR
Director/OPA
STATE
INR (ATTN: Robert Baraz)
JS I Ifor distribution within DIA as you see appropriate
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Regular reporting on the political situation in Poland
and the Alert MemoranddW concerning the crisis have already
alerted US poZicymakers to be prepared for a possible Soviet
intervention. The following discussion is intended to inform
readers that they may no longer be able to depend on seeing a
full range of warning indicators spanning the one to two week
period prior to an actual Soviet invasion. As Soviet Leaders
Lose confidence in the Polish regime and armed forces, Moscow
may feel pressured to react rapidly and forcefully. The
Soviets are Likely to place heavy emphasis on the need for
complete tactical surprise if an invasion under these
circumstances is to be Launched at all. In that event, we
may have only a day or two of advance warning of the crossing
of the Polish frontier by Soviet forces.
1. The unrest in Poland is of intense interest and importance to the Soviet
Union and its leading East European clients. Since late summer, the USSR
has carefully maintained a full range of options in response to the upsurge
of the free trade union movement throughout Poland, from upgrading its military
posture in the region to professing full confidence in the new Kania regime
in Warsaw.
2. There is a variety of indications, however, that the USSR and its allies
may be losing confidence that the present Polish leadership is either able
or willing to take needed steps to reverse the "antisocialist" tide. At
the same time, there are signs that the Polish government and armed forces are
preparing for a possible national emergency resulting from renewed large-
scale strike activity. In Soviet eyes this might constitute evidence that the
prospects for a satisfactory outcome are worsening rather than improving,
and that the chances are increasing that "disloyal" Polish troops will heavily
,resist any Soviet intervention in the crisis.
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3. According to one recent report detailing Kania's visit to Moscow at the
end of October, Soviet leaders insisted on a detailed description of Polish
policy if, despite Kania's predictions to the contrary, a general strike
were to be declared during November 1980. Kania told the Soviets that he
would then immediately declare a state of emergency, would mobilize Polish
military and security forces, and would order the arrest of any union or
dissident leader who continued to express opposition. Yet at the same
time, Kania reportedly acknowledged doubts as to the willingness of the average
Polish soldier to use force against the strikers. In this regard, he claimed
that plans were ready for loyal units made up of officer trainees to occupy
key industrial areas. According to this report, the Soviets, while expressing
satisfaction with this plan, offered "help" if it were needed.
4. There are recent signs as well that Moscow's European allies view the
Polish situation with growing unease. Exchanges among East European leaders
have picked up, with the Czechs apparently taking the lead. Following a trip
to East Germany by Czech foreign minister Chnoupek on 4 November and a visit
to Bulgaria by Czech Premier Strougal on 10-11 November, Hungarian party
first secretary Kadar arrived in Bratislava on 12 November for an unscheduled
meeting with Czech party chief Husak. The joint communique issued after
their talks stressed the theme of solidarity with "Polish Communists" now
facing not only an "onslaught of antisocialist forces" but "attempts by
international imperialism to interfere in Poland's internal affairs."
Romania is reportedly Strougal's next stop, with arrival set for 21 November.
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As for East Germany, an SED Central Committee official recently stated
privately that the situation in Poland was regarded by his party as more
dangerous than that of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
5. All-source reporting continues to reveal no firm indications of increased
military readiness or unusual military preparations suggestive of immediate
military actions by any of the participants. Several anomalies worthy of
attention have been noted recently, however, and these are outlined in an
annex to this report.
6. At the same time, there are continuing indications of strenuous effort
to stabilize the situation in Poland. Foremost among these is the decision
issued by the Polish Supreme Court on 10 November allowing the registration
of the free trade union organization "Solidarnosc" on terms acceptable
to the movement's leaders. Soviet media coverage of the latest developments
has remained unemotional and largely upbeat. For their part, the Poles
seemingly remain unconvinced that the worst is behind them. An unusual recall
of Polish military attaches from embassies abroad is now under way, while
Polish diplomats speculate over such possibilities as actual Soviet intervention
or the introduction of martial law within the country. One novel measure of the
situation, a public opinion survey in Poland recently conducted for a French
magazine, reportedly suggested that only three percent of the populace
would vote for the Communist Party in a free election.
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7. Looking to the weeks and months ahead, it is clear that the continuing
downspin of the Polish economy makes the satisfaction of many of the basic
grievances voiced by the union movement increasingly unlikely. A national
congress of Solidarnosc is scheduled to convene in mid-December with the
formal task of assessing the regime's compliance with the accords reached
last September. If the government's performance at that point is found
wanting, renewed resort to large-scale strike threats may be the result.
The Polish Communist Party, for its part, will soon be deeply embroiled in
preparations for its "extraordinary" Ninth Congress, with numerous political
careers as well as concrete issues at stake. An already floundering party
will hardly be capable of reasserting its role in resolving basic social and
economic conflicts if it remains unable to master itself. Worst of all, the
responsiveness of the Polish armed forces to the regime's commands evidently
can no longer be taken for granted.
8. Knowledge of these symptoms of decay almost certainly affects Soviet
confidence that the Polish leadership is capable of resolving the current
conflict on terms compatible with Moscow's interests. This perception may
put Soviet leaders under increased pressure to reach a final decision over
how to deal with the Polish challenge in the near term, apart from any new
turn of events in Poland.
9. Increasingly suspecting that personnel and perhaps entire units of the
Polish armed forces would not support the regime against the strikers and
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might even resist a Soviet invasion, Moscow may be putting heavy emphasis on
the need for complete tactical surprise if,a military intervention is to
be launched at all. In practical terms, this would lead to a conscious
effort to minimize such political indicators as "heavy message" propaganda
and protracted consultations among Warsaw Pact leaders. It would also lead
the Soviets to make concrete preparations for a "standing start" invasion
with little or no interval following mobilization. In such a move, Moscow
would rely on the demoralizing and disorganizing effect of a blitzkrieg-
style operation, using mobility and the shock effect of the sudden appearance
of an invading army to compensate for any lack of overwhelming troop strength.
10. An intelligence judgment regarding overall Soviet intentions toward
Poland remains difficult. If the USSR is already well past the decision point
on the Polish question--having determined that a military solution is
unavoidable and that only the timing of such a move remains a question--
awareness that the resistance is gathering strength would surely advance
Moscow's plans considerably. If, on the other hand, the Soviets have not
yet agreed among themselves that an invasion of Poland is the only alternative,
indications of likely Polish resistance would almost certainly have a
galvanizing effect on the Politburo, creating a strong sense that a fundamental
decision must be made sooner rather than later.
11. The Soviets would almost certainly be confident that they could meet
the diplomatic costs of a Polish invasion, including massive but perhaps
temporary disruption of European detente. They may be less certain about
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accepting the military costs of the operation, including the possibility
that a bloody invasion followed by imposition of an occupation-style regime
might significantly curtail Soviet military options elsewhere. Soviet leaders
must also be aware that an invasion of Poland would cause massive economic
disruption throughout Eastern Europe and would even affect the USSR.
Yet none of these factors would be likely to deter the Soviets, from invading
once they had concluded that the situation in Poland had gotten out of control.
12. The possibility that a situation may arise in Poland that the Soviets
viewed as so serious that immediate action must be taken carries implications
for warning related to the reduced preparation time for invading Soviet
forces. Mobilization and assembly of Soviet divisions for the three armies
in the western USSR stationed near the Polish border seems likely to take
two to three days regardless of the circumstances. Our ability to provide
warning of this mobilization process will be less than we would expect for
a larger scale, more deliberate Soviet move into Poland. We may be able
to supply warning of the preparations some one to two days in advance of the
crossing of the Polish frontier. If the Soviet decision to carry out the
invasion is made as a result of some conspicuous event in Poland, we may
be able to see signs of Soviet intervention somewhat earlier.
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For the last two months or so we have had evidence of Soviet activities
almost certainly related to preparations for a contingency requiring an
invasion of Poland. It is clear that the preparations have not been completed
,but the Soviets almost certainly have reduced the time it would take to
complete them. There is still no evidence of the broad scale mobilization
and movement necessary prior to an invasion but there have been some
disquieting events reported, in.addition to those in the text, that might
be indicative of a movement toward a more serious situation.
EAST GERMANY
-- Unofficial travel to and through Poland by all members of the
East German Army has been prohibited until further notice, except in special
cases, by a decree issued by the East German National Peoples Army Chief
of Staff. Official duty travel, however, is still allowed.
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military reserve doctors
and other reservists with medical experience were called up around 25
the East German armed forces are
at a state of alert similar to that maintained during the Czech crisis in
in September 1980
acquaintances and co-workers were called up without prior notice to participate
in a military exercise. This call up was supposedly in preparation for
actions concerning Poland.
on 4 November that the military compound
in Bruntal, Czechoslovakia, which includes the headquarters of the Soviet
31st Tank Division, was empty.
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stationed there had been transfered to the Czech-Polish border and that
the woods along the border were "crawling with" Soviet soldiers and tanks.
the Soviet "tent city" formerly located outside 25X1
of Prague was now located at an unidentified point along the Polish border.
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-- On 11-12 November, while passing through Brest--a major transportation
junction in the Belorussian Military District-~
an estimated 2000 Soviet military personnel, of mixed services
and branches and clearly not recent draftees, apparently headed for East
Germany-by rail.
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