WARNING ON POLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300150002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 16, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/08/15: CIA-RDP83BOl027R000300150002-0
TOP ?ET
Strategic Warning Staff
16 October 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR WARNING
FROM: Strategic Warning Staff
SUBJECT: Warning on Poland F-1
The attached memorandum discusses the performance of Poland analysts in
connection with the aborted Alert Memorandum on Poland of 16 September 1981.
It raises some useful points with respect to warning methodology and
presents some lessons learned from the mid-September events in Poland.
The memorandum was prepared by the Strategic Warning Staff and has not
been coordinated with the rest of the intelligence community. Questions
or comments should b ected to the author, extension
Pentagon.
TOP SECRET
COL, USA
Acting Director, SWS
Approved For Release 2007/08/15: CIA-RDP83BOl027R000300150002-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/15: CIA-RDP83BOl027R000300150002-0
TOP?CRET -
Strategic Warning Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR WARNING
FROM: Strategic Warning Staff
SUBJECT: Warning on Poland
The recent attempted Alert Memorandum on martial law in Poland raises
some interesting questions about the relationship of the warning analytical
method to political intelligence analysis. In retrospect, CIA/OPA analysts
accurately assessed that martial law would not be imposed, in contrast to
the draft Memorandum's conclusion that it seemed imminent. On the other
hand, the warning community
accurately identified and assessed the warning signs of martial law. In
mid-September Poland was heading for a confrontation involving the use of
force backed by the armed forces leadership itself. This curious blend of
right and wrong predictions contains some useful lessons.
What Went Right
Several days before the first session of the Solidarity National
Congress in Gdansk, the Soviet propaganda machinery began pumping out
vitriolic commentary about the dangers of the union and the limits of per-
missible conduct. Even the somewhat extreme course of events at the
Congress provided few surprises, it seems, to Soviet analysts until the
fateful 8 September appeal by Solidarity to the workers of Eastern
Europe. One of the issues debated at the 16 September warning meeting on
Poland was whether Soviet and East European outrage over this appeal was
genuine or bluff. CIA/OPA analysts suggested that the Soviets were cer-
tainly angry, but not enough to do anything about the Poland crisis except
decry it in the media and urge the Poles to contain it. Most other
analysts judged that the Solidarity appeal exceeded the ill-defined limits
of Soviet tolerance and that the Soviets would pressure Warsaw to take
strong corrective action against Solidarity.
Subsequent intelligence suggests the majority view of Soviet attitudes
was correct.
a 21 September press item from Yugoslavia
claims that the first letter notified Poland that economic aid from the
USSR "was terminated." The second letter, delivered on 17 September and
published in Polish and Soviet media, also evinced Soviet distress.
25X1
2 A11
Approved For Release 2007/08/15: CIA-RDP83BOl027R000300150002-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/15: CIA-RDP83BOl027R000300150002-0
TOP ?CREl
As evidence that martial law appeared imminent, the draft Alert
Memorandum cited the Polish army's contingency
plans in the event martial law was declared, Premier Jaruzelski's abrupt
departure from the Za ad-81 war games in western USSR on 8 September, and
an assertion that strong
measures had been prepared by the government for use if necessary. The
draft Memorandum also noted that this was verified by
an official Polish government statement to the same effect on 16
September.
Other information suggested that the Soviets also expected some impor-
tant development in Poland in mid-September.
During the discussion of the draft Memorandum on 16 September, most
analysts agreed that martial law would only be implemented in extremis, but
many differed over whether the extreme situation had arrived and whether
the Polish communists would face it boldly, as by using force. CIA/OPA
analysts restated the conventional wisdom that Kania and Jaruzelski would
not impose martial law, other options remained, and significant signs of
martial law were absent, despite the evidence to hand. To their credit,
the prediction by these analysts proved right, but not for the reasons
What Went Wrong
Several factors seem responsible for the draft Memorandum's faulty
overall prediction, amid so many lesser, correct judgments.
Approved For Release 2007/08/15: CIA-RDP83BOl027R000300150002-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/15: CIA-RDP83B0l027R000300150002-0
TOP ?RET
All analysts were aware that the
Polish party contains a minority hardline faction opposed to the "line of
accord," of Kania and Jaruzelski. Information on military attitudes has
been very sketchy. Additionally, our understanding of the influence of the
army on the party and the way the Politburo works under Kania and
What was available to all participants in the warning meeting was a
12-month trend of political compromise and an even longer history of aver-
sion to the use of Polish troops against Polish citizens. Additionally,
the new Politburo was associated publicly with Kania's line of conciliation
which it endorsed at the party congress in July, just two months earlier.
Barring a true national emergency, the Politburo would seem to lack the
authority to reverse an official Dar policy line without Central
Committee approval at least.
The CIA political analysts credited these factors, insofar as they
surfaced at all, more than most other analysts. It should be recognized,
however, that the institutional patterns of behavior of the Polish
authorities proved a surer guide to predicting Polish decisionmaking than
did other approaches
The one issue that did not surface at the warning meeting is the
possibility of a struggle for power within the government and party
apparatus. This is the one idea that explains how genuine signs of martial
law could be operative simultaneously with precisely contradictory
political trends. It is still not at all clear what happened between 13
and 15 September. Was the army really pushing in its own right for a
crackdown or was it a pawn in a larger power play? Did the Soviets merely
know beforehand or did they orchestrate the army's martial law proposal?
Why was the proposal beaten so soundly, who spoke for or against it and who
were the the key actors? No one at the 16 September meeting surfaced any
inkling that the army leadership might be so far out of step with its
political superiors. The failure to ask a question about an internal
splintering of the party and government must be judged a serious analytical
flaw. As to the questions that were raised at the meeting, the political
and warning analysts can tame comfort in knowing that the techniques
of both proved sound.
Approved For Release 2007/08/15: CIA-RDP83B0l027R000300150002-0
 Approved For
elease 2007/08/15: CIA-RDP83B0l027R000300150002-0
R
TOP SECRE1
For The Future
From the foregoing discussion, we now may infer that the government
does not trust the army and that the army lacks clout with the party. The
present Politburo is committed to the "line of accord" by a large margin,
despite heavy Soviet pressure. The Politburo, however, may be out of step
with local party members. Use of force appears to be a true last resort in
the Polish crisis, unless the leadership changes. This may be attempted
again soon.
Continuing vitriole in the army newspaper indicates that the army was
not just a pawn in the mid-September events and that its attitude towards
restraining Solidarity remains unchanged. This contains seeds for further
crisis within the Polish government and party. Having failed to make the
system work as it desires, army leaders may begin to see no alternative but
to seize power. In any event, the government's main arm of power is not
reliable. The professional bureaucracy runs Poland now, insofar as it
continues to "run.." Bureaucratic attitudes bear closer scrutiny and more
collection.
Solidarity and the Soviets both recognize the power vacuum in
Warsaw. Signs persist that the union leaders lag the rank and file in
extreme positions. Solidarity has no choice but to move ahead with its
"counter-revolutionary" program at delib rate speed. It does so without
meaningful government restraint.
Soviet alternatives have narrowed even further. In June Moscow
supported an internal Polish party coup which failed. Now the Polish army
has failed in trying to halt the pace of compromise and retreat by the
party. Fatalism and frustration must have deepened. In the past Moscow
has cited its aid program as proof of sympathetic and benign intentions.
While aid may continue for a time, the recent stress on balanced trade in
1982 is absurd and bespeaks an ominous turn of mind in Moscow. If economic
pressure fails, as seems likely, Soviet options must narrow to military
intervention or accommodating defacto counterrevolution in Poland. There
are no tools left. Soviet media treatment of events leaves no doubt that
Moscow recognizes and foresees these alternative o!jtcnmPs- This explains
its past reluctance to use the "economic weapon."
Perhaps the most important question bearing on the future is whether
the Poles will return to work. The past year shows that Moscow will
tolerate large deviations by Poland if the workers will just return to work
reliably and steadily.
but it seems increasingly doubtful that the Polish workers will
stop strikes or slowdowns. The momentum of political freedom has yet to
spend itself. Logic points to still greater confrontation between
Solidarity and the Polish authorities, struggle within the Polish party
leading to leadership change, and still less work. The Soviets have chosen
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/08/15: CIA-RDP83B0l027R000300150002-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/15: CIA-RDP83B0l027R000300150002-0
TOP OCRET
to play for time to heal Poland's problems and are profoundly reluctant to
get further involved. Clear evidence that they are applying economic
leverage would indicate that the decision to intervene directly had been
Approved For Release 2007/08/15: CIA-RDP83B0l027R000300150002-0