2. AFGHAN POWER STRUGGLE INTENSIFIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000600170003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 12, 1980
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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 Nation L Secret
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Assessment
Center
Afghanistan: Factions
in the Ruling Party
Secret
PA 80-10251
June 1980
Copy
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Summary
Afghanistan: Factions
in the Ruling Party E
The ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) of Afghanistan, in which
Moscow has a substantial stake, is beset by longstanding divisions. President
Babrak Karmal's regime would have fallen apart by now were it not for
constant Soviet pressure on the feuding factions-Babrak's Parcham
(Banner) and the Khalq (People's) of former Presidents Amin and Taraki-
to work together.0 25X1
Still, personal enmity and the settling of old scores between the more
numerous Khalqis and their Parchamist adversaries continue in spite of
Soviet attempts at mediation. Moreover, as the intraparty struggle erodes
the authority and saps the energies of the PDP's leaders, the Soviets will
become even more involved in the regime's day-to-day decisionmaking
process.
The strains in the regime are the same as those that weakened the
governments of Amin and Taraki before the Soviet intervention. Soviet
military intervention and political interference, far from bringing the two
party factions together, have sharpened the antagonisms dividing them.
Moscow could engineer yet another coup, but the Soviets are unlikely to
come up with a new leadership that will achieve Moscow's objective of
restoring stability under a Soviet-dominated regime.
As they try to deal with the infighting, the Soviets are concerned that
Babrak's faction in the military is weaker than its Khalqi rival. If the Soviets
are ever to disengage from Afghanistan, they must first rebuild the
demoralized Army and ensure its loyalty to the regime. Babrak's weak
position in the military is a serious vulnerability Moscow must confront and
probably will be an important factor in any Soviet consideration of an
alternative leadership.
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Babrak recognizes that he remains in power only as long as Moscow believes
he can serve Soviet interests. As he and the Khalgis vie for Soviet backing,
Moscow will face difficult choices in estimating the prospects for each
faction in holding the regime together and, over the longer term, governing
effectively in the absence of Soviet occupation forces. For the foreseeable
future, however, Moscow will not be able to look to its clients in Kabul to
shoulder the burden of protecting Soviet interests in Afghanistan.
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Afghanistan: Factions
in the Ruling Party F
Origins of the Split The government that came to power following the military coup on
27 April 1978, although purportedly representing the Communist People's
Democratic Party formed in 1965, was actually an uneasy coalition of leftist
groups including-most importantly-the two main factions of the PDP,
the Khalq, and the Parcham. These two factions were divided for most of the
period after 1967 when a group including Babrak Karmal broke away from
Nur Mohammad Taraki's Khalq and formed the Parcham. 25X1
Parcham was generally considered more pro-Soviet than Khalq, but
factional differences were largely over personalities and tactics. Despite the
Khalqis' more moderate reputation, there were no significant ideological
differences between the two groups. Regarding tactics, the Parchamists
advocated participation in the political process, and in 1965 and 1969
Babrak was elected to parliament. Taraki's Khalqis favored a slower, more
methodical approach to power, recruiting cadres among the military, civil
servants, teachers, and workers. At the urging of the Soviets, the two wings
reunited in July 1977 to oppose President Daoud. But they did not expect
they would be propelled into power within a year.
0
Falling Out of Almost immediately after the Marxists seized power in April 1978, factional
the Coup Makers infighting and jockeying for power resumed, stirred by old, personal
antagonisms and mutual distrust. Most of the military officers who had
overthrown President Daoud were Khalqis and sided with Taraki in the
factional disputes. A few others, led by Defense Minister Abdul Qader, were
not formally aligned with either faction. Although leftist, they were more
nationalist and suspicious of Moscow than the Khalqi and Parchamist
participants in the coup against Daoud.0
On the surface, the Khalqis and the Parchamists seemed to be fairly evenly
balanced, while the position of Qader's third group was considerably
weaker. President Taraki headed the government and the party. In the
Cabinet, Khalqis had two of three deputy prime ministers, and the
Parchamists, one, but of the three most important ministries, Taraki's
faction held the weakest, the Foreign Ministry, while the more important
Defense and Interior Ministries were held respectively by Qader and
Babrak's chief supporter, Nur Ahmad Nur. II
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Although a confrontation among the three groups may have been inevitable,
Taraki and his chief lieutenant, Amin, moved against Babrak long before
any serious tensions developed. In late June and early July Taraki-
apparently with Qader's full support-exiled most of the Parchamist leaders
to ambassadorial posts abroad. The Soviets, undoubtedly concerned about
the resumption of the power struggle within the party, nonetheless
acquiesced in Taraki's move against Babrak. Babrak's followers do not
appear to have been plotting against Taraki-despite later allegations by the
government. There was, however, growing unhappiness among the military
officers led by Qader at an influx of 300 to 400 Soviet advisers, which they
may have attributed to Babrak's influence.
A month later Taraki moved against the Qader group of leftist officers. On
17 August the government announced the arrest of Qader and several others
for plotting against the revolution. Taraki and Amin linked Parcham to the
Qader plot and tried unsuccessfully to recall the Parchamist ambassadors to
stand trial. Babrak, who had been posted as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia,
remained outside Afghanistan-primarily in Prague-until his installation
as President in December 1979
Chief of Staff General Shahpur and a few others named by the government
did plot against Taraki, but there is little to suggest that Qader was involved.
A nationalist, and more an opportunist than a leftist, he was clearly a threat
to Taraki, however, and had reportedly objected on a number of occasions to
the growing Soviet influence in the country. Taraki presumably moved
against him as soon as he felt strong enough, using his connection to the coup
plot as an excuse.F]
A key element in Taraki's success was his control of the military. His faction
of the party-largely through Foreign Minister Amin's efforts-had in the
years before the coup recruited many junior officers who moved into
positions of authority when the leftists came to power. Babrak's Parchamists
were not as successful as the Khalqis in recruiting supporters in the military,
and there was no reaction in the military to Babrak's exile. Qader's position,
moreover, was not as strong as it appeared. Many leftist officers' loyalty was
through the party to Amin and Taraki, not through the chain of command to
Qader, whose removal, like Babrak's, triggered no response in the military.
0
Feuding After The regime installed by the Soviets on 27 December 1979 is an unstable
Intervention alliance of former rivals patched together by Moscow in the hope that
supporters of both factions in the military and bureaucracy will work for the
regime. The Soviets must have had reservations about backing a coalition so
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Factional Alignment
of the Regime's Key Figures
Babrak Karmal
Prime Minister, Secretary General of Leading figure among
the People's Democratic Party, Presi- Parchamists. Exiled by Taraki
dent of the Revolutionary Council in July 1978.
Nur Ahmad Nur
Member of the PDP Central Commit- Second most important
tee Secretariat, Member of the Central Parchamist. Served as Interior
Committee and Politburo, Member of Minister under Taraki before
the Presidium of the Revolutionary being exiled.
Council
Ghulam Dastagir
Panjshiri
Member of the Central Committee and Survived purge of the
Politburo, Member of the Revolution- Parchamists by Taraki. De-
ary Council moted from Minister of Educa-
tion to Minister of Public
Works.
Soltan Ali Keshtmand
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Served as Minister of Planning
Planning, Vice President of the Revolu- under Taraki until his arrest in
tionary Council, Member of the PDP August 1978.
Central Committee and Politburo
Anahita Ratebzad
Member of the Central Committee and
Politburo, Minister of Education,
Member of the Revolutionary Council
Minister of Social Affairs under
Taraki until she was exiled as
Ambassador to Yugoslavia.
Mohammad Raft
Minister of National Defense, Member Participated in armored attack
of the Central Committee, Member of against Daoud's forces. Ap-
the Revolutionary Council pointed Minister of Public
Works, he was arrested by the
Khalqis in August 1978.
Saleh Mohammad Ziray
Member of the Central Committee Has retained his post on Polit-
Secretariat, Member of the Politburo, buro since April 1978 coup.
Member of the Revolutionary Council
Assadullah Sarwari
Deputy Prime Minister, Vice President Headed the Afghan Intelligence
of the Revolutionary Council, Member and Security Command under
of the Central Committee and Polit- Taraki. Sarwari, Watanjar,
buro Mazduryar, and Gulabzoi went
into hiding in September 1979,
when Amin seized power.
Participated in coups of 1973
lutionary Council, Minister of Commu- and 1978. Served for a time as
nications Minister of Defense under
Taraki.
Sherjan Mazduryar
Member of the Central Committee, A close friend of Watanjar.
Member of the Revolutionary Council, Under Taraki, served as Kabul
Minister of Transport Garrison Commander and Min-
ister of Interior.
Minister of Communications
Member of the Revolutionary Council, under Taraki. Organized Air
Minister of Interior Force officers in support of
Taraki prior to 1978 coup.
Abdul Qader
Member of the Presidium of the Revo- Taraki's Defense Minister until
lutionary Council, Member of the Cen- he was arrested in August 1978.
tral Committee
Member of the Presidium of the Revo- A shadowy figure, Gul Aqa is
lutionary Council, Member of the Cen- entrusted with the sensitive post
tral Committee, Director of Political of the military's political
Affairs, Ministry of Defense commissar.
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deeply divided. They probably had difficulty persuading Babrak to give
important party and government posts to his rivals. In view of the scarcity of
leftist talent, however, the Soviets and Babrak may have concluded that they
had to work with available party members, even the contentious ones.
Several key figures have old scores to settle:
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The Soviets have had little success in getting the two rival factions to work
together. A fundamental difference in the two factions' bases of support
helps explain the enmity between the two groups. Since the party's
formation in the 1960s, Babrak Karmal and the Parchamists have attracted
the educated sons and daughters of wealthy urban families, whereas Taraki,
Amin, and the Khalqis have recruited bright, poor, young people of city or
village origins. In addition, the Soviet intervention has complicated the
problem by sowing dissension among the party rank and file, many of whom
believe the Soviets' expanding control of internal security, particularly in the
cities, has turned most of the population against the regime 25X1
The factions show no inclination to reconcile their differences, and
developments since the intervention indicate infighting is growing more
intense:
? Fighting is reported to have broken out at a meeting of party leaders
following Babrak's unsuccessful effort to remove Deputy Prime Minister
Sarwari from office. One or more ministers are reported to have been
wounded in the fracas.
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? Babrak, recalling his own exile by the Khalqis in 1978, is said to have
made an abortive effort to remove Watanjar and other leading Khalqis by
assigning them to ambassadorial posts abroad. 25X1
? Members of the two factions carry out nightly killings o each other's
officials.
? Parchamist senior government officials fire their Khalqi subordinates at
every opportunity. Parchamist-Khalqi rivalry in ministries and depart-
ments is interfering with work.
? The two-month-long debate among party leaders over the selection of a
new national flag ended when the one favored by the Parchamists was
approved after heated argument at a meeting of the Revolutionary
Council.
The Soviets must be particularly concerned that the factional rift in the
military is eroding the already diminished effectiveness of the Army, a force
that has been reduced to less than half its strength of 100,000 when the
insurgency broke out in 1978. Factional violence has flared up, and a
number of Afghan officers are reported to have been killed. One such
incident, brought under control by the Soviets, resulted in the death of a
Soviet adviser. The Soviet occupation has deepened the rift in the ruling
party, posing a dilemma that the Soviets cannot resolve short of withdrawing
their forces. Many Khalqi officers ridicule Babrak for having "ridden into 25X1
power on a Soviet tank." They resent the presence of Soviet combat units,
even though they recognize that the Afghan Army's counterinsurgency
effort would collapse immediately if the Soviets withdrew.
As the factional dispute among Afghan officers accelerates the disintegra-
tion of the Army, the Soviets will be forced to shoulder more of the burden of
fighting the insurgents. Feuding between Parchamist and Khalqi officers,
who hold most of the key command and staff positions, is undermining
Moscow's long-term objective of "Afghanizing" the war, if this was ever
possible.II
Perhaps the most important reason for the Soviets' resistance to Parchamist
efforts to purge the Khalq from the ruling party is that the Khalqi faction is
stronger than the Parchamist in the military, owing to Amin's recruitment
of junior officers before the Marxists came to power. In a showdown,
assuming the Soviets do not intervene, Khalqi military officers would
probably have an edge over their adversaries. 25X1
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Babrak is trying to strengthen the Parchamists' hand by selectively
promoting Parchamist officers. The celebration on 27 April of the second
anniversary of the revolution was the occasion for the promotion to general
of several of the regime's leading figures, none of whom are Khalqis. At the
same time, a number of Khalqis were retired or put on the reserve list. The
Parchamists are also trying to bolster their position by reinstating officers
jailed during Amin's Khalqi rule and enlisting their support in the power
struggle against the Khalqis. The Soviets appear to have acquiesced in
Babrak's attempts to shift the balance of power in the military even though
these moves seem certain to stimulate more infighting.
Prospects Moscow can maintain whatever government it wants in Kabul as long as it is
prepared to accept the political and economic costs of doing so. It would be
difficult for the Soviets to allow one faction to get the better of the other in
the persistent struggle for power. The Parchamists appear to be more
amenable to Soviet guidance, but the Khalqis greatly outnumber them.
Total party membership is small-probably no more than 10,000-and the
regime cannot afford to alienate the rank and file of either faction who are
needed to ensure the loyalty of the bureaucracy and, more important, the
military. Attrition of military and civilian party members through purges,
assassinations, and battlefield casualties has already seriously weakened the
party's hold on the instruments of power.
As the Soviets continue to impose an uneasy truce on the factions, they
probably are considering the installation of new leaders who might have a
better chance to establish an effective government. New leaders selected by
Moscow, however, if not Communists, would have to be responsive to
Moscow's guidance and serve Soviet interests in Afghanistan. If the Soviets
conclude Babrak has outlived his usefulness, the Afghan Prime Minister
would be pressed to step down for the "greater good of the revolution." If he
resisted, the Soviets could easily engineer a coup using opportunists in the
regime's leadership, all of whom recognize that Soviet backing would be
essential in any move to oust Babrak.l
Moscow could arrange to replace the Babrak government with little or no
forewarning if it came to believe that new leadership would be more
effective. In assessing the strength and effectiveness of possible alternatives
to Babrak, the Soviets will be looking for someone who might command the
loyalty and rebuild the morale of the military and make some headway in
overcoming popular resistance to the revolution. None of Moscow's possible
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candidates are capable of dealing with what seem to be the regime's
insurmountable problems, but a few choices may be more attractive to the
Soviets than others:
? Saleh Mohammad Ziray. One of seven members of the PDP's first Central
Committee in 1965, Ziray, a 44-year-old Khalqi, has demonstrated a
talent for survival. A holdover from Amin's Politburo, he has been a
member of the party's leadership since it was founded. Ziray is bright-he
graduated from Kabul University Medical School at the head of his
class-and has the reputation of being an opportunist. His appointment to
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Babrak's Politburo and Revolutionary Council may have been at the
insistence of the Soviets. He is a member of the politically dominant
Pushtun ethnic group,
? Dastagir Panjshiri. Panjshiri, 25X1
47, is a survivor. Despite his alignment with the Parchamists, he was
retained in the Cabinet and Politburo when Taraki and Amin exiled
Babrak and most leading Parchamists. It is possible that he and other
figures in the regime who have survived the revolution's numerous purges
and power struggles have been retained because of Soviet intercession on
their behalf. The Soviets would see his proven ability to get along with
Khalqis as an asset in the effort to rebuild party unity. But Panjshiri's
Tadzhik ethnic origin would weigh against his selection for the top party
and government posts.
? Abdul Qader. Although a left-leaning member of the PDP, Qader, 38, is
probably more nationalist than Marxist, and according to some he is an
opportunist with no firm ideological commitments. Promoted to lieutenant
general on 27 April, he was one of few non-Parchamists on the promotion
list. As Air Force Chief of Staff at the time of the April 1978 coup, Qader
had enough influence with fighter pilots at Bagram Air Base to tilt the
outcome in favor of the coup plotters. That he was not executed during his
imprisonment by Taraki has given rise to speculation that the Soviets used
their influence to save him. Qader might be attractive to the Soviets as a
candidate for one of the top posts in a post-Babrak government because of
his following among nonpolitical officers. Not being an ideologically
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committed Communist, however, he would probably be a figurehead. If he
is more opportunist than nationalist, he probably would accept figurehead
status. Now tainted by his association with Marxism, Qader in January
received a hostile reception in Herat when he tried to calm antigovernment
protesters.
? Mohammad Khan Jalalar. The Soviets may view Minister of Trade
Jalalar as a candidate for one of the regime's key posts. Because of his
reputation as an apolitical figure, he might help overcome popular
resistance to the revolution. His status as a minority Uzbek would
probably preclude his selection as president or prime minister, but he
might be named deputy prime minister. Jalalar, 44, has had extensive
service in government, having served as Minister of Finance under the
monarchy and Minister of Commerce under Daoud. Like Qader, however,
he is too identified with the left to gain popular acceptance
In 1930 his family fled to Afghanistan from the Soviet Union,
In the end, the Soviets may decide to muddle through with Babrak. Unlike
Amin, whom the Soviets deposed, Babrak is tractable and has no illusions
about charting an independent course. He is reasonably articulate, although
one performance before the media was poor. One of a few figures in the
regime who was elected to parliament during the constitutional period, he
probably has so a appeal among the small number of Afghans who support
the regime
The Soviets are unlikely to devise a formula that resolves the conflict
between their objective of dominating Afghanistan and their interest in a
government that is acceptable to the Afghan people and not reviled by them
as an appendage of Moscow. The Soviets could replace Babrak and bring
additional non-Communist figures into the government, but any regime
sponsored by Moscow is unlikely to be more effective than the present one in
halting the disintegration of the Army or attracting broader popular
support. The Soviets will almost certainly not be able to install a popular
Afghan Government unless they are willing to reduce their military
presence significantly and give assurances that all of their troops will be
withdrawn.
As the Army continues to disintegrate and factional strife in the
bureaucracy paralyzes the government, the Soviets will be forced to expand
their role in pacifying the country and running the government. The Soviets
will get no early relief from these problems. The factional split in the regime
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is probably beyond repair, and under the best of conditions, it could take
years to assemble an army capable of making headway against the
insurgents without Soviet help. For the forseeable future, Moscow will not
be able to look to its clients in Kabul to shoulder the burden of protecting
Soviet interests in Afghanistan. Moscow may be aware of the open-ended
nature of its commitment. There is no sign that the Soviets are
contemplating withdrawal, and the military and economic resources that
they have poured into Afghanistan in support of the intervention suggest
they are preparing for a long-term presence
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