BALUCHISTAN: IRAN'S WEAKEST LINK?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000400020001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1980
• Content Type: RP

1 {Ql
.Secret
11 Foreign
Assessment
Center
Baluchistan:
Iran's Weakest Link?
A Research Paper
Secret
GC 80-10023
March 1980
146
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Foreign
Assessment 5 X 1
Center
Baluchistan:
Iran's Weakest Link? (u)
A Research Paper
Researchfor this report was completed
in March 1980.
This paper was prepared by the Middle East/
Africa/Latin America Branch, Geography Division,
Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research.
It was coordinated with the Iranian Task Force and
the National Intelligence Officer for Near East
and South Asia. Comments and queries are welcome
and
ma be addressed to the Branch Chief
I1(U)
Secret
GC 80-10023
March 1980
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Baluchistan:
Iran's Weakest Link? (v)
Overview Iranian officials have long been aware that Baluchistan's geographic and
political vulnerabilities make it highly susceptible to outside meddling.
Some officials are concerned that Soviet influence in Afghanistan may
spread southward into the region and turn the Baluchi dissidents-now only
a small, poorly organized threat-into a serious disruptive force. (c)
The Baluchis, because of their isolation and years of neglect, have been
better able to resist government "Persianization" efforts than other Iranian
minorities. They have retained their distinctive culture, including the Sunni
religion, but they have also remained Iran's poorest and least educated
minority. (u)
Iran's 600,000 or so Baluchi tribesmen live in the hot, dry, barren, and
remote province of Baluchestan va Sistan, some 1,400 kilometers southeast
of the Persian heartland. The Baluchis, who comprise less than 2 percent of
Iran's population, are almost exclusively Sunni Muslims. They share the
province with a small number of Persian Shiites and Afghan border peoples.
(u)
The region is part of Greater Baluchistan-an ill-defined Baluchi tradi-
tional homeland that includes western Pakistan, with 2 million Baluchis,
and southern Afghanistan, with about 25,000 Baluchis. Cross-border
political and economic links between these groups have been strengthened
since the Iranian revolution began. (u)
The Iranian Baluchis have long desired greater autonomy but, unlike the
more restive Pakistani Baluchis, are fairly passive. The spurt of economic
development during the last few years under the Shah placated most Baluchi
critics of the government. Current depressed economic conditions in the
province and Tehran's unwillingness to redress basic Baluchi grievances,
however, have increased local resistance to continued government presence
in the province. (c)
Iranian officials have also feared that the Soviets, by undermining Tehran's
control in the province, might encourage the development of an autonomous
Baluchi state. Through it they could seek to gain access to Chah Bahar-a
small fishing port on the Arabian Sea that could be converted into a naval
facility. In such an attempt the Soviets would face serious problems: the
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1,000-kilometer distance between Afghanistan and Chah Bahar, the poor
condition of some of the roads, and the strong summer swells and shallow
depths in the harbor. (c)
Clashes between Revolutionary Guards and Baluchi dissidents have
occurred on several occasions and will probably continue. Provision of arms,
equipment, and training-either from Baluchis in neighboring Pakistan or
from a Soviet surrogate in Afghanistan-could greatly increase the Baluchi
threat to Tehran's control of the province. (c)
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Geopolitical Setting
The Geographic Base
Climate
Transportation
Roads
Railroads
Airfields
Ports
Religion
Agriculture
Smuggling
10
The Baluchi Quest for Autonomy
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 U.S.S.R.
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Baluchistan:
Iran's Weakest Link? (U)
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Iranian officials have long been aware of the geo-
graphic as well as political vulnerabilities of
Baluchestan va Sistan Province. Located some 1,400
kilometers southeast of the Persian heartland, the
province occupies one of the most remote and desolate
regions of Iran. Its heavily Sunni Muslim population,
with strong cultural links with Baluchi tribesmen in
western Pakistan and southern Afghanistan, makes the
province highly susceptible to outside meddling. Politi-
cal and economic conditions have worsened since the fishing ort on the Baluchistan coast
ouster of the Shah and are ripening for serious unrest. (c)
Tehran fears that, if externally exploited, the situation
could lead to a serious secessionist movement. (c)
The tri-nation region that makes up Greater
Baluchistan has traditionally formed a land bridge
between the Middle East and South Asia. Cultural ties
among the approximately 600,000 Baluchis in Iran,
the 2 million Baluchis in Pakistan, and the 25,000 in
Afghanistan are far stronger than those between the
Iranian Baluchis and the country's Persian majority.
Cross-border political and economic links with fellow
Baluchis have been strengthened since the Iranian
revolution. (c)
Baluchestan va Sistan has little intrinsic economic
value and, from an economic standpoint, is hardly
worth fighting for. Belated economic development of
the province under the Shah was geared more to
Tehran's strategic concerns than to the province's
internal needs. (c)
Tehran's fears that dissident activity could evolve into
a widely based secessionist movement are based largely
on a concern that Soviet influence will extend south-
ward from Afghanistan into the province. Government
authorities have long feared that the Soviet Union
would seek influence in Baluchistan as part of its grand
design to gain access to a warm water port. The Soviet
invasion fortifies those fears and places the Soviets
more than 600 kilometers closer to a warm water port
as well as to the West's strategic Persian Gulf oil
tanker routes and to the Middle East oil. Officials fear
that the unsettled political situation in Tehran and the
isolation and cultural separation of Baluchestan va
Sistan make the province vulnerable to Soviet inter-
vention. The officials theorize that the Soviets would
work through the 25,000 Baluchis in Afghanistan to
support Iranian Baluchi efforts to establish an autono-
mous state. The Soviets would, in exchange for that
support, be granted access to Chah Bahar, a small
With such a plan the Soviets would encounter prob-
lems, though not insurmountable ones, both in reach-
ing Chah Bahar from Afghanistan and in constructing
a relatively large port there:
? Chah Bahar lies more than 1,000 kilometers by road
from the nearest border-crossing point between
Afghanistan and Iran (through the Sistan Basin).
Major improvements to some of the existing roads in
both Afghanistan and Iran as well as construction of
a bridge over the Helmand River (which forms the
Afghanistan-Iran border in the Sistan region) would
be necessary to permit heavy traffic through
Afghanistan to Chah Bahar.
? Use of the better route from the Soviet rail line at
Kushka south to Herat, then northwest to Mashhad
and south through Zahedan to Chah Bahar, would
require Soviet annexation of much of eastern Iran-
a far more ominous development than a takeover of
Baluchistan alone. (The most direct route from the
Soviet Union to Chah Bahar is from the rail line at
Ashkhabad through Mashhad. But the 110-
kilometer road that crosses the border has a daily
the Soviets may have designs on
Pa iT stain a uc is an an on wadar, a small fishing port 175
kilometers east of Chah Bahar. But its harbor is smaller and less well
protected and the route between Afghanistan and Gwadar is longer
and more tortuous than between Afghanistan and Chah Bahar.
Western Pakistan, moreover, is presently not as vulnerable a political
target as is southeastern Iran. (c)
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Caspian
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Iran
BalUchestan va Sistan ~'`. ;ran
Province 1'11ii
Railroad Manama
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capacity of only 1,500 tons. There is no other road
route from Afghanistan to Chah Bahar through
Pakistan.)
? Construction of a relatively large port facility at
Chah Bahar would be difficult and expensive-
particularly a long breakwater to block the strong
summer swells and nearshore dredging to permit
docking of large naval vessels. The Shah's plan to
build a small naval facility there was canceled when
the port expansion was found to be much more
expensive than expected. (c)
Land
Baluchestan va Sistan is a rugged and dry province,
about the size of Missouri or Oklahoma. It covers
about 180,000 square kilometers, or 11 percent of
Iran's land area.2 It is barren of resources and among
the least habitable regions of the country. Its
moonscape appearance is reinforced by a dearth of
vegetation, broken only by scattered oases of sparse
grasses, shrubs, and cultivated crops in the better
watered areas and by a few sparse stands of broadleaf
deciduous forest in the mountains. At least one volcano
also contributes to the forbidding appearance of the
landscape. Occasional devastating earthquakes rock
the eastern part of the province. (u)
Most crests of the ranges in the eastern mountains
exceed 2,500 meters. Transportation lines between
Iran and Pakistan are channeled through inter-
montane valleys. Kuh-e Taftan, a volcanic peak with a
height of 4,042 meters, is the highest mountain in
eastern Iran. Although it is now fairly quiescent, it
occasionally emits a plume of smoke and bubbles of
mud and gas. (u)
The mountain range in the south is a little lower-with
elevations of most crests between 1,500 and 2,000
meters-but is more rugged and an even greater
' Greater Baluchistan includes 625,000 square kilometers, of which
more than half lies in Pakistan. Some Baluchi liberationists have
claimed that the area of Baluchi influence in Iran extends well
beyond the province boundaries-west as far as Bandar-e Abbas and
north to the Soviet border near Mashhad. This additional area,
however, includes only small Baluchi enclaves amidst a hodgepodge
of other minorities. (u)
barrier to transportation. Only two roads, both of
which link Chah Bahar with Iranshahr, penetrate this
southern massif. The isolated coastal plain, nowhere
more than 80 kilometers wide, has a regular coastline
with few indentions (the Chah Bahar harbor is the
major exception) and clear and deep approaches. (u)
Terrain in the rest of the province is a checkerboard of
mountain ranges and flat basins with salt flats and
sand dunes, much of which is an extension of Iran's
Great Central Plateau. (u)
Most of Baluchistan's water courses are dry for the
better part of the year and have meager flows even
during relatively wet weather. Soils are thin to
nonexistent in most places and the scant precipitation
runs off the land rapidly. The lack of water has been
the most critical inhibiting factor to the development
of the province and has confined the settled population
to the better watered basins-such as around
Iranshahr and Zabol I land
intermontane plateaus, such as around a edan and
Khash. (u)
The best watered area-and the most densely settled
and agriculturally developed-is the Sistan Basin,
nestled along both sides of the Iranian-Afghan border.
The Helmand, the major river of southern Afghani-
stan, flows into the basin. The basin is comprised of
scattered marshes, threaded with winding distribu-
taries of the Helmand and with irrigation canals. It
includes three lakes that normally coalesce to form one
large (1,100 square kilometers) water body during the
period of maximum river flow (May and June). The
basin, however, may be completely dry during drought
years. Hundreds of irrigation canals once crisscrossed
the basin, but many were destroyed during the Mongol
invasion in the 16th century. Despite some improve-
ment and expansion under the Shah, the irrigation
system is still only a fraction of its former expanse, and
the basin's population is probably less than it was 500
years ago. (u)
Should the Baluchi dissident movement expand, the
geography of the province would probably confine the
insurgents to the eastern and southern mountains. The
especially rugged terrain would limit access to them by
government forces, but the sparse vegetation, as in all
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Hard-surface road
(18,000-25,000 tons/day)
- - - - Loose-surface road
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(under 3,000 tone/day)
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Secret
parts of the province, would make them vulnerable to
government air operations. (c)
Climate
Baluchistan is one of the hottest and driest regions in
Iran. Mean daily maximum temperatures are highest
in the interior basins where they soar to more than 40
degrees Celsius on most summer days (May through
September). Iranshahr, for example, registers a mean
daily high of 44?C in July and August. Coastal
temperatures, moderated by proximity to the sea,
usually peak in the mid-30s but are still uncomfortable
because of the higher relative humidity. The major
temperature aberrations occur in the eastern moun-
tains and in the Sistan Basin where winter tempera-
tures are cold, normally dipping below freezing on
many days in December and January. Light snowfalls
in the eastern mountains are not unusual. (u)
The province normally gets no more than six inches of
precipitation annually. The highest amounts fall on the
upper mountain slopes, the lowest in the lowlands.
Most rain falls as torrential downpours on only a few
days in winter from November through April. (u)
The most prominent climatic feature of the province is
its strong summer winds, called the "Wind of 120
Days," which blow steadily and strongly (and some-
times violently) from north to south along the Iranian-
Afghan border through the Sistan Basin and, with
slightly lesser intensity, into the southern part of the
province. It is hot and desiccating and is saturated with
particles of dust, sand, and salt. It strips off top soil and
destroys vegetation, precluding summer crop cultiva-
tion in the Sistan Basin. An equally strong but less
persistent wind blows icy air into the northern part of
the province in the winter. (u)
Transportation
Roads. The road network in Baluchestan va Sistan is
sparse but adequate for this lightly peopled area. The
main trunk road that links the port of Chah Bahar via
Iranshahr to Kerman and Tehran and the fork that
extends north from Iranshahr to Zahedan are paved,
have two lanes, and were completed in recent years as
part of the Shah's program to better connect the
province with the rest of the country
than 20,000 tons. The road that links Zahedan directly
These roads have daily carrying capacities of more
with Tehran via Bam and the two roads that lead
north-one from Zahedan to Afghanistan via the
Sistan Basin and the other to the Soviet border via
Mashhad-have also been recently upgraded. Some
sections, however, are still unpaved and have daily
capacities of only about 7,000 tons. All other roads,
including the three that cross into Pakistan, are
bituminous treated, gravel, or natural earth and have
daily capacities between 2,500 and 10,850 tons. (c)
The sparse road network, coupled with the rugged
terrain, would favor insurgent operations over conven-
tional military operations. Although all major popu-
lated areas of the province can be reached from
Tehran, Kerman, and Mashhad by road in all seasons
with no difficulty, military traffic within the province
would be slowed by the tortuous road alignments
through the mountains as well as by landslides in the
mountains during the occasional heavy rains
(November-April). Military traffic would be particu-
larly vulnerable to interdiction by guerrilla forces in
the mountains; Baluchi dissidents reportedly have
already harassed military vehicles near Zahedan. (c)
If Iranian fears are realized and the Soviets move into
the province to reach Chah Bahar, some road sections
in both Afghanistan and Iran would have to be
significantly upgraded to handle sustained Soviet
military traffic. The vehicle ferry across the Helmand
River, now the major choke point on the route between
Herat and Chah Bahar, could readily be replaced by a
pontoon bridge, but the roads could not be so easily
improved. In Afghanistan, the southern part of the
gravel road between Herat and the border, via
Delaram, has a daily capacity of only 5,000 tons.
Railroads. The only rail line in the province is a broad-
gage (5-foot, 6-inch) extension of the Pakistani rail
system that crosses the border southeast of Mir'aveh
and extends the 85 kilometers to Zahedan
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The line, which extends through northern
Baluchistan Province in Pakistan to Spezand (near
Quetta) where it connects with the line to Karachi, was
built by the British in World War I for military
purposes. Traffic on the line, which serves a sparsely
populated and little developed region, is light and
irregular. The line handles both passengers and
freight, including coal and other goods for Zahedan.
The Shah had planned to extend the standard-gage (4-
foot, 8-inch) Iranian rail line to tie the province
directly to the rest of Iran as well as to provide a
connection to the Pakistani system. Construction,
which has proceeded east only as far as the Kerman
area, has been halted. (u)
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Airfields. The Chah Bahar airbase, built in the mid-
1970s as part of the naval port development plan, can
handle C-141 aircraftl (It is actually
located nearer to the village of Konarak than to Chah
Bahar.)
ahedan, which
norma y serves as the province's only international
airport with roundtrip service from Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and India, now handles only domestic traffic.
It can accommodate craft of Boeing 747 size. The few
other airfields in the province are considerably smaller
but most can handle C-130 aircraft. (c)
Ports. Chah Bahar, which handles some small general
cargo craft in addition to small fishing vessels, is the
only port in the province. It is located on the eastern
side of a large and well-protected embayment, at the
terminus of the paved road that links it with the
interior of the province as well as with the rest of Iran.
Konarak, across the embayment from Chah Bahar,
does not presently function as a port. A pier, still in
existence there, was used,.in the construction of the
Chah Bahar military complex. The nearly completed
$1 billion military complex might have invigorated the
local economy, but the facility is now little used and
cannot be counted on to provide additional revenue for
the future. The Revolutionary Council has considered
turning Chah Bahar into a free port, a plan that has
equally dim prospects for upgrading local economic
conditions. (c)
Chah Bahar has no harbor facilities other than a short
pier that is rarely used. The Shah's expansion plan was
canceled when surveyors determined that local rock
was too soft for the construction of a substantial
breakwater, necessary to block strong summer swells.
The nearest usable rock is in the mountains, about 100
kilometers away by road. While the 11- to 13-meter
depths in the center of the harbor could accommodate
large naval vessels, nearshore bottoms would need to
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be dredged for them to dock at the berths that were
planned. Chah Bahar otherwise has the potential to
become a good port: the approaches are deep and clear
and the bottoms are suitable for anchorage. (u)
People and Places
The Baluchis are believed to have originated in Iran,
around the southwestern shores of the Caspian Sea.
Medieval invasions by Turks and Mongols most likely
pushed them southeastward through the Dasht-e Kavir
and Dasht-e Lut deserts to the area around Kerman.
Their nomadic wandering led them eastward, eventu-
ally into Pakistan and Afghanistan. Many of the
Baluchis now living in Iranian Baluchistan are be-
lieved to be descendants of Baluchi tribesmen who
returned to Iran from Pakistan as recently as 300 years
ago. (u)
The population of Baluchestan va Sistan Province is
only about 700,000, about 2 percent of the Iranian
population. Overall population density is a little more
than three persons per square kilometer. The province
has never attracted significant Persian settlement and
today probably no more than one-tenth of the popula-
tion is Persian, nearly all of whom are confined to the
few urban centers; most of the remainder is Baluchi.'
(u)
To Baluchi tribesmen, Iranian Baluchistan begins
south of the provincial capital of Zahedan. Between
this theoretical line of Baluchi demarcation and the
province's coast, at least 80 percent of the people live as
pastoral nomads or peasant farmers in small, isolated,
mud-hut villages or semipermanent tent camps. (u)
To the north of Zahedan, only about 20 percent of the
100,000 or so inhabitants of Sistan are Baluchi. The
remainder are a mixture of various Persian Shiite
tribal groups, collectively known as Zabulis, and
Afghanis called Marzneshin, (those who live on the
' Some Baluchi "opportunists" have left their traditional homeland
for Iranian cities such as Kerman or Bandar Abbas. Others have
sought employment outside Iran in Persian Gulf countries such as
Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, where most work as
unskilled laborers, fishermen, or merchants. Of the 25,000 Baluchis
in Oman (most of whom are from Pakistan), many are in the armed
forces; Qatar also uses Baluchis in its security forces. (c)
border). All of these non-Baluchi peoples, regardless of
ethnic origin, are known locally as Sistanis. This has a
perjorative connotation that for the Baluchis infers an
"us against them" significance. Most Sistanis are
peasant farmers or livestock owners who live a more
settled existence than the Baluchis to the south. (u)
Although the population of the province is predomi-
nantly rural, a few larger towns did develop under the
Pahlavi regimes. Zahedan is the lag est with a
population of 93,000 . Non-Baluchis
(Persians, Indians, and Pakistanis), make up one-half
of the residents, providing a cosmopolitan atmosphere
more akin culturally to the Sistan portion of the
province than to Baluchistan proper. A thriving
smuggling business keeps the bazaars of this market-
ing center well stocked with merchandise. The other
five major towns-Zabol (about 30,000;
Iranshahr (14.00 0 Chah Bahar 6 and
Qhashi and Saravan (both around
5,000)-serve as trade, agricultural, and administra-
tive centers. Their populations have been inflated by
the presence of administrative, law-enforcement, and
military staffs from Tehran. Baluchis rarely fill these
government positions. Had the Shah stayed in power,
these urban areas might have grown even more. He
had planned to build eight self-contained shahraks
(government villages) nearby as part of a program to
permanently settle some of the nomadic population.
The shahraks were to have contained houses, hospi-
tals, and schools. None was built. (u)
Baluchi Culture
The Baluchis have been the most successful of Iran's
minorities in their attempts to resist "Persianization."
They take pride in their cultural distinctiveness and
regard their Persian countrymen as outsiders, whom
they call "Qajars," an uncomplimentary reference to
the harsh rule of the dynasty prior to the Pahlavis.
Baluchi success in preserving their culture is due
largely to their physical isolation from Tehran as well
as to the relatively belated efforts by the Shah to bring
the Baluchis into the Persian political fold. Conse-
quently, they have retained their Sunni religion, their
distinctive attire (baggy trousers and tunics for the
men), architecture, and food preferences. The Baluchis
even appear physically different from the Persians.
They tend to be somewhat darker, particularly those
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along the southern coast where the infusion of African
stock-apparently from Oman where many Ornanis
were slave traders-is more pronounced. While the
Baluchis may have managed to retain their cultural
heritage, they have remained the poorest and least
advanced of all of Iran's minorities. (u)
Tribal Structure. The several hundred tribes that
comprise Baluchi society are little more thanextended
families. Each tribe is led by a sardar, or supreme
chief, and often takes its name from the founding
sardar. The selection of tribal leaders is theoretically
democratic; sons do not necessarily succeed their
fathers. New sardars are selected from an elite coterie
of eligibles within each tribe. Rank and status within
the tribe are normally based on age and the services
rendered to the tribe. (u)
Under the Shah, some of the traditional power of the
sardars was reduced. Their role as representatives and
war leaders for the tribe was changed to that of
intermediariesfor administrative and economic
matters between the government and the tribe. But the
distance between Tehran and Baluchistan is immense,
both in kilometers and in centuries, and the feudal
power of the sardars still remains a wieldy force over
their tribesmen. Since the revolution, their power has
increased. (u)
Available information on the role and significance of
individual Baluchi tribes is limited and dated. The Rigi
tribe, concentrated around Khash, is one of the largest
and most progressive. In 1970 the Rigi claimed the
honor of having Iranian Baluchistan's only Baluchi
university graduate as well as most of its meager
complement of gendarmerie officers, merchants, and
civil servants. (u)
The Yar-Mohammad Zehi tribe, concentrated along
the Iran-Pakistan border east of Zahedan and Khash,
is best known for its lengthy wars with the British
during the British colonial reign in Pakistan (then part
of India). The tribe's most famous chief, Jaynad Khan,
led a guerrilla war against the British for 20 years. His
son, Bajjar Khan, fought the forces of Reza Shah.
When he was captured and eventually pardoned, he
changed the tribe's name to Shahnavazi, which means
"caressed by the Shah." The Shahnavazi have been
traditional enemies of the Rigi. Tribal quarrels
between them as well as between other Baluchi tribes
still arise but are mild in comparison to the blood feuds
that occurred before Reza Shah, the father of the
current deposed Shah, enforced his policy of tribal
reconciliation. (u)
Language. The Baluchi language is related to Farsi,
although few Baluchis know Farsi. Around Zahedan,
whereBaluchi-Persian contact has been most pro-
nounced, Farsi-speaking Iranians are usually able to
communicate with the Baluchis after a short exposure
to their language. Farther south, however, the Baluchi
language is heavily influenced by nearby South Asian
dialects and even contains some words of African
origin, and Persians are more apt to need interpreters.
(u)
Customs. Folk customs and rituals are important to the
Baluchis. Births and weddings are lively occasions and
always include music played on the qeychak, a string
instrument. When a child is born, friends and family
celebrate for six consecutive nights; on the last night,
they collectively select a name for the infant.
Weddings are a three-day celebration. The bride is
dyed with henna, and on the third night guests bring
gifts and join in to celebrate. (u)
Religion. Religion has perhaps been the most binding
cultural tie for the Baluchis. When the Shia Persian
government of Reza Shah asserted its control over the
predominantly Sunni Baluchis in the 1930s, the
tribes-perhaps as a means of stressing their cultural
identity-intensified their devotion to Sunnism. These
efforts were led by religious leaders known as
mowlavis who are somewhat the Baluchi equivalent of
the Shiite ayatollahs. (u)
In Sistan and around Zahedan, many of the
Muslims-including some Baluchis-are Shiites.
Religious friction between the two sects, common in
the past, has heated up even more since the revolution
began, brought on by Baluchi resentment of the
government's Shiite favoritism. This favoritism,
although partly dispelled by Tehran's recent agree-
ment to allow Sunni courts in Sunni-dominated areas,
will continue to impair Baluchi relations with Tehran.
(u)
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 Approved For Release 2006/06/09: CIA-RDP81 B00401 R000400020001-8t
Education
Educational facilities in the province are sorely
lacking. Outside of the six major towns, there are no
schools above the primary level. Of those few primary
schools that do exist in the rural areas, nearly all are
located in the larger villages. Because most Baluchis
live in scattered, small, hut or nomadic tent settlements
in isolated areas, most children never attend school.
Even those that do live near a school generally drop out
before graduating. (u)
As a consequence of the limited educational opportuni-
ties, only about one in four Baluchi males is able to
read. The literacy rate for females-who are discour-
aged from attending school by prevailing religious
conservatism and feudal traditions-is even lower; less
than one in 30 can read." (u)
Iranian Baluchi college graduates number no more
than a few dozen. According to one government
official who was assigned to the province during the
Shah's regime, the University of Baluchistan in
Zahedan had only 10 Baluchi students in 1978. (u)
In the last two years of the Shah's regime, attempts
were made to improve education by hiring more
teachers, establishing more schools, and upgrading
media communications in the area. The program to
recruit qualified teachers was not particularly success-
ful; despite substantial salary offers, the province's
isolation had little appeal for prospective teachers. In
1978 the government also formulated a plan to set up
tent schools for the Baluchis similar to those intro-
duced among seminomads in southwestern Iran, but it
was never implemented. (u)
The Shah's government made large investments in
media broadcast facilities in an effort to entice Iranian
Baluchis away from dependence on news and enter-
tainment from South Asia and across the Persian Gulf.
Local programing designed to appeal to Baluchis was
promoted by National Radio and Television in
Zahedan. A high-powered radio transmitter was to
have been installed near Chah Bahar to serve the
southern portion of the province. Westinghouse was
involved in a project to use a high-altitude balloon to
Reportedly, the only Baluchi grammar book in existence was
written by a British traveler in the 19th century; it has been
preserved in the British Museum. (u)
beam television to all parts of the province. These
media projects, like the plans to increase the number of
schools and teachers, were probably halted after the
overthrow of the Shah. (c)
In the early 1970s, rural income in Baluchestan va
Sistan was about one-half that of other provinces.
After long years of neglect, a government agency was
established in 1972 specifically to develop long-range,
socioeconomic programs for the province. This belated
development was probably undertaken by the govern-
ment more to mollify the Baluchis and to secure the
eastern border than to upgrade the living standards of
the Baluchis per se. (u)
Earning opportunities did increase as a result of this
development; many Baluchis took jobs as laborers on
road and building construction projects, usually earn-
ing no more than $3 a day. This economic "boom" did
not last. Most of the money that was pumped into the
province was used for projects that only marginally
improved the province's economic potential. Nearly all
of the projects have succumbed to the revolutionary
upheavals and the Baluchis are now probably worse off
economically than they were eight years ago. (u)
Agriculture
Most Iranian Baluchis live a meager existence as
herders of sheep, goats, or camels in a land so barren
and devoid of resources that there is no other way to
make a living. Names of Baluchi villages-Shuregaz
(Growing in Salt Marshes), Tallesiah (Black Heap),
and Shah Resukhteh (Burnt Town)-reflect the
harshness of the area. Settled farming has been
severely limited by the lack of water. Rainfall is
infrequent and erratic, most often occurring either as
torrential showers or not at all. In the lowland area
along the coast, for instance, crop cultivation is
particularly risky, subject to either flood or drought;
35 villages near Chah Bahar were flooded by heavy
rains in December 1979. Other major agricultural
oases exist around Iranshahr, Zahedan, and Khash,
but production is inadequate even for the local
populations. (u)
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 Approved For Release 2006/06/09: CIA-RDP81 B00401 R000400020001-8
Sistan is the only area in the province that is normally
sufficiently watered for extensive crop cultivation, and
even it is subject to periodic droughts. The Helmand
River that flows into the region from Afghanistan
provides a more stable water supply than those in the
rest of the province. Irrigation schemes in Afghanistan,
however, had threatened to deny adequate water for
the Iranian side. A treaty, signed in the mid-1970s,
established rules for water usage on both sides of the
border. (u)
The relatively abundant water resources in Sistan have
enabled the Sistanis to lead a more prosperous
existence than the nomadic Baluchi tribesmen in the
rest of the province. Cattle farming is widely practiced
in the region as animals can be grazed on the relatively
well-watered and lush grasslands rather than be moved
from one pastoral grazing area to another. Sistan is
also blanketed with irrigated fields of winter wheat,
barley, beans, and other food crops. Despite an overall
improvement in the agricultural base under the Shah,
cultivation methods still remain primitive and produc-
tion limited. (u)
Industry
Little industry exists in the province. A subsidized
garment manufacturing plant is located in Zahedan. A
rug factory, where Baluchi "tribal" carpets are woven,
is located in Zabol. Two mechanized bakeries are
located in Zahedan and Iranshahr; a third was under
construction in Chah Bahar as of 1978. Plans had been
made under the Shah to establish a textile mill in
Iranshahr to supply the garment factory in Zahedan,
but it has not been built. A small fishing industry exists
at Chah Bahar, but the expectation of its growth into a
major fishing center was somewhat dubious even
before the revolution. (u)
Smuggling
The only continually profitable business-and the
cornerstone of the province's economy-has been
smuggling, an enterprise that capi- talizes on the
porous international borders of the region. Iranian,
Pakistani, and Afghan Baluchis regularly cross over
into one another's terrritory. Many carry identification
cards for all three countries, just in case they are
challenged by local government authorities. Even
under the Shah, government officials looked with a
tolerant eye upon smuggling as long as the perpetrators
kept to such innocuous items as foodstuffs and other
small-scale consumer goods. It was only when the
smugglers dabbled in illicit goods such as weapons and
narcotics that the government stepped in, using "hired
guns"-trusted Baluchis armed by the government-
to help the local gendarmerie. Since the revolution and
its ensuing economic and security breakdown, smug-
gling operations have increased; one observer has
estimated that as many as 70 percent of the Baluchis is
engaged in the activity. (u)
Baluchis also have a long history of brigandry, going
back to the days when they raided caravans traveling
through the area. Most such activity is now targeted
against the few trucks that haul goods from Chah
Bahar to the towns of the interior. (u)
The Baluchi Quest for Autonomy
For the past 2,500 years, tribes of Greater Baluchistan
have been ruled by outside powers-Greek, Indian,
Aryan, Mongol, Arab, Iranian, and British. None,
however, ever established effective control over them.
All present-day boundaries in the region were drawn
by the late 19th century and the Baluchis have been
reluctant vassals of the three host countries ever since.
Although they have not forsaken their aspirations to
reunite in an independent Baluchistan, most Baluchi
political-military efforts have been aimed at gaining
greater autonomy within their respective countries. (u)
The Pakistan Baluchis, who account for more than 75
percent of the entire Baluchi population of more than
2.5 million, have been the most vociferous in their
demands for greater autonomy. They have been far
more troublesome to Islamabad than the Iranian
Baluchis have been to Tehran. Their demands have
been in response to a heavyhanded government policy
that has given them limited government representation
while taking their resources with (according to the
Baluchis) little in return. The battle for greater
Baluchi autonomy in Pakistan culminated in a bloody,
five-year war with the central government. Despite a
1977 truce, signed by General Zia (who ousted Ali
Bhutto as Prime Minister in 1977), the Pakistan
Baluchis are still not satisfied with their lot and
Islamabad still fears a resurgence of Baluchi
dissidence. (c)
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 Approved For Release 2006/06/09: CIA-RDP81 B00401 R000400020091EPet
Tehran, fearing that the Baluchi fight for greater
autonomy in Pakistan would spill over into Iran,
worked with Islamabad to quell the dissidence there.
Iaimen2i zisirzLIC aauarnHsi
the Iranian Baluchis sympathized with the plight of
their ethnic brethren in Pakistan, Tehran's fears were
probably greatly exaggerated. (s)
Even if the Pakistan Baluchis had actively supported a
movement to gain greater autonomy for fellow
Baluchis in Iran, it is doubtful that their efforts would
have had much success. The Iranian Baluchis are not
as well educated or politically astute as their Pakistani
cousins, and Iranian Baluchi resistance movements
have been poorly led and poorly organized. Although
the Shah systematically weakened the powers of the
Baluchi sardars and arrested those sardars who
opposed him, his policies were otherwise less dictato-
rial than those of Islamabad and Iranian Baluchi
grievances were correspondingly fewer. The discontent
that did exist among the Baluchis, which stemmed
from Persian domination and the lack of Baluchi
participation in the management of their affairs, was
partly compensated for by the relative prosperity under
the Shah, particularly during the last few years of his
regime. (c)
Baluchi charges of economic and cultural repression
have greatly increased since the revolution. Economic
conditions have deteriorated. Foreign construction
firms have left the province and unemployment has
soared; stores have closed and availability of consumer
goods has declined. The government presence has
taken on a higher profile, particularly through the
deployment of the Revolutionary Guards. Shiite Islam
has been codified as the state religion (although the
Sunni Muslims were granted special considerations in
January). (u)
Baluchi dissatisfaction with the present government
and their demands for greater autonomy have grown
more vocal: Baluchi independence movements have
reappeared, ties with Baluchi separatist movements in
Pakistan have been strengthened, and the first Baluchi
political party has been formed. Clashes between
Baluchis and Revolutionary Guards occurred in
Zahedan, Iranshahr, and Chah Bahar during the last
half of 1979 and in early 1980. Martial law was
imposed in Zahedan in December when more than 100
Revolutionary Guards were reported to have been
killed.' The disorder has since been controlled, but the
truce is a tenuous one so long as the Baluchi grievances
remain. Even though Tehran's longstanding fears of
Soviet-supported Baluchi separatism are still
unsubstantiated, these developments, accompanied by
the Soviet advance into Afghanistan, give them added
credibility. (s NF)
Although visions of an independent Baluchistan have
been resurrected among many Iranian Baluchis since
the revolution began and a few now actively support
secession, most still see secession as an unrealistic goal
(or are ignorant of political events altogether). A
redress of their grievances-particularly the removal
of the Revolutionary Guards, an increased Baluchi
representation in local government, recognition of
Sunni Islam as an equal to Shiite Islam, and an
improvement in their economic well-being-would
satisfy most. (c)
In view of its tenuous control of Baluchestan va Sistan,
Tehran might be forced to grant some of these
concessions to the Baluchis, such as greater involve-
ment in local administration, to head off a more serious
insurrection. But, given the present chaotic political
and economic conditions in the country, an improve-
ment in economic conditions in the province is not
likely to happen soon. Even if Tehran grants conces-
sions, a continuation of economic lethargy in the
province will probably encourage more Baluchis to
resist the government's presence. While they do not yet
pose a serious threat to government control of the
province, provision of arms, equipment, and training
either from fellow Baluchis in Pakistan or from a
Soviet surrogate in Afghanistan (both of which may
already exist to a limited extent) could make the
Baluchis a much more serious disruptive force. (c)
' The Zahedan disorders were complicated by flareups between
Baluchis and their Sistani neighbors. The Baluchis charged that the
government showed favoritism to the Shiite Sistanis in the province.
(S NF)
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 Approved For Release 2006/06/09: CIA-RDP81 B00401 R000400020091EPet
Tehran, fearing that the Baluchi fight for greater
autonomy in Pakistan would spill over into Iran,
worked with Islamabad to quell the dissidence there.
Iaimen2i zisirzLIC aauarnHsi
the Iranian Baluchis sympathized with the plight of
their ethnic brethren in Pakistan, Tehran's fears were
probably greatly exaggerated. (s)
Even if the Pakistan Baluchis had actively supported a
movement to gain greater autonomy for fellow
Baluchis in Iran, it is doubtful that their efforts would
have had much success. The Iranian Baluchis are not
as well educated or politically astute as their Pakistani
cousins, and Iranian Baluchi resistance movements
have been poorly led and poorly organized. Although
the Shah systematically weakened the powers of the
Baluchi sardars and arrested those sardars who
opposed him, his policies were otherwise less dictato-
rial than those of Islamabad and Iranian Baluchi
grievances were correspondingly fewer. The discontent
that did exist among the Baluchis, which stemmed
from Persian domination and the lack of Baluchi
participation in the management of their affairs, was
partly compensated for by the relative prosperity under
the Shah, particularly during the last few years of his
regime. (c)
Baluchi charges of economic and cultural repression
have greatly increased since the revolution. Economic
conditions have deteriorated. Foreign construction
firms have left the province and unemployment has
soared; stores have closed and availability of consumer
goods has declined. The government presence has
taken on a higher profile, particularly through the
deployment of the Revolutionary Guards. Shiite Islam
has been codified as the state religion (although the
Sunni Muslims were granted special considerations in
January). (u)
Baluchi dissatisfaction with the present government
and their demands for greater autonomy have grown
more vocal: Baluchi independence movements have
reappeared, ties with Baluchi separatist movements in
Pakistan have been strengthened, and the first Baluchi
political party has been formed. Clashes between
Baluchis and Revolutionary Guards occurred in
Zahedan, Iranshahr, and Chah Bahar during the last
half of 1979 and in early 1980. Martial law was
imposed in Zahedan in December when more than 100
Revolutionary Guards were reported to have been
killed.' The disorder has since been controlled, but the
truce is a tenuous one so long as the Baluchi grievances
remain. Even though Tehran's longstanding fears of
Soviet-supported Baluchi separatism are still
unsubstantiated, these developments, accompanied by
the Soviet advance into Afghanistan, give them added
credibility. (s NF)
Although visions of an independent Baluchistan have
been resurrected among many Iranian Baluchis since
the revolution began and a few now actively support
secession, most still see secession as an unrealistic goal
(or are ignorant of political events altogether). A
redress of their grievances-particularly the removal
of the Revolutionary Guards, an increased Baluchi
representation in local government, recognition of
Sunni Islam as an equal to Shiite Islam, and an
improvement in their economic well-being-would
satisfy most. (c)
In view of its tenuous control of Baluchestan va Sistan,
Tehran might be forced to grant some of these
concessions to the Baluchis, such as greater involve-
ment in local administration, to head off a more serious
insurrection. But, given the present chaotic political
and economic conditions in the country, an improve-
ment in economic conditions in the province is not
likely to happen soon. Even if Tehran grants conces-
sions, a continuation of economic lethargy in the
province will probably encourage more Baluchis to
resist the government's presence. While they do not yet
pose a serious threat to government control of the
province, provision of arms, equipment, and training
either from fellow Baluchis in Pakistan or from a
Soviet surrogate in Afghanistan (both of which may
already exist to a limited extent) could make the
Baluchis a much more serious disruptive force. (c)
' The Zahedan disorders were complicated by flareups between
Baluchis and their Sistani neighbors. The Baluchis charged that the
government showed favoritism to the Shiite Sistanis in the province.
(S NF)
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