EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT WITH ANGOLA'S INSURGENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010063-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 63
• Publication Date: November 15, 1978
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
MEMORANDUM
EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT WITH ANGOLA'S INSURGENTS
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Jonas Savimbi's leadership of the National Union for
the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has kept in the
field a force that numbers approximately 18,000 guerrillas.
UNITA, the only serious insurgent threat to Angolan President
Neto, moves freely within and is supported by the inhabitants
of an area of southern Angola that is roughly between a
third and a half of the country's territory.
UNITA has demonstrated the ability to survive
Angolan/Cuban offensives against it.and the insurgents
should be able to continue denying southern Angola to
Luanda's control. UNITA will not be successful in expanding
its territory, but will continue to harrass the central
government by various means. Continued attacks on the Benguela
Railroad is one example.
This memorandum was prepared by the African Division of the Office
of Regional and Political Analysis and coordinated with the Directorate
of Operations and the Office of Strategic Research. Questions and
comments may be addressed to the author,
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External assistance to UNITA comes from a variety of
sources and may be decreasing. Such aid is important but
not critical to the insurgent's ability to sustain the
pressure on the Luanda government. We have no hard evidence
of South African support to UNITA, but believe Pretoria
could be supplying limited logistical support, intelligence
information, non-lethal military equipment such as radios,
and perhaps some funding to Savimbi's guerrillas. It is in
Pretoria's interest to keep the attention of the Angolan
Government focussed on its internal insurgency so as to
limit its support to SWAPO operations in Namibia.
President Mobutu has supported Savimbi in the past,
allowing supplies for UNITA to be ferried through Zaire and
permitting Savimbi's insurgents to maintain a few small
bases in southern Zaire. While the recent Angolan-Zairian
rapprochement has lessened Mobutu's support'to UNITA, it is
unlikely Mobutu would block all arms shipments to UNITA via
Zaire. Zambian President Kaunda is an old supporter of
Savimbi, as are the West African moderates Senghor and
Houphouet-Boigny, but they probably do not provide material
assistance to UNITA. Savimbi would look to these and other
moderate African states for transit rights in the event an
alternate supply route were needed.
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FNLA and FLEC
Neither the National Front for the Liberation of Angola
(FLNA) nor the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of
Cabinda (FLEC) poses a serious threat to the Neto government.
Both groups suffer from ineffective leadership, a lack
of arms and ammunition, and FLEC has had serious internal
problems. While both groups continue to tie down Cuban
and Angolan forces, they are unable to engage in large-
scale military confrontations.
The FNLA has 2,000 to 4,000 combatants operating
mainly within the area of the Bakongo tribe in northern
Angola from which it draws its major following. In the
past, South Africa has provided some assistance to the
FNLA insurgents but this probably was terminated two years
The FNLA has received some military assistance from the
Zairians and the French, but we have no recent evidence
of such support. Some FNLA leaders reside in Zaire but
Zairian President Mobutu claims that his government is no
longer assisting the rebels. Recently, the Chinese
have shown growing interest in FNLA activities
Representatives of FLEC's estimated 1,000-man force
maintain that they have received no foreign assistance
over the past two years. While we have no evidence to
disprove this, the insurgents could be receiving some limited
assistance from the French or the Zairians. FLEC recently
has attempted to reorganize into a more effective military
force, but this has not yet been reflected in the insurgents'
anti-government activity.
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