SYRIA'S ALLIES AND ASSETS IN LEBANON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010051-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: November 7, 1978
• Content Type: IM

.W T J'0
Approved For R lease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP80T00634A 00400010051-6 25X1 19
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
SYRIA'S ALLIES AND ASSETS IN LEBANON
KEY POINTS
25X1
Since its intervention in Lebanon in June 1976, Syria
has aggressively sought to develop a network of allies and
assets. Although Damascus has been unable to build a unified
broad front of Lebanese factions dedicated to supporting
Syria's position in Lebanon, the Syrians have forged strong
ties with several Lebanese groups.
Syria's allies in Lebanon include representatives of
almost every religious community. Among the Lebanese
Christians, Syria's strongest ties are with Maronite former-
President Sulayman Franjiyah and Greek Catholic leader Joseph
Skaff. They provide Syria with influence in the regions they
control--Franjiyah in the Zgharta area and Skaff in the Bekaa
Valley around the town of Zahlah.
Among Lebanon's Muslims, the Syrians have carefully
nurtured ties with Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. Although
Jumblatt still suspects the Syrians assassinated his father
Kamal, Walid has been willing to accept Syrian political and
military support. Jumblatt's relationship with Damascus is
a marriage of convenience, but one that gives the Syrians an
ally in the Shuf region of central Lebanon.
This memorandum was prepared by the Middle East Divisio77
of the Office of Regional and Political Analusis. Questions
and comments may be addressed to the author,
State Dept. review completed
Approved For R
lease 2001MJ08 : CIA-RDP80T00
125X1
 Approved For Release 2007/02/08ECIA-RDP80T00634A000400010051-6
Among the Sunni and Shia Muslims the Syrians have
several puppets on whom they can count to provide con-
sistent and loyal backing. Assam Qansu, leader of the pro-
Syrian wing of the Lebanese Baath Party; Kamil Shatila, head
of the Nasirite Union of Working Peoples Forces; and Talal
Marabi, chief of the Confrontation Front, all have close
and old ties to Damascus. While none is a major figure,
together they provide the Syrians with allies in areas
important to Syria--Qansu and Shatila in West Beirut and
Marabi in the Akkar region of northern Lebanon.
Syria's greatest potential asset in Lebanon is the
Palestinians. Although the Palestinians and Syrians remain
mutually suspicious of each other and have not forgotten the
bitter battles of "Black June" in 1976, the Syrians can
count on the mainline Palestinians in Fatah to generally
support Syria's position in Lebanon. Moreover, Syria's
puppets in the Palestinian movement--Saiga and the Palestine
Liberation Army--provide Damascus with the means to influence
developments both in Lebanon and inside the Palestinian
community.
While these groups are occasionally mutually antagonistic
and many are tied to Syria only by tactical need, taken
together Syria's allies and assets amount to a significant
source of support for Damascus' efforts to maintain its role
in Lebanon. If the Syrians decide to pull their forces out
of the country, President Assad could count on these surro-
gates to defend Syrian interests.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010051-6
 Approved For Release 2007/02/0$F-TRDP80T00634A000400010051-6
For most of their history, Syria and Lebanon were part
of a larger political entity.* Much of Lebanon, as created
in 1919 by France, was added to the Maronite Christian heart-
land of Mount Lebanon--a province of the pre-World War I
Ottoman Empire--from territory traditionally considered a
part of Syria--the Bekaa Valley, Akkar and Tripoli, Sidon
and Tyre. Syria has always had close relations with many
Lebanese political figures and parties. Kinship and family
ties between the two countries are numerous.
Since the movement into Lebanon of 30,000 Syrian troops
in June 1976, Syria has tried to strengthen old alliances and
establish new ties with various Lebanese political factions.
We do not believe these Syrian moves presage an attempt to
annex Lebanon, although from time to time in the past years
there have been proposals to create a "Greater Syria." Syria's
goal in Lebanon is to reestablish stability and ensure Syria's
preeminent influence in Lebanese politics. Damascus will not
tolerate the creation of a regime in all or part of the country
linked to Israel.
The Christians
Syria's best known and most vocal supporter in Lebanon
in recent months has been former President Sulayman Franjiyah.
The 68-year old Franjiyah's ties to Syria go back to the 1950's,
despite differences from time to time. Nonetheless, Franjiyah's
link with the Syrians--like most such alliances--is a marriage
of convenience. The Syrians do not control Franjiyah's actions.
Franjiyah, leader of the northern Maronites is, in effect,
a modern feudal baron whose power base centers around kinship
ties. Politics in the Lebanese mountains too often resembles
gangland vendettas. Franjiyah's tough image is enhanced by his
direct involvement in interfamily warfare dating back many years.
His home territory around Zgharta is infamous for its feuds.
There has been frequent gunplay between the Franjiyahs and the
three or four other powerful Maronite clans in the area over the
years.
'Syria has never recognized that Lebanon is a foreign
country--there is no Syrian Ambassador in Beirut nor a Lebanese
Ambassador in Damascus.
Approved For Release 2007/02/ gRDP80T00634A000400010051-6
 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 CCIATRDP80T00634A000400010051-6
in 1957, for example,.Franjiyah was personally involved
in the massacre of thirty people in a Zgharti church, After
the incident Franjiyah found refuge in Syria where he remained
in exile. for about a year. Inter-family feuding in the north
became so serious in 1965 that the Lebanese army had to inter-
vene.
Franjiyah's term as President (.1970.-19.76) was marked by
growing tension among L:ebanon's confessional groups and
Maronite alarm over the. Palestinian presence, ultimately
leading to the Lebanese civil war. Franjiyah was unable to
hold the country together. During the civil war Franjiyah's
followers joined with the other Maronite groups--the Phalange
and the National Liberal Party--in their battles against the
Palestinians. This reversed Franjiyah's policy in the 1958
civil war when he fought against the NLP and the Phalange.
Franjiyah began to distance himself from the other
Maronite leaders in early 1978. He became disenchanged with
their plans to confront the Syrians and try to force them out
of Lebanon. He was particularly unhappy with the close ties
the Phalange and. NLP Leader Camille Shamun were developing
with Israel--Franjiyah had consistently refused to work with
the Israelis. Franjiyah has never been close to Shamun--a
rival for the Presidency and Israel's biggest backer in
Lebanon. Franjiyah in early June 1978 initiated discussions
with moderate Muslim leaders like former Prime Minister Rashid
Karami--the chief Sunni politician in Tripoli--aimed at broker-
ing a reconciliation between Christians and Muslims. Franjiyah
has advocated a more equitable division of power between
Christians and Muslims. Syria almost certainly was witting of
these moves and perhaps even sponsored them.
It was the murder of Franjiyah's son Tony and thirty other
people on 13 June in Ihdin that propelled Franjiyah firmly into
the Syrian camp. The decision by the Phalange Party to kill
Tony Franjiyah resulted from several factors including their
disapproval of his ties with-Syria. The-major factor, how-
ever, was the struggle for profit and power between the Phalange
and the Franjiyahs in northern Lebanon. The two Maronite fac-
tions were rivals for control of smuggling and extortion rackets
in the north as well as for the support of local Maronites.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010051-6
 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 :80T00634A000400010051-6
Since the death of his son, daughter-in-law and arand-
dauahter in June, Franiivah.h.aa tied himself. very closely to
the Syrians. Although. some of his fellow Maronites have been
appalled to see their leader supporting the Syrians as they
bombarded Maronite East Beirut, 'ranjiyah is still the most
important political figure in northern Lebanon, With Syrian
help he has extended his area of Influence Into Batrun and
Bsharri--former strongholds of the Phalange.
The Syrians have provided advisers to train Franjiyah's
militia called the Giants' CMarada)i Brigade--estimated to be
2,000 strong. The Syrians have provided 2,000 AK-47 assault
rifles to the Giants and have also provided Franjiyah with a
guard force to protect his stronghold at Zgharta. Tony's
successor as head of the Giants, his younger brother Robert,
is also said to be very pro-Syrian.
The Franjiyah-Syrian relationship is also a business
relationship. Tony Franjiyah was personally close to Presi-
dent Assad's brother Rifaat. The two were partners in illicit
businesses in the north and these ties continue under Robert.
Since June, the Syrians have consulted closely with
Franjiyah on many occasions. He has visited Damascus and
Foreign Minister Khaddam, Rifaat, and other key Syrian
officials often have traveled to Zgharta. The Syrians have
encouraged Franjiyah to build a broad national front of Leb-
anese factions to balance the Phalange and NLP. These efforts
have met with little success because the factions have little
in common and distrust each other almost as much as they dis-
like the Phalange. Nonetheless, Franjiyah has formed an
informal alliance with Karami and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt.
Some of the other key Christian leaders in northern and
central Lebanon also have close ties to the.Syrians. Parlia-
mentary Deputy Rene Muawwad--also from Zgharta--is close to
the Syrians and has often been mentioned as a possible Syrian
candidate for the presidency after Sarkis' term.
Greek Catholic leader and parliamentary Deputy Joseph
Skaff is another pro-Syrian Christian. Skaff's power base
is in the Bekaa valley town of Zahlah.. The Bekaa is viewed
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : 180T00634A000400010051-6
 Approved For Release 2007/02/6C CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010051-6
by the Syrians as crucial to their military position in
Lebanon and their presence there. is deeply rooted. Skaff
has traveled to Damascus frequently this year and has
participated with Franjiyah and Juznblatt in talks with the
Syrians.
The Syrians provided Skaff with. one thousand small arms
in July and his small militia force has cooperated with. them
and Franjiyah in several operations against the Phalange in
the Bsharri area.
The Syrians also have successfully wooed other Christian
leaders in the Bekaa Valley including religious figures like
Greek Catholic Patriarch Maximos Hakim and Greek Orthodox
Patriarch Elias IV as well as many of the Bekaa deputies to
the Lebanese parliament. The pro-Syrian public comments of
these figures received much media attention inside Syria and
are pointed to by Syrian diplomats in defending President
Assad's role in Lebanon.
Damascus has also developed some ties with the Syrian
Social Nationalist Party (Party Populaire Syrien--PPS) a
multiconfessional Lebanese group founded in the 1930s by
Antun Saadah, a Greek Orthodox. The party, which in its
early days favored the creation of a Greater Syria to include
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Iraq and even Cyprus, twice
tried to overthrow the Lebanese government. Both efforts--in
1949 and 1961--failed disasterously. The orientation of the
party was transformed in the 1960s from fascist to leftist.
The PPS is currently headed by two Greek Orthodox
Lebanese, Inam Raad and Abdallah Saadah. They workedeclosely
with the Palestinians and Lebanese leftists during civi
war but began to distance themselves from the Lebanese left-
ists after the Syrian invasion in June 1976. Raad umbrella
first member of the. leftist National Kovement-an
organization founded by the late Kamal Jumblatt--to visit
Damascus after the Syrian intervention and by early 19.77 he
was publicly praising Syria's role in Lebanon.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010051-6
 Approved For Release 2007/02/(RDP80T00634A000400010051-6
Syria's Christian allies represent a minority of the
Lebanese Christians. Despite Syrian claims, most Christians--
especially most Maronites--are opposed to the Syrian presence
in Lebanon. The Phalange can field a 15,000-man militia
against the Franjiyah's 2,000. Nonetheless, with Syrian
backing the Franjiyah and Skaff factions have consolidated
their hold over significant parts of northern Lebanon and
provide some basis of support for Syria.
The Muslims-Jumblatt
Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, who--like Franjiyah--
is the traditional leader of an almost feudal constituency, has
been courted by the Syrians. Although only comprising about
six percent of Lebanon's population, the Druze--a schismatic
Muslim sect--have played a major role in the country's politics
and history. The Druze homeland is the Shuf region of central
Lebanon.
Syria's relationship with the Jumblatts has been a stormy
one. The Syrians traditionally favored the efforts of Kamal
Jumblatt--Walid's father--to reform the Lebanese political
system which is based on the 1943 National Pact. The 1943 agree-
ment divided political power in Lebanon on the basis of religion.
The Christians--then a slim majority of the Lebanese population--
were given the President's office and a 6 to 5 majority ratio
in the Chamber of Deputies. Sunni Muslims got the Prime Minis-
ter's office and the Shia Muslims the position of Speaker of the
parliament. The attempt to strike a confessional balance reached
to the bureaucracy and the military.
Approved For Release 2007/02/0$_>ECWERDP80T00634A000400010051-6
 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010051-6
SECRET
The Muslims now regard this system as archaic and
unfair since they are now a majority of the population.
Kamal Jumblatt--supported by the Palestinians--led the
Muslim and leftist campaign to overthrow the confessional
system in the 1975-1976 civil war. The Syrians reversed
their traditional alliances and intervened to defend the
Maronites in 1976 because. President Assad was worried that
a Palestinian-Jumblatt victory would lead to a dangerously
radical state on his border that might involve Syria in a
war with Israel for which Damascus'was unprepared.
Most observers believe that Syria was involved in the
assassination of Kamal Jumblatt in mid--March 1977. His son
Walid succeeded to leadership of the Druze and Jumblatt's
leftist Progressive Socialist Party. Walid Jumblatt almost
certainly believes the Syrians were responsible for his
father's death.
Despite this, Walid has been willing to renew the tradi-
tional alliance with. Syria. Walid told a Lebanese magazine in
November 1977 that "I didn't approve of his (Kamal's) confron-
tation with'Syria. I thought Syria had an important role to
play and could not be left out."
The Syrians have tried unsuccessfully to get Walid to
join a broad front of pro-Syrian Muslims in late 1977 and
have encouraged him to work with Franjiyah this year. Jumblatt
has resisted any formal alliance with the Syrians, but recent 25X1
reporting indicates that he is working closely with them.
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010051-6
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2007/02gIOl--RDP80T00634A000400010051-6
The Druze-Syrian alliance is a tactical move on Walid's
part but we believe it is likely to endure. Both sides have
an interest in keeping close ties. Walid has kept open his
ties to other Arabs,'including the Palestinians and Iraqis,
but he recognizes that without Syrian support the Druze and
PSP are a poor match for the Maronites.
Walid was not eager to succeed to power when his father
died and was generally characterized as a nervous young man
who would be unable to fill his father's shoes. He does not
have the charismatic appeal of Kamal nor has he been able to
achieve his stature as leader-spokesman of the Lebanese left.
He does command a significant power base among the Druze, how-
ever; his PSP militia is said to have bout 2,000 fighters and
can be supplemented by several thousand more in any major
struggle.
The Muslims--Syriats Puppets
Syria has several close supporters among the leadership
of Lebanon's Sunni and Shia Muslim population. These figures
faithfully adhere to the Syrian line on all major issues. They
are not widely respected by the Lebanese but do have some
political influence. Because of their ties to Damascus, patron-
age and other political benefits flow to them and they attract
followers. The Syrians have repeatedly tried to get their pup-
pets into the Lebanese cabinet and may ultimately succeed in
doing so despite the opposition of the Phalange and Shamun.
The best known Syrian puppet is Assam Qansu, leader of the
pro-Syrian wing of the Lebanese Baath Party (there is also a
pro-Iraqi Baath faction in Lebanon). Qansu, a Shia Muslim, is
a relatively moderate leftist. He favors greater Lebanese
support for the Palestinians and greater involvement in Arab-
Israeli issues. He espouses the Syrian line of an equal divi-
sion of political power in Lebanon between Muslims and Chris-
tians, although the Maronites would still hold on to the
Presidency.
Approved For Release 2007/02/OBE DP80T00634A000400010051-6
 Approved For Release 2007/02/0Q3fDP80T00634A000400010051-6
Qansu joined the Baath in 1955 and has been closely tied
to the Syrians ever since. After Assad came to power in
Damascus in November _1.970 he placed Qansu in charge of the
Lebanese Baath organization. While Qansu is loyal to Assad he
does not appear to have much influence on Syrian decisionmaking
about Lebanon. Qansu is said to have good personal relations
with Phalange leader Pierre Jumayyil, and he served as a con-
tact point between Assad and the Phalange in the past.
Kamal Shatila, who heads the Nasirite Union of Working
People's Forces, is completely subservient to Syria with which
he has had close ties since the early 1970s. He also works
closely with Qansu's Baath.
Shatila, a Sunni, espouses "the highest degree of coordina-
tion with Syria" and argues that Lebanon's "Arab identity" must
be strengthened. Shatila, an advocate of strengthening the
Muslims' political role in Lebanon, told a recent visitor that
the Muslims felt they were "strangers in their own land."
Qansu and Shatila have their power base in Muslim West
Beirut where they each have a small armed following. Together
their militias probably do not exceed 1,000 men but they are
receiving arms and money from Syria. These forces are totally
under Syrian control. Qansu told US officials that he had
wanted to send some fighters to the south in March 1978 to
fight the Israelis but the Syrians refused permission.
Talal Marabi is a less well known Syrian puppet who heads
the Confrontation Front, a small organization based in the
Akkar region in northernmost Lebanon. The Akkar is an area
where the Syrians have long had close ties and which they
regard as crucial to their security. The Akkar has a signifi-
cant Alawite population--the religious sect to which Assad
belongs.
Marabi, a Sunni Muslim, is a deputy to the parliament from
the Akkar and has supported Syrian efforts in the past to build
a national front with. Qansu and Shatila. We know very little
about his activities but he has a small militia trained and
armed by Syria.
-10-
Approved For Release 2007/02/ICRDP80T00634A000400010051-6
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010051-6
The Syrians have also tried to improve their relation-
ship with other Lebanese Muslim groups. Recent reporting
indicates that the Syrians have offered arms to leftist
groups like Ibrahim Qulaylat's Murabitun. Nonetheless, most
of the leftists remain deeply suspicious of Syria's designs
in Lebanon and they have not forgotten the defeat inflicted
on them and the Palestinians in June 1976 by the Syrians.
The Syrians also have been unable to attract much
support from the old-line Muslim political leaders. Only
Tripoli Sunni leader Rashid Karami has worked with the Syrians
to build a coalition of groups opposed to the Phalange and
Shamunists,
The Muslims, in general, support Syria's continued
presence in Lebanon primarily because they fear the Phalange
and NLP will dominate the country if the Syrians pull out in
the near term, In early October, for example, leaders of
almost every Muslim party in Lebanon visited Damascus to urge
President Assad to keep his forces in Lebanon,
The Syrians did not ask their Muslim allies--even puppets
like Qansu and Shatila--to join in the fighting against the
Maronite militias this summer. The Syrians fear that such a
move would undermine Damascus' claim to being an impartial
peacekeeping force in Lebanon. For their part, most of the
Muslims and their Palestinian allies do not want to be drawn
into the struggle.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010051-6
 Approved For Release 2007/02/0hSEC$RDP80T00634A000400010051-6
The Palestinians
Syria's greatest potential asset in Lebanon is the
Palestinian fedayeen. Despite a residue of suspicion of
both sides left over from the 1976 clashes, the Syrians and
Palestinians have reformed their traditional alliance to
work together in Lebanon. Although the Syrians have gener-
ally poor relations with the radical wing of the Palestinian
movement--the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,
the Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Black. June, and
the Arab Liberation Front---Damascus does have a fairly good
working relationship with Fatah., the largest commando group.
The Syrians have resumed training and arming Fatah and
have reopened some Fatah.facili.ties 'Inside Syria. Fatah, in
turn, supports the Syrian presence in Lebanon. Fatah has
been willing to accede to Syrian requests to support and
train other Syrian allies in Lebanon.
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 S8WP80T00634A000400010051-6
 Approved For Release 2007/02/08~&R?bP80T00634A000400010051-6
Fatah, whose 7,000-to 10,0.Q0-man militia is the largest
Palestinian fighting force, recognizes that it needs Syrian
acquiescence to maintain its position in Lebanon. If the
Syrians should pull out of Lebanon, Fatah would look to
Syria for materiel aid against the Maronites.
25X1
A key Syrian asset within the Palestinian movement that
Assad uses in Lebanon are the Syrian-controlled units of the
Palestine Liberation Army, most of which is usually stationed
inside Syria. Other PLA units are also in Iraq, Jordan and
Egypt.
The Syrians have used the PLA as a surrogate in Lebanon
for several years--with varying success. The PLA was sent
into the country by Assad in early 1976 in an unsuccessful
effort to restore calm. The PLA disintegrated during June
1976, when many of its soldiers deserted to the Palestinian
fedayeen.
Since 1976, Syria has rebuilt the PLA. Today it consists
of two brigades--the Hittin and Qadisiyya. They are controlled
through PLA headquarters in Damascus and are completely respon-
sive to Syrian commands. The Hittin Brigade consists of 1,800
soldiers, mostly Palestinian refugees living in Syria. The
brigade has three infantry battalions and one antiaircraft
battalion. The Qadisiyya Brigade has about 1,200 soldiers
organized into two infantry battalions and one antiaircraft
battalion. These forces are regular military, units, trained
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010051-6
 Approved For Release 2007/FiME'bIA-RDP80T00634A000400010051-6
by the Syrian army in infantry and commando tactics, includ-
ing the use of helicopters.
In early October 1978, the Syrians again moved the
Hittin and Qadissyya Brigades to Lebanon where they are
deployed in West Beirut. As long as they are not used
against the fedayeen the.PLA will serve Syrian interests
faithfully.
The Syrians can also count on the support of Saiqa,
the. second largest fedayeen group with a 3,000-member
militia in Lebanon. Saida was created by the Syrian Baath
Party in December 1968 and is controlled through the Syrian
Baath Party Command in Damascus. Syria supplies its arms
and training and most of its commanders are Syrian rather
than Palestinian. Saiqa's leader, Zuhair Muhsin, is loyal
to the Assad regime and considered a Syrian puppet by most
Palestinians.
Saiqa's regular military forces consist of two battalions--
the Abd al-Qadr al-Husaini battalion and the Khaled ibn al-
Walid battalion--both stationed in Lebanon. Many of the offi-
cers and men in these units are actually Syrian army commandos.
Saiqa also has militia forces in all the major Palestinian
refugee camps in Lebanon. There are camps in Tripoli, Beirut,
Sidon, Tyre, Nabatiyah and the northern Bekaa.
Approved For Release 2007/OikiRCIA-RDP80T00634A000400010051-6
 Approved For Release 2007/02/0?EL`lA-RDP80T00634A000400010051-6
ASSESSMENT
En toto, Syria's assets and allies in Lebanon are a
significant force in the country's political life. While
individually weak, together they are a relatively viable
basis of support for the Syrian presence in the country.
The. Syrians have been unable so far to form a formal.
alliance between their various Lebanese allies, Given the
enormous differences in outlook among Franjiyah and Jumblatt
for example, it is unlikely that the Syrians will be able to
form a united front in the future. Damascus can probably
continue to use its assets and allies, however, to serve its
interests in Lebanon.
Many of Syria's most important alliances in Lebanon--
Jumblatt, Franjiyah and Arafat's Fatah--are tactical in
nature. In the byzantine world of Lebanese politics such
alliances are subject to rapid and unexpected change. None-
theless, we believe the current Syrian ties with these groups
would survive if Syria suddenly had to withdraw from Lebanon
if only because Franjiyah, Jumblatt and Fatah would need
Syrian support to hold off the Maronite.militias.
if the Syrians were to pull out of Lebanon or were
forced out by international pressure, Assad's assets and
allies would lose some of their influence. Groups like
Qansu's Baathi.s and Marabi's Confrontation Front. depend
heavily on Syrian support.
Nonetheless, Syria's allies would not fall apart and
the Syrians would probably provide them with materiel and,
financial aid across the border. The long and mountainous
border is easy to infiltrate with men and materiel., The
Syrian assets--Lebanese and Palestinian--are probably strong
enough to hold their own in a renewed civil war with the
Maronite militias.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010051-6
 STAT Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010051-6
Next 11 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010051-6