SIHANOUK'S SUPPORT IN CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000800130002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 6, 1973
• Content Type: MF

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61.14
C. 7 2AL, INTELLIGENCE AGM~TtY
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
6 October 1973
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : Sihanouk's Support in Cambodia
MEMORANDUM FOR:
1. Attached is the analysis of Norodom Sihanouk's support
(or lack thereof) inside Cambodia which you requested at the WSAG
meeting on Tuesday, 2 October. This study was done by thi- It incorporates the views of ~'
queried before drafting this response to your request. ve
2. I am sending copies of this memorandum to the other WSAG
principals and to Secretary Schlesinger.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
Attachment
SC No. 07809/'73, Copies 1, 2 and 3
Copy No. 4 - Deputy Secretary Rush
Copy No. 5 - Under Secretary Porter
Copy No. 6 - Acting Assistant Secretary Hummel
Copy No. 7 - Secretary Schlesinger
Copy No. 8 - Deputy Secretary Clements
Copy No. 9 - Assistant Secretary Hill
Copy No. 10 - Admiral Moorer MORUCIDIF Pages 3-18
Copy No. 16 -- WH Special Projects
Copy No. 17 - VAS/RAC
Copy No. 18 - GAC Chron0 l'~
Copy No. 19 - VAS Chrono
Copies 20 and 23
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~CF24- O%~ AL fNTELLIGE1VCi
DATE: 10 Oct 73
To: The Director
FROM: GACarver, Jr.
SUBJECT: Sihanouk's Support in Cambodia
REMARKS:
Attached is a memorandum entitled
"Sihanouk's Support in Cambodia"
prepared in response to Dr.
Kissinger's request. The note by
which it was transmitted to him is
also appended. Copies have already
been distributed to those who
participated in the preparation of
this memorandum: OCI (who did most
of the drafting) and EA Division.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Of
Attachment
SC No. 07809/73, Copy No. 11
Copy No. 12 - DDCI
Copy No. 13 - DDO
Copy No. 14 - DDI
Copy No. 15 - D/ONE
Copy No. 21 - OCI/FE
Copies No. 24 and 25 - C/EA
Copy No. Z2 - 'S'AC
Copy No. 21 - F7 CCX/FE)
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Sihanouk's Support in Cambodia
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6 October 1973
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
6 October 1973
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SIHANOUK'S SUPPORT IN CAMBODIA
Key Judgments
--There is no evidence of any groundswell of
support for Sihanouk in Cambodia.
On The Communist Side
--The Khmer Communist leadership is opposed
to Sihanouk, and only "supports" him for its
own tactical reasons.
--There appears to be some pro-Sihanouk senti-
ment among the rank-and-file in the insur-
gency, but the Khmer Communists probably can
keep it within bounds.
On The Government Side
--Although many of the peasants in the country-
side undoubtedly are still loyal to Sihanouk,
they will be helpless to support him in any
meaningful way unless he returns to a position
of power.
--There are some indications that dissatisfac-
tion with the performance of the Lon Nol gov-
ernment has made Sihanouk more acceptable to
some circles in Phnom Penh than he was a year
ago.
--The bulk of the civil servants most likely do
not have any strong emotions about Sihanouk
one way or the other. The intelligentsia=-
journalists, educators, and students--currently
Comments and queries on the contents of this
are wezonmo They may be directed to
I-P the nff~ ,~ ,,4,
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seem to be looking at Sihanouk in a slightly
more favorable light. There is probably residual
support for Sihanouk in the Buddhist clergy.
--Those relatively few members of the elite who
engineered Sihanouk's ouster have not changed
their views on the Prince.
--With a few exceptions, most Cambodian army
officers below the top level and their troops
would support Sihanouk if he returned.
--There is no evidence, however, that any of-
ficers, including those who have considered
moving against Lon Nol, are contemplating ac-
tion to return Sihanouk to power.
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Introduction
The concept of political support is an amorphous
one, even as it pertains to societies that are rela-
tively open. Cambodia. is not such a society. There
are no public opinion polls in Cambodia and the ex-
pression of candid opinion is, ci7,rcumscribed in the
conventional media. Sihanouk is a controversial
figure in Cambodia, never more so than today. There
is a natural reluctance on the part of people, both
on the government and Communist side, to speak forth-
rightly or objectively about the Prince. The follow-
ing assessment of Sihanouk's standing in Cambodia
today is therefore more im res
than i -F might be otherwi-&p.1
Sihanouk and the Khmer Communists
In drawing up a current balance sheet on Sihanouk,
one logical point of departure is to review his stand-
ing with the leaders of the Khmer Communist movement--
who will probably be key figures in any future Cam-
bodian settlement. The identities of most of these
leaders and their true ranking within the Khmer Com-
munist Party (KCP) have long been difficult to deter-
mine. What is clear, however, is that most of these
leaders have a history of opposition to Sihanouk that
stretches back twenty or more years. Exposed to com-
munist ideology as students in France, many of these
leaders worked for Communist and leftist causes in
Phnom Penh in the 1950s. Some were probably members
or leaders of the Communist-front Pracheachon party
that Sihanouk put out of business in the early 1960s.
A number, including Saloth Sar who is reputedly
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secretary-general of the KCP Central Committee, fled
from Phnom Penh for the Cambodian countryside during
one of Sihanouk's periodic anti-left purges. Others,
including "defense minister" Khieu Samphan, made a
similar flight during a 1967 purge. Although little
is known about the whereabouts and activities of these
men before Sihanouk's ouster in 1970, their present
positions indicate that they made good use of their
time in the shadowy "maquis" that was the forerunner
of the present insurgency.
There is another group of Khmer Communist leaders
who went to Hanoi directly after the end of the first
Indochina War in 1954, and after Sihanouk had made it
clear at Geneva that he would not legitimize the pres-
ence in Cambodia of an indigenous Communist movement.
Some of these men returned to Cambodia in the late
1960s to assist the fledgling insurgent movement. Many
others returned after Sihanouk's ouster in 1970 to
help organize and run the greatly expanded and ambi-
tious operation.
Whatever their differences, the Khmer Communists
share a common background of opposition to Sihanouk
the person, Sihanouk the symbol of all that is ata-
vistic and wrong about Cambodia, and Sihanouk the adroit
and unscrupulous political operator who would, and fre-
quently did, screw them to the wall. They are suspi-
cious of his intentions and his capability to make mis-
chief; they are contemptuous of his pretentions and
self-aggrandizement, and, probably more than a little
fearful of what role he may play in the future.
The degree of antipathy toward Sihanouk may dif-
fer from one individual to another, as may judgments
regarding the appropriateness of using Sihanouk as the
figurehead of the movement, but no one among the Com-
munists would support Sihanouk for other than tactical
reasons, and no one of them would genuinely back Siha-
nouk's return to power if there were some palatable
alternative.
Since March of 1970, they have recognized that
their nominal "commander in chief" is useful as a
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rallying point for people in the Cambodian country-
side and as an internationally known figure strug-
gling to regain his country from "foreign imperial-
ists." Sihanouk has given the movement a legitimacy
both inside and outside Cambodia it would not have
otherwise had. The cynic'
is only barely dis i
For his part, Sihanouk is painfully aware of
his real position vis-a-vis the;Khmer Communists. In
the past few weeks, for examplef- Sihanouk stressed in
Algiers and again in Peking, that he cannot engage in
any negotiations without prior authorization from the
Khmer Communists. He has also indicated that he wants
the Chinese to pressure the latter into negotiations,
and that he wants the US to facilitate his return to
forestall an eventual Khmer Communist takeover in
Cambodia. Sihanouk could hardly be more explicit
about the game he would like to play. One might infer
that his candor is made possible by a realization that
the Khmer Communists have not labored under any illu-
sions about what Sihanouk would like to do.
Sihanouk and the Insurgents
It is safe to say that Sihanouk can count on op-
position from the ranks of the Khmer Communist Party
to his playing any meaningful future role in Cambodia,
but this does not mean that Sihanouk is without sup-
port within the Khmer insurgent movement. It should
be kept in mind that the number of long-standing ideo-
logically committed Khmer Communists is but a small
fraction of the total number of military and political
officers and cadre who run the insurgency's military
and political apparatus. The political structure and
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front organizations in the towns and rural districts
under Communist control have drawn heavily on dis-
placed bureaucrats of the old Sihanouk regime,
schoolteachers, merchants, and Buddhist clergy. Most
of these people are not outright Communists. Many
of them have been recruited with the explicit under-
standing that the restoration of Sihanouk was the
objective of the movement. Some of them continue
to favor Sihanouk's return to power.
The insurgents' military structure also harbors
real or potential Sihanouk supporters. The rank and
file of the insurgent armed forces (this applies to
the Cambodian Army as well) are peasants and it is
the peasantry which is the backbone of Sihanouk's
genuine support-in Cambodia. How many of these peas-
ant-soldiers are strong supporters of Sihanouk is
hard to tell and impossible to quantify.
Similarly, it is not possible to tell how many
insurgent military commanders and units owe their
principal allegiance to Sihanouk. The reporting from
the countryside is too episodic and fragmentary to al-
low responsible estimates of their numbers. It does
indicate quite clearly that there are many insurgents
who back Sihanouk but not the Communists. They have
been given or have assumed the term Khmer Rumdoh
(Khmer Liberation), a term that appears to signify
a .political tendency or function rather than an or-
ganizational entity. The Khmer Rumdoh phenomena ap-
pears to be present to some degree in..all areas of
Cambodia and in at least some i
tro me for the Communists.T
reports a case in Kanda rovince in which
urgent Battalion 24--sporting Sihanouk pic-
tures on their caps and uniforms--moved.-into a town
last January, arrested and summarily shot the KCP
Province Secretary whose anti-Sihanouk sentiments
evidently were well known. No mere renegades, the
battalion was acting under the orders of its com-
mander. Similar reports of overt bloodletting be-
tween Khmer Rumdoh and Khmer Communists have been re-
ported from elsewhere in Cambodia.
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Although troublesome to the Communists, there
is little evidence to suggest that the Khmer Rumdoh
or quiescent Sihanoukists in the insurgent apparatus
will directly or seriously challenge the control of
the Communist leaders. On the contrary, if the war
drags on the chances are the pro-Sihanouk elements
will gradually be weeded out or assimilated by the
Khmer Communists. As indicated earlier, however, the
Communists for now must still rely on Sihanouk's name
in many sections of the countr
t
y
o promote the in-
suraencv. This situation perhaps has been described
"the people recognize Sihanouk as a leader
and this is an important factor when planning
on how to win their allegiance. The revolu-
tion must serve the people and many people
do not know that Sihanouk was corrupt and a
traitor. They will eventually be educated
but for the time being their believing
Sihanouk to be a real leader of the people
must be taken into account. We have there-
fore decided that in order to liberate the
country, Sihanouk must be used. Our revo-
lutionary organization must therefore support
him in order to gain the peoples' respect
and to cast ourselves as true Cambodian
patriots leading the revolutionary cause."
The Peasantry
Sihanouk has always been very popular in the coun-
tryside. He spent 20 years traveling to obscure and
isolated villages, dispensing bolts of cloth to boeisant
farmers, patting smiling children on the head, and
pay-
ing homage at the village religious shrine inthe com-
pany of proud monks. The key questions are how much
of this support has waned since Sihanouk's ouster, and,
how important is such support as remains. On the first,
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we can say that by the accounts of the Communists
themselves, Sihanouk's name still sells in most--
but not all--of rural Cambodia. On the government
side, some indirect evidence of residual pro-Sihanouk
sentiment emerged in the June 1972 presidential elec-
tion. In that contest, which was marked by some
heavy-handed electioneering for Lon Nol by the army,
a political nonentity who had no money and did little
campaigning polled a remarkable 21 percent of the
vote by doing nothing more than advocating Sihanouk's
return to Cambodia as a "private citizen." We would
place some credence in Sirik Matak's remark of some
months ago that Sihanouk could easily beat Lon Nol
in a free election. That may tell us more about Lon
Nol and Sirik Matak then about Sihanouk, but still
the Prince's standing in Cambodia cannot be ascer-
tained without reference to the reputation and popu-
larity of other potential leaders.
On the question of what Sihanouk's residual
popularity means in practical terms, one.can say
that--at a minimum--we have not yet deteoted any
groundswell of sentiment for the return of Sihanouk.
In part, this is because of the predominately rural
character of his support. In government-held areas,
the peasants are neither sufficiently organized,
aroused, or motivated to turn their inchoate feel-
ing that things went better under ;Sihanouk (rice
yes, war no), into positive action to bring him
back. In Communist-held areas, the peasants are a
more powerful force than they were three years ago.
They have been armed, organized and politicized.
But this same peasantry is also being led and manip-
ulated by a Communist leadership opposed to Sihanouk's
return to a position of real authority. Only the Khmer
Rumdoh seem likely to give Sihanouk the support of
their weapons in a potentially meaningful way.
In short, the peasantry could not prevent Siha-
nouk's ouster in 1970; they cannot bring him back
to authority in 1973. Their importance would only
become manifest if Sihanouk were already returned to
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Phnom Penh. This popularity in the countryside
would be a factor in any contest for power that
evolved between him and the Communists or the
rightists.
The Buddhist Clergy, the Intelligentsia and the
Bureaucracy
Except for the peasants, refugees in the cities,
and possibly the urban working class, it seems un-
likely that there are any socio-economic or politi-
cal groups of any importance which enthusiastically
support Sihanouk, or which would actively promote
Sihanouk's return. There are probably some among
the Buddhist clergy, the intelligentsia and the
bureaucracy who are Sihanouk enthusiasts, but they
are not many. But sentiment within these groups may
be shifting toward accepting the idea of Sihanouk's
return to power. This may be only negative support,
i.e., these groups would not be dead set against the
Prince's return. At the same time, it seems ines-
capable that except for the occasional Sihanouk-hater,
many among these groups, as among those in other
walks of life, cannot help but draw an invidious
comparison between conditions under Lon Nol and con-
ditions before March 1970.
Unlike their co-religionists in South Vietnam,
the Buddhist clergy in Cambodia has never been in
the forefront of political affairs and its political
views have always been muted. Before his ouster,
Sihanouk was held in high regard by the Buddhists.
He strongly upheld the region's precepts, was def-
erential to the leading monks, and saw to it that
the clergy maintained a non-political role. It is
reasonable to assume that today some Buddhist leaders
deeply regret Sihanouk's alliance with the Communists
and his reluctance to negotiate with the Phnom Penh
regime. Buddhist leaders have long favored national
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educators, and university-level The small Cambodin intelligentsia, journalists,
Penh, were among the regime's staunchest supporters
in the first year of the war. Few among them sup-
ported Sihanouk; most thought his ouster would herald
a more modern Cambodia, free of the backward-looking
influence of the monarchy and traditional authoritarian
ways. They have been bitterly disappointed by Lon
Nol's own brand of authoritarianism, by his regime's
corruption, and by its failure to produce a truly
democratic form of government. Ironically, these were
their chief criticisms of Sihanouk during his years
in power. Lon Nol's failure to improve upon Sihanouk's
record appears to have led to a gradual shift in at
least the students' attitude toward the latter. Last
February, leaders of the Khmer Student Association in
Phnom Penh publicly stated that they could not coun-
tenance Sihanouk's return because he is a king at the
head of a so-called "royal government." But by June
the disenchantment of these same students had reached
the point where they privately saw no alternative to
talks with Sihanouk. Such views may not be in the
majority among the intelligentsia, but they are prob-ably growing that Sihanoukais thewillkeycontotinbringingue if it appears
to the
fighting and is the best chance of keepingdCam
bodia.
from complete Communist control.
The bureaucracy is another group in which there
is no great enthusiasm for Sihanouk, although anti-
Sihanouk sentiment is almost certainly less common
within its ranks than within the intelligentsia.
Self-interest is the most important determinator of
how a bureaucrat feels about Sihanouk's return. At
the higher levels, i.e., army, cabinet ministers,
senior technicians, and provincial bigwigs, appre-
hension about the future is high. Many of them
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served Sihanouk in the past, and few would have in-
tellectual or visceral qualms about serving him in
the future. We have evidence that a key question is
already being asked by the individuals: am I ac-
ceptable to the Prince? The answer will help deter-
mine how the particular individual stands on the
Sihanouk question.
The instinct for survival is even greater among
the lower and middle levels of Phnom Penh's civil
service because--unlike many of their superiors--
they lack the political and financial resources to
improve their positions or to leave the country.
The civil service has been particularly hard hit
economically over the last three years, and its en-
thusiasm for Lon Nol's leadership has evaporated.
Consequently, any prospect for change and improve-
ment--even if that spelled Sihanouk--probably would
not be unwelcome.
The Leaders in Phnom Penh
There is little or no overt or latent support
for Sihanouk among the top military and political
leaders in Phnom Penh. The men who deposed Sihanouk
appear to be as hostile as ever to their former
leader. Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, Cheng Heng and In
Tam have been unflagging in their denunciations of
Sihanouk, as he has been of them. There is an out-
side chance that In Tam or Cheng Heng could be per-
suaded to cooperate with Sihanouk in some future
coalition government, if Sihanouk were agreeable,
but Lon Nol and Sirik Matak would have to leave
Cambodia. We have detected no expressions of sup-
port for Sihanouk among the government's military
leaders. There have been numerous reports during
the past year of disgruntlement at all levels of
the officer corps with Lon Nol's leadership. At
times, the grumbling has taken the form of coup
threats uttered by a few particularly disaffected
senior officers. Most of the coup "plotting" has
dwelled on the need to get rid of Lon Nol, without
tackling the question of a. replacement. Sihanouk's
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name has never been raised in any of these cases
as a possible alternative. (In his day, Sihanouk
exercised firm control over the military and kept
them out of national politics. He played one clique
of officers off against another, and kept most of
them content through the judicious use of promo-
tions and other suitable "rewards.")
Most officers below the top level probably could
make their peace with Sihanouk, provided that they had
some reason to believe that they would not be sub-
jected to reprisals at the hands of the Khmer Commu-
nists. Those that have been especially close to Lon
Nol, however, would likely recognize that it would
be better for them to leave Cambodia. Such hard-
line Khmer Krom leaders like Generals Dien Del and
Un Kauv probably would also decamp. Naturally, the
degree of military support for Sihanouk among the of-
ficers would depend heavily on the circumstances of
his return. The factionalized nature of the officer
corps would probably preclude any effective organized
military resistance to Sihanouk. By the same token,
the officer corps' support for Sihanouk would prob-
ably be spotty. As for the troops themselves, they
would probably follow their commanders, although
some latent good will toward Sihanouk might surface.
Summing Up
Few Cambodians are able or willing to work
actively for Sihanouk's return to a position of real
power in Cambodia. Most, however, would find his
restoration acceptable, even beneficial if it were
seen as necessary for an end to the war and as a way
of keeping Cambodia from falling to the Communists.
Real hostility to Sihanouk seems to be confined to
the top civilian and military leaders in Phnom Penh
and to the Khmer Communist leadership.
Sihanouk is better known than any other Cambodian
political figure. And for all his faults, he is per-
haps the only leader with the experience and ability
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to achieve some semblance of national reconciliation.
Like Souvanna Phouma in Laos, Sihanouk may be in a
position to straddle otherwide irreconcilable politi-
cal tendencies. There may be doubts in Cambodia
whether Sihanouk can perform such a function; there
is little doubt that no other Cambodian leader pres-
ently on the scene has as good a fighting chance.
Whatever other misgivings they might have, most Khmer
know that--whatever are the circumstances of his re-
turn--Sihanouk will try to defend Cambodia's independ-
ence.
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