THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM: OVERVIEW AND OUTLOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000600020056-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2006
• Sequence Number: 56
• Publication Date: January 24, 1969
• Content Type: LIST

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The Situation in Vietnam: Overview and Outlook
Secret /Sensitive
24 January 1969
No. 0550/69
152
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SUBJECT: THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM: OVERVIEW AND OUTLOOK
CONTENTS
I. THE CURRENT SETTING
II. THE MILITARY PICTURE
III. THE POLITICAL PICTURE
IV. PACIFICATION
V. THE VIEW FROM HANOI
VI. COMMUNIST INTENTIONS: THE NEAR TERM
VII. OUTLOOK
Annex A. The Vietnamese Protagonists
Annex B. Military Forces
Annex C. Hanoi's Four Points and the
Front's Five Points
The present time is particularly appropriate
for a review of the situation in Vietnam since we
are at the close of a phase that began with the
Tet offensive last January. With the change in
American administrations, the opening of the sub-
stantive negotiations in Paris and the current re-
intensification of the fighting after an appreciable
lull, a new phase is now beginning.
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Since Tet 1968, military trends have been
increasingly favorable for allied forces. The Com-
munists have taken staggering casualties, their
combat effectiveness has declined, and their overall
strength has been maintained only through huge inputs
of North Vietnamese manpower. Hanoi recognizes its
military shortcomings and has been seeking for sev-
eral months to redress them. Many of the units
withdrawn from combat last year are now returning
after refitting and the level of infiltration has
risen sharply since late November. The enemy has
already begun to step up the level of his military
action and we can expect more activity along the
lines we have seen over the last few weeks. This may
include at least terrorist and sapper attacks on
major urban centers, including Saigon. Such attacks
could come at anytime.
Politically, the Communists are engaged in
a major effort to weaken the GVN and to create the
appearance if not the substance, of an ongoing ad-
ministrative apparatus "governing" as much of
South Vietnam as possible. Their aim is to boost
the prestige and image of the National Liberation
Front and its claims of control over territory and
people. These claims are wildly exaggerated. At
the moment, the GVN?s position is a strong one:
the political surface in South Vietnam is reasonably
calm, progress is being made toward the elusive
goal of stability, and the pace and effectiveness
of pacification has increased appreciably in the
past few months. Events of the next few months,
however, are certain to test South Vietnam's
internal stability, the solidity of recent pacifi-
cation gains, and particularly the GVN's ability
to withstand the war of nerves the Communists
patently intend to wage in Paris.
In the negotiations, the Communists have al-
ready proved to be tough and skillful bargainers.
They obviously want to move into substantive issues,
which they hope will prove explosive in Saigon and
divisive in relations between the GVN and the United
States. We believe, however, that they also view the
Paris talks as a serious effort to explore the pos-
sibilities of a negotiated settlement.
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We cannot predict the terms the Communists
would eventually accept as a compromise settlement.
Hanoi's minimum position, however, probably will
include total American troop withdrawal in a
clearly defined period, and a restructuring of
the political order in South Vietnam which guaran-
tees the Communists a role and a power base from
which they can work to achieve their ultimate ob-
jective of domination.
Over the next few months the Communists will
attempt to combine political action and military
efforts ina mix that will enable Hanoi to cope
with whatever policies are adopted by the new US
administration. At the moment the Communists
believe the war can be continued at acceptable
costs long enough to convince the United States
that a compromise political settlement is mandatory.
Over the near term, the critical variable in
all major aspects of the Vietnamese struggle--de-
cisions in Hanoi, negotiations in Paris, and the
course of events in South Vietnam--will be the
posture and policies of the new American adminis-
tration.
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I. THE CURRENT SETTING
1. The present time is a particularly appropri-
ate one for a review of the situation in Vietnam in
terms of the balance of military and political forces.*
With the start of substantive negotiations in Paris,
we have witnessed the close of a distinct phase in
Vietnam that began with the Tet offensive last Janu-
ary. Looking back, it seems more evident that this
was a critical watershed not only in the strictly mil-
itary sense, but also in the broader political con-
text. What the phase has demonstrated, at least to
the North Vietnamese, was that a military victory was
clearly beyond their capabilities and that the politi-
cal dimensions of the struggle would have to assume
greater. significance in their overall strategy.
2. They had already made some preliminary moves
in the summer of 1967, when the National Liberation
Front revised its seven-year-old political program,
altering it to emphasize national goals in an attempt
to broaden its appeal to non-Communist elements..
Thep at the Tet offensive the first appearance was
made by the so-called Alliance of National, Demo-
cratic and Peace Forces, an urban based coalition
of ostensibly non-Communists. Finally, in the wake
of Tet, and the failure to stimulate an "uprising,"
the Communists began to develop administrative bodies
called "Liberation Committees" at the local levels.
Though largely a paper-shuffling affair, in which old
cadre assumed new titles, the overall effort is to
lay the groundwork for claiming de facto control
over a wide area of the country and a high percentage
of the population.
3. In Paris, the Communists have proved skillful
and tough bargainers. They have been agonizingly
persistent and patient. Several points emerge from
'See Annex A for a background discussion of the
political forces struggling for control in Vietnam.
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the record since last May. Hanoi has been careful
to avoid an irrevocable stalemate. On both critical
issues, the bombing halt and the seating hassle, the
Communists have eventually climbed down from initial
positions and have given ground on some key points.
In each case, of course, Communist negotiators waited
until the last moment to shift their positions, trying
to extract every possible concession and timing their
moves to take advantage of developments in American
politics. Finally, there is the intriguing role of
the Soviet Union as a go between at crucial junctures.
The exact relationship between Hanoi and Moscow is
uncertain, but it seems clear that Soviet influence
is growing, apparently at the expense of the Chinese.
II. THE MILITARY. PICTURE
4. In the military field, the trends since
the low point at Tet have been generally favorable
for the allies.* Communist. forces of all types suf-
fered unprecedented casualties during 1968 and the
combat effectiveness of enemy units declined. Despite
his mounting problems, the enemy has been able to
keep his combat forces quantitatively about as strong
as they were a year ago, mainly through the input of
vast numbers,of North Vietnamese troops. During the
last half of 1968 the enemy deployed a number of units
into sanctuary areas where training has undoubtedly
improved and units have probably been restored to
something approaching full strength.
5. By contrast, the overall strength and effec-
tiveness of allied forces has sharply improved. Al-
terations in US tactics have increased the combat ef-
ficiency of US units, and Allied intelligence has been
more successful in detecting Communist movements since
Tet. More firepower and combat punch have been added
to the ARVN and South Vietnamese paramilitary forces
by upgrading armament, stepping up mobilization, and
The relative strengths and problems of ARVN and
VC/NVA forces are discussed in more detail in Annex B.
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improving training. Nevertheless the ARVN forces
are beset by a number of weaknesses and basic faults
and remain highly dependent on US forces for air,
artillery and logistics support. An ARVN capability
to assume a significantly greater responsibility for
the ground war against enemy forces at its current
strength is unlikely to be attained within the next
year or two.
6. The allies, especially the US forces, have
become increasingly effective in maintaining steady
pressure on many enemy units and in preventing enemy
campaigns from materializing on a large scale. Not
only have allied forces been generally able to block
major new enemy offensives over the past few months,
they have done so while retaining a substantial
margin of force to support the extension of security
and a GVN presence in the countryside.
7. Several developments point to a renewed
Communist effort to launch a new phase of intensive
combat. The Communists probably have completed the
refurbishing and refitting of the main force units
previously pulled back into sanctuary areas along
the Cambodian and Laotian borders and in North Vie t-
nam. Recent intelligence has provided an increasing
number of indications that this stand-down is ending
and that most of these units are moving or are pre-
paring to move back into their normal operational
areas.
8. Moreover, after a relative lull in enemy
infiltration during the fall, the number of North
Vietnamese troops being put into the pipeline took
a sharp upturn in December which has continued in
January 1969. We estimate that at least 40,000 and
possibly 50,000 men are en route to South Vietnam
at present. Most of these troops should arrive in
South Vietnam during the first quarter of 1969,
and they could be followed by additional large in-
puts.
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9. The Saigon government weathered the shock
of the Tet offensive and, on balance, emerged strength-
ened from the tribulations of early 1968. All in-
volved at topmost levels--Thieu, Ky, and Prime Minis-
ter.Huong--apparently recognize the need for unity in
the face of common danger, both on the battlefield
and in in. the Paris meetings. The personal rivalry
between Thieu and Ky persists, however, as does the
increasingly sharp rivalry between Ky and Huong.
These rivalries naturally tend to undermine govern-
ment cohesion. Although Thieu has maneuvered
adroitly to strengthen his position against Ky and,
on the whole, has become an increasingly effective
president during the past year, he still finds it.
difficult to project the image of a political leader
and has failed to develop an effective political
organization to mobilize popular support for the GVN.
10. Although the dire prospects of Tet had a
rallying effect, particularly on the urban popula-
tion, as the immediate danger has receded, so too
has the resultant sense of unity. There are grumblings
in various quarters by such elements as the militant
Buddhists who dislike those in power. At present,
however, none of these groups seem likely to offer
the government serious trouble. On balance, the
political surface in Vietnam is reasonably calm and
progress continues toward the elusive goal of sta-
bility.
11. Despite this surface calm, uncertainities
about Communist military plans, the course of the
Paris meetings and, above all, the policies of the
new American administration have produced a wide-
spread mood of apprehension. Acutely conscious of
their need for American assistance in coping with
the Communist drive for political power, the Saigon'
government's leaders--and, for that matter, most
politicized segments of South Vietnamese society--
have long been hypersensitive in their concern
for American constancy and what they think of as
the US willingness to stay the course.
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12. Over the past year, this general concern
has incorporated the mounting specific fear that
American domestic political considerations may lead
or impel the US government to give Vietnamese in-
terests short shrift in a quest for settlement and
peace at almost any price. In this most sensitive
area, even when the GVN leadership is operating with
the advantage of sophistication.transcending that
of its citizenry or with knowledge and reassurances
privately conveyed through ambassadorial channels,
Saigon's leaders still cannot afford to move too
far out in front of Vietnamese opinion on the emo-
tionally charged political issues here involved.
Also, on these central issues, even when Saigon's
leaders want to be cooperative, they feel an acute
political need to save their own and their govern-
ment's "face" by not appearing to cave in under
American pressure.
13. President Thieu and his senior colleagues
(including Vice President Ky) do not necessarily
fear peace; but rationally or not, they are genuinely
afraid of being sold out. Their behavior in recent
weeks has reflected this fear and their behavior
in the weeks ahead will continue to do so. Thieu
and Ky's expressed awareness of the need for nego-
tiations, and their professed endorsement of the
desirability of an early honorable settlement are
almost certainly sincere, but their private stress
is much more an "honorable" than "early." The GVN's
leaders recognize the political reality of the wide-
spread desire for peace within the United States.
The GVN's recent initiative on a US troop withdrawal
announcement was a reflection of that recognition.
But Thieu and his colleagues are also worried about
the Communists' ability to exploit this desire to
the detriment of the non-Communist Vietnamese. One
specific GVN concern, for example, is that the Ameri-
can desire for peace may lead the US government to
an overly optimistic assessment of the NLF's.poten-
tial independence from Hanoi and hence to pressure
on the GVN for concessions that--in GVN eyes--would
be politically disastrous in South Vietnam.
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IV. PACIFICATION
14. These uncertainties and apprehensions have
contributed greatly to a more positive attitude on
the GVN's part toward the broad effort to secure
the countryside against the Viet Cong military forces
and political organization and to engage the allegiance
of the rural population. Thieu recognizes that pacifi-
cation is a critical element in preparing his govern-
ment for the inevitable struggle with the Viet Cong
when and if the fighting ends. Concern over how
much time is left has stimulated GVN support for a
much more vigorous and sustained pacification effort.
15. In assessing the status of this effort,
two sets of facts need to be constantly borne in
mind: First, approximately 80-90 percent of South
Vietnam's population is concentrated in about 25
percent of the country's total land area: the
coastal lowlands, the cities and the Mekong Delta.
What counts politically, therefore, is control of
people, not territory. Secondly, the shadings of
control found in Vietnam are not tidy or neatly
demarcatable. Save in a few extreme cases, there
are no clear zones of GVN or of Communist control.
Overall, the most recent figures from Saigon indi-
cate that as of the end of December 1968, 76.3 per-
cent of South Vietnam's population lived in con-
trolled urban areas or rural hamlets classed as
at least "relatively secure", 11.4 percent of the
population lived in contested hamlets, and 12.3
percent of the population was controlled outright
by the VC.
16. This rather bright picture requires a
number of cautionary caveats. Though we "measure"
pacification progress an "population control" via
a data matrix--the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES)--
this matrix was designed primarily as a program
management tool and not as an index of progress
or measure of "control." HES provides a better
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gauge than anything else extant, but its data needs
to be read in light of the fact that when employed
to measure "control," the system is being used
for purposes it was not designed to fulfill.
Furthermore, smooth national HES data curves gen-
erally mask considerable provincial and even greater
district level movement--i.e. dramatic progress in
some areas cancelling out, in national averages,
almost equally dramatic regression in others. In
addition, the national percentages cited above
reflect the eminently defensible but nonetheless
debatable judgement which classes "C" hamlets as
"GVN controlled" rather than "contested." The de-
tailed statistical breakout for the last quarter
of 1968 is not yet available in Washington, but
in September, C hamlets accounted for 27.8 percent
of South Vietnam's total population.
17. In addition to the "positive" task of
providing the rural population with security and
tangible benefits sufficient to induce it to identify
its fortunes with those of the GVN, the pacification
program also involves the "negative" task of identi-
fying and eradicating the Communist politico-military
control apparatus known as the Viet Cong Infrastructure
(or VC I) .
18. The allied attack on the Viet Cong Infra-
structure was never properly integrated or system-
atically organized until the advent of the Phoenix
program early in 1967 and, really, not until President
Thieu--on 1 July--signed the decree that made Phoenix/
Phung Hoang a truly joint effort fully backed by the
Vietnamese. In the past few months, this effort
has picked up momentum and it is already causing
the Communists considerable concern. Despite genuine
signs of early promise, however, broad judgements
on the probable net impact of Phoenix can not now
be made and will have to await the record of Phoenix's
performance over the next few months.
19. In our view, the pacification effort as
a whole has made a significant contribution to the
prosecution of the war and strengthened the GVN's
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overall political position and prospects. The record
of the past few months has been particularly en-
couraging. At a minimum, the setbacks which occurred
in the wake of last year's Tet attacks seem. to have
been largely overcome.
20. Progress over the past four months, however,
reflects not only the results of the current intense
GVN and allied effort known as the Accelerated Pacifi-
cation Campaign (APC)? but also the general standdown
in Communist initiated military activity and the
pullback of main force units which have provided an
optimum climate for pacification efforts. It would
be extremely disquieting if significant progress
had not been recorded in recent months. The acid
test--both of allied abilities to record continued
progress and the solidity of gains recently registered--
will come when the Communists resume some significant
measure of military activity and exert military pres-
sure deliberately designed to-counter the pacification
campaign. This test will almost certainly come
within the next few weeks and may, in fact, have
already begun.
V. THE VIEW FROM HANOI
21. It is against this general background
that the Communists have had to formulate their
strategy for the coming year and to face the new US
administration. We are fairly certain that there
has been considerable debate in Hanoi over a correct
strategic line and its proper tactical implementation.
The essence of the discussion seems to be whether
Hanoi should adopt an "offensive strategy" looking
once again for dramatic military results, or adopt
a more flexible combination of political and military
tactics.
22. What evidence there is points to the latter
course as the one the Communists are now pursuing.
There are several factors which may have influenced
Hanoi in this direction. First of all, and probably
the most important is a conviction that Hanoi cannot
win the war through large-scale, offensive military
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actions. Hanoi knows that continuing such a strategy
would involve high losses without commensurate gains.
The North Vietnamese further believe that the effort
necessary to support large-scale fighting results in
a serious weakening of the ideological struggle in
both North and South Vietnam. Closely allied to
these propositions, is the probable conviction that
the US will to persevere in South Vietnam is weakening
and can eventually be undermined through a combination
of the threat of indefinite military struggle coupled
with pressures and gestures toward compromise and
political settlement. In sum, the prevailing view
in Hanoi seems to be that the first priority should be
directed at getting the US out of Vietnam and, further,
that united front tactics, negotiations, and other
political means should be used to this end, with
military pressures and terrorism playing an ancillary
and supporting role.
23. Hanoi's problem is to decide on the best
mix of political and military tactics in order to
encourage what it regards as favorable trends in
US thinking about the war and to get the new US
administration committed to the route of a negotiated
settlement. Hanoi almost certainly calculates that
a large measure of military pressure will continue
to be needed, if only to make sure that allied pro-
gress--whether in conventional battles or pacifica-
tion--never reaches a point of significant breakthrough.
In other words, Hanoi must demonstrate to the US that
the Communists can make the war continue with no
clear end in. sight.
24. Hanoi realizes that it is in no position
to impose its own terms for a settlement. Its
standard positions, as stated in the DRV's four
points and more recently in the new five points
of the Liberation Front, clearly are for bargaining.*
'Annex C contains the full texts of these basic
Communist statements.
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In private and through various third parties Hanoi
has already intimated a willingness to discuss
lesser demands.
25, The Communists probably have set out sev-
eral possible scenarios for the negotiations. They
certainly hope that in the process of fighting and
negotiating the Saigon government will crumble and
be replaced by a group of leaders more amenable to
the kind of agreements the Communists desire. This
is why they are putting such emphasis at the moment
on the need for a "peace cabinet" in Saigon or at
least the removal of Thieu, Ky and Huong.
26. If neither events nor negotiations produce
such results, we cannot be certain how far the Commu-
nists will go in scaling down their demands. Hanoi
views the Paris talks as a serious venture, however.
Its terms will have to be explored by our negotiators,
of course, and they will only emerge clearly in the
process of hard bargaining. At the core of the
Communist position are two minimum essentials% first,
that all American troops must be withdrawn within
a clearly defined period; and second, that the US
agree to a formula which gives the Communists some
guaranteed political status and a power base suf-
ficient to provide them with a clear shot at obtaining
control in the South and eventual reunification of
the country. This is the "political beachhead"
President Thieu believes the Communists hope to
retain at the conclusion of the talks. Remembering
the period after 1954, the Communists almost cer-
tainly would refuse to accept a settlement which
fails to satisfy these minimum aims.
27. Once substantive discussions actually
begin, Communist negotiators probably will lead
off with a broad sketch of their standard positions
as outlined in the DRV's four points and the Front's
five points. Within this propaganda framework,
however, we believe the Communists are prepared
to be fairly flexible in their tactics. The precise
degree and nature of that flexibility will be largely
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determined by how Hanoi sizes.up the policies and
attitude of the Nixon administration and by Hanoi's
assessment of the situation on the ground in South
Vietnam.
VI. COMMUNIST INTENTIONS: THE NEAR TERM
28. Military. In the military field, the
Communists have to decide whether their objectives
are better served by 1) maintaining a relatively
low, but steady, pace of fighting in South Vietnam
in the hope that this may encourage the new US
administration to move ahead toward a negotiated
settlement; or (2) by sharply increasing the pace
of military action-to project an image of Communist
strength and thus convince American leaders that
delay in reaching a settlement will not result in
a better deal for the allied side. Most of our
evidence suggests the Communists are trying--by
increased infiltration, new troop deployments, and
stepped up harassing attacks--to be in a position
to make the latter option genuinely viable.
29. One of the main considerations impelling
Hanoi toward a course of intensified military activity
is the current allied Accelerated Pacification Cam-
paign. Hanoi cannot permit the allies to proceed
relatively uncontested with a program which not
only solidifies and extends Saigon's political writ
but which also poses a basic threat to the Communist
organization in the South. Moreover, the military
situation in South Vietnam in the past several
months has given the appearance of relative Communist
passivity in the face of allied initiative. In
Hanoi's view, this is the wrong kind of background
music for conducting substantive discussions in
Paris.
30. In addition, Hanoi would certainly like
to create within the American people and their new
leaders a psychological mood duplicating as much
as possible that produced by the 1968 Tet attacks.
Major attacks, however, would involve considerable
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risks. Failure would be a major setback and the
Communists must realize that prospects for success
are doubtful at best. Moreover, they must be quite
uncertain about the reaction of the new US adminis-
tration even to an attempted major offensive--es-
pecially one which included attacks on Saigon it-
self.
tiations is attractive and feasible. We believe
the current high level of infiltration activity is
aimed at putting teeth in this argument and to put
the Communists in a position to apply greater mili-
tary pressure. We do not think the Communists will
move forward with anything approaching an all-out
effort, however, until they have sized up the policies
of the new US administration. In the meantime, we
can expect some rise in the overall level and scope
of Communist military activity along the lines which
have been developing in the past week or two. This
may include at least sapper and terrorist attacks on
urban centers, including Saigon. There is evidence
that such attacks could be tried at any time.
32. Political. Current Communist political
and propaganda activities are concentrated on ex-
acerbating relations between South Vietnam and the
United States, denigrating and embarrassing the
Saigon government and its leaders, encouraging
factionalism and rivalry among non-Communist Viet-
namese, and improving the status of the NLF as
a body rightfully entitled to a share of political
power in South Vietnam. The theme Hanoi most wants
to see developed is that all parties to the war
want peace except the current Saigon government,
which is the primary obstacle to an early settlement
of the Vietnam conflict. In Paris and elsewhere,
Hanoi has already developed a major propaganda
campaign that the peace so universally desired
cannot come until Thieu, Ky and Premier Huong are
31. Nevertheless, Hanoi
will
try to demonstrate
that it has the capabilities
and
the will, despite
allied pressures, to continue
the
military struggle,
and thus convince Washington
that
the road of nego-
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removed from their leadership positions in Saigon.
In support of this campaign, the Communists are
stepping up their political action efforts in
South Vietnam--terrorism, attempts to foment de-
monstrations, and other efforts to create unrest
and to weaken the GVN's administrative authority.
33. As they strive to undermine the GVN, the
Communists also are working on improving their politi-
cal prospects in South Vietnam. Their main energies
are directed toward enhancing the status of the
Liberation Front and securing a future political
role for it in South Vietnam. At the same time,
the Communists are preparing for the eventuality of
a ceasefire and a shift toward greater stress on
political competition. The "Liberation Committees,"
which they have been setting up in rural areas during
the past year, will be a prime mechanism for this
effort and will probably be used in Paris to support
Front claims of territorial control. The numbers
of these committees and the extent to which they
actually exercise governing functions are wildly
exaggerated by the Communists, but such claims are
one of the best indications of the bargaining line the
Front is likely to take eventually in Paris.
VII, OUTLOOK
34. In sum, a new phase seems to be developing
in Vietnam with the opening of the substantive nego-
tiations in Paris, the change in American administra-
tions, and the current intensification of the fighting.
The Communists seem prepared to employ a'flexible
combination of diplomatic, political, and military
tactics, which they still hope will achieve their
ends. But the critical variable--at least over the
near term--will be the posture and policies of the
new American administration and their impact in Paris,
Saigon, and Hanoi.
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1. The Nature of the Struggle. The struggle
in Vietnam is in essence a struggle for political
domination over those Vietnamese who now live in
that portion of Vietnam lying south of the 17th
parallel. The primary issue is control over people,
not territory. Armed force--ranging from the deprada-
dations of individual terrorists to coordinated
campaigns by line military units of multi-regimental
size--has long played a key role in the prosecution
of this struggle; but our adversaries have seldom
employed armed force, of any kind, for the classical
military purpose of seizing and holding demarcatable
plots of terrain. Instead, our adversaries have
generally employed armed force, of all kinds, pri-
marily as a political abrasive intended to cow
the population into submission, collapse all
political structures (from the local to the na-
tional level) they do not control, and erode the
appetite for struggle of all who oppose our
adversaries' drive for political control. For the
Vietnamese involved in this struggle, therefore, the
ultimate measure of success or failure will not be
relative casualties inflicted, battles won or lost
or even territory enterable with impunity but--
instead--whose political writ runs (for whatever
reason) over the population of South Vietnam..
2. Discussion and analysis of the struggle
in Vietnam, and the major issues involved, frequently
employ nouns or adjectives with definite geographic
connotations (e.g. "North Vietnam," "South Vietnam,"
"northern aggression," "southern self-determination").
Though descriptively accurate in some contexts, in
others, these geographically oriented labels are
misleading or give rise to serious distortion.
Such language implicitly suggests a conventional
struggle between two traditional nation states whose
populations are ethnically similar (e.g. the US
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and Canada), each of which acknowledges the other's
existence even though both may dispute the location
of their common frontier.
3. Such an implicit image bears almost no
valid relationship to the realities of the struggle
in Vietnam, primarily because none of the major
Vietnamese participants therein thinks of the
struggle or the issues involved in these terms--
whatever these participants, on both sides, may
say for public or international consumption. What
you really have is not a contest between two nation
states but a struggle for political control being
waged in the southern part of Vietnam between,-on
the one hand, the Vietnamese Communist Party and its
adherents, clients and supporters--some witting
some not--and, on the other hand, a much more dif-
fuse group whose only real thread of unity is its
opposition to Communist rule.
4. The Vietnamese Communists: It would be
a gross, and erroneous, over simplification to
suggest that all those fighting or working for
the "Viet Cong" are Communist party members doc-
trinally motivated by devotion to Marxism-Leninism.
Many who fight and work for the VC cause have never
heard of Marx or Lenin and are motivated by concerns
that have little or nothing to do with Communist
doctrine. Nonetheless, the control and direction
of all aspects of the insurgency, which began in
1957 and has evolved into the full scale war being
waged today, has always been kept firmly and ef-
fectively in the hands of the Vietnamese Communist
Party, which, since 1951, has called itself the
Dang Lao Dong (Vietnam Workers Party) and since
1962, referred to itself south of the seventeenth
parallel as the Peoples Revolutionary Party. The
control center for all VC activity in South Vietnam--
the Central Office For South Vietnam (COSVN)--is a
Party command echelon subordinate, through Party
channels, to the Politburo in Hanoi.
5. For over two decades, the Vietnamese Com-
munist party has shown a penchant for and skill in
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using Front organizations, always under tight covert
Party control but ostensibly independent groupings
incorporating both Communist and non-Communist ele-
ments. Whenever the Party hand in one group became
too obvious or well known, it was followed by a
successor, e.g. the Viet Minh was followed by the
Lien Viet (during the struggle against the French)
which was subsequently replaced, in North Vietnam,
by the Fatherland Front. Using the same style and
format, in 1960 the Party created the South Viet-
namese National Liberation Front (NLF) which has
always been kept under tight Party control and whose
pretentions to independence have always been taken
much more seriously by foreigners than by the
Vietnamese, who quickly recognized the NLF's lineal
antecedents. After Tet 1968, the Party created
the "Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace
Forces" as a possible urban oriented complement
to the NLF. In a similar vein, the Party is now
setting up "liberation committees", which are the
lineal descendants of the "Administrative/Resistance
Committees" through which, in the First Indochina
War, the Party attempted to exercise political
control over territory wrested from the French.
Though as many non-Communist as possible are re-
cruited into these various groups, their control
is always tightly (and ruthlessly) kept exclusively
in Party hands.
6. The Party thinks of itself--and is--as a
single, nationwide organization. (For that matter,
the state structure the Party overtly controls--the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam--also thinks in
similar terms and adamantly denies that its writ
lawfully stops at the 17th parallel.) The Party's
leadership thinks in national, not regional, terms.
Furthermore, many key members of the Party leadership's
upper echelons are persons of southern origin and/or
persons whose party careers and rise to power within
the Party are rooted in the southern struggle and
the development of the Party's southern organization.
Politburo member Pham Van Dong, Premier of the DRV,
was born south of the 17th parallel (in Quang Ngai
Province). Even more significantly, so too was
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the present head of the Party apparatus, Politburo
member Le Duan. It was Le Duan who first organized
COSVN (in 1952) and who remained its director until,
probably,. 1957, when he went to Hanoi to assume the
function and, eventually, his present title of Party
First Secretary. During the Franco - Viet Minh War,
Le Duan's deputy in COSVN, who helped him build the
southern Party organization, was Le Duc Tho, now
a Politburo member, head of the Party's Organization
Bureau and its chief negotiator in Paris. The present
head of COSVN is another Politburo member, Pham
Hung, a native of Vinh Long Province in the Mekong
Delta. The "north/south" language Hanoi's leaders
sometimes use in propaganda or diplomacy, in short,
masks the central fact that the Hanoi leadership
really does not think in such language. To the
Party leadership, in language it also frequently
employs, "Vietnam is one."
7. The way the Communist leadership views
the overall struggle has several important ramifi-
cations. It explains why Hanoi believes it has the
right to support the struggle in South Vietnam
with North Vietnamese troops, who are, by definitition,
not foreign. Hence, when Hanoi calls for the with-
drawal of all foreign troops from South Vietnam,
Hanoi is talking only about US and allied troops,
not its own forces. Secondly, the Communist
leadership's outlook and command structure, means
that any discussions of present reality or potential
future developments framed in terms of relationships
between "North Vietnam" or "Hanoi" (as a government)
and the National Liberation Front are apt to be
misleading or meaningless.* All of our available
evidence indicates that the Front's capacity for
action independent of Party control is negligible
and likely to remain so. The real point is the
central (Politburo) Party leadership's capacity
for maintaining control over and discipline within
The Saigon leadership's acute appreciation of this
point accounts in part for its strong emotional re-
sistance to any negotiation arrrangements which treat
"Hanoi" and the NLF as two separate entities.
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its southern organization. Here there are some signs
of friction, but not at higher command levels.
COSVN (which controls the NLF) will almost certainly
remain the disciplined servant of the Hanoi Polit-
buro and the six regional Party committees in South
Vietnam will almost certainly remain the disciplined
servants of COSVN. Any problems that arise are more
likely to develop at provincial, district and village
level. Finally, this leadership outlook means that
whatever interim political arrangements the Hanoi
Politburo may accept during the coming months (as
the Politburo accepted the "temporary" division of
Vietnam in 1954), the Politburo is unlikely ever to
abandon its goal of establishing centralized Party
political domination over South Vietnam.
8, The Non-Communist Vietnamese Protagonists:
Whereas on one side of the political struggle now
being waged in Vietnam you have a set of protagonists
clustered around and effectively controlled by an
articulated and definable organizational structure--
the Vietnamese Communist Party--on the other side
the picture is considerably more diffuse. Here too,
geographically oriented labels (e.g., "the South
Vietnamese", or "the South Vietnamese Government")
can often be misleading since a high proportion of
the key positions in the Government of Vietnam's
military establishment, civil service and top
leadership (e.g. Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky)
are held by northern refugees. In discussing the
political goals or preferences of those Vietnamese
now living south of the seventeenth parallel, it
is also important to recognize that the "politicized"
portion of Vietnamese society--i.e., those who think
in concepts we in the West construe as political--
tend to be concentrated in urban areas. The goals
and attitudes of the rural population, by and large,
tend to be much more localized, pragmatic and
immediate.
9. Given these caveats, the non-Communist
protagonists in the struggle may be said to
comprise all Vietnamese in South Vietnam opposed
to Communist rule (and in Vietnamese eyes, short
shrift is usually given to subtle distinctions
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between the Communist Party per se and its various
front groups such as the NLF or the Alliance).
Collectively, these protagonists span a spectrum
ranging from almost the extreme left over to the
extreme right, and encompass people of all regional,
religious and other groups politically important
in Vietnam. In the aggregate, this spectrum of
those opposed to Communist rule comprises the
overwhelming majority of politicized Vietnamese
living in South Vietnam. Were this not the case,
the war would have inevitably ended in a Communist
victory years ago. A root problem, however, lies
in the fact that though a majority of the politicized
population of South Vietnam may be united in not
wanting to come under Communist political domination,
it is not yet united on anything else. Opposition
to Communist rule does not necessarily, or even
generally, equate to positive support for the Gov-
ernment of Vietnam or its leaders who are directing
the main effort to prevent a Communist takeover.
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I. Enemy Strength and Capabilities
Manpower Resources
1. The North Vietnamese are estimated to have
had about 500,000 men in the Regular Armed Forces
at the end of 1968. In addition to those located
in South Vietnam and the border areas, about 35,000
combat and combat support troops are deployed in
Laos. North Vietnam infiltrated about 100,000
men into South Vietnam each year during 1966 and
1967. infiltration during 1968 was at least 250,000
and may possibily have been as high as 300,000.
2. The number of males fit for military service
reaching draft age each year in North Vietnam is
currently about 120,000. Although large numbers
of infiltrators have been outside this age group,
from the point of view of a manpower balance, only
in 1968 did the requirement for troops exceed the
new age group. We estimate that North Vietnam also
has a civilian manpower pool of at least 600,000
physically fit males in the 18-30 age group out of
the 10.5 million people in the 15-64 age group.
3. During the first half of 1968, training
apparently was a more serious problem for Hanoi
than the mobilization of manpower. Some draftees
did not receive a full cycle of basic or infiltra-
tion training, and reservists who make up the
majority of many infiltration groups did not re-
ceive additional training after being called up.
The intensified scale of warfare during the first
three quarters of 1968 added to the problems met
during two years of building up the force structure
also put a severe strain on the supply of NCOs and
officers, particularly able ones with combat ex-
perience. These quality problems undoubtedly caused
reduction in the effectiveness and regenerative
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capacity of some units. The deployment of a number
of units into sanctuaries during the last quarter
provided opportunities for refitting and training.
The units involved have probably been restored to
something approaching full strength though qualita-
tive deterioration may have proved more difficult
to rectify.
4. Despite these problems and the personnel
losses suffered during 1968, the enemy Regular
Forces in South Vietnam and in contiguous border
areas of North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are
quantitatively about as strong as they were a year
ago. The maintaining of Regular Force strength
has been accomplished mainly by Hanoi providing an
increasingly large share of replacements. The
enemy has also been able to maintain the strength
of his Guerrilla Forces but only at the cost of a
significant diminution in their quality. The mili-
tary threat represented by the Guerrilla Forces is
limited by the fact that only one-third of them
are estimated to be fully armed and adequately
trained. Despite some erosion during 1968, the
Viet Cong have been able to maintain a viable
political infrastructure. These people are highly
organized, well trained, and dedicated cadre that
constitute the major target of Allied programs for
the political resolution of the war.
5. We believe that the enemy should be able
to maintain his forces at their current strength.
His success in doing this, however, will depend on
Hanoi's continued willingness to make large in-
puts of its own manpower and on Viet Cong ability
to recruit in the South.
6. Beginning in August 1968 there was a sharp
reduction in the number of infiltrators observed
entering the infiltration system in North Vietnam.
In December, however, infiltration activity picked
up sharply, and it is now believed that at least
40,000 and possibly 50,000 men are en route to
South Vietnam.
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7. Most of these troops should arrive during
the first quarter of 1969. Their deployment at
this time is consistent with the expected increase
in enemy military pressure during the current winter
season.
8. The current and future ability of the Viet
Cong to recruit in South Vietnam is difficult to
judge. There is increasing competition from the
South Vietnamese draft but the most important factor
will be the extent of Viet Cong military and politi-
cal success during the coming months. It is be-
lieved that recruitment averaged about 8,500 a month
during 1966 and about 7,500 a month during 1967. At
these rates the Viet Cong were able to increase
somewhat the number of men in regular units. Through
a combination of recruitment and impressment the Viet
Cong were able to at least double the average 1967
rate during the last two months of 1967 and the
first quarter of 1968. Desertion among enemy forces
later cut substantially into the gains of early 1968.
For sometime recruiting clearly has been a serious
problem to the Viet Cong, and the current monthly
recruitment rate almost certainly is well below the
average maintained in 1967.
9. The proportion of ethnic southerners in the
enemy forces declined sharply during the last half
of 1968. Above two-thirds of the personnel in the
Viet Cong Main Forces are now believed to be infil-
trated ethnic North Vietnamese, and during 1968 for
the first time some North Vietnamese fillers have
been allocated to some Viet Cong Local Force Units.*
Logistical Support
10. There is no evidence that supply problems
have been a significant inhibiting factor in Hanoi's
war planning. Logistical support to the Communist
The Viet Cong Local Forces are subordinate to
Province and District Party Committees and normally
operate in their home areas. The Main Forces are
subordinate to higher military headquarters.
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Forces operating in South Vietnam during the next
six months should be adequate to maintain the
present or even an expanded force structure at
present or higher levels of combat. The logistical
system through Laos has been continuously improved
throughout the war and the burden in North Vietnam
is substantially lessened as a result of the cessa-
tion of the bombing. Materiel movement continues
at a high rate throughout the system. In addition,
enemy forces have been able to procure a substantial
share of their non-lethal stores and an unknown
share of arms and ammunition directly from Cambodian
sources. The most serious logistical problem now
being faced by the enemy is the increasing success
of Allied spoiling operations in disrupting re-
supply operations within South Vietnam and in un-
covering large quantities of supplies in forward
positions and thus disrupting planned enemy opera-
tions.
II. The Outlook for ARVN
11. ARVN's long-term potential for assuming a
greater share of the combat burden has been greatly
enhanced during the past year. The size of the
regular and territorial forces increased about 30
percent during 1968. The firepower of most units
is rapidly being increased as much of their World
War II-type weaponry is replaced by modern US equip-
ment. Moreover, most ARVN units gained extensive
combat experience during 1968 as the level of com-
bat intensified. Nevertheless, there are a number
of constraints and basic faults in the ARVN military
structure. An ARVN capability to assume a major
share of the ground war against enemy forces at
their current strengths is unlikely to be attained
within the next year or two.
12. A major limitation to ARVN's future pros-
pects for attaining an effective military capa-
bility is a serious lack of adequate air, artillery,
and logistics support. For example, the ARVN is
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almost completely dependent on US airlift capabil-
ities for deploying and supplying their combat
forces during military operations. In addition to
these basic deficiencies, the ARVN potential is
limited by a large number of fundamental weaknesses.
These include training, leadership, pay, and moti-
vation. The latter is reflected in part by the
serious desertion rate among ARVN's major combat
units.
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The four points were made at the end of a long
policy address by North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van
Dong in April 1965, Hanoi has described them ever
since then as the "basis" for a political settlement
in Vietnam. They read as follows:
to Recognition of the basic national
rights of the Vietnamese people--
peace, independence, sovereignty,
unity, and territorial integrity.
According to the Geneva agreements,
the US Government must withdraw from
South Vietnam US troops, military
personnel, and weapons of all kinds,
dismantle all U.S. military bases
there, and cancel its military al-
liance with South Vietnam. It must
end its policy of intervention and
aggression in South Vietnam. Accord-
ing to the Geneva agreements, the
US Government must stop its acts
of war against North Vietnam and
completely cease all encroachments
on the territory and sovereignty
of the DRVO
20 Pending the peaceful reunfication
of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still
temporarily divided into two zones
the military provisions of the 1954
Geneva agreements on Vietnam must
be strictly respected. The two
zones must refrain from entering
into any military alliance with
foreign countries and there must
be no foreign military bases, troops,
or military personnel in their
respective territory,
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3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam
must be settled by the South Vietnamese
people themselves in accordance with
the program of the NFLSV without any
foreign interference.
4. The peaceful reunfication of Vietnam
is to be settled by the Vietnamese
people in both zones, without any
foreign interference.
Ii. The Five Points of-the-National Liberation Front
The Front set out a vague five-point state-
ment in March 1965 which was less a program than
an analysis of the situation and exhortation to
the South Vietnamese people. The Communists touted
the five points widely as the definitive Liberation
Front position for a settlement, but they never
really carried much weight. On 3 November 1968
in a statement reacting to the full US bombing halt,
the Front included a revised five-point program which
is now considered the basic Front negotiating posi-
tion. The new five points read as follows:
1. South Vietnam is resolved to struggle
for the materialization of its sacred
rights; namely independence, democracy,
peace, neutrality, prosperity, and
ultimate peaceful reunification of
the fatherland.
2. The US imperialists must put an end
to their war of aggression against
Vietnam, withdraw all their troops
of their satellites and all war means
from South Vietnam, and liquidate
all US military bases in South Vietnam.
3. The internal affairs of the South Viet-
namese people must be settled by South
Vietnamese people themselves in accord-
ance with the political program of the
NFLSV, without foreign interference.
The NFLSV advocates the formation of a
broad national and democratic coalition
government and holding of free general
elections in South Vietnam.
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4. The reunification of Vietnam will
be decided by the people in the two
zones of Vietnam, step by step, by
peaceful means and on the basis of
consultations and agreements between
the two zones, without foreign inter-
ference.
5. South Vietnam will pursue a foreign
policy of peace and neutrality: No
military alliance in any form with
foreign countries, and establishment
of friendly relations with all coun-
tries on the five principles of
peaceful coexistence. Good neighborly
relations will be set up with the
Kingdom of Cambodia on the basis of
respect for its independence, sov-
ereignty, neutrality, and territorial
integrity within its present borders,
and with Laos on the basis of respect
for the 1962 Geneva agreements concern-
ing that country.
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