VIET CONG RECRUITMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000400150007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: November 22, 1966
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/09/01 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000400150007-1
22 Noveznbsr 1964
MMACRAINDUM MR3 M. Robert W. Korner
Special Assistant to the Preaident
SUBJECT t ? Viet C-ong Recruitment
SUMMARY
Hard evidence on actual Wet Cons recruitwent rates
is scanty, An analysis of theoretical recruitment capabilities
and estimated manpower requirements, however, permits 113
to frame an estimate of current recruitment rates which we
have checked against such ev3.dence as la ava3lable. We believe
the Viet Cons may have difficulty in meeting their overall
recruitraent goals but believe that the essential Communist ?
requirement of repla,cing VC main and local force losses is
being met by recruitment within South Vietnam, This recruitment
averaging 3,000 to ,4,000 recruits per month is not only
within VC capabilities but io aamost certainly being met in
actual practice,
1, In response to your request of 17 November, we have taken a :fresh
look, at Viet Cong capabilities ior recruiting manpower within South Vietnxos
and endeavored to assess the current rate at which South Vietnamese are
b-eing recruited and trained by the Viet C-ong.
25X1
Declassified by.
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2,, The judgments, methodology and argumentation offered below
reflect the views of all components of this Agency concerned with Vietnam.
Per your rogue 2t, however, thin paper has not been cliecussed with any
other comporlent of the intelligence community. Thus it conetihites a CIA
rather than a community appraisal, though we believe DIA and State would
probably be in substanaal agreement with. it.
3. As you are aware, hard evidence on actual Viet Clang recruitment
rates is scanty. Hence in responding to your requeet we have analyzed the -
Viet Congla theoretical recruitment capability, estimated their manpower
requirements and, in light of these, framed an estimate of c-urrent recruit-
meat rates which we have then checked against such evidence as is available.
Thie procedure noes not yield very fiem conclusions but, given the paucity of
hard evidence, we feel it is the best available line of attack on this problem.
4. Vie_LS_Aon assL_u.i_ftrn, 'abilities.: The number of South Vietnaraese
living under some form of Viet Cons control is at least 3.5 million and could
be as much as five to six million people, depending on the extent to which
the VC have access to contested areas. The population to which the VC have
effective access for recruitment purposes (largely concentrated in the Delta
region) probably contains some 500,000 physically fit young males. Within
this potential recruitment pool some 30,000 to 35,000 youths annually
become old enough for military service. In addition to this population pool,
/living in area to which the VC have relatively unrestricted access/ the VC
can also draw on the population of military age in contested areas, on GVN
deserters and on recruits from urban areas. On the basis of what we consider
its available manpower resources, we estimate that in 1966 the Viet Cong
had a theoretical capability to recruit and train some 7,000 to 10,000
personnel a month. Thee figures are based on a consideration of available
rnalea and hence are certainly on the low nide, since we know the Viet Cong
make extensive use of females oven in combat and comhat support roles.
5. Recruitment at this rate would probably be close to the mancin-Lum
capabilities of the VC. Several factors combine to place this ceiling on VC
recruitr-. -int and training capabilities. The deterioration of the VC political
control resulting from allied military operations shrinks the population pool
to which VC recruiters have ready access. Increasing manpower losses
being sustained by VC forces and an apparent VC requir,Drnent to meet at
least part of the North Vietnamese troop losses in South Vietnam diminishes
the number of cadre available for training assignments and hence imposes an
effective training liraiteon theoretical r.semitinent
.2-
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. VC Maipo yJtJ There is little hard intelligence
on the actual manpower requirements which guide Viet Con recruitment
activity. An examination of the known buileaup of VC. military forces from
1961 through 1965 and the estimated losses oastained by the Viet Cons during
the same period, however, give some indication of recruitment requieementa
that obviously were met. As shown in the following table, the total manpower
requirements during these five years -- to expand VC main and .Teerrilla
forcea and to rerplace 103303 WaS on the order of 356,000 to 371,000 men.,
or an average monthly requirement during this period of about 6,000 persona.
During this period additional personnel ware recruited to form the VC
political/railitaery cadre and combat support unite which now probably include
from 60,000 to 90,000 persons.
ylVT CONO MA1\17
Year
ow ER Ea u m NITS?
Annual
Forte Inceeasee?
1000'
Eatimated
Lossea b/
1961
23
2.4
1962
16
37
3.963
13
35
1964
34
35-40
1965
54
80-90
Total
145
211-226
7. This 356,000 to 371,000 an estimate is based on cu.rrent order
of battle loadings. A reappraiaal of the strength of Communist irregular
forcea which la currently underway indicates thee accepted (i.e., MACV)
estimates of the strength of Viet Ceong irregular forces may have drastically
valderstated their growth, possibly by as much as 200,000 persona. If this
should prove to be the case, .the buildup of Communist forces during the 1961.-
1965 periled would have required rescruitmnent at a monthly rate of 9,000 to
9,500 persons. ..Tven these higher Tta-sulTemianta are within. the above113raatz,
of Viet Cong r.apabilities to recruit and train from 7,000 to 1.0,000 personn4
a month, _
Ba5red on DIA/JCS OB V.gures, for main force and irregular units.
b. nIA/JCS figares 1961.1963, ai3justed to include earioualy wounded.
1964-65 figures s.reCLostimate94
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8. Viet Cong recruitzn.ent requirements have varied sharply durirtg
the 1961 to 1965 period, ranging from at least 40..000 a year during 1961-
1964 to over 120,000 in 1965, the year of the Viot Cong's greatest force
increase and the year during which their estimated manpower losses more
than doubled,
9. 1965 also saw a leveling off in the estimated buildup of VC
regular forces. Although these forces will probably increase only by about
5,000 personnel in 1966, the rising nu,.-nber of casualties being sustained by
tile VC will keep the man-power requirements at about 1965 levels. We
estimate that Wet Cong forces will suite,: manpower losses of from 90-
100,00-0 personzel during 1966.** This yields a total manpower replacement
requirement from 93,000 to 105,000 personnel for Wet Cortg forces alone.
In addition the Viet Cong may be tasked with providing replacements for a
growing number of North Vietnamese losses. Depending on the edent of
North Vietnamese infiltration. the Wet Cong could be called upon to providae e
rnany as 15,000 troops to compensate for northern 1,022133*
10, Ztimnate of Ac tual C r ent :Recruitment Rates: The precise
extent to which those theoretc.aj r'equirements are actually satisfied
cannot be determined on the basis of available evidence. We are reasonably
allres however, the Viet Cong are having difficulty in meeting their recruit-
ment goals. This is reflected in the increased frequency of reporting on.
Viet Gong recruitment difficulties and increasing Communist recourse to
forced conscription despite the adverse political effects of such coe.rc,ion.
11. It should also be borne in mind that the,fts,',11res on VC manpower
losses do not directly translate to true xnilitar7 recruitment requirements
since a large number of the totirzated loaaa ci are probably civilians eithsr
innocent victims of military action or labor encsraged for logistic support
activities and recruited or impressed only for short term periods. Furtherraora,
4 The recruitment figures expressed here represent the personnel input
required afeor allowance has been made for the :Infiltration of personnel
from North Vietnam.
includbc
4,311 /Our (l. 0., the CIA) estimate of manpower losses/ rallierej deserters
.i
cap7red and seriously wounded p$ i. 44;1iLiti4C-i to the* KAliguritiR
reported as casualties by J-2, MACY.7
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the Viet Cons v.ndcrubtedly compensate for at least some of their military
manpower lossee by upgra.ding personnel assigned to irregular units (i. G. ?
traneferring, them to main and local force 'units) rather than. by direct
levies on the civil population.
12. We believe the via Cons vifl consider it imperative to replace
the manpower losses oultained by their naain and local force unite. Our
estimate is that during 1966 such forces will lose some 35,000 to 40,000
troops as a result of casualties, disease, desertion, etc, if the VC are to
compensate for these losses and, at the same time, expand their main and
local forces by 5,000 troops daring 1966, their manpower requirernente
for main and local forces alone would be on the order of 3,000 to 4,000
troops a month or 36,000 to 43,000 new troops per year,
13. One of the few captured documents giving meaningful agg,regative
data. on annual recruitment in a VC province indicates that total recruitment
in 1965 amounted to 1.5% of the total population controlled by the VC.
Recruitment specifically for military purposes (iecludingrn1itia and defense
forces) was just over 1% of the population. On a nationwide basis, recruit-
ment at thirs rate would be insufficient to meet total estimated Wet Colic;
manpower requirements, but recruitment at this rate, projected nationally,
would provide from 35,000 to 50,000 personnel annually -- or enough to
meet local and main force requirements outlined above. Hence this document
tends to confirm our estimate of what the VC need to do and in, :fact are doing
in recruitment,
14. A few isolated reports on recruitment programs indicate that
VC overall recruitment targets in 1965 were generally fulfilled by at least
50%. In Linh Dinh province, for example, the percentage of population
joining guerrilla forces has reached only 3.3% of the Lowland population and
5.1% of the highland population e- compared to targets of 5% and 10%
. respectively. Captured documents indicate, neverthelese, that the Comenue
niets in Binh Dinle considered 1965 recruitment suificient to permit marked
increaseein the ittrenth of guerrilla and rail; tie. forces,
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15. la although we are reasonably.conficient of our estimate
of VC manpower losses we lack adequate or detailed knowledge of the way
the Wet Cong attempt to compensate for thesis losses and, p,arV.cularly,
lack hard evidence on the role of recruitment in this process. Nevertheless,
we believe' that the essential requirement of the VC for replacing main and
local force losses which average 3,000 to 4,000 'troops a month is not only
within VC recrmerit capabilities but reflects a naixlimv.ra recruitment
goal that is probably being moat.
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