CAPABILITIES OF THE VIETNAMSE COMMUNISTS FOR FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000400150004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 13, 1967
• Content Type: NE

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TS 186035
SNIE 14.3-67
13 November 1967
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 14.3-67
Capabilities of the Vietnamese
Communists For Fighting in
South Vietnam
Submitted by
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
13 November 1967
DECLASSIFIED BY 014522:
1 December 1975.
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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart.
ments of State and Defense, and the NSA.
Concurring:
Vice Adm. Rufus Taylor, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State
U. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Lt.. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, the Director, National Security Agency
Abstaining:
Mr. Howard C. Brown, Jr., the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Com-
mission and Mr. William 0. Cregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
This, material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM ..................................................... 1
INTRODUCTORY NOTE ............................................. 1
CONCLUSIONS ..................................................... 2
DISCUSSION ........................................................ 4
1. CAPABILITIES OF NORTH VIETNAM ............................ 4
A. Manpower and Mobilization Potential ........................... 4
B. The Armed Forces ............................................. 5
C. Military Training and Leadership ............................... 6
D. Infiltration .................................................... 6
E. LOCs ........................................................ 8
II. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE SOUTH. . .................. 10
A. Communist Forces ..................................... ...... 10
B. The Command Structure ........................................ 16
C. Logistical Support ............................................. 16
D. Communist Manpower in the South .............................. 20
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Nang
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CAPABILITIES OF THE VIETNAMESE
COMMUNISTS FOR FIGHTING IN
SOUTH VIETNAM
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists to con-
duct military operations in South Vietnam over the next year or so.2
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
Our earlier understanding of overall Communist capabilities in
Vietnam had, of necessity, to rely heavily on data provided by the
GVN. Much of this turned out to be unreliable, and in many instances
our numerical estimates of Communist forces, other than for the
Regular units, were too low. Our information has improved sub-
stantially in the past year or two, but the unconventional nature of
the war poses difficult intelligence problems, the more so in a social
environment where basic data is incomplete and often untrustworthy.
Manpower, for example, is a key element for the Communists but
we lack precise basic data on population size, rates of growth, and
age distribution for both North and South Vietnam. Assessing Com-
munist capabilities also involves an understanding of the organization
and effectiveness of the various components in the Communist military
and political apparatus in South Vietnam. Much of the evidence on
these components is obtained from a variety of sources, including
captured documents, of varying reliability and timeliness. The analysis
of this data, as well as that concerning North Vietnamese support
to the South and all manpower questions requires complex method-
ological approaches which cannot rise above the uncertain data inputs.
'The figures in this estimate are current as of 1 October 1967.
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Our data and conclusions are therefore subject to continuing review
and revision, especially since capabilities do not remain static. In
this estimate we have concentrated on reaching the best judgments
of the current strength of the Communist forces and, because of
incomplete and unreliable basic data, we have not attempted. to recon-
struct Communist strength retrospectively.
. Reservations with respect to evidence are explained where appro-
priate in the individual sections of the estimate. The main conclusions
which follow, however, allow for such uncertainties in the supporting
intelligence, represent our best appreciation of the overall situation
as it now stands, and are based on the assumption that there is no
radical change in the scale and nature of the war.
CONCLUSIONS
A. During the past year, Hanoi's direct control and share of the
burden of the war in South Vietnam has grown substantially. This
trend will continue.
B. Manpower is a major problem confronting the Communists.
Losses have been increasing and recruitment in South Vietnam is
becoming more difficult. Despite heavy infiltration from North Viet-
nam, the strength of the Communist military forces and political
organizations in South Vietnam declined in the last year.
C. The major portion of this decline has probably been felt at
the lower levels, reflecting a deliberate policy of sacrificing these
levels to maintain the structure of political cadres and the strength of
the Regular military forces. In particular the guerrillas, now estimated
to total some 70,0.00-90 0 0, have suffered a substantial reduction
since the estimate peak of about early 1966. Regular force strength,
now estimated at 118,000, has declined only slightly, but Viet Cong
(VC) units are increasingly dependent upon North Vietnamese
replacements.
D. Given current Communist strategy, and levels of operations,
a major effort will be necessary if the Regular forces and the guerrillas
are to be' maintained at or near present levels. To do so will require
both a level of infiltration much higher than that observed in 1967
and intensive VC recruitment as well. Considering all the relevant
factors, however, we believe there is a fairly good chance that the
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overall strength and effectiveness of the military forces and_the_politic4l
in r a tr cture will continue to decline.
E. The Communist leadership is already having problems in main-
taining morale and quality. These problems have not yet impaired
overall military effectiveness, but they are likely to become more
difficult.
F. Difficulties in internal distribution will continue to cause local
shortages and interfere with Communist operations from time to time.
But we believe that the Communists will be able to continue to meet
at least their essential supply requirement for the level of forces and
activities in South Vietnam described in this estimate.
G. Communist strategy is to sustain a protracted war of attrition
and to persuade the US that it must pull out or settle on Hanoi's
terms. Our judgment is that the Communists still retain adequate
capabilities to support this strategy for at least another year. Whether
or not I-fanoi does in fact persist with this strategy depends not only
on its capabilities to do so, but on a number of political and inter-
national considerations not treated in this estimate.
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DISCUSSION
1. It has become increasingly obvious that Hanoi's share of the burden of
war in South Vietnam has grown substantially. Infiltration of personnel in 1966,
particularly into the northern provinces, was more than twice that of 1965.
Hanoi's direct control of military and political operations has become more
evident. The supply of weapons from the North has continued, and new
weapons of greater firepower have been introduced. The logistical systems
within North Vietnam and in Laos and Cambodia have been expanded since
1965 to provide a greater flexibility to cope with the effects of air interdiction,
thereby enabling the Communists to meet higher levels of combat and support
the growth of their forces to at least their present levels.
1. CAPABILITIES OF NORTH VIETNAM
A. Manpower and Mobilization Potential
2. The growing intensity of the war in the South and more than two years
of US air strikes against the North have made manpower an increasingly im-
portant aspect in estimating Communist capabilities. Since mid-1965 the North
Vietnamese Armed Forces have expanded from an estimated 250,000 men to at
least 470,060 ._ Thus expansion includes those troops in Laos and South Vietnam.
The a of the physically fit draft age class of 17-year-olds (about 100,000 each
year) is being taken into military service. The war in general and the bombing
in particular have forced Hanoi to divert from 500,000 to 600,000 civilians (men
and women, young and old) to full-time and part-time war-related activities.
3. Nevertheless, it does not appear that North Vietnam is encountering insur-
mountable problems in o taimn~su fiicient able-bodied men to support the war
in South Vietnam. Of North Vietnam's total population of over 18 million,
about 4' million or so are males between 15 and 49, and about half of these are
probably physically fit for military service.3 At present, the North Vietnamese
Armed Forces have taken less than one-quarter of the fit males aged 15 to 49
and less than two-fifths of the approximately 1.2 million fit males in the prime
military ages of 17 to 35. Though there is some evidence of lowering of draft
standards and extending of age limits, it appears that, with a few local excep-
tions, Hanoi is still drafting only those between the ages of 17 and 35.
4. The number of physically fit males above and beyond the annual incre-
ment of those reaching age 17 and who are not yet in the armed forces is sub-
stantial. The most obvious source of manpower is agriculture, where there are
almost 3 million men of all ages, and where per capita production is low. There
are also about half a million men in the service sector of the economy, including
'These figures are based on US Census Bureau estimates of North Vietnam's population,
which do not accept entirely the figures of North Vietnam's 1960 census and subsequent
demographic statistics published through 1963.
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170,000 in consumer services; almost half a million men in industry, over half
of whom are in handicrafts; and some 60,000 male students of military age.
5. There is of course no fixed percentage of these men who can be spared for
military duty. Hanoi has already drawn men from the civilian economy for
military and war-related tasks, replacing them where possible with women.
Taking large additional numbers of men would obviously involve some addi-
tional costs to the civilian economy, but this would be a question of priorities in
Hanoi. Losses in agricultural and industrial production can be made up by im-
ports to the extent necessary to maintain essential subsistence levels of consump-
tion; consumer services are to some degree expendable and education can be
postponed. Thus we believe that the manpower problem, while growing more
serious, is still manageable in North Vietnam. At a conservative estimate we
believe there are some 100,000 to 200,000 men who could be called into military
service, in addition to the annual draft class.
B. The Armed Forces
6. The North Vietnamese Armed Forces expanded last year and are now
estimated to total about 470,000. Despite better evidence on their strength,
there e arstill some uncertainties-'concerning the actual strength of units, the
number of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops in Laos, and the size of the
Armed Public Security Forces. The following table should be regarded as a
conservative estimate.
TABLE 1
ESTIMATED NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES
1 October 1967
SUMMARY
Army ................................................................... 447,500
Air Force ................................................................ 4,500
Navy .............................................................. 2,500
Armed Public Security Forces ............................................... 16,500
TOTAL Armed Forces ................................................... 471,000
North Vietnamese Army Breakdown
Out-of-Country
South Vietnam ....................................................... 54,000
Laos .............................................................. 18,000
TOTAL ............................................................... 72,000
In-Country
Infantry ............................................................. 171,500
Air Defense` ......................................................... 93,000
Other" .............................................................. 111,000
TOTAL ............................................................... 375,500
This includes only regular army personnel in AAA units, radar, and SAM battalions. It
does not include part-time air defense personnel such as militia, or, logistical troops supporting
air defense.
'This includes artillery, armor, high command, logistics, engineers, and transportation.
TS 186035
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7. If the recruitment of men for replacements and for unit infiltration into
the South should become a critical problem for Hanoi, as a last resort it could
draw down its standing military establishment in North Vietnam. The number
of troops which could be released for out-of-country duty would be influenced
greatly by Hanoi's concern to retain a sizable force for defense against a possible
invasion. If, for example, Hanoi should want to keep some 225,000 troops for
the defense of North Vietnam and another 85,000 as a training base and for com-
mand and administration, then some 65,000 additional NVA troops could be
made available for use outside of North Vietnam.
C. Military Training and Leadership
8. Special preinfiltration training of North Vietnamese recruits has averaged
about 3 months, although increasing numbers of prisoners report training of only
1 month prior to infiltration. There is evidence of a growing deficiency of prop-
erly trained personnel to fill the ranks of squad leaders, platoon sergeants, and
platoon leaders. There are indications that the normal source of platoon
leaders, the Infantry Officers' School near Son Tay, has reduced its 2-year
course to 8 months. The bulk of the reserve officers and noncommissioned
officers have been recalled to active duty. The largest single source of junior
officers is now from battlefield commissions.
D. Infiltration
9. North Vietnam has the capability to train 75,000-100,000 men a year for
infiltration. By shortening current training cycles or increasing the number of
units involved in the training of new recruits, this number could be substantially
increased. Training replacements at the rate of 75,000-100,000 annually, however,
would not permit organizing all of them into units and providing them with the
necessary leadership at the same rate, Theoretically, North Vietnam could train
and form 24-36 infantry regiments (48,000-72,000 men.) per year, but at this pace
there would be a considerable reduction in quality. In any case, actual forma-
tion and training of organized units for infiltration has been well short of this
theoretical capability.
10. During 1966 at least 55,000 and possibly as many as 86,000 North Vietnam-
ese troops were sent into South Vietnam (see Table 2). Through July 1966, the
bulk of the infiltration was accounted for by the introduction of organized infantry
regiments, including three regiments that moved directly across the DMZ. After
July the pace of infiltration slackened somewhat, and it appeared that the Com-
munist Regular force structure had reached planned levels. Most of the infiltra-
tion thereafter was to provide replacements in existing units.
11. During 1967, however, the introduction of organized units resumed-six
regiments thus far-and the flow of individual replacements has continued. This
mixture of units and individual replacements, plus the special situation along
the DMZ, complicates an estimate of total infiltration. Not only is there the
usual lag in identifying new units and infiltration groups, but there is less chance
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TABLE 2
MONTHLY INFILTRATION: 1966-1987'
(Data as of 30 September 1967)
Accepted
Monthly
1968
Jan ...... ...............
4,200
1,800
8,000
3,000
9,000
Feb ......................
6,900
2,200
9,100
2,100
11,200
Mar . ....................
11,700
1,400
13,100
3,600
16,700
Apr
100
500
600
600
1,200
41ay ......................
1,300
500
1,800
3,600
5,400
June .....................
12,300
700
13,000
1,700
14,700
July ......................
4,000
700
4,700
4,100
8,800
Aug ......................
1,800
400
2,200
3,700
5,900
Sept ......................
1,400
700
2,100
800
2,700
Oct ......................
100
600
700
4,700
5,400
Nov ......................
500
100
600
600
1,200
Dec ........... ..........
800
600
1,400
2,500
3,900
TOTAL 1966
45,100
10,200
55,300
30,800
86,100
1967
Jan ......................
1,000
800
1,800
3,600
5,400
Feb ......................
1,700
2,000
3,700
1,300
5,000
Mar ......................
3,600
400
4,000
4,600
8,600
Apr ......................
3,700
600
4,300
300
4,600
May ......................
2,700
1,500
4,200
1,600
5,800
June .....................
3,300
-
3,300
300
3,600
July ......................
-
400
400
-
400
Aug ......................
1,100
-
1,100
700
1,800
Sept ......................
-
-
-
-
' Infiltration includes only arrivals in South Vietnam. Statistics for 1967 are subject to
retroactive updating because of the continuing receipt of new information. In particular, the
figures for the last 6 months or so are incomplete, and inadequate to determine trends. These
figures include the following categories:
ACCEPTED: Accepted Confirmed: A confirmed infiltration unit/group is one which is accepted
in South Vietnam on the basis of information provided by a minimum of two
POW's or returnees from the unit/group, or two captured documents from the
unit, or a combination of personnel and documents.
Accepted Probable: A probable infiltration unit/group is one which is accepted
in South Vietnam on the basis of information provided by one POW or returnee
from the unit/group, or a captured document, supported by information from
other sources which can be evaluated as probably true.
POSSIBLE: A possible infiltration unit/group is one which may be in South Vietnam on the
basis of information which can be evaluated as possibly true even though no
POW, returnee, or document is available to verify the reports.
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of capturing personnel or documents from each of the numerous small replace-
ment groups. There is also the problem of the units that suffer casualties in the
DMZ area and return to North Vietnamese territory for replacements; these
latter cannot always be identified as new infiltrators when the units return to South
Vietnamese territory. A similar problem applies to other border areas.
12. Infiltration thus far in 1967 totals about 35,000 in all categories (accepted
and possible). Allowing for the probability that later information will raise
these figures, and extrapolating, it now appears that total infiltration for 1967
will be no more than last year's and possibly somewhat less. We estimate that
some 65 to 75 percent of the infiltration will probably consist of replacement
personnel for existing units. The remainder will probably include seven to nine
organized regiments which will add to the Communist force structure but not
necessarily their total military strength, because losses have resulted in generally
lower unit strengths. There still appears to be no clear-cut seasonal pattern in
infiltration or any significant indication that Hanoi is unwilling to dispatch addi-
tional men and units to South Vietnam.
E. LOCs }
13. Supplies for Communist forces move into South Vietnam by various means.
In North Vietnam, truck, rail, and water transport are used to bring supplies
through Military Region 4 (MR-4). From MR-4, most supplies are trucked
through Laos, although some use of waterways is also made in Laos. Some sup-
plies move directly across the DMZ, and some are moved by sea. In addition,
some supplies from Cambodia enter South Vietnam directly while others are
routed through Laos.
14. Roads. The Communist logistical roadnet in MR-4 in North Vietnam
and in Laos was improved over the past year. Though the improvements have
increased tonnage capacities somewhat, they were intended primarily to provide
additional flexibility for the system and better year-round movement. One
development was the extension of a new motorable road from Laos directly
into the A Shau Valley of South Vietnam. In addition, the administration and
operational control of the LOCs have been improved and expanded. The ca-
pacity of the entire system for delivery of supplies to South Vietnam through
Laos continues to be limited by the capacities of the routes in Laos rather than
by those of North Vietnam.
15. Trucks. We estimate that at the end of 1965 the North Vietnamese had
an inventory of between 11,000 and 12,000 trucks. Losses from air attack have
been substantial, and North Vietnam has been forced to increase its imports
to counter this attrition. Imports from Eastern Europe, the USSR, and China
have enabled North Vietnam roughly to maintain the size of its inventory.
16. Maintenance problems have increased, and as many as 30 percent of the
trucks may not be operable on a daily basis. There is a lack of well-equipped,
See centerspread snap.
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properly manned maintenance facilities, and the variety of truck imports has
resulted in a fleet of over 30 models from at least seven different countries. POL
imports into North Vietnam during the first half of 1967 have been at record
levels, and we have had no evidence of any serious POL shortages affecting
the movement of supplies to South Vietnam.
17, Waterways. The coastal and inland waterway system in North Vietnam
provides a useful supplement to the road and rail system and has been used
extensively, particularly since the start of the US bombing program. Although
the mining of some North Vietnamese waterways has reduced the movement of
large craft, small boat traffic continues. Increasing imports of barges and barge
sections into North Vietnam and a program of waterway improvement indicate
that the Communists intend to exploit further the potentialities of these water
routes. In Laos, there has been increased use of small pirogues and motor-
boats on rivers over the last year. The use of these waterways will probably
continue to increase.
18. Rail. The North Vietnamese also use the rail line south of Hanoi for
movement of supplies into MR-4. Despite repeated US air attacks, the North
Vietnamese have been able to construct bypasses and keep sections of the line
serviceable from Hanoi to Vinh. South of Vinh the rail line is not operable for
regular rail equipment. The North Vietnamese can only use light gear, princi-
pally trucks with converted wheels, to transport supplies over the remaining
rail segment in this area.
19. Impact of Air Attacks. Air attacks in North Vietnam, Laos, and the
DMZ have destroyed trucks, railroad rolling stock, and watercraft, have damaged
the highway and rail systems, and have restricted the movement of cargo and
personnel particularly during daylight hours. They have created construction
problems and delays, caused interruptions in the flow of men and supplies,
caused a great loss of work-hours, and forced North Vietnam to tie up large
numbers of people in air defense and in the ,repair of LOCs. Communist coun-
termeasures in North Vietnam and Laos have included diversification of the
means of transport to include greater use of inland waterways and porter trails,
construction of alternate roads, and of multiple bypasses at important bridges.
A number of truck parks and vehicle pulloffs for quick convoy dispersal have
been built. These measures have increased the ability, of , the Communists to
cope with the effects oFair attacks, although at a considerable cost and effort.
Units and personnel moving to South Vietnam have been forced to move under
cover of darkness, slowing their movement and subjecting them to the rigors
of the trail for longer periods.
20. Cambodia. The importance of Cambodia as a sanctuary and a source of
supply (principally rice) to the Communist war effort is substantial and growing.
Recently captured documents indicate that some Communist units in Tay Ninh
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Province have substantially increased their purchases in Cambodia since March
1966. The movement of supplies in Cambodia to Communist forces along the
border, particularly on the Se San and Tonle Kong Rivers in the northeast and
along Route 110 in Laos, has increased in the past year. Indications are that
Communist units along the Cambodian border have been stockpiling some of
the food and other materials obtained from Cambodia.
21. There is still no good evidence, however, that substantial amounts of
weapons or ammunition are being obtained by the Communists from Cambodian
stocks or through Cambodian ports. On the other hand, there is evidence that
Communist units, particularly in the border area, receive arms and ammunition
from stockpiles maintained on Cambodian territory. These munitions probably
were moved south through Laos. Should infiltration of arms into South Vietnam
through Laos be substantially reduced, Cambodia could be an alternative route
for the Communists.
22. Sea Infiltration. We are unable to estimate the extent of the infiltration of
supplies by sea into South Vietnam, We believe, however, that such infiltration
has been greatly reduced by US counterefforts. Much of the Communists' use
of sea routes, at present, is for the movement of supplies along the South Viet-
namese coast. We believe that when a pressing need exists North Vietnam will
increase attempts to move some supplies by sea, primarily arms and ammunition.
II. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE SOUTH
A. Communist Forces
23. For the purpose of this estimate, we consider the following elements of
the Communist organization in South Vietnam: the Regular forces (NVA and
VC Main and Local forces), the administrative service units which support them,
the VC guerrilla forces, the political cadres, the self-defense forces, the secret
self-defense forces, and the "Assault Youth." The contribution of these diverse
elements to the Communist effort in South Vietnam differs widely in value.
Their capabilities and missions are set forth in the following paragraphs.
24. We believe that, with the exception of the Regular forces, we have pre-
viously underestimated the strength of these elements. The figures carried in
this estimate for these elements reflect new information and analysis rather than
an increase in actual Communist strength. Furthermore, our information on
the strength and organization of the different elements varies widely. For the
Regular forces it is good; for other components it is much less reliable, less
current, and less detailed. The resulting uncertainties are explained in the fol-
lowing paragraphs and are reflected by the use of ranges in the estimates we
present.
25. Regular Forces. We are reasonably confident that the Communist Regu-
lar forces in South Vietnam now total about 118,000 troops who are generally
well-armed (see Table 3). This strength has fluctuated over the. past 12 months;
it is now somewhat less than it was at this time last year. During this period,
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however, an increasing number of NVA replacements have been introduced into
VC Main force units.
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF REGULAR COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(As of 1 October 1967)
Type
Number
Organization
Regular NVA Forces
54,000
3 Front Headquarters`
7 Division Headquarters'
26 Regiments (18 divisional and 8 separate)
106 Battalions (76 regimental and 30 separate)
VC Main and Local Forces
64,000
2 Division Headquarters'
11 Regiments (7 divisional and 4 separate)
96 Battalions (34 regimental and 62 separate)
234 Separate Companies
54 Separate Platoons
' A Front is a military organization designed to perform tactical and administrative functions
and to control a number of units in a specific area. A Front is intentionally flexible, its military
force composition changes as operational requirements dictate. Vietnamese Communist Fronts
currently operating against South Vietnam are the B-3 Front, the DMZ Front, and the North-
ern Front or Subregion (now called the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region). (See map on
page 17.)
' NVA/VC divisions in South Vietnam are considered as light infantry divisions tailored
specifically for operation in South Vietnam. These divisions are highly foot-mobile and are
flexible in force structure, organization, and strength. They normally are composed of three
regiments (of about 1,500-2,000 per regiment) with varying technical and fire support elements.
They lack wheeled transport and the type of artillery normally associated with NVA conventional
divisions.
' In addition to the seven NVA divisions in South Vietnam, elements of the 341st division in
North Vietnam have been committed from time to time to operations south of the DMZ under
control of the DMZ Front.
' This total includes some NVA replacements; see paragraph 56.
26. Administrative Service Units. There is an extensive system for the ad-
ministrative support of both NVA and VC Regular forces. It operates through-
out South Vietnam and extends into Laos and Cambodia as well as the area
immediately north of the DMZ. In South Vietnam it includes the military per-
sonnel in the staff and service elements (e.g., medics, ordnance, logistics, etc.)
comprising the central, regional, provincial and district military headquarters,
and in rear service technical units of all types directly subordinate to these head-
quarters. The need for administrative service forces, and hence their size, varies
widely from province to province.
27. We cannot be confident of the total size of the administrative service
forces at any given time. Information on the current strength of the administra-
tive services at the various echelons is insufficient to establish a firm estimate.
This force has almost certainly suffered attrition and has probably been drawn
down to provide some combat replacements. Moreover, we do not estimate
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LAOS PANHANDLE AREA
COMMUNIST ROADNET
0 25 50 75 100 Miles
i r r I I T1
0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers
EXPANSION OF THE COMMUNIST ROADNET
Roadnet, 1 Jan. 1964
Roadnet extension,
1 Sept. 1965
Kham
tKeut
15
Don 8ai Dinh(
Mu Gia Pass
12
Mahaxay
CA M'B 0 D I A
Roadnet extensior
1 June 1966
Roadnet extensior
1 June 1967
I
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INFILTRATION AND ROAD CAPACITIES
`~'VIETN M
... `' ~` . Phu Dien Chau Dry season--500/100-Rainy season CHINA
HAINAN
16avaner
GROUP
e.cwoeo rxox a x, nw+nc :awncn.oix~
Kham Naps
ut
1 ~?.
` L~ Tfn ak Sao ~/
~,? ~C 740%250-,,,
15'
13 C
8
~Mu Gio Pass
180140- L BanNa
Savar(nakhet
c 13 23 Ban sac
as ne
Ban
I L A N D ;.; Bouang; 400/10 ,
Kong Sbdone Nam
96
L tt S 92 Da Nang
Communist roadnet
Other road
-o- Personnel Infiltration
(by foot)
Motorable road capacity (uninterdlcted)
&ULF
OF
TON KIN
~?. 1590/10 1A
50 101 960/120
6610!120
200/50',?_ Uan
D
,.550/50
11
( Sbpone .
Tchepone)l
V
EMILITARIZED ZONE
t3an"Frion - _.. -~..
Mouang 200%50, HUB
_ ~ftorrg Nbng 400/10
\:G s Bang Hie, 9 400/10 `200650, 48
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/01: CIA-RDP80R01720R000400150004-4
the size of the administrative service units located outside the boundaries of
South Vietnam which support the forces in the DMZ and the western highlands.
In light of these considerations, we estimate that there are now at least 35,000-
40,000 administrative service personnel in South Vietnam who are performing
essential administrative support functions. In addition, almost anyone under
VC control can be and is impressed into service to perform specific administrative
or support tasks as local conditions require,
28. Guerrillas. The guerrillas provide an essential element of the VC combat
capability. They are organized into squads and platoons which are not neces-
sarily restricted to their home village or hamlet. Typical missions for guerrillas
are terrorist and sabotage activities, protection of villages and hamlets, provision
of assistance to VC Main and Local force units as well as NVA, and the creation
of local threats in order to divert allied forces to local security missions.
29. The guerrilla force has been subject to conflicting pressures. On the one
hand, increasing numbers of guerrillas have been drawn upon to provide replace-
ments for the VC Main and Local forces, because these have suffered heavy
casualties as a result of more intense combat. At the same time, numerous
captured documents as well as VC propaganda indicate a concern to increase
the guerrilla force substantially. There is evidence which suggests that the
leadership set very high force goals for the guerrillas but had, by mid-1966, fallen
far short of its aims.
30, Information from captured documents leads us to believe that we have
previously underestimated the guerrilla strength. Certain Communist docu-
ments which date from early 1966 assert that there were then about 170,000-
180,000 guerrillas. This figure was almost certainly exaggerated. There is evi-
dence which suggests that the Communists sometimes consider other groups
part of the guerrilla force and therefore carry a larger number of guerrillas on
their rolls. There is also considerable uncertainty over the accuracy of VC report-
ing at the lower levels. We believe that guerrilla strength has declined over
the past year or so because of losses, upgrading of some personnel to Main and
Local force units, and recruiting difficulties. We are unable to substantiate the
extent to which the VC have been able to replace guerrilla losses. Considering
all the available evidence and allowing for some uncertainties, we estimate that
the current strength of the guerrilla force is 70,000-90,000.
31. The Political Organization. Presiding over the Communist effort is the
political apparatus. This includes the leadership and administration of the
National Liberation Front (NLF) and the People's Revolutionary Party (the
name under which the North Vietnamese Communist Party operates in South
Vietnam), both of which extend down to the hamlet level. The apparatus not
only acts as a government in VC-controlled areas but also has major responsibil-
ities for maintaining morale and for mobilizing manpower and other resources
in support of the war effort. Its functions are not primarily military and it is
therefore not included in the military order of battle. Nevertheless, it does
represent a continuing potential for organizing and motivating the military
forces. Through this apparatus the Communists seek to control the people of
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South Vietnam. It is, therefore, a key element which ultimately will have to be
overcome along with the military and guerrilla forces. Its numbers are large-
with a hard core estimated at about 75,000-85,000-but more important is the
wide geographical extent of its power and the dedication and effectiveness of
its personnel.
32. Other Communist Organizations. The Communists make a deliberate
effort to organize most of the people under their control into various work
forces and semimilitary organizations. Among the more significant of these organ-
izations are the self-defense forces, secret self-defense forces, and groups such as
the "Assault Youth." Moreover, when occasion demands, almost every able-
bodied person under VC control may be called upon to support the war effort.
33. The self-defense force is described by the Communists as a military organi-
zation. It is clear, however, that its organization and mission differ from that
of village and hamlet guerrillas. Self-defense forces include people of all ages
and a substantial percentage of them are females. They are largely unarmed and
only partially trained. The duties of self-defense units include the maintenance
of law and order, the construction of bunkers and strong points, warning against
the approach of allied forces, and the defense of villages and hamlets in VC-
controlled territory. Self-defense forces do not leave their home areas, and mem-
bers generally perform their duties part-time. Their existence poses an impedi-
ment to allied sweeps and pacification, however, and in their defensive role, they
inflict casualties on allied forces.
34. Another element, the secret self-defense forces, operates in government-
controlled and contested areas. They provide a residual Communist presence
in such areas and support the Communist effort primarily by clandestine intelli-
gence activities.
35. During the past year we have learned more about a VC organization called
"Assault Youth." They serve full time at district level and above, and they are
organized into companies and platoons. Although some are armed, the Com-
munists do not consider them a combat force; their primary mission appears to
be logistical, frequently in battlefield areas. This organization also serves as
a manpower pool and provides a training program for youth who later go into
the VC Main and Local forces, Little information is available to indicate the
strength or distribution of the "Assault Youth."
36. Our current evidence does not enable us to estimate the present size of
these groups (self-defense, secret self-defense, the "Assault Youth," or other similar
VC organizations) with any measure of confidence. Some documents suggest
that in early 1968 the aggregate size of the self-defense force was on the order
of 150,000. This force and the other groups, however, have unquestionably
suffered substantial attrition since that time, as well as an appreciable decline
in quality, because of losses, recruiting of some of their members into the guer-
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/01: CIA-RDP80R01720R000400150004-4
rillas or other VC military components and, particularly, the shrinkage in VC
control of populated areas. Though in aggregate numbers these groups are still
large and constitute a part of the overall Communist effort, they are not offensive
military forces. Hence, they are not included in the military order of battle total.
Nevertheless, some of their members account for a part of the total Communist
military losses.
37. In sum, the Communist military and political organization is complex, and
its aggregate numerical size cannot be estimated with confidence. Moreover,
any such aggregate total would be misleading since it would involve adding
components that have widely different missions and degrees of skill or dedication.
The VC/NVA Military Force (Main and Local forces, administrative service
elements and guerrillas) can be meaningfully presented in numerical totals and,
as indicated above, we estimate that this Military Force is now at least 223,000-
248,000, It must be recognized, however, that this Military Force constitutes
but one component of the total Communist organization. Any comprehensive
judgment of Communist capabilities in South Vietnam must embrace the effective-
ness of all the elements which comprise that organization, the total size of which
is of course considerably greater than the figure given for the Military Force.
B. The Command Structure
38. The Communists have continued to modify their command apparatus,
and, in particular, Hanoi has significantly increased its direct control. This is
most apparent in the DMZ and central highlands areas where Hanoi increasingly
bypasses both COSVN and Military Region 5 (MR-5) Headquarters. With the
exception of two VC divisions and one NVA division, all division headquarters
and all the confirmed Fronts are in MR-5 or the DMZ area.' In addition to the
creation of the DMZ Front, which is controlled directly by Hanoi, it appears
almost certain that MR-5 has been divided into three operational areas: The
Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region (formerly the Northern Front or Subregion), the
B-3 or Western Highlands Front, and the remaining coastal provinces of the
region.? There is substantial evidence that Hanoi also exercises direct military
control over the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region and the B-3 Front.
C. Logistical Support
39. During the past year captured documents and POW interrogations have
provided a better basis for estimating how much of each class of supplies was
needed and consumed by the Communist forces. Table 4 shows the estimated
total daily Communist requirement in South Vietnam for Regular and Admin-
istrative Service Forces and that portion of it which comes from external sources.
40. About one-quarter of the daily requirement for both 1966 and 1967 was
drawn from sources outside of South Vietnam. There is a growing dependence
'The remainder of the command structure consists of provincial commands and of separate
units, both directly subordinate to the respective YC military regions.
See map on opposite page for provinces included in these areas,
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 Approved For Release 2006/0 80R01720R000400150004-4 17
SOUTH VIETNAM .
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
n
f
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
D.mW
crizedZo
e
OCTOBER` 1967
- QUANQ TRI
D. Nand.
..
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NAM I CORPS
QUANO TIN _
- _ - -
- QUANQ
NOAI
KONTUM
SINN
-
-'~
-
DINH
PLEIKU -
_
--~--- Corps boundary PNU
SON
COMMUNIST (VIET CONG)
,: ..
PHU
- Province-boundary YEN - - OMZ FRONT-_ Demilitarized Zone -
TRFTHIEN-HUE MR"
i ue Autonomous municipality
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QUANQ TRI (Farmarly Norfhsrm.Su6ngion) -
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