THE DILEMMA OF 'PROTECTION OF SOURCES'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100004-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 29, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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TO: William B. Spong
COPIES TO: Francis O. Wilcox
Peter Szanton
Tom Reckford
Kent Crane
DRAFT = FH:mlv - 1/29/75
NSC Review Completed
SUBJECT: The Dilemma of "Protect_Lcon of Sources"
An urgent need arises to decide the manner in which
the Commission addresses the complex and controversial
n
question of CIA authority in "prot_ecticn of sources." The
subject probably will come up : n('::a}=/Tuesday, February 3/4,
at the forthcoming Committee II - I;r e? lioence Meeting.
The National Security Act of 1917 gives the DCI the
responsibility "for?.L ~ ~_ i :..elligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure." Under this provision,
CIA, :~~n-c er performs important count-er-intelligence
Al
activities abroad, including su'veillazce of Americans. It
also seeks to contain leaks and limit disclosures of
important information. Recently the CTA has sought to re-
enforce its statutory authority in this area, to mmatch'chat
it holds to be its responsibility and need.
The Commission initially contracted with Bil`! Harris
to make a study of the issue. As this one paper could not
encompass all the pros and cons of this complex i~& e and
afford the Commission a asis of r= ponsihle judgment, the
Committee II first drat t avoided the issue. This may not
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be possible any longer to do and yet the Committee lacks
any clear and comprehensive basis for taking a position.
Legally the issues seem to fall into the following
areas:
1. Should CIA have any authority for protection
of sources? Presumably it should because of
its overseas counter-intelligence responsibility.
In any event, a. contrary case would have to be
developed by lawyers who know intelligence.
2. CIA has recommended in its proposed legisla-
Lion that it have some authority for prior
restraint. To evaluate responsib ' this
complex constitutional issue would a major
exercise; to say anything about it without
such careful evaluation would be less than
fully responsible.
3. CIA also proposes more restrictive disclosure
statutes and much stronger criminal punish-
ment for unauthorized disclosure. Again,
highly controversial legislation on which
the Commission should presumably be loatie
to make judgments without very thorough and
balanced evaluations t probably is not
appropriate to the mandate simply to indicate
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~j7' ST~`'-7hxc 0FJ
the one side of the issue "a real
f~vS 7-:5 need to protect sources."
The question then is how to come to grips with iwe
1. Can we duck it, taking the position that
intelligence is important to the support of
the conduct of foreign policy but the Commission
c4 not look-into every detail of the
Intelligence function and still keep to its
basic purpose, even as it cannot look into
every corner of the Pentagon? To some this
would be a cop-out.
2. Do we take a procedural route, pointing out
that the issue is big, technical and con-
stitutional and recommending a special
commissiono Alternatively, d-:r we indicate it
is a Congressional matter and the Oversight
7
Committees should address.
(Cop-out also?
What are we in business for?)
3. Do we go after the substance and in the
remaining weeks mount a panel of constitu-
tional lawyers and intelligence specialists
who can explore in whatever depth is
necessary make recommendations to the
Commi s s ions.J F
f''~-c.-
Other considerations:
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a. Other Congressional and Executive Committees and
Commissions cannot avoid being smothered in these
same issues.
b. Mounting publicity accompanies any discussion o.-
L--the issues, e.g. Marchetti, Agee.
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DRAB /F'H/2/13
II. THE DIRECTc,R OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
In the quarter-century since the enabling act, the
DCI has assumed the leadership of the Intelligence Community
and taken full responsibility for the coordination of
functions and organizations as well as for the production --
that is, correlation and evaluation -- of "national"
intelligence reports and estimates. To these ends he has
developed a) a "Community' Staff" to assist him in the
coordination-of activities, and b) a group of National
Intelligence Officers (NIOs) to assist in the preparation
of coordinated substantive intelligence. On the other
hand, as the=Director of the AL7ency he has been directly
in charge of all of its important collection and research
assessment functions.
The DCI, quite clearly and purposefully, wears two hats.
He is the principal adviser to the President and the MSC
for intelligence and as such is responsible for the activities
of the entire intelligence community. And he is-also the
head of CIA. Nor surprisin ly, over the years proposals
have frequently, and responsibly, been put fosvard to separate
these two functions into two distinct positions, thus seeking
to reduce the burden and to avoid what appeared at times to be
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a conflict G_?interest between the two duties. For reasons
which the Commission believes to be altogether sound, this
course has not been followed: neither of the two responsibilities
coild be strongly, or even adequately, discharged if divided. A
DCI without his own agency would have great difficulty filling
a leadersh: ty; an independent intelli-
gence agency without a leadership responsibility would be at
the mercy of the several departments, particularly the
military.
In 1971,however, the President, on the recommendation of
the Schlesinger Report, chose a compromise course: the DCI, while
?_sti l _:r . ? 1ne r e ' - - over the CIA, should remove himself
from the qay~to-day direction of the agency and concentrate
on his Community responsibilities. Although this directive,
for a number of reasons, was never fully carried out, the
Commission is impressed with its validity as a concept and
with the undesirability of having the DCI preside over matters
in which he is himself an interested party. The pattern of
Chairman of the Board and President of a business-enterprise,
although only partially analagous, suggests itself in this
connection. In this way the DCI should be siZnificantly
freed of a major management load but at the same time would
out be wholly stripped of line responsibility which inevitably
ances his leadership capability.
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RECO1 r1EN DATTTIO~T The Director of Central
Intelligence should retain line authority over
the CIA but delegate to the fullest possible extent
the day-to-day manaF7ement responsibility to the
Deputy Director of the au*ency and himself
concentrate on the important leadership role of
the Intelligence Community.
The Commission has given some thought to the qualities
to be sought: in a DCI:_what are the principal elements the
President should loot; for in selecting a man for this taxing
position, particularly as intelligence functions are, and inevitably
will be, at once controversial and prominent in the public eye.
In essence -- and part from the obvious characteristics of
leadership, integrity, managerial talent and substantive
knowledge of foreign affairs -- two perhaps conflicting demands
afire presented. There is need for a man with experience and
professional talent in the highly technical field of intelligence.
At the same time there is need for someone with bigh public
standing, one at home in the swirl of political life; in
short, a man of cabinet stature. The Commission believes
that the latter qualifications should be dominant. Without
excluding the possibility of a professional career officer
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achieving the position -- even as a Foreign Service Officer
"could be" Secretary of State -- the Commission would favor
the position being filled by a public figure, a "politcal"
appointment.
REC0T?;l!ENIDA7IO? The position of DCI should be
filled I~y
someone with the strong personal confidence
of the President. The DCI should probably be drawn
from public l i T e, as Cabinet officer, instead of
being a professional career intelligence officer.
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DRAFT/2/13
V. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
In dealing with the allocation of resources, three
separate intractable problems plague the Intelligence
Community:
1) The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has
leadership responsibility over the entire
Intelligence Community, but authority for budget
resources, which is the basic instrument of control,
remains with the Departments and agencies to whom
Congress appropriates the funds. Thus, the DCI
actually controls only 15 percent of the vast
governmental intelligence budget; the remainin-
85 percent is beyond his reach, principally in the
realm of the Secretary of Defense.
2) A curious anomaly exists in the matter of
duplication and size of effort in the function of
assessment of research and analysis, positive value
is to be found in some measure of redundancy and
duplication of effort. Moreover, the cost of
additional resources is generally not
consequential. On the other hand, with the
function of collection, the reverse is true: duplication
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is of no value and of high cost; and the "need''
for more and more information is apparently
limitless. Moreover, because of the technical
facilities needed in collection, the high cost
is almost impossible to assess. in meaningful terms.
3) The normal difficulti:s in bureaucratic budget
procedures are compounded in the intelligence
area by the pervasive necessity for confidentiality
which inhibits the normal governmental practices,
especially-those of open Congressional review.
The foregoing problems were explored with special
thoroughness in an !?SC/0113 study in 1971, led by James
Schlesinger. The Schlesinga:? Report, endorsed b;; President
Nixon and reaffirmed by President cord, led to several important
developments in the resource management effort of Intelligence
Community. The Commission has leaned heavily upon that report
and without exception has endorsed its proposals in respect to
resource management. The recommendations which the Commission
makes therefore are by way of being supplementary. However,
because of the enormous size of the intelligence effort - several
billions of dollars, and because the manner in which the
resources of intelligence are allocated are at the heart of
one of the two imperatives to which !he Commission attaches
such importance -- the imperative of oonomy of Effort -- it
has Given great weight to these nattmm-s and makes its
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recommendations with particular care.
A. Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC).
Following the recommendations of the Schlesinger
-ort, IRAC was established, shared by the DCI and including
representatives of 0MB and the main components of the intelligence
community. It (~Gsigned to provide advice to the DCI
on he allocation of resources in much the same way as
does the USIB assist the DCI in the coordination of
intelligence activities anti the finished intelligence.
IRAC apparently has proved itself to be a useful instrument.
It meets regularly and has active working groups; its members
have gained a much deeper understanding of the collection
activiL L E..- . ~ ,J-blems of other members of
the community. It has helped the DCI to identify some
of the major collection resource issues even though members
tend still to be defensive about their o n organizations'
resources.
The Commission's studies reveal that there is still a
-nLt.:;_r l tendency to concentrate on proposals_ fcr new projects;
the temptation is ever present to accept items uncritically
because they are about the same as the previous year or generally
s
within budget guidelines for increases, and to concentrate
_t_ention on proposed new items. An aggressive policy is
n--aed to adjust this perspective. Ho.%,ever, no specific
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recommendations are presented .wTith respect to IRAC.
B. Intelligence Co:7imn_ini ty Staff.
In accordance with the Schlesinger Report, the President
directed the DCI to emphasize positive leadership in planning,
reviewing, and evaluating intelligence programs and to structure
ardstrengthen its personal staff to accomplish this. Since
that time, the DCI perscnal staff - the IC staff - has been
very substantially expanded and has become very much
involved in community management. Its endeavors are in
part directed at the guidelines for collection of intelligence
and in the KIQ's program (fey Intelligence Questions) which
are discussed in relation to the "Policymaker and Intelligence
Support." lost importantly, the IC staff plays a
central role in the resource allocation management, in the
IRAC deliberations and in the whole budget process and
procedures for the intelligence Community. The Commission
believes that the work of the IC staff is altogehter constructive
and useful and has no recommendations to make.
C. Budget Procedures.
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Ingredients of an effective resource management and
of sound budgetary process are threefold:
- - a clear understanding of the purposes for which
resources are to be expended.
-- a comprehensive plan and strategyt?;hich would
relate programs for intelligence to these
purposes.
a consolidated presentation which relates agency
budgets to coordip.ated programs and functional
objectives.
To meet the foregoing demands, the DCI no: ?r has two
important instrumentalities, which were the direct product
of the Schlesinger T~epor?t.
i) Perspectives for `slii er n 1975-]O4n is an
important annual substantive overview of the
political, econommic, and security environment
anticipated in the next five years prepared by
the DCI in collaboration with members of the
Intelligence Community. This document has value
in many aspects of intelligence support for policy.
In terms of budget it could play a more effective
S.
part by setting a common base, reviewed annually,
on which intelligence needs are structured.
Accordingly, the Commission believes that Perspectives
, as
prepared by the DOT, and coordinated in USIB and
IPAC, should be reviewed and endorsed by the
i'1SC and made the foundation block for resource
allocation.
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ii) Also pursuant to the Schlesinger Report recornmenda-
tions, a Gon. olidu.ted 'rational ?orei c n Intelli.^ence
Budget has been pulled together by the PCI for the
past three years. This Consolidated Bud=get presentation is
valuable as it puts forward a consistent overall
picture of the intelligence effort which can be
reviewed in the normal budgetary process by 01"MFIB,
by the President, and by Congress.
The remaining key ingredient to a sound resource management
and budgetary process -- a comprehensive plan and strategy --
still needs to be developed. The Commission believes a start
has been made but that strong steps should be taken by the
DCI - with the constant backing-; of the MSC and in particular
the full concur ence of the Secretar_as of Stat.e- and Defense -
to formulate annually such a community-:ride plan and strategy.
This document should give a forward look to intelligence programs,
should bring greater coherence to the community effort, and should
afford the President and NSC a useful instrument in its
direction of the Intelligence Community. The Plan and Strategy
must critically examine on-going programs and-in particular 1 CD
highlight the impact and future costs of current intelligence
program and budget decisions. In addition, ittshould each
year focus attention on the five or six major issues in the
current com:.,nity budget, on which the -members of the Community,
and the NSC should ernphasi?e. In this way the Plan and
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Strategy could become for the DCI a far more effective
instrument of leadership tb n the cumbersome and limited
review process now carried cut in conjunction with the
0,,1B. Indeed, the Cor mission believes this instrument -
an annual Plan and Strategy - could become a central means
of Resources 1?'anagement of the intelligence community on which
the President can confidently rely.
In its examination of the economy of effort in the
Intelligence Community, the Commission has struggled with
the simple problem of size. It believes that significant cur-
tailment is possible without cripnling the intelligence support
for policy and operations and that his curtailment can only be
achieved by the strong leadership of the DCI and the strict
budgetary review procedures recommends. From testimony
before it, ho~rever, the Commission has come firmly to the
view that intelligence agencies must go to exceptional
lengths to overcome inheret pressures for enlarged budgets.
Despite the fact that roughly a 40 percent cutback has been
made in personnel over the last five years, and that the
overall intelligence budget has been held rL-latilvely constant,
we are persuaded that agencies can maize substantial further
reductions.
z
RECD: _E';DAT10,~ Tne ?1SC should a) direct the
DCI to prepare in addition to the Consolidated
National Foreign Into l i gence Budget and his Five-
s lve-
Yea.r Perspectives for -telliF_ence, an annual "Plan
and StrateHy for Intelligence" to be the basis for
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agency; budgets b} Y>ec ;ire all intelligence agency
budgeL, submissions to conform to -at asking
pattern deterrni.;ed by the DCI which would set
agency responsibilities and budget lir:itations,
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DRAFT :FH/hpl/2/l4/75
S;IIl. Executive Oversight
The U.S. government must have adequate safeguards for
overseeing U.S. foreign intelligence activities. The very
nature of its work and the fact that it operates under the
screen of secrecy which greatly inhibits normal processors of
oversight, m kcs this especially necessary.
Some constraints among CIA activities are of course
built into the normal foreign policy procedures of the Executive
branch. Intelligence officers, for example, deal with, and
therefore are somewhat controlled by, policymakers. The CIF,
representative in each country abroad is subject to the overall
rdirection of the US Ambassador - although the privacy of
communication makes this relationship difficult to control.
In Washington CIA officials meet regularly with policy officers
to review both substantive developments and operational a-ctivity.
More importantly, the 40 Committee of the NSC approves
all covert actions undertaken by CIA. Elsewhere, the Commission
recommends a strengthening of this important review procedure.
In addition to the foregoing, the President has need for
an altogether independent body, free of operational responsibilities
and removed from the possibility of any organizational bias,
constantly to assess the effectiveness of the intelligence
community and to oversee its conformity to the letter and the
spirit of the President's wishes. President Eisenhower established
a Citizens Panel in 1956 to perform this oversight role. The
group, now known as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
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Board (PFIAB) is composed of japproximatel_y! 12 distinguished
I C
private citizens, selected on a non-partisan basis whose
knowledge in previous experience qualify them as advisers on
intelligence matters.
The PFIAB meets regularly two dais every other month,
and its chairman anti various mer ers devote time betieeen meetings
to the work of the Board. The Board is served by a two-man
professional staff. In its early days, the Board played a role
in satellite systems.
In recent years, the PFIAB has conducted several useful postmortem
studies of alleged intelligence failures, such as Sihanouk_ville,
Chile and the Middle East war of 1973. It has also produced
constructive reports on subs-t