DOMESTIC ASPECTS OF CUBA'S COMMITMENTS IN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003400010010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: January 19, 1978
• Content Type: MEMO

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19 January 1978
SUBJECT: Domestic Aspects of.Cuba's Commitments in
Africa
This memorandum assesses how the Castro government
has been managing the political, military, and social
costs of its expanding role in Africa, what we know
about the people's reaction, and whether it could pose
a significant constraint on Cuban policy makers who
are now making plans for increasing Cuba's role in
Ethiopia. The issue of economic costs is addressed
in a separate annex. In brief, we believe the domestic
"costs" so far are well within manageable limits, Whether
they become serious will depend largely on the extent
of the fighting in Angola and Ethiopia; heavy Cuban
casualties could present the Castro regime with difficult
political problems.
Political-Social Costs
Based on a careful, continuing analysis of Cuban
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we have received, we are able to conclude only that
service in Africa is not meeting with the full approval
of the Cuban people. While activists of the party, the
mass organizations., and the military openly support the
regime's African adventurism, many people are convinced
that the country's current austerity, which actually
stems largely from low world sugar prices, is caused
b Cuban involvement in Africa. 25X1
reports present contradictory evidence, but, in
general, those who have a stake in the regime wax en-
thusiastic while those whose careers are not dependent
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on how strongly they identify with government policy
privately express dissatisfaction.
As is customary during periods of flagging popular
sentiment, Castro has spent considerable time since
mid-1977 traveling through the countryside trying to
bolster morale. Flanked by what frequently has been a
larger-than-normal complement of officials of the
Politburo, Secretariat, and cabinet, he has concentrated
his speeches on favorable economic facts, stressing the
achievement of new production records and the inaugu-
ration of large industrial facilities, while playing
down the cost of Cuban aid to foreign countries. Lately,
Cuban media and speeches by high officials have paid
more attention to the theme of sacrifices "that are re-
quired of all good revolutionaries,"-probably to prepare
the Cuban people for higher casualty rates in Africa.
Service in Angola and elsewhere in Africa is al-
ready considered a badge of honor in Cuba officiladom,
and duty abroad is becoming an important prerequisite
for career advancement. In addition, a cult of "the
internationalist fighter"--soldier, doctor, teacher, or
technician--is being molded, and the press has resur-
rected the dormant tales of various Cuban "internation-
alist" guerrilla heroes of the 1960s. Public ceremonies
in September 1977, for example, featured the inaugural
activities for a new military school named after an
"internationalist combatant who offered his life for
the liberation of the people of Angola."
Castro is keenly aware of--and exploits--the con-
siderable capacity of the Cuban people to endure hard-
ships. His normal reaction is to manufacture both a
reason to suffer and a scapegoat to hate. A master of
media manipulation, he has little trouble refocusing
public antipaty and generating renewed revolutionary
momentum. If the US, for example, became actively
engaged in the Horn of Africa on behalf of Somalia,
Castro would use the US as a scapegoat for Cuban losses
and probably succeed in deflecting public opinion.
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At any rate, no organized opposition exists in Cuba,
and without planning, coordination, and leadership those
who oppose Cuba's African adventures have little impact
on regime leaders. So far, their activities apparently
have been limited to grumbling among friends and family.
In our judgment, Castro--who keeps his fingers on
the national pulse at all times--is not yet overly con-
cerned about public attitudes. The numerous speeches
and heavy media treatment in the last six months are,
in effect, pre-emptive moves on the part of the leaders
to head off mounting disaffection. The apparent recent
decision to up the stakes drastically in Ethiopia, in
terms of the role and presence of Cubans there, suggests
Cuba's leaders are not unduly worried. We believe
that Castro knows that the current level of discontent
is well within tolerable limits and that by careful
persuasion he can keep it far short of the point where
outright repression might be required.
Military Costs
There are now 21,000-23,000 Cuban military person-
nel in Africa. Most were mobilized from Cuba's ready
reserves, in part to spread the effects throughout
the island and to avoid drawing from Cuba's active
armed forces, thus weakening Cuba's defenses.
If the USSR continues to underwrite the bulk of
the costs of the Cuban effort, we believe that Havana
has the wherewithal to increase significantly its com-
mitment in Africa without seriously damaging Cuba's
economy or defense capabilities. For example, a
doubling of Cuban military-technical personnel in Africa
to 54,000-58,000 would represent only about two percent
of the Cuban labor force and an estimated loss in output
of about $160 million or about two percent of estimated
1976 GNP. The further diversion of potentially pro-
ductive workers would aggravate labor squeezes in several
economic sectors, but we believe the impact would be
largely offset by the annual. entry of some 50,000 new
workers into the labor force and by the more efficient
utilization of large numbers of presently underemployed
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Cubans. The impact on the important agriculture sector
would be minimized by the continuing utilization of the
burgeoning student population for part-time labor in
non-sugar agriculture.
A doubling of Cuban military personnel in Africa
to 42,000-46,000 would not have a serious impact on
Cuba's military capabilities, assuming Moscow continues
to replace Cuban materiel sent to Africa. Cuba's armed
forces total about 180,000 active duty personnel, in-
cluding some 60,000 ready reserves who can be mobilized
within 24 hours. In addition there are another 210,000
reserves who have undergone basic training and who could
be activated within 20 days. Moreover, like most less
developed countries, Cuba has a relatively large and
expanding young population--53 percent of its 9.65
million people are under 25 years of age--including
some 550,000 males between 18 and 24.
Outlook
While the political and economic costs of Cuban
involvement in Africa will probably remain manageable,
at least for the near term, a deepening popular
disaffection stemming from an exaggerated perception of
the financial costs could pose a constraint on Cuban
policy makers should Cuba's African commitments rapidly
escalate (e.g. increasing the number of Cubans in
Ethiopia to a level close to the Angola numbers). A
more important factor will be the number of casualties
the Cubans suffer. Reporting on the number killed or
wounded in Angola is spotty at best; the regime does
not announce casualty figures. We have seen figures
on Cubans killed there that range between 600 and
2,000. We have a reliable report that seven were
recently killed in Eritrea. If, however, one-third
to one-half of the Cuban force in Ethiopia (which is
scheduled to number more than 5,000 by the end of
February) should be killed in the coming Ogaden offensive,
combined with a sudden deterioration in the Cubans'
fortunes in Angola (where there are 19,000-20,000 troops)
causing heavy casualties there, we believe the regime
would be unable to manage the domestic impact suf-
ficiently to prevent a major increase in public dis-
affection. The extent of discontent would depend on
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the numbers, and the regime's response would depend on
the political resolve of the leaders to continue their
course.
At a minimum, the Cuban populace might resort to
passive measures of protest. Such measures would not
be unprecedented in recent Cuban history. Worker slow-
downs and widespread absenteeism occurred in the early
1970s in the wake of the failure to increase consumer
goods after the record 1970 harvest.
These protests, together with strong pressures
from the USSR, caused the Castro government to institute
major economic policy changes--some of which reversed
basic ideological tenets of the Revolution itself--in
an effort to increase economic production. If faced
with popular protests of a similar magnitude, the Cuban
leadership might well decide to. pursue a less ag-
gressive African policy to assuage public disenchantment.
Given the Cuban people's demonstrated past capacity
for endurance and sacrifice, however, their level of
acceptable costs is high by US standards. Moreover,
this high "endurance factor" may be further enhanced
if the theme of the Castro government's propaganda
machinery of recent months continues successfully to
influence public opinion. The bottom line, however,
will depend on the extent of political will on the
part of Cuba's leaders. All indications so far are
that they are prepared to pay a heavy price.
Attachment
as stated
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Economic Costs of Cuba's. Commitments in Africa
We believe the present economic cost of Havana's
involvement in Africa is too low to be an important
constraint on the Cuban economy or on those Cuban leaders
planning Havana's African policy. The presence of 27,000
to 29,000 Cubans there represents only about 1 percent of
the island's labor force and an estimated loss in national
output of about $80 million annually--the equivalent of
about 1 percent of estimated 1976 GNP--if these people
were productively employed at home.
While the costs to the economy in general have
been relatively small, the loss of skilled and unskilled
workers has caused disruption in several sectors of the
economy; the loss of unskilled workers has been minimized,
however, by increased mechanization of the labor-intensive
sugarcane harvest and the widespread use of student labor
in agriculture. Logistical costs have been limited to
no more than 10 percent of the Cuban merchant fleet at
any one time and a small number of aircraft. This cost
of diversion has amounted to only about $15 million
annually at most and has not seriously disrupted Cuban
trade patterns or commercial airline.schedules.
Although the rate of economic growth apparently
slowed in 1976, the slowdown is primarily the result of
a small decrease in that year's sugar harvest and a
decline in investment. Sugar production dropped about
2.5 percent in 1976 because of prolonged drought con-
ditions during the sugarcane growing season. Non-sugar
agriculture fared better and registered small gains.
Industry also showed a small gain, but output was impaired
by a reduction in raw material imports from the West.
In neither case did a shortage of labor significantly
affect output.
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Investment, however, declined significantly in
response to a 17 percent reduction in capital goods
imports from the West--caused by a 44 percent drop in
average world sugar prices from the previous year.
Although production data for 1977 is not yet available,
we doubt that GNP was any more affected in 1977 by
Havana's involvement in Africa than it was in 1976.
While Cuba supplies the bulk of the manpower and
most of the subsistence. and salary costs for Africa,
virtually all of the materiel costs have been borne by
the USSR. The Soviet-made military equipment being used
in Africa is either transshipped from Cuba or sent
directly to Africa from the USSR. Most of the equip-
ment sent from Cuba has already been replaced by newer,
and, in some cases, more sophisticated weapons. Mos-
cow has provided Soviet planes and pilots to facilitate
Cuban logistics and has leased two IL-?62s to Havana
for twice-weekly flights to Angola. Cuban maintenance
costs have also been partly offset by several African
nations who are receiving Cuban civilian and military
assistance.
We calculate that Cuba's direct economic costs
from its military commitment in Africa in comparative
terms represent only about one-third of the US
economic costs of Vietnam during the peak year of 1968.
The direct cost of maintaining the 21,000-23,000 military
personnel in Africa is estimated at about $50--$55 million
annually in subsistence and salary payments and, at most,
$15 million annually in logistical expenses. Fidel
Castro told a visiting US State Department official last
September that these expenses amounted to $10 million
and were the only foreign exchange costs of Cuba's
African involvement. This estimated $65-70 million annual
bill represents only about 0.9 percent of estimated 1976
GNP. At its peak, the US commitment in Vietnam totaled
$26.5 billion in 1968 according to US Defense Department
and Senate Appropriations Committee estimates or about
3 percent of 1968 US GNP. The share of Cuba's labor
force represented by its military personnel in Africa
equals about 0.8 percent compared to 0.65 percent of
the US labor force stationed in Vietnam in 1968.
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Having little detailed knowledge of the Cuban
involvement in Africa, some sectors of the Cuban populace
incorrectly view the Cuban military and civilian presence
in Africa as a major cause of Cuba's economic difficulties
and at least partly responsible for ongoing austerity
measures. Cutbacks in ration allotments of coffee, rice,
and certain clothing items and major downward revisions
in Cuba's first Five Year Plan have coincided with the
highly visible Gallup of military reserves destined for
Africa.
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SUBJECT: Domestic Aspects of Cuba's Commitments in
Africa
DISTRIBUTION
1 - ORPA/ECS
1 - ORPA/AF
2 - P&PG
1 AD/ORPA
1 - NIO/LA
1 - NIO/AF
1 - DDO/COG
1 - OER
1 - OSR/RAD
Orig & 1 - SA/NFAC~
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