REPORT OF PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON NARCOTICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000900100012-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: August 21, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved ? s Q07f0 / 6 ZDP80 01495ROO1
~1 )
21 August 1975
is
TO Mr. Paul Walsh, ADDI
DDI/CINM
SUBJECT: Report of President's Task
Force on Narcotics
The attached draft document will bed
come part of the final report to the
President from the special task force
that was created under the direction of
the Domestic Council to study the govern!
ment's overall narcotics control effort.
is the CIA
representative on the Task Force; and
we have been supporting him as requested
The final report is due in September.
The attached paper is the draft
"Assessment of the Narcotics intelligenc
Functions." Although CIA is only dealt
with in a limited way--and the DDI only
by inference--I believe you will find
the entire report interesting, especiall
the section dealing with strategic
intelligence analysis. I have marked
those paragraphs of particular interest.
Not Referred to 0MB. Waiver
applies
DOJ Review Completed.
--continued
a
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S
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OFFICE OFH
SUBJECT: Report of President's Task
Force on Narcotics
The paper points up the deficiencie
of the "national narcotics intelligence
system" under the direct leadership of
the DEA. These are deficiencies that I
believe we can help alleviate if we are
h more current in-
i
s
permitted to publ
telligence on the international narcotic
control situation, at least until the
DEA develops a capability to fill this
intelligence gap. The DEA Quarterly
Intelligence Trends and the ,other DEA
rcement,
f
o
periodical Drug En
do not
highly professional publications, meet intelligenceecoverageooflthensub-
ent
ject.
cc: D/OCI
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COVER SHEET
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE 'OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Attach this form to CONFIDENTIAL
material in use. DETACH the form
when material is filed, stored or
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N F I D E N T I.A L
ASSESSMENT OF THE NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS
AUGUST, 1975
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THE-INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION
Pa e
I. Introduction 1.
II. Operational Intelligence. 1
A., Assessment of Current Capabilities 1
l: General Comments on Current
Operational Intelligence Capabilities 1
2. Current Capabilities for Collection 3
3..' Current Capabilities for Analysis/
Production 5
4. Current Capabilities for Dissemination . 11.
5. Value of Tactical and Operational
Intelligence Analysis in Developing
Cases
B. Effect of Intelligence from Sensitive
Sources on Prosecution.
C. Requirements for Development and Coor-
dination of Intelligence Capabilities
1.
2.
3.
4.
Performance of Individual Agencies
Interagency Relations and Cooperation
Basic Requirements.
-Other
III.
Stra
teg
ic' Intelligence
A.
Assessment of Current Capabilities
1.
Current Capabilities for. Collection
2.
Current Capabilities for Strategic
Intelligence Analysis
3.
Current Capabilities for Strategic
Intelligence Production
19
20
22.
29
30
30
30
.31
31
B. Requirements for Development and Coordination
of Strategic Intelligence Capabilities 32
1. Interagency Coordination .32
2?. Basic Strategic Collection Requ,Vements -38
IV.- Measures of Effectiveness
35
A. Identification of Methods
1. In-house Management Supervision
2. Judgment by Users of Operational
Intelligence
3. A Note on Strategic Intelligence
Assessment of Methods and Proposed
Improvements
Attachment A
13
14'
for the Future 18'
CONFIDENTIAL
35
35
36
36
37.
38
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: CONNF1OTl4i SUBJECT TO GENERA= ~ECLASSIFICATIrJPF
SCHEDULE OF EXCCUT1 E CRCER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO.
YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLA.SSLFIED ON DDC. 31..?..?..
THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The Functional Group on Intelligence comprehensively
reviewed the narcotics intelligence function. In order
to focus on the main issues and problem areas, the group
assumed the underlying rationale embodied in Peorganization
Plan N
2
f i
i
i
o.
as one o
ts pr
nc
pal guideposts. .However,
it was recognized that the Plan did create certain
.operational problems which were reviewed..
The assessment.resulted'in certain basic and long-
standing differences in philosophies and operations
among agencies. These differences could not.be resolved
at the working group level. Accordingly, a separate
issue/problem paper was prepared (Attachment A) which
sets forth these positions. The resolution of these
issues could result in changes to the sections of this
.paper which follow.
The group concluded that the intelligence function is
an essential and integral part of the overall narcotics
enforcement effort. While it is fundamentally in a
support role, intelligence'.in fact enhances more
effective utilization of enforcement resources by
permitting focusing of resources on specific targets.
Without this key input,'the enforcement effort would
be deployed on a more random basis with a resultant
reduction of efficiency and effectiveness.
It was also concluded that the narcotics intelligence .
function generally suffered during the internal resource
allocation process of.the domestic agencies.
II.' OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
A. Assessment of Current Capabilities
1. General Comments on Current Operational Intelligence
Capabilities
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973 placed in DEA
the responsibility for developing a national
narcotics intelligence capability. Outlined below
are some of the key issues that persist and
.proposals for future action to resolve these problems.
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Two comments should be made at the outset,
.since they apply to the entire ii.tel~ligence
process, from collection to dissemination:
a. If the several enforcement agencies are
to"be adequately supported by intelligence,
in order to permit enforcement action to become
more effective than mere reliance on random
inspections and informants' initiatives, then
all intelligence producers must be made to
recognize that they serve many users. There is
ample evidence that competitive attitudes within
and among agencies have impeded the development
of an optimal production and flow of operational
intelligence. While DEA has the primary charter
to take the initiative (under the CCINC'..s overall
direction for overseas efforts) in designing the
national narcotics intelligence system and plays
a central role in determining what should be
produced by that overall enforcement activity,
nor does it control all intelligence collectors.
Therefore it is not in a position to resolve
.serious conflict among agencies. Some person
or group of persons must be identified as serving
a neutral "inspector general" role. The CCINC has
responsibility only for international aspects of
the problem, and therp ear o be inadequate
control over the entire ,ine ence system from
above. The Tyler Group is currently wrestling
with some of these issues, but it is too early
.to determine whether it will fill the obvious gap.
b.* -In the process of shifting narcotics
operational intelligence toward conspiracy cases
against major traffickers, the receipt, by
Customs, of interdiction-related tactical and
operational intelligence has suffered. Customs
is no longer in a position to collect such
intelligence itself, under Reorganization Plan
No.-2, and says it is not receiving it in the
needed quantity from other agencies (primarily
DEA). There appear to be aspects of DEA's
collection activity, analytical processing and
dissemination procedures which are in need of
improvement.
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2. Current Capabilities for Collection
a. ?evere sentencing of drug offenders may
be the single most effective means of increasing
the intelligence flow. While a wide variety of
agencies are actively collecting operational
intelligence, the greatest single source of such
information is from interrogations of persons
detained by enforcement officers light sentences
of offenders inhibit collection of such information.
The Intelligence Group agrees that, insofar as
it would have a favorable impact upon the amount
of raw intelligence available, more severe
sentencing would be helpful.
b. The flow of operational intelligence
from debriefing of arrested persons and other
sources is also impeded by failure of the
agencies to fully exploit such sources for the
purposes of both their own agency and other arms
of the Government. The DEA representative
has stated that one great problem is-simply
getting investigative officers to commit to
paper the operational intelligence they receive.
Furthermore, the range of questions asked in
such debriefings'-tends to focus too narrowly
upon the immediately exploitable tactical
information rather than upon what that source
may know which would be of use to other elements
of the officer's agency, or to other agencies.
(See Task 35 for suggestions as to how to
resolve this problem.)
C. The Narcotics Intelligence Officer (NIO)
program has been slowed somewhat by the post-
Watergate climate. Foreign governments have
expressed reservations about permitting in
telligence officers to be accredited to their
countries, part of their sensitivity stems from
the recent revelations concerning CIA activities.
.Nonetheless, the program has been launched and
there are plans for its expansion. It is too
early in the program's development to make a
judgment as to whether separating the NIO
function from the Special Agent function overseas
is a more effective approach than is combining
both functions in the same officers.
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d. -A consistent and integrated "country
.organization overseas" would be useful.
Collection of narcotics intelligence abroad-is
coordinated within the missions under the aegis
-of the Ambassador's Country Team, and the
procedures appear to be needlessly complicated
by DEA's continuing to operate through regional?
as opposed to country, directors. The Ambassador
of Belgium does not, therefore, have control over
DEA elements there, who report to a DEA Regional
Office in Paris. With the growth in DEA presence.
abroad to the point it has now reached, with
personnel assigned to virtually all major countries
of interest, the "regional director" appears to
be an anachronism.' Insofar as regional management
is called for in certain aspects of the foreign
narcotics problem, this could be accomplished
by adopting the regional approach at Headquarters.
Field organization abroad, however, s ould more
closely parallel that.of the State Department.
DEA does not fully concur in.this observation.
e. Some unnecessary duplication of effort
.occurs insofar as certain Customs activities in
non-narcotics areas occasionally lead them
into investigations which overlap those of DEA.
Improved cooperation and intelligence sharing
-between DEA and Customs will ensure that Customs'
potential for contributing to the narcotics
effort is exploited while unnecessary duplication
of effort is minimized.
Customs, however, perceives a further gap
in that they no longer have agents abroad in the
numbers they previously had, collecting operational
and tactical information from official (host
government Customs) and unofficial (shipping
community) sources.' Customs claims that their.
personnel had. unique expertise in areas of
knowledge vital to-their operations, and that
the withdrawal of.most of these personnel has
-created an intelligence gap.
f. There has been a problem in coordination
and exchange of information between DEA and Customs.
Customs 'has found it difficult if not impossible
to arrange access for follow-up questioning of
sources turned over to DEA. This occurs despite
Customs belief that such questioning would be
productive and that answers they seek are not contained
in the reports they receive from DEA. Apparently this
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reflects usw.00perative attitu es a
installation level rather than the i ntions of
the DEA management. DEA management (Office of
Intel) has no control over DEA enforcement officers
in the field. Only the DEA Administrator can
resolve issues of. this type. Steps to resolve.
this.problem.have been taken by DEA through
recent'field instructions and through estab-
lishment of a Liaison Group to ensure compliance.
3.. Current Capabilities for Analysis/Production
The analytic function is important in developing
cases and provides vital'support to the planner of
operations against major traffickers. Analysis
is . also. important in ensuring that intelligence
that has been collected is correctly identified
and transmitted to those who can use it. In
both of these areas, DEA's analytical resources
have been found to be inadequate. Customs'limited
analytical resources, located in the Office of
Enforcement Support (OES), are endeavoring to
fully process the data currently being received
.by them. However, their ability to handle a larger
flow of intelligence, should it be provided by
DEA or Customs personnel, is probably inadequate.
Steps to keep this unit abreast of future demands
upon it are currently being taken.
Intelligence 'support is wasted if enforcement
-officials do not-use it. it follows that en-
.forcement officials must be convinced of the
value and utility of intelligence. The quality
and relevance of the intelligence product are
therefore critical to its impact on enforcement
operations, and both quality and relevance depend
upon sound analysis.
There are approximately 34 intelligence analysts
at DE A. Headquarters, responsible mainly for
geographic areas, but where necessary they have
functional responsibilities. These respon-
sibilities correspond with the geographical
breakdown of the Office of Enforcement. In
relation to the amount of information available
to them and the requirements laid on them, the
analysts are not able to process the raw data
adequately. A problem at this phase of the
intelligence cycle affects not only the use of
the operational intelligence by enforcement
agencies but also the support of the strategic
intelligence effort, dependent as it is upon
operational intelligence.
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Moreover, in.addition to the lack of qualified
analysts, DEA cites an inadequate level of
clerical and support personnel.
Related to the shortage of analytical personnel
is the lack of adequate information processing
procedures and well-conceived ADP systems.
Agencies currently maintain, or has under develop-
ment, four major automated systems:
a.. . PATHFINDER
b.- NADDIS
c. TECS
d. MINT System
integrated centralized. capability for the automated
storage and retrieval of information concerning
known or suspected illicit drug.activity. In
.providing this capability, the system shall
accommodate the operational needs of DEA Intel-
ligence in terms of both the specific information
to be processed and the modes and methods of
Liser/system interaction. With regard to the
specific information to be processed, the system
shall provide a data base structure which
facilitates the storage, search,. retrieval and
presentation of information which identifies and
describes:
o Individuals known or suspected of illicit'
drug activity.
a. PATHFINDER I System. The principal
objective of the PATHFINDER I system shall be
to provide DEA intelligence with a'totally
Illicit drug activities and their known
or suspected relationship with identified..
individuals.
o Aircraft and aircraft related operations
known or suspected of involvement with
illicit drug activities.
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The modes and methods of user/system inter-
action shall be such as to support the tactical,
operational and strategic-mission objectives
of DEA ?Intelligence.
The system shall operate in an on-line/inter-
active mode through the use of keyboard/CRT type
terminal devices located in secured facilities
within the Office of Intelligence, DEA. Through
the use of these terminals facilities, authorized
DEA Intelligence personnel shall be able to
access the system data base for the rettieval
of specific information of.interest, the input
of new information, and the modifications or deletion
of existing information. In addition to these
basic on-line functions, the system sha-1.1 also
include processing functions which continuously
monitor system activity and alert DEA Intelligence
personnel to the occurrence of or request for
significant information for which an information
look-out has been established. Additional system,
processing functions shall provide for log-on/
log-off system access control, .telecommunication
support, system maintenance support, batch mode
data base update,-intelligence report generation,
system audit and management support reporting, and
operations report generation.
b. Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information
Stem (NADDIS). NADDIS is an on-line computer
automated system that permits the compilation,
retrieval, and analysis of operational intel-
ligence data from over 330,000 criminal history
records of drug law violators. The system is. an.
integral portion of the comprehensive data base
accessible through DEA ADP Telecommunication
System (DATS) and consequently, provides instan-
taneous access to information on persons of
.interest to DEA both. at Headquarters and
in DEA field offices.
Through off-line processing the NADDIS data
base provides drug traffic statistics, biographic
profiles of drug law violators to support DEA
enforcement and intelligence operations both in
the field and at Headquarters. Also provided are
various management reports related to operational
effectiveness and planning.
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Requirements exist for the enhancement of-
NADDIS through expanded time of operation, increased
efficiency of operation and retrieval, improved
security, and interfaces with other DEA data bases
as well as the law enforcement data bases of
other agencies. DEA also has TECS - NADDIS
exchange and Customs has DEA/NADDIS terminal
in house.
The NADDIS is composed of centralized automated'
files on subjects of DEA interest, a nationwide
computerized telecommunications network, and a
set of. supporting system maintenance, security,
and user procedures. NADDIS terminal and
communication facilities provide'NADDIS subscribers
with the capability to access the NADDIS'files,
as well as other on-line DEA automated files
and relevant files in the Department-of Justice.
Computer support for the DEA, NADDIS., compliance
and certain administrative files is provided
by the Department of Justice (DOJ)?IBM, 370/155
system. The NCIC files are supported by the FBI
IBM 360/50 NCIC computer. DEA access to the .
NCIC files is provided by. a communications link
between the DOJ and FBI computer systems.. The
DEA headquarters IBM 360/4.0 provides the capability
for remote entry of NADDIS batch transactions
into the.DOJ system. .
The telecommunications network links DEA
headquarters, all domestic regional officers,
and most district offices. Communications
linking the stations are a combination of dedicated
leased and dial-up telephone circuits. Computer
programs have been.designed and stations at the-
regional offices are configured such that the..
capability exists to both access and update
NADDIS files from the remote terminals. District
-offices with appropriate terminal equipment also
possess this capability. Most district office
stations, however, will be.supported by dial-up.'*
communications that will provide the query
capability only.
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c. Treasury Enforcement Communications
System (TECS . Treasury Enforcement
Communications System is a system of
telecommunication terminals located in law
enforcement facilities of the Department of
Treasury throughout the United States and
connected to a computer center in San Diego,
California.
TECS users include the U.S. Customs Service,
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, IRS
Inspection Service, IRS Intelligence Division, DEA,
and INTERPOL Washington.
TECS provides to the Treasury law enforcement
community-with:
o A computer-based index to files of common
interest to Treasury enforcement . agencies.
o On-line access to the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) of-the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
o Immediate message-switching capability
point-to-point and broadcast among
Headquarters and Treasury enforcement
field levels.
o An interface with the National.Law
Enforcement Telecommunications System
(NLETS) which provides:
a)
An administrative message-switching
capability
enforcement
states.
between TECS and the
agencies in the fifty
b)
Vehicle registration inquiries.
c)
Driver's license inquiries.
The computer-based network, which was
originally conceived as CADPIN (Customs
Automatic Data'Processing Intelligence Network),
began operation in April 1970 with a total of
20 terminals, all located at the Customs port
of entry in San Ysidro, California.
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Currently the network consists of more than
500 terminals located at land-border crossings
along the Canadian and Mexican borders, key
ports of entry at seaports and international
airports, field offices of the Customs Office
of Investigations, as well as' offices of the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, IRS
Inspection Service, and the IRS Intelligence
Division.
These terminals have immediate access to
records in the TECS data base containing
information on known or.suspected violators
of Customs laws. TECS records contain information
on individuals, businesses, vehicles, aircraft
and vessels; and include active records in NCIC
contained in eight separate files on wanted persons,
vehicles,. license plates, articles, guns,
securities, boats and criminal history records.
d. The Major International Narcotics
Trafficker Program (MINT). The MINT program
was initially approved by CCINC in, early 1973.
.The concept of the program was to identify and
accord highest priority to intelligence collection
and enforcement action against key foreign leaders
of large scale narcotics-trafficking organizations
throughout the world. It was an effort to focus
.the limited resources of the U.S. Government where
they would have the greatest impact. Experience
of the past few years has shown that a major
factor contributing to the disruption of the flow
of illicit narcotics into the United States has
been the immobilization of a relatively small
number of persons who play a major role in the
international narcotics traffic, -- for example,
the small group of major traffickers immobilized
a few years ago that disrupted the France/Latin
America connection.
CIA, Customs and DEA jointly identified and
-compiled basic data on approximately 225 major
.international foreign narcotics traffickers in
Latin America, Europe, the Near East and East
Asia. (The MINT includes no U.S. citizens.)
This inventory was formally approved by the CCINC
Working Group in September 1973 and designated as
the MINT Register. It was sent to the field in
January 1974 for additions and deletions and has
been modified slightly as a result of subsequent
field comments.
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A special computerized information retrieval
system known as the MINT Target Analysis System (TAS).
was developed by CIA to manipulate and analyze
intelligence information. on individuals on the
MINT Register. This system uses the NMCS
Information Processing System (NIPS), a
formatted file system developed by IBM and
the Department of Defense. This system provides
for both batch and online processing, and allows
the user to search and retrieve information from
any data element in the file. A MINT record
contains basic biographic data on the major
trafficker, plus information on his associates,
criminal history, addresses and phone numbers,
vehicles and bank accounts. By sorting out.
these items of data, the system can establish
relationships between various traffickers on
the basis of common associates, the use of the
same phone numbers or addresses, etc. Retrieval
of data is accomplished either through online
terminals, or in batch mode. A number of regular
reports are produced both in printed form and in
microfiche.
This system is designed to serve the needs of
CIA and DEA until the latter Agency's PATHFINDER I
system is operational. By employing a proven data
management system and existing hardward, CIA was able
to develop a'usable system by mid-1974. When the
PATHFINDER system is fully developed, the data.in
the MINT file will be transferred to DEA.
4. Current Capabilities for Dissemination
Competitive attitudes within and among agencies
ave had a negative impact on the sharing and
use of intells.crence. So long as budget hearings
.emphasize numbers of arrests as justification
for enforcement agency budgets, intelligence
will be withheld in order to maximize its
holder's advantage over competing agencies.
Two things are needed: (1) an educational
program for the Congress and the public designed
to provide a more sophisticated measure of the
effectiveness of the Government's overall
anti-narcotics program than numbers of arrests
and seizures; and (2) some pressure on the
agencies from above (perhaps from the Tyler
Group) to minimize the destructive impact of the
competitive attitudes which persist.
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One of the responsibilities of the analyst,
as mentioned above, is the recognition of which
data is of interest to users both within and
outside of his own agency. It is also the analyst
who can establish the-links-which make individual
intelligence reports relevant to the work of the
user. It is wrong, once this has been established,
to then permit. the withholding of information
.on specious grounds simply to advance the bureau-
.cratic cause of the agency. Rather, the pre-
sumption should-be that the information should
be passed, and will be properly exploited by the
user.
A problem.which centers upon the behavior of
the user, rather than the originator, has also
surfaced: users of intelligence information
must be compelled to observe all caveats concerning
i s~exploitation.and/or further dissemination.
Failure to impose discipline in this regard. .
leads to reluctance on intelligence producers'
parts to provide sensitive intelligence.
.Speed in dissemination of operational intelligence
is often. important. One man's operational
intelligence may be another's tactical intelligence
(for example, Customs would logically regard much
of DEA.'s operational intelligence as tactical to
their border operations). As DEA does not have
the executive responsibility for all narcotics
enforcement operatives, it follows that a higher
level entity must take responsibility for policing
the timely intelligence support of enforcement
officers. The technical and organizational capa-
bilities for,speedy intelligence dissemination are
clearly available; the problem is one of policy
and -- perhaps to a, greater degree -- of working
level attitudes. (e.g., sharing of tactical infor-
mation must usually be handled by field elements
because of the time element; however, it is the
field elements which are reportedly the source of
much of the uncooperative and narrowly competitive
attitudes cited to us.)
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'Other impediments to dissemination of operational
intelligence are the Right to Privacy Act, the
Freedom of Information Act, and other statutory
provisions regulating the handling of defendants'
and witnesses' statements obtained in the course
of criminal investigation. The full ramifications
of these statutes and their interpretation by the
courts are not yet foreseeable.
5.. Value of Tactical and Operational Intelligence
Analysis in Developing Cases.
a.- Value of Analysis. Certainly any pursuit
of major traffickers will require analysis beyond
the tactical thinking done by the investigative
officer in the field. The latter is, Of?course,
an essential input into enforcement activity and
it is not our intention to belittle it. However,.
the full capabilities'of.intelligence support
.for more effective operational. planning (including
the most efficient allocation of limited enforcement
resources) can only be.brought into play with the
assistance of analytical-resources beyond the
field investigative officer. The analyst provides
.access to a broader information base than is
available to the investigative officer., Much
important information concerns activity beyond
the regional assignment of the enforcement
officer, and can assure that adequate attention
can be focused on the linkages among narcotics-
related individuals in different areas and
activities. Only in this manner can the basis
be provided. for intelligent targeting and for the
effective coordination of enforcement operations.
DEA's inadequate staffing of analytical
positions is recognized both-within its own_.
management and by.other agencies, since both groups
perceive the gaps in intelligence support which
result in part from insufficient analysis.
Boosting the analytical staff of DEA's Office.
of Intelligence would not only increase the
effectiveness of DEA's enforcement activity
but'would better enable DEA to meet its respon-
sibilities in providing better intelligence
support to other agencies, such as Customs.
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Improved analysis would also help resolve
another problem hampering intelligence support
within DEA: the problem of inadequate recognition
by enfcrcement officers of the potential value
of intelligence support. The analyst performs
.the key function of ensuring that information is
evaluated and that the right information reaches
the interested user. Improving the quality
of that analysis helps promote the dialogue
between intelligence producer and intelligence
user which we have described elsewhere as essential
to good intelligence support.
Analytical personnel must be supported by
a well-organized data base, so that their
work may be of maximum effectiveness and timeliness.
The existing and the planned computer-based
information systems in DEA as well as in the
other intelligence producing and using agencies
must be carefully reviewed in order to ensure
that the most efficient system is being devised.
At the same time,. it is recognized that
requirements of security as well as of
covering differing assortments of agency
responsibilities will require some
duplication Of equipment and data bases.
B. Effect of Intelligence from Sensitive Sources on
Prosecution
In some recent cases the need to protect sensitive
intelligence sources and methods has required that
prosecutions of traffickers be dropped. This has
drawn attention to the question of the degree to
which agencies producing such intelligence and supplying
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it to enforcement
agencies should continue such
activity. Primarily, of course, the int6lligence
producing agency in question is the CIA.! Further,
the intelligence at issue here is not the valuable
strategic.and background intelligence CIA produces,
but rather the collection and reporting:of'information
on individual traffickers and suspects.
Any response to this question must distinguish among
users of CIA's product. While prosecutions, by other
agencies may be affected, the operations of the
Customs authorities are not affected by this problem:
Customs can use sensitive information for an arrest
or seizure, and then use the arrest/seizure as the'basis
of an investigation. Customs' authority to'search
at border points is very broad; it is virtually
inconceivable that the source of a tip which led to
the search could be the subject of a discovery motion.
(Should this ever happen, Customs would forego
prosecution in order to protect the source; in any
event, the. contraband will have been taken out of
circulation even though the violator may have to be
released). For other enforcement agencies, the
problem is a more.serious one.
Ethical, statutory, and.case law requirements
force the Federal criminal prosecutor to
disclose certain types of evidence which,
:when disclosed, would joepardize the identify and
continued existence of the source or publicly reveal
a confidential agreement between the United States
and a foreign government. Such revelations could cause
seriousadverse political or national security problems
for either country.
The government's disclosure responsibilities are
discussed briefly below. The impact of. disclosure
on federal prosecutions is discussed thereafter.
.Under the present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 16 provides for disclosure to the defense of
written or recorded statements or confessions made by
the defendant. In addition, Rule 16 permits the
defendant access to books, papers, documents,
tangible objects, buildings or places which are
within the custody or control of the government upon
a showing of materiality to the preparation of his
defense and provided the request for disclosure is
reasonable.
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The Jencks Act (18 U.S.C. 53500) provides that a
statement or report. by a government witness in the
government's possession must be turned over to the
defense following direct examination of the witness
at trial. The Act also applies to a witness'
transcribed grand jury testimony if the witness is
subsequently called as a government witness at
trial. Failure or refusal to produce a Jencks
statement will result in the trial court striking
.the testimony of that witness or declaring a mistrial.
In Brady vs. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83(1963) the United
States Supreme Court held that the prosecution must
turn over evidence favorable to the accused after
a defense request. Non-compliance requires reversal
irrespective of the prosecutor's good or bad faith.,
Brady applies even where the prosecutor was personally
unaware of the exculpatory information Giglio vs.
United States, 405 U.S. 15C(1972)
Circumstances arise where the prosecution must disclose
the identity of an informant or a source of information.
In a pretrial hearing concerning the sufficiency of a
warrant and affidavit, disclosure may become
essential to prevent ,suppression of evidence when
the reliability of the informant is in serious doubt
and independent proof does not establish it.. At
trial, disclosure will be required if the informer's
testimony is relevant and helpful to the defense or
essential to a fair trial CRoviaro vs. United States,
353 U.S..52(1957)2
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S3504 the government has an
obligation to conduct a search of appropriate
agencies to affirm or deny a defendant's claim,
based upon sufficient evidence contained in. an.
affidavit, that he has been the subject of electronic
surveillance. in Aldetman vs. United States,
394 U.S. 165(1969) the Supreme Court held that a
defendant should receive'all surveillance records
as to which he has 'standing, e.g., conversations
to which he was a party and conversations taking
place on his premises. In Toscanino vs.United States,
500 F.2d (1974) the Second Curcuit Court of Appeals
held not only that the Fourth Amendment's protection
against illegal electronic surveillance protects
citizens abroad but also that it protects aliens
illegally monitored in foreign countries by federal
agents. Consequently, the government is obliged to
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supply information concerning electronic surveillance
information to aliens whose conversations were over-
heard in foreign countries by federal agents.
The foregoing illustrate that a defendant may pursue
.a number of courses in order to obtain information
regarding the way in which the government develop
its case. The defendant can challenge each link in
the chain. If a sensitive source is a link, it'is
entirely possible and often highly probable-that
the government will have to produce evidence regarding
his identity and the nature of his agency affiliation.
Once the government decides that it is necessary to
protect the source, - regardless of reason - the defendant
is, in effect, immunized from prosecution as long
as the' need for confidentiality exits. The government
could not risk prosecution for fear of the consequences
of disclosure.
Assuming that government agencies will continue to
use sensitive sources for drug intelligence gathering
purposes, we must look for ways to minimize the
possible detrimental effects of such a procedure.
One method of accomplishing this would be to ensure
that drug intelligence gathering is under the direction
of one agency (DEA). This would reduce the possibility
that the intelligence operations of the various
agencies would conflict and cause a drug prosecution
to be dismissed. The agency charged with overall
responsibility in drug intelligence matters should,
decide how best to handle a developing case. It may,
well be that greater emphasis would be placed on
helping foreign countries build prosecutable cases
against their indigenous violators with American
connections. Foreign'legal systems may not
permit defense' discovery motions and thus
no sensitive source would be divulged. .
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'It is there re recommended that in th long run
DEA should fully develop its own capabilities and
sources. While the advantages of having1ICIA operatives
supplement the efforts of DEA abroad are:,important,
the risk of contaminating cases must be considered
in order that prosecutions not be dropped in the. interest
of protecting CIA's "sensitive sources and methods."
While CIA performed an extremely valuable service
during DEA's early years, this collection effort
should be. phased down concurrently with DEA's ability
to build its own assets. CIA should continue to
.collect strategic intelligence, particularly that
obtainable only through sources'within foreign govern-
ments. However., coordination between CIA and DFA is
essential. Only in this manner can complex cases in-
volving both U.S. and foreign nationals be.kept
prosecutable. in U.S. courts.
The roles of the various agencies overseas involved
in the narcotics: intelligence effort is an area of
extreme sensitivity and complexity. Accordingly,
with respect to the role of the CIA in narcotics
intelligence activities and its relationship''
to DEA, it is recommended that the USIB re-examine
and update its 1972 Intelligence Activities
Against Narcotics and. Dangerous Drugs study and
in conjunction with CCINC make specific operating
recommendations for both the long and short run.
C. Requirements for Development and-Coordination of
Intelligence Capabilities for the Future
Any program for improving our national narcotics
operational-intelligence over the next few years
must include an improvement both in the way individual
agencies perform their intelligence roles and the
ways in which they interact. The improvements we
seek will make themselves felt throughout the
intelligence cycle from collection through
dissemination to enforcement agencies. Substantial
agency disagreement exists concerning the respective
agency roles in the intelligence function.
Accordingly, a separate issue paper has been prepared.
which if resolved, could alter the comments of this
section.
i.ON flEMT1;1
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1. Performance of Individual Agencies*
a. The key to'improving the intelligence'
support to the narcotics program is attracting
and training good personnel, especially. for the
overseas collection assignments and the analyst
functions. With regard to the overseas NIO's
it might be worth considering a separate "foreign
service" corps of officers, distinct from those
on domestic?U.S. duty, since the attraction of
overseas service may draw candidates otherwise
unreachable. Another suggestion which should
be considered is combining the NIO function
with the Special Agent function, if after a.
reasonable period of experience with the present
arrangement such a change appears warranted.
We suggest that after another year has passed
DEA review this matter and assess the performance
of the NIOs.
b. DEA's analytical..resources must be
increased. Failure to do this will cause negative
impact not only upon DEA's own operations
against major traffickers but also upon DEA's
ability to provide needed intelligence support
to.other enforcement agencies (e.g., Customs).
Along with increased analytical-personnel, the
requisite clerical and support personnel must
also be added.
c. Each intelligence-collecting agency .
must exploit its sources fully and for the whole
narcotics intelligence and enforcement community.
Much information becomes available to debriefers
and interrogators that is not now passed along
to potentially interested users. We suggest
that a 'new investigative report form .be devised,
with the participation of representatives of all
user agencies, which would reflect priority'
operational intelligence questions and would
compel the interrogator to cover a broader
range of subjects than his individual investigation
might dictate. Such a form could be divided
-into two parts, with the first-part containing
data on modus operandi, routes, concealment
devices, communications, documentation, etc., which would
automatically becoming available to other agencies
with appropriate caveats. This bureaucratic
device would therefore also serve to improve the
flow of operational information among agencies
involved in the narcotics supply reduction program.
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d.- 'In-addition to the interrogation of
sources cited above, DEA officers ab~oad must
be directed to collect against Customs require-
ments, rather than shift their efforts entirely
away from. interdiction-related intelligence.
The withdrawal of most Customs officials from
overseas .has left an information gap which,
despite DEA claims of having equal "expertise"
to that possessed by the Customs personnel
withdrawn (indeed, DEA points out that the
majority of their personnel overseas are ex-
Customs men), reflects a total lack of'activity
directed against Customs intelligence needs.
(The options paper cited under 33-I-B- is
relevant to this subject.)
e.- The information processing, storage-and
retrieval system within DEA must be studied and.
improved. A filing system established for case
reference must be transformed to meet intelligence
analysis needs. Appropriate systems, both manual
and ADP, should be studied. CIA experts could
give good guidance on this.
f. There must be a recognition on the part
of DEA management-that enforcement and intel-
.ligence elements, both in the field and at
headquarters work more closely. Field elements must be
made responsive to Headquarters decisions and
communications. It other words, management must
re-assert its authority over. its field elements,
and see.that the Office of Intelligence needs
.are being.given appropriate attention by enforce-
ment elements (just as intelligence must work in
support -of enforcement).
2. Interagency Relations and Cooperation
a. .'.Ideally, something very basic must be
attempted to remove the causes of the competitive
strife among the agencies nvolved in this program,
primarily between Customs and DEA. -The committees
of the Congress-.who pass on the agencies'.budgets
()yr.i _. Al
f.
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e. 'Provision must be made for Customs
officers to be granted direct access1to sources
of operational information for follow-up
questioning on points of particular interest.
in cases involving sources turned over
to DEA by Customs. The results of the recent
DEA memorandum to its field elements calling
for Customs access should be assessed after an
appropriate interval to ensure that it is being
complied with in the field.
3. Basic Requirements
DEA (subject to the overall guidance of-.the CCINC
with regard to foreign activity, and of the
Tyler Group with regard to domestic) should take
the lead in coordinating with agencies which collect
against the following requirements by mounting anti-
.-narcotics intelligence collection operations.
All collection agencies should use the list as
.a guide in screening information they collect
as a by-product of their other activity, so that
this type of operational intelligence will be
disseminated to users.
Information on individuals:
Biographic (Name, date of birth, race,
sex, height, weight, other descriptions,
address and telephone number, identi-
f' t'
i
Criminal record
ca ion numbers--social security
number, drivers license, passport, NCIC)
Associates and Contacts (with bio)
Narcotics activities and modus operandi
Travel patterns and routes
.Vehicles, ships, planes used
.Language capability
Financial data (including bank accounts)
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T"W
b. Production
Identify production cycles (e.g.,
locations where specific plants
are grown; growing and harvest seasons).
Describe production methods (e.g.,
equipment needed, seed supplies, method
of collecting raw materials).
Identify the owners and/or financiers
of narcotic crop producing areas'.
Describe eradication efforts; assess
their effectiveness.
c.' Processing/Laboratories
Identify marihuana packaging sites.
Identify the personalities involved
in the purchase and use of precursors.
How ar_e precursors purchased, protected,
stored, and shipped? By whom?
Identify the sources of precursors
and. other items necessary for the
processing of. narcotics.
Identify laboratory chemists involved
in the production of illicit drugs.
Identify the characteristics, if any,
of varioug types'of laboratories
which make-them susceptible to
identification.
Identify the reasons laboratories are
moved. What happens to laboratory
equipment when not being used?
Are diluents or cutting-agents ever
added to a specific drug in a foreign
..country prior to entry into the U.S.?
At what level? Where? What materials
are used? Who adds the diluents?
When are the diluents added?
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d. Caches
Identify storage sites. for various
drugs and narcotics; both raw and
finished products.-
Proximity of storage sites to major
urban or port areas with connecting
international transportation facilities.
- Definitive listing of major inter-
national carriers and/or routes which
service urban areas in or near
storage.sites.
- Can all narcotics be stored? Which
narcotics deteriorate? What is done
about narcotics that deteriorate?
How does this affect the trafficker's
method of operating?
e. Organizations
- Identify the role played by a
particular trafficker/group vis-
a-vis other individuals/groups.
Identify organizational trends in.
trafficking. What causes traffickers
to operate independently? In Groups?.
In splinter groups? As entrepreneurs?
Identify rivalries between traffickers/
groups. How are these problems handled?
Identify methods groups use in
controlling/e.liminating competition.'
Identify role played by particular
groups, ethnic groups and traffickers
(e.g., some are traditionally. suppliers,
others are couriers, etc.).
Identify-sub-groups, satellite groups
and specialists and the roles they play.
Describe the ability and capability of
a trafficker or group to provide,
deliver, and produce narcotics.
Ct1NF DENT1At.
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- -Describe the relationships among
various traffickers. Is there any
common bond or unity among traffickers?
Do they owe allegiance to any higher
authority? Are there different levels
of traffickers? How is this determined?
Are there gang wars for control of
production or the market? Is there
competition for base and raw materials?
If there are conflicts, how are they
resolved? What kinds of decisions do
traffickers have to make and how. do
they make them? What do they worry
about? What is important to.them?
How do they go about evaluating their
operations and personal situations as
circumstances change?
f. Subversives
- Identify narcotics trafficking
activity associated with subversive
and terrorist activities.
Method of Operation
Identify the diversion of legally
produced materials into illegal
channels.
Identify characteristics of methods
used by traffickers, groups and
couriers in the transportation and
concealment of illicit narcotic
.substances which make them susceptible
to discovery.
Identify' traffickers' methods of
protecting each other and cohorts
who have been caught.
Identify other criminal (non-'narcotic)
activity on the part of traffickers.
Identify security measures taken by
traffickers to preclude rip-offs.
- Identify the methods used by U.S.
buyers to contact foreign sources of
supply. How do sources of supply
find buyers?
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Describe how connections are made and
transactions are negotiated.
Are transactions dependent on the
personalities involved (e.g., level
of importance of principals;
nationality; established traffickers
vs. new entrepreneurs)?
Identify methods or means used by
traffickers for security and protection
from arrest or harrassment or dis-
covery from other traffickers or
criminals.
How do traffickers protect themselves
from customers who may be informants?
Are couriers used more than once?
Under what circumstances?
Describe the relations among various
traffickers. To what extent, if any,
is the traffic organized? Are
trafficking groups formed ad hoc
or do they have any degree of
permanence?
Are there 'different types of customers
in relation to their security, reliability,
value as a customer? How would different
categories of, customers be described?
h.'-Neutralization
Identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities
of traffickers and groups of traffickers
for legal prosecution; for enforcement
activities; for infiltration; for
disruption; for action by other agencies,
governments and jurisdictions.
:identify means for introducing
collectors of information into the
groups (e.g. informants, undercover
personnel, technical equipment).
Identify potential sources of
information within groups; identify
potential witnesses.
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Identify from among the recognized
narcotics traffickers, those most.,
promising for further investigation
and ultimate neutralization either
through prosecution, conviction or
sentencing (or other actions
on the part of foreign governments);
disruption by seizures; disruption
by cutting off supplies or narcotics.
Identify conditions requiring
immediate. and prompt investigative
and enforcement action.
Identify conditions requiring long-
term information gathering prior to
the possibility of enforcement action/
resolution.
i. Infrastructure/Personalities.
Identify owners of production areas
(poppy, coca and marihuana fields, etc.).
Identify.Class I violators as targets
for intensified intelligence and
enforcement activity.
Identify chemists, sources of.financial
support, attorneys., bail bonds persons,
sources of supply, financiers, couriers/
groups, stolen or false document
specialists, domestic distributors,
importers, enforcers.,
j. Communications
Identify methods of communications
used by.major traffickers (e.g.,
codes, terminology, language, radios
(frequencies, hours of transmission),
letters, telephones, telegraphs,
carrier.pigeon).. ?
Describe communications security used
by traffickers or the non-use of .
security .(e.g., those who. talk freely
over telephones).
;ONEIJENT A!
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Finances
of funds in narcotics tra.risactions.
Identify'the methods for the handling
Identify other means of payment for
narcotics (e.g., exchange of one
drug for another, exchange of
weapons, gold, precious metals,
precious stones, strategic materials).
Identify the price of drugs.. Are there
different price levels for a specific
drug? What is the basis for the
difference and how is it determined?
What are.the going standard prices?
How. much leeway is there in negotiations
over price.?
What do traffickers do with their
profits?
Concealment/Transportation .
Identify methods of concealment
used in the shipping of narcotics
(at all stages of the traffic)..'
Identify and describe methods of
.transportation at. various stages from
production to ultimate distribution
(-e.g., vehicles, vessles, aircrafts,
locations of 'airstrips, identity of
businesses used in the transportation,
pilots).
Describe transportation security used.
by traffickers.
Identify routes, frequency of shipments,
and patterns. .
What -is the easiest way to bring
drugs into the U.S? Why?
Identify major Free Zone areas
which could be utilized as transhipment
points.
t;7NFLUENTIM
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Identify international firms with
U.S. connections utilizing Free Zone
Areas.
- Identify existing carnets available
which provide maximum potential for
smuggling activity.
- Identify shipping methods -- e.g.,
containers -- which provide maximum
potential for smuggling of drugs.
Identify businesses used as covers
for the narcotics traffickers.
Identify ownership of businesses which
lend themselves to smuggling operations --
e.g., bottling, canning -- owned or
controlled by known or suspected
smugglers.
Identify hotels, bars, restaurants,
night clubs, etc.,?frequented by
major traffickers.
Identify rest and recreation sites
frequented, owned, or used by
traffickers.
n. Political/Economic Support
Identify banking or other financial
institutions suspected of underwriting
narcotics transactions.'.
- Identify international businesses or
financial institutions having contacts
with major traffickers.
Report any information indicating
that major traffickers are being
aided by foreign governments or by
officials of those governments.
What form does this aid take?
4. Other
a. The pattern of light sentences of
offenders reduces any incentive arrested
suspects might have to cooperate in a full
debriefing. As the DEA Acting Administrator
believes heavier sentences imposed upon
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offenders would stimulate more cooperation
with enforcement officers and inr'rease the
amount and quality of intelligence obtained
from these potentially valuable sources.
b. Court and legislative actions
affecting these programs will have to be
-watched closely during the next few years, since
agency actions which improve the sharing of
intelligence informationand promote effective
enforcement efforts may-increasingly be
restricted under laws (and court inter-
pretations of laws) protecting privacy of
individuals. Regulation of the flow of
official reporting and record keeping may result.
III. STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
A. Assessment of Current Capabilities
1.. Current Capabilities for Collection
DEA is inadequately equipped for the collection
of the foreign strategic intelligence needed.
In part, this reflects the heavy demands
which domestic enforcement responsibilities
impose upon DEA's limited manpower, and the
resulting imbalance between DEA's relatively
-large allocation of resources to domestic
.operations. In part, it also reflects the
fact that in DEA the-strategic collection
responsibility falls largely upon the same
shoulders as the criminal investigation:
On 'the special agent, rather than on resources
devoted to intelligence collection. The
gradual-development of the NIO system is
seen as potentially helpful in resolving
this difficulty..
For' the reasons stated above, DEA's strategic
intelligence effort satisfies neither its
internal needs nor those of the U.S. Govern-
ment narcotics control effort. Precise
strategic requirements must therefore be met by
other intelligence collection agencies,
including CIA. The DEA requirements
staff must show both greater perception of
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-the kind.of guidance required by collectors
and of the needs of DEA and the U.S. Govern-.
ment's policy-level decision makers.
Experience in this area -- new to DEA's
law enforcement-oriented organization --
and additional resources will contribute to
a more rapid development of DEA's
collection requirements system.
The Group believes'that it is DEA,as the
agency charged (under CCINC guidance) with
the overall direction of. the U.S. Government's
anti-narcotics strategy and planning, which
must both develop a perception of its strategic
intelligence needs (appropriately through
its office of Policy and Evaluation)..
and articulate these needs to the intelligence
collectors via its Requirements Staff.
2. Current Capabilities for Strategic
Intelligence Analysis .
DEA's in-house personnel assigned to strategic
intelligence analysis (9 persons and clerical
su port) are inadequate to the task of
andlina the high volume of incoming infor-
mation, largely contained in operational
rather than strategic reporting. They are.
therefore compelled to fall back upon
reviewing operational intelligence analyses
and extrapolating from them.. DEA also turns
to CIA for support in this area. CIA, if
provided with both"precise'.requirements and a
reasonable flow of reporting from DEA
channels to supplement its own reporting,
performs very useful strategic intelligence
analysis.
3. Current capabilities for strategic intelligence
production .
The production of strategic intelligence has.
suffered from a lack of effective central
direction of the effort, as well as inadequate
al-location of resources within DEA . CIA
has considerable production capability if
.it is advised of precisely what is needed,
but CIA has been receiving little by way
of requests from DEA on this type of intel-
ligence.
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DEA recognizes that its "capabilities for
collection, analysis and production in
the strategic area are very modest indeed."
It.als.o recognizes that "the consumers of
this type of intelligence at the policy
--level of government have needs considerably
greater than what they are receiving."
But:, the problem is not merely one of assigning
.more analysts to the Strategic Intelligence
Staff. DEA itself must, as the lead agency
in. the Federal anti-narcotics program, provide
the leadership to its own production unit
as well as coordinate with those in other
agencies capable of effective work of this
kind. This requires that DEA offices outside
of-the-Office of Intelligence (such as the
Office of Planning and Evaluation) become in-
. vohved. These outside offices should have
good ideas as to what the most pressing strategic
intelligence needs are at any given time.
B. Requirements for Development and Coordination
of Strategic Intelligence Capabilities
DEA must under appropriate CCINC supervision,
:provide the leadership in the foreign strategic
intelligence area which is currently lacking.
Its own Administrator and staff are the key users
of such intelligence,. and are in the best position
to know what the system should be required to
provide at any given time.
However, DEA should not attempt to do the entire
job alone. Once more precise requirements are
articulated, other agencies with good capabilities
in this area should.be asked for their contributions.
CIA, for example, should continue to collect and
assess strategic intelligence.
1. Interagency Coordination
.DEA should also coordinate, but not attempt
to develop the,capability to carry out
alone, the process of producing strategic
estimates. CIA and other agencies should be
brought into such enterprises, when needs
are clearly perceived and expressed. Again,
.it'is DEA's own leadership which should
provide the initiative in calling for
estimates in support of policy decision-making.
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An Intelligence Estimates Board has been
(Foreign and Domestic) established within
DEA. The purpose of the Board is to focus
insights from various disciplines on major
intelligence questions-and situations requiring
authoritative assessments. To assess the
impact of foreign political and military develop-
ments that might significantly affect DEA's
presence and effectiveness in critical over-
seas areas, an appropriate intelligence community
committee and the aegis of USIB should be
.considered.
2. Basic'Strategic Collection Requirements
What. changes are occurring in the
U.S. addict population?
What are the current patterns of drug
abuse?
What measure do we have of availability
and price of drugs?
What is the relative availability,
in each major drug use area, of drugs
from each of the various foreign
sources?
Through what import centers are
'drugs currently entering the U.S.?
What are current ethnic patterns
in drug trafficking and distribution?
What are the distribution routes of
illicit drugs within the U.S..?
What is the overall current impact of
enforcement programs on traffickers
and trafficking patterns?
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b. International
What are the current and potential
foreign.source and levelsiof production
of narcotics and dangerous drugs?
What are the current international
trafficking patterns in narcotics
and dangerous drugs?
What are the international political
factors which may be involved w.ith
drug trafficking or which may affect
U.S.:counteractions against traffic?
To what extent will foreign. governments
fulfill their commitments for narcotics
control?
In which countries will the presence
of.corrupt or weak officials in the
government adversely affect narcotics
control?
and into illicit drug conspiracies,
and which domestic U.S. and foreign.
financial institutions are involved?
What are current drug abuse trends
in the foreign countries on the CCINC
Priority Country List? Include data
on availability, price and purity
.of illicit drugs in these countries,
?an&'the impact of international
sanctions or changes in drug enforcement
procedures and national laws directed
at drug abuse.
- What are the currency flows within
What scientific and medical innovations
have a bearing on the production,
.availability, effects and profitability
of known and. potential illicit narcotics
and dangerous drugs?
What are the anti-narcotic plans and
intentions of the priority countries
designated by the CCINC?
f flNF'lf FNTIA1
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What are the. capabilities and per-
formance of the priority ountries
in carrying out anti-narcotics programs?
To what degree are these anti-
narcotic activities supported by
politically influential groups
within the designated countries?
What role do licit or illicit narcotics
play in the designated countries
economics?
Does the existence of corruption
.within these countries inhibit or
prevent effective anti-narcotic programs?
How willing are these governments to
cooperate with U.S. efforts to expose
and prosecute producers, traffickers
.and their collaborators?
I.V. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
Caution must:be used in reliance upon quantitative.
measures of any sort in measuring intelligence
:.achievements. Too often, management has read into
indices which supposedly relate intelligence
to operations something other than what those
indices actually measured. Sheer numbers of reports
seldom indicate the precision, credibility, or
utility of the sources employed. One is,
therefore,-obliged to depend upon a combination of
qualitative judgments: some from'within the collection
apparatus' itself, others.from the perspective of the
user.
A. Identification of Methods
1.. In-house Management Supervision
Collectors of sensitive intelligence protect
their sources and methods from disclosure
in order to remain effective. For this
reason, even those who receive and use the
intelligence produced are often left unaware
of details of the collection process (exceptions
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occur if such precise background is essential
for them to know in order for the intelligence
itself to be of value). For this reason,
a certain amount of the judgment concerning
the effectiveness of the intelligence effort
must be performed within the collecting
agency. This constant-internal (intra-agency)
assessment is an important responsibility
of management. Management is in the unique position
to know the difficulty of the job, the
relevant operational problems and circum-
stances, and the effort being applied toward
its accomplishment.
2. Judgment by Users of O erational Intelligence
From the perspective of the overall Federal
drug supply reduction program, however,
there are other and, in some ways, more
important, methods'of monitoring.intelligence.
achievements. Of course,' success or failures
in reducing narcotics supplies may or may not
reflect significant intelligence achievements..
The users of operational intelligence (primarily
n
l
a
a
ysts and enforcement officers) are in the
best position to judge the degree to which
-intelligence has contributed to the achievement
of their missions.. In the intelligence'..
community, these judgments are usually
communicated to management and to collectors
in-two ways: (a) in formally-designed
questionnaires of one sort or another
(DEA currently uses a transmittal form
requesting customer evaluation of the
accompanying intelligence report within
sixty days), and (b) in the form of feedback
from users to collectors of the kind that
takes place informally and frequently in an
effective intelligence support operation.
3. A.Note on Strategic Intelligence:''
In the case of strategic intelligence
collection, the key measure of achievement
.is whether the user -- in this case the.
policy planner -- has the data base he
requires for decision-making. He is the
best judge of this, and no measure that
relies on the judgments of others is
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valid. As with other types of intelligence,
regular dialogue back and forth between
those who. produce and those who are strategic
intelligence not only improves the
intelligence support to the planners but
can provide an important measure of
intelligence achievement.
Assessment of Methods, and Proposed Improvements
The most important improvement that could be
made in the ways in which the above functions
are performed would be to improve the relationship
between those who provide .intellig