LETTER TO MR. WILLIAM E. COLBY FROM GEORGE J. KEEGAN, JR.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000200150024-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: October 8, 1974
• Content Type: LETTER

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTER-3 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
8Oct1974
Mr. William E. Colby
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
The Air Force is most pleased with your even-handed and objective
approach to the estimates of BACKFIRE capabilities and intended use.
My objective during the past two and one-half years has been to bring
about a wider recognition of the engineering studies dealing with
BACKFIRE's performance capabilities. That has now been achieved.
Intended use is another matter. The Air Force position has been that
design capabilities and previous experience patterns will drive the
question. BACKFIRE will likely be used - as have its predecessor
bomber aircraft - in a variety of missions and roles, of which the
intercontinental is but one. The Soviets urgently need replacement
or augmentation of the BADGER, BLINDER, BEAR, and BISON bombers.'
They require a new tanker which from all indications to date will likely
be the IL-76, and they need an export bomber.
My judgment is that the BACKFIRE in time will likely meet many of the
above needs.
Low-level, peripheral, anti-naval, intercontinental, reconnaissance,
and electronic warfare missions will probably be of primary importance.
I suspect that the anticipated production run is probably understated
by a factor of one or two - unless the bomber develops some undesirable
quirks.
Of continuing concern to me - and I am certain to you - is the amount
of "push" effort which is required to get a simple matter of capability
analysis reflected in an NIE. It has taken three years of intensive
initiative effort, considerable analysis, and a costly number of man
years to make the community see the light. Of equal concern to me is
the type of contract effort to study the BACKFIRE system which was
assigned Had that effort gone unchallenged, an
extremely misleading assessment of the BACKFIRE would have been promul-
gated. In fact, initial analysis was quite unprofessional,
replete with error, and apparently based on less than adequate input data.
USAF review(s) completed.
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My experience with Soviet ICBM/MIRV accuracy predictions during the
past two years has been equally unsettling. Again, considerable
"push" has been required to make the estimators understand the full
range of problems associated with CEP calculations. Today, we have
a much better understanding of where the Soviets stand accuracy-wise
relative to our limited ability to make finite determinations of
accuracy.
The current -drafting effort on NIE ll-3/8-71 has been going on for
many weeks and it has been uphill all the way on the portion drafted
by State. Had my people agreed with their draft - I suspect the final
product would have been rather far removed from reality. The writing,
analysis, and cliche abounding "cut and paste" text left much to be
desired. A working knowledge of Soviet strategic literature and policy
documents was certainly not in evidence during the first difficult few
weeks of drafting.
Having been deeply impressed by Kohler's and Goure's recent book on
The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Strategy - certainly the most
authoritative and thoroughly documented work of its kind available -
we invited the authors to meet with the State drafters. Regrettably,
scholarship gave way to polemics and the meeting achieved very little;
however, much to my distress, I learned from the authors that a CIA
representative had earlier recommended against publication of what
is now recognized as the best study of its kind ever written.
While I have major reservations about the latest NIE 11-3/8-74 draft,
it does finally represent a much-improved product.
I think there is much that is still fundamentally wrong with the
estimative process - especially with perceptions of Soviet policy,
strategic objectives, and intent.
Fortunately, many of your estimators are easier to deal with, more
open, and less polemical about their traditional commitment to an
"institutionalized" point of view. You are directly responsible for
that, and rest assured that most of us are extremely grateful.
But it does take altogether too much effort - at my level at least -
to keep the estimative juggernaut closer to the mark of reality.
If Wohlstetter is right - and I believe he is -we are not getting
better fast enough - in spite of the significant "attitudinal" changes
you have brought about.
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Needless to say, we will keep on trying however, the wherewithal at
the Service level is fast shrinking.
Again, my deepest thanks for your most even-handed approach to BACKFIRE
and ICBM accuracy.
Warmest= egards
,/ ' GEORG "J. KEEGAN, JR
''Major General, USAF
ACS/Intelligence
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