CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T01146A000900160001-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
17
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 22, 2006
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 22, 1952
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T01146A000900160001-6.pdf | 893.04 KB |
Body:
Approved For W ease 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T01146 p09001660/14'
SECRET
22 April 1952
OCI No. 5164
Copy No. 266
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re-
ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office
of Current Intelligence.
DIA and PACOM review(s) completed.
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC9 SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
GENERAL
25X1
1. Agreement reached on Chinese Communist-Czech cooperation:
On 6 4ay the zec de ega.tion now n eiping wil sign agree
ments on postal and telecommunications links and cultural
and scientific cooperation, according to Radio Prague. The
postal and
Comment: This latest postal and telecommunications
agreemen is further evidence of the importance attached by
the Soviet Union to linking the Chinese Communist communica-
tions network with that of Eastern Europe. The Peiping
government signed postal and telecommunications agreements
with North Korea in December 1949, with the USSR in February
1950, with Poland in January 1951 and with East Germany in
October 1951.
2. Mrs. Kora to visit Japanese war graves in Irkutsk:
Mrs. ura, a apanese Diet member who a tended he oscow
Economic Conference, is leaving for the Caucasus and Ukraine
areas. She expects to return to Moscow about 1 May, and will
then travel to Irkutsk to see Japanese war graves, according
to a local report not yet passed by the censors. Mrs. Kora
again said she did not think the Soviets
25X1A Japanese prisoners of war.
Comment: By linking the POW issue with Mrs. Kora's
visit, Soviet officials probably hope to capitalize further
on her favorable attitude to help allay Japanese antagonism
regarding this controversial issue.
The scheduled return of Mrs. Kora to Moscow about 1 May
suggests that this date may have been selected to enable her
to witness the impressive May Day demonstrations and to
interview Stalin, as she has requested.
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3. Soviet collective-farm abuses condemned- A 19 April
editorial in av a entitle uar Ong t e nterests of the
Collective Farmconomy" referred to instances of "criminal
pilfering" and squandering of collective-farm property in
various districts which "grievously harm" the consolidation
and further development of the agricultural economy.
Some party and local officials are said to have in-U
fringed the agricultural charter by exploiting their positions
to coerce farmers into handing over farm produce either free
of charge or at reduced prices. Some senior secretaries of
rayon party committees have already been expelled from the.
part and are now facing trial.
25X1
Comment- The agricultural artel charter, the basic law
of co ective-farm life, was established by government decree
in 1946. It aimed at preventing abuses that might prove
harmful to the collective-farm system and dangerous to the
entire Soviet program of socialist construction.
The present campaign to eliminate pilfering and
squandering on the collective farms is believed to be part
of a general administrative effort to reinforce the neglected
provisions of the basic law of 1946.
4. USSR not expected to play host to UNGA session: Ac-
cording to the A represen a ive in Moscow, t K6 press story
alleging that the USSR would invite the UN to hold a General
Assembly session in Moscow was based on information from
Soviet spokesmen. The AP correspondent cites suggestions
by Soviet foreign trade and press officials and reports that
certain chiefs of mission,.including the Swedish, also be-
lieve that a GA session in Moscow is likely.
25X1,
25X1
The US Embassy in Moscow is not inclined to attach any
special significance to this story.
I I
Comment: On previous occasions Soviet spokesmen have
informally and evasively claimed willingness to hold a
session in Moscow. Although, the Soviet Government per-
mitted the greatest influx of non-Communist foreigners in
recent years for the Moscow Economic Conference, the Kremlin
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did not permit the unbiased reporting, unrestricted
activities or extensive press accreditation that would be
necessitated by a UN meeting.
EASTERN EUROPE
6. B-29--type aircraft sighted over Hungary- On 16 April, the American .Air A tac e in Hungary sig ed three B-29
type aircraft in the area of Tokol airfield. The aircraft
were at an a' RnA feet and climbing in a northerly
25X1 direction.
Comment; No Soviet TU-4 bomber or TU?70 transport air-
craft are Known to be based in Hungary or in any other
Eastern European Satellite. The observed aircraft may have
been on a practice cross-country flight or returning Soviet
personnel to the USSR following the 4 April Liberation Day
celebration.
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FAR EAST
Communist-front Japanese student groups schedule strikes:
The Communist-front National Student Self-Government Federa-
tion, Zengakuren, issued a 14 April directive ordering its
members to stage nation-wide strikes on 28 April and 1 May,
according to CINCFE. The strikes will be a protest against
the government-proposed subversive activities prevention bill.
CINCFE comments that the strike may succeed in rallying
a considerable number of students since the proposed bill
indirectly involves strengthening olice authority, which
most students bitterly oppose.
Comment: Zengakuren is Japan's largest student group
with a membership estimated at 100,000 - 150,000. The
proposed government bill provides excellent'material for
protest because its provisions could theoretically be
perverted into the strict student supervision of the pre-
occupation era.
By selecting. the date of 28 April, Zengakuren may
attempt to present the strike as a protest against the peace
treaty, scheduled to become effective on that date.
8. Japan expected to maintain controls on exports to China:
Despi a pressures from business groups and some members
the Diet, the Japanese Government will maintain its present
controls on exports until a truce is achieved in Korea,
according to Department of State officials in Tokyo. The
Japanese Government also believes that COCOM is too
European in focus and too closely related to NATO in member-
ship to serve its interests best. Japan is inclined to
favor a separate Far Eastern arr
trade with the Communist areas.
Comment: The Yoshida government, already under opposi-
tion attack- for its China policy, will find the present
SCAP-directed controls politically difficult to maintain for
an extended period after the peace treaty becomes effective.
Japan's dependence on the West for its three principal
imports--food, cotton and petroleum--assures its cooperation
in export controls, but the government eventually can be
expected to relax controls on items not being embargoed by
its European competitors.
25X1
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Bawdwin Mines may reopen in Burma: Rail service
between Rangoon and Mandalay has been -uninterrupted for
three weeks, and therefore the Burma Corporation has
initiated action to reopen the Bawdwin Mines in the Shan
25X1A States. F-- I
Comment: Before the war, the Bawdwin Mines were large
producers of lead, silver, zinc, copper, nickel, gold and
antimony. In recent years, small amounts of ore have been
shipped from stocks on hand, but resumption of production
and smelting have been held up by interrupted communications
and insurgency in the area.''
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12. Indonesian official sees possibility of increased trade
with ov e r ito The -ndones an Minister o. Econom e
Economic Conference9 "very good possibilities exist" for
4- 4
o
i
U
n,
n
e
expanded trade between Indonesia and the Sov
a and the Eastern European countries.
25X1
Comment: The Indonesian delegation to the Moscow
Economic Conference reportedly emphasized that the diffi-
culties of Indonesian rubber producers result from American
"price-depressing tactics," and offered "unlimited quanti-
ties" of rubber to the Soviet Union.
In March, an Indonesian official discussed expansion of
trade agreements in Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia-.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
25X1
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14.
Trouble in Morocco reported imminent: Well-placed
military sources have told the America n Consul in Rabat to
expect "serious trouble" in Morocco shortly.
Other sources, however, have su plied no recent
corroborating information. 25X1
Comment: Despite frequent warnings of a "general
uprising" in French Morocco, there is no evidence that the
Moroccans can stage a full-scale, coordinated revolt.
French military authorities probably could maintain control
in the event of sporadic disturbances in urban areas.
The young nationalists are rowing
impatient with the present policy of restraint established
by their more moderate leaders. The Moroccan Communists'
capabilities for taking full advantage of the situation are
restricted by recent French security measures.
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WESTERN EUROPE
25X1
Slovenes reportedly desert Stalinist arty in Trieste:
American o c a s n r este ave 1912:12,17-ea n ormat on tFiat
form Communist Party has
i
C
n
om
the reported schism in the pro-
etmembers to local
resulted in the defection of many Slovene
Slovene parties, including the P O
This Slovene minority in the party has apparently been
estranged by party chief Vidali?s pro-Italian election pronounce-
ments in Italy and by the party?s pa.rtic in the pro-
olitical strike in late March.
Italian 25X1
Comment: The recent upsurge of f Italian rift
Tries a as undoubtedly contributed in the pro?Cominform party since the Tito-Cominform split.
American officials in Trieste received reliable reports in early
April that the Communist-led port workers in Trieste were greatly
displeased with Vidali?s "irredentist" statements.
Although Slovene elements fear
its new election platform supporting i
suggests that their fears are not justified. Othl.romeasuresken
designed to heal the breach in party
by Vidali since his return from Italy.
16. European Defense Community conference agrees to early May
or signature o t e European
deadl nee n view o t e urgency
e ense Community treaty, the conferees in Paris have agreed on
a deadline of 3 May for the completion of their work.
The French delegate suggests that the treaty itself be
forwarded to the governments by that date. He believes that
signing finished
scheduledtime
any remaining work the
and the could
mmeeting protocols
f for
for tehe final r
25X1 17'May.
Comment: The United States had originally proposed 9 May
as the e1ine for signing the treaty,
Most of the Defense Community members agree that the un-
resolved issues are minor and could be covered in a protocol
after the signing. The German financial contribution is the
principal problem blocking complete agreement.
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17. East German propaganda reflects unusual control by. USSR:
The pr nc pa. t eme o East erman Deputy Premier Walter richt's
speech on 16 April was a call for mass strikes and demonstrations
by West Germans for a peace treaty, as the "hour of decision for
the German people has come."
American officials in Berlin believe this call suggests
that the Communists may go beyond merely fostering "unity of
action"; strikes instigated by such organizations as the Free
German Youth could result.in clashes with the police. The
American officials also believe that the Communists have been
directed to avoid giving any impression that the USSR plans
drastic counteractions if the contractual agreement is ratified.
The war-danger theme, they believe, is to be used only as a
warning against the possibility of aggressive actions by the
West.
On 17 March East Berlin propagandists were instructed that
the campaign for a peace treaty was the paramount task. They
were directed to avoid discussions of militarism, German
boundaries and Germany's development after all-German elections,
and were accused of failure to clarify for the 9o ulation the
imperialist and just wars.
25X1
18, Soviet authorities reported extending land reforms in
1 ave eased ustrian
Austrian ustrian tenants w o s nce
es ates which were seized by the Soviet occupation forces or held
by them as German assets are reportedly being evicted in "whole-
sale" numbers. Tenants who have refused to associate themselves
with Communist activities have allegedly lost not only homes and
land,.but also livestock _purchased with Austrian governmental
assistance.
Comment: The Russians' control and exploitation of the
275,0 acres of land they hold in eastern Austria have elicited
repeated complaints from the Austrian Government. The extent
of alleged "land reforms" has not, however, been established,
recent publicity being primarily concerned with the Esterhazy
estates seized by the Russians when the family properties in
Hungary were expropriated. Efforts to distribute these lands
have heretofore been frustrated by strong Austrian opposition
and by the general suspicion that titles so acquired would be
invalid.
25X1
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19. Chief of BW propaganda mission penalized by Austrian Govern-
ment: Dr. . Heinrich andweiner, , who hareturned from Korea,
suspended on 17 April by the Austrian Government from his
position as professor of international law at the University of
Graz. Dr. Brandweiner, who used a leave of absence from the
university to accept the post of chairman of the International
Association of Democratic.La.wyers' commission investigating
biological warfare charges in Korea, has been under public fire
for misuse of his official capacity to further propaganda charges.
25X1
20. Italian Communists abate germ warfare campaign: The Com-
munisf o o~ g l warfare campaign seems to be tapering off,
apparently because of a recent dispatch from North Korea written
by Wilfred Burchett and printed in the Italian Communist daily
Unita, The article states that the BW battle has been won by
tie-TTorth Korean medical personnel and adds, "We can now state
there is no epidemic among the population or the troops."
25X1
Comment: The Italian Communist biological warfare campaign
had previously tapered off toward the end of March, but was
vigorously revived early in April,
LATIN. AMERICA
25X1
21, Argentine delegates to Moscow conference depart for China:
Four rgent ne delegates to the Moscow Economic Conference
reportedly are en route to China to study the possibilities
of expanding international trade. The chief delegate states
that he had exploratory trade talks with delegations repre-
senting the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East and West
Germany, and France. He said that trade treaties with these
countries would enable Argentina to purchase machinery, gasoline,
petroleum and hydroelectric equipment. Argentina would sell
wnnl- h des., cottonseed oil, and casein. 25X1
25X1A
Comment: The most immediate gain Argentina can hope to
derive Tram the projected trip is publicity for its independent
attitude vis-a-vis the United States, in support of its "third-
position." Argentina now lacks an exportable surplus rather
than export markets, and it is doubtful that it can find more
liberal credit offers in the Soviet Orbit than in the West.
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After World War II, Argentina developed significant but
not major trade with eastern European countries in order to
dispose of large exportable surpluses and obtain some manu-
factured goods not readily available in the West.
22. Brazilian press reports Orbit-Brazil trade possibilities
arising from Moscow conom c Conlerence: t ma Hora, a news-
paper reportedly close to the administration, lastweek headlined
a reported USSR offer of 1,000,000 tons of wheat for Brazilian
products including rice and rubber. The generally pro-US and
conservative 0 Jornal printed on its front page a. Reuter's
dispatch from oscow quoting the Brazilian delegation on com-
mercial offers from China, the USSR, East Germany, Rumania,
Poland, and Hungary. 0 Jornal describes a three-way trade in
which Brazil would sell ext es to China. and receive wheat from
the USSR. Other reported trade arrangements would involve the
sale of Brazilian cotton, textiles, rice, vegetable oils, hides,
and industrial diamonds for wheat, petroleum, tractors, loco-
motives, paper, synthetic rubber manufacturing equipment, and
coals
The US Embassy in Rio comments that, despite the impos-
sibility of the Orbit's executing all such offers, the reports
are likely to have some effect on Brazil which is having diffi-
culty finding markets for the .products the Orbit offers to buy
and with exchange roblems.in connection with the desired imports.
25X1
Comment. Anticipated expenditures for 1952 wheat imports
alone equal 180 million dollars, and the nonavaila.bility of
Argentine wheat has already created a serious dollar shortage
in Brazil. A concrete offer along the lines of the cited ar-
rangements might well have some appeal in Brazil.
23. Deteriorating economic situation in Paraguay affecting
olit ca stab ity. Tfie rising cost of living and food
with the Para-
ti
f
i
on
ac
s
s ortages are a increasing public dissat
guayan Government. The army is believed generally united
behind President Chaves. The government, aware of the
political implications of the economic situation, and, "sparked
"
is considering major
by the President and Chief of Police,
economic changes. Government preoccupation with the proximity
of the recent Bolivian coup is evident; the Chief of Police
states that the coup came at a most inopportune time for Para-
25X1
aiinv In view of the deteriorating economic situation.
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Comment: Generally the political and economic situation
is more favorable to revolutionary attempts now than it was a
year ago. Tension can be expected to increase with political
machinations in anticipation of the coming presidential election.
Maladministration, increased graft,and corruption have caused
growing discontent, even, reportedly, in the higher army echelons.
24. Bolivian Cabinet rejects immediate nationalization of mines:
The new o ivian Cabinet has rejected immediate nationalization
of mines, as demanded by Juan Lechin, Minister of Mines and
Petroleum and leader of the important mine workers' federation.
The cabinet has decided to adopt President Paz Estenssoro's plan
to study the whole problem, meanwhile exacting a higher share
25X1 of exchange receipts.
Comment: While Paz has approved the principle of nation-
alization-,-Ea would prefer to proceed cautiously, especially in
view of the still pending tin negotiations with the United States,
His stand, however, may be undermined by Lechin and other extreme
nationalists who continue to inflame public opinion by demanding
immediate nationalization.
Strong pressure will also be exerted. by the Central Organi-
zation of Bolivian Workers, which has just been formed to unify
workers "in the fight for nationalization of mines and railroads,
and agrarian reform." Lechin and the Minister of Labor are the
top officials of this organization.
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TOP SECRET
22 April 1952
CIA No. 49622
Copy No, 4 6
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release - 01146A000900160001-6
Approved Four Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01NA000900160001-6
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC9 SECS, 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
WESTERN EUROPE
25X1
n
the London talks, provided the Italian press is not unduly
stirred up over the need for a "political agreement," which
is not covered by the draft.
The Embassy suggests that the draft would be more use-
ful to the Italian Government if only a document in general
i uLll+asu t+vv +-~~ v ~__._ __ _
the Italian public will accept the substance of the Anglo-
Aierican draft on Trieste as a satisfactory conclusion of
Anglo-American draft on Trieste believed acceptable to
terms were issued for public consumption: L_ I
2. Delay in Norwegian-American base negotiations explained:
Accor ing to t e American Embassy in Oslo, the government *s
delay in completing negotiations with the United States for
the development and use of Norwegian military facilities is
due partly to the impression received by a cabinet member at
the UN General Assembly meeting last winter that the Russians
were aware of the negotiations. The Norwegian Foreign Minister
and Defense MiniQtmr f--till and the project as "provocative"
25X1 and dangerous.
Comment: Norwegian alarm over Soviet knowledge goes
back to the- formal reassurance given the USSR at the time
of the formation of NATO and subsequently repeated --
that "bases" on Norwegian territory would not be granted to
any foreign power in time of peace. Ultimate successful
conclusion of the current Norwegian-American negotiations
can nevertheless be expected.
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
LATIN AMERICA
3a Chile and Peru alarmeSe over unrest recognizing in the South America:
I Bolivian
Chile an Peru irm p~3The Chilean
g' f- h t before there has eenv th roug investigation of foreign influence in the Boliian there
Governmen
and up Military
Foreign Minister has has stated lmathats dur~ngstherco
Attache in La Pa informed him
t lies were of
were more arms and amormunitiolo~~lyhhiddenetupphan in the
arsenal, and that these prev
foreign origin.
The Chilean Foreign Minister is alsthalarmedoseerathe
Peron
general continental situation which, he ,
special threat to Chile ander Peru. He Paraguayan offbelieviescials that and over
exerts strong influence
a leading presidential candidate in Ecuador.
Velasco Ibarray
ge is alsoreatly disturbed by the unrest in Colombia.
TOP SECRET
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UNCLASSIFIED when b bgaA8,S Eh iS%tt~l des/~jp:SLeyrt gr 19 rlt J i c or declassi-
fied when filled in form s etac ed document.
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