CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T01146A000900160001-6
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RIPPUB
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S
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17
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December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 22, 2006
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1
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Publication Date: 
April 22, 1952
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REPORT
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Approved For W ease 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T01146 p09001660/14' SECRET 22 April 1952 OCI No. 5164 Copy No. 266 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re- ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. DIA and PACOM review(s) completed. State Department review completed SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79 T01 146A000900160001-6 Approved For (ease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T0114f 900900160001-6 SECRET THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC9 SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. GENERAL 25X1 1. Agreement reached on Chinese Communist-Czech cooperation: On 6 4ay the zec de ega.tion now n eiping wil sign agree ments on postal and telecommunications links and cultural and scientific cooperation, according to Radio Prague. The postal and Comment: This latest postal and telecommunications agreemen is further evidence of the importance attached by the Soviet Union to linking the Chinese Communist communica- tions network with that of Eastern Europe. The Peiping government signed postal and telecommunications agreements with North Korea in December 1949, with the USSR in February 1950, with Poland in January 1951 and with East Germany in October 1951. 2. Mrs. Kora to visit Japanese war graves in Irkutsk: Mrs. ura, a apanese Diet member who a tended he oscow Economic Conference, is leaving for the Caucasus and Ukraine areas. She expects to return to Moscow about 1 May, and will then travel to Irkutsk to see Japanese war graves, according to a local report not yet passed by the censors. Mrs. Kora again said she did not think the Soviets 25X1A Japanese prisoners of war. Comment: By linking the POW issue with Mrs. Kora's visit, Soviet officials probably hope to capitalize further on her favorable attitude to help allay Japanese antagonism regarding this controversial issue. The scheduled return of Mrs. Kora to Moscow about 1 May suggests that this date may have been selected to enable her to witness the impressive May Day demonstrations and to interview Stalin, as she has requested. SECRET l 22 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900160001-6 Approved QRelease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01''1i6A000900160001-6 SECRET 3. Soviet collective-farm abuses condemned- A 19 April editorial in av a entitle uar Ong t e nterests of the Collective Farmconomy" referred to instances of "criminal pilfering" and squandering of collective-farm property in various districts which "grievously harm" the consolidation and further development of the agricultural economy. Some party and local officials are said to have in-U fringed the agricultural charter by exploiting their positions to coerce farmers into handing over farm produce either free of charge or at reduced prices. Some senior secretaries of rayon party committees have already been expelled from the. part and are now facing trial. 25X1 Comment- The agricultural artel charter, the basic law of co ective-farm life, was established by government decree in 1946. It aimed at preventing abuses that might prove harmful to the collective-farm system and dangerous to the entire Soviet program of socialist construction. The present campaign to eliminate pilfering and squandering on the collective farms is believed to be part of a general administrative effort to reinforce the neglected provisions of the basic law of 1946. 4. USSR not expected to play host to UNGA session: Ac- cording to the A represen a ive in Moscow, t K6 press story alleging that the USSR would invite the UN to hold a General Assembly session in Moscow was based on information from Soviet spokesmen. The AP correspondent cites suggestions by Soviet foreign trade and press officials and reports that certain chiefs of mission,.including the Swedish, also be- lieve that a GA session in Moscow is likely. 25X1, 25X1 The US Embassy in Moscow is not inclined to attach any special significance to this story. I I Comment: On previous occasions Soviet spokesmen have informally and evasively claimed willingness to hold a session in Moscow. Although, the Soviet Government per- mitted the greatest influx of non-Communist foreigners in recent years for the Moscow Economic Conference, the Kremlin SECRET 2 22 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900160001-6 25X1 Approved f o Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T0tBA000900160001-6 SECRET did not permit the unbiased reporting, unrestricted activities or extensive press accreditation that would be necessitated by a UN meeting. EASTERN EUROPE 6. B-29--type aircraft sighted over Hungary- On 16 April, the American .Air A tac e in Hungary sig ed three B-29 type aircraft in the area of Tokol airfield. The aircraft were at an a' RnA feet and climbing in a northerly 25X1 direction. Comment; No Soviet TU-4 bomber or TU?70 transport air- craft are Known to be based in Hungary or in any other Eastern European Satellite. The observed aircraft may have been on a practice cross-country flight or returning Soviet personnel to the USSR following the 4 April Liberation Day celebration. SECRET 3 22 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000900160001-6 25X1 Approved FiRelease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01'WA000900160001-6 SECRET FAR EAST Communist-front Japanese student groups schedule strikes: The Communist-front National Student Self-Government Federa- tion, Zengakuren, issued a 14 April directive ordering its members to stage nation-wide strikes on 28 April and 1 May, according to CINCFE. The strikes will be a protest against the government-proposed subversive activities prevention bill. CINCFE comments that the strike may succeed in rallying a considerable number of students since the proposed bill indirectly involves strengthening olice authority, which most students bitterly oppose. Comment: Zengakuren is Japan's largest student group with a membership estimated at 100,000 - 150,000. The proposed government bill provides excellent'material for protest because its provisions could theoretically be perverted into the strict student supervision of the pre- occupation era. By selecting. the date of 28 April, Zengakuren may attempt to present the strike as a protest against the peace treaty, scheduled to become effective on that date. 8. Japan expected to maintain controls on exports to China: Despi a pressures from business groups and some members the Diet, the Japanese Government will maintain its present controls on exports until a truce is achieved in Korea, according to Department of State officials in Tokyo. The Japanese Government also believes that COCOM is too European in focus and too closely related to NATO in member- ship to serve its interests best. Japan is inclined to favor a separate Far Eastern arr trade with the Communist areas. Comment: The Yoshida government, already under opposi- tion attack- for its China policy, will find the present SCAP-directed controls politically difficult to maintain for an extended period after the peace treaty becomes effective. Japan's dependence on the West for its three principal imports--food, cotton and petroleum--assures its cooperation in export controls, but the government eventually can be expected to relax controls on items not being embargoed by its European competitors. 25X1 4 22 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900160001-6 Approved Fo, elease 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79TO11MA000900160001-6 25X1 SECRET Bawdwin Mines may reopen in Burma: Rail service between Rangoon and Mandalay has been -uninterrupted for three weeks, and therefore the Burma Corporation has initiated action to reopen the Bawdwin Mines in the Shan 25X1A States. F-- I Comment: Before the war, the Bawdwin Mines were large producers of lead, silver, zinc, copper, nickel, gold and antimony. In recent years, small amounts of ore have been shipped from stocks on hand, but resumption of production and smelting have been held up by interrupted communications and insurgency in the area.'' SECRET 5 22 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900160001-6 25X1 Approved j Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T011A000900160001-6 SECRET 12. Indonesian official sees possibility of increased trade with ov e r ito The -ndones an Minister o. Econom e Economic Conference9 "very good possibilities exist" for 4- 4 o i U n, n e expanded trade between Indonesia and the Sov a and the Eastern European countries. 25X1 Comment: The Indonesian delegation to the Moscow Economic Conference reportedly emphasized that the diffi- culties of Indonesian rubber producers result from American "price-depressing tactics," and offered "unlimited quanti- ties" of rubber to the Soviet Union. In March, an Indonesian official discussed expansion of trade agreements in Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia-. NEAR EAST - AFRICA 25X1 SECRET 6 22 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900160001-6 Approved F94,RRelease 2007/03/07: CIA-.RDP79T011AfiA000900160001-6 SECRET 14. Trouble in Morocco reported imminent: Well-placed military sources have told the America n Consul in Rabat to expect "serious trouble" in Morocco shortly. Other sources, however, have su plied no recent corroborating information. 25X1 Comment: Despite frequent warnings of a "general uprising" in French Morocco, there is no evidence that the Moroccans can stage a full-scale, coordinated revolt. French military authorities probably could maintain control in the event of sporadic disturbances in urban areas. The young nationalists are rowing impatient with the present policy of restraint established by their more moderate leaders. The Moroccan Communists' capabilities for taking full advantage of the situation are restricted by recent French security measures. SECRET 7 22 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900160001-6 Approved F ,&F 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T014 A000900160001-6 SECRET WESTERN EUROPE 25X1 Slovenes reportedly desert Stalinist arty in Trieste: American o c a s n r este ave 1912:12,17-ea n ormat on tFiat form Communist Party has i C n om the reported schism in the pro- etmembers to local resulted in the defection of many Slovene Slovene parties, including the P O This Slovene minority in the party has apparently been estranged by party chief Vidali?s pro-Italian election pronounce- ments in Italy and by the party?s pa.rtic in the pro- olitical strike in late March. Italian 25X1 Comment: The recent upsurge of f Italian rift Tries a as undoubtedly contributed in the pro?Cominform party since the Tito-Cominform split. American officials in Trieste received reliable reports in early April that the Communist-led port workers in Trieste were greatly displeased with Vidali?s "irredentist" statements. Although Slovene elements fear its new election platform supporting i suggests that their fears are not justified. Othl.romeasuresken designed to heal the breach in party by Vidali since his return from Italy. 16. European Defense Community conference agrees to early May or signature o t e European deadl nee n view o t e urgency e ense Community treaty, the conferees in Paris have agreed on a deadline of 3 May for the completion of their work. The French delegate suggests that the treaty itself be forwarded to the governments by that date. He believes that signing finished scheduledtime any remaining work the and the could mmeeting protocols f for for tehe final r 25X1 17'May. Comment: The United States had originally proposed 9 May as the e1ine for signing the treaty, Most of the Defense Community members agree that the un- resolved issues are minor and could be covered in a protocol after the signing. The German financial contribution is the principal problem blocking complete agreement. SECRET 8 22 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900160001-6 Approved RwRelease 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79TO11+49A000900160001-6 SECRET 17. East German propaganda reflects unusual control by. USSR: The pr nc pa. t eme o East erman Deputy Premier Walter richt's speech on 16 April was a call for mass strikes and demonstrations by West Germans for a peace treaty, as the "hour of decision for the German people has come." American officials in Berlin believe this call suggests that the Communists may go beyond merely fostering "unity of action"; strikes instigated by such organizations as the Free German Youth could result.in clashes with the police. The American officials also believe that the Communists have been directed to avoid giving any impression that the USSR plans drastic counteractions if the contractual agreement is ratified. The war-danger theme, they believe, is to be used only as a warning against the possibility of aggressive actions by the West. On 17 March East Berlin propagandists were instructed that the campaign for a peace treaty was the paramount task. They were directed to avoid discussions of militarism, German boundaries and Germany's development after all-German elections, and were accused of failure to clarify for the 9o ulation the imperialist and just wars. 25X1 18, Soviet authorities reported extending land reforms in 1 ave eased ustrian Austrian ustrian tenants w o s nce es ates which were seized by the Soviet occupation forces or held by them as German assets are reportedly being evicted in "whole- sale" numbers. Tenants who have refused to associate themselves with Communist activities have allegedly lost not only homes and land,.but also livestock _purchased with Austrian governmental assistance. Comment: The Russians' control and exploitation of the 275,0 acres of land they hold in eastern Austria have elicited repeated complaints from the Austrian Government. The extent of alleged "land reforms" has not, however, been established, recent publicity being primarily concerned with the Esterhazy estates seized by the Russians when the family properties in Hungary were expropriated. Efforts to distribute these lands have heretofore been frustrated by strong Austrian opposition and by the general suspicion that titles so acquired would be invalid. 25X1 9 22 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900160001-6 Approved Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T01A000900160001-6 SECRET 19. Chief of BW propaganda mission penalized by Austrian Govern- ment: Dr. . Heinrich andweiner, , who hareturned from Korea, suspended on 17 April by the Austrian Government from his position as professor of international law at the University of Graz. Dr. Brandweiner, who used a leave of absence from the university to accept the post of chairman of the International Association of Democratic.La.wyers' commission investigating biological warfare charges in Korea, has been under public fire for misuse of his official capacity to further propaganda charges. 25X1 20. Italian Communists abate germ warfare campaign: The Com- munisf o o~ g l warfare campaign seems to be tapering off, apparently because of a recent dispatch from North Korea written by Wilfred Burchett and printed in the Italian Communist daily Unita, The article states that the BW battle has been won by tie-TTorth Korean medical personnel and adds, "We can now state there is no epidemic among the population or the troops." 25X1 Comment: The Italian Communist biological warfare campaign had previously tapered off toward the end of March, but was vigorously revived early in April, LATIN. AMERICA 25X1 21, Argentine delegates to Moscow conference depart for China: Four rgent ne delegates to the Moscow Economic Conference reportedly are en route to China to study the possibilities of expanding international trade. The chief delegate states that he had exploratory trade talks with delegations repre- senting the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany, and France. He said that trade treaties with these countries would enable Argentina to purchase machinery, gasoline, petroleum and hydroelectric equipment. Argentina would sell wnnl- h des., cottonseed oil, and casein. 25X1 25X1A Comment: The most immediate gain Argentina can hope to derive Tram the projected trip is publicity for its independent attitude vis-a-vis the United States, in support of its "third- position." Argentina now lacks an exportable surplus rather than export markets, and it is doubtful that it can find more liberal credit offers in the Soviet Orbit than in the West. SECRET 10 22 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900160001-6 Approved f4pF Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79TO1+4AA000900160001-6 SECRET After World War II, Argentina developed significant but not major trade with eastern European countries in order to dispose of large exportable surpluses and obtain some manu- factured goods not readily available in the West. 22. Brazilian press reports Orbit-Brazil trade possibilities arising from Moscow conom c Conlerence: t ma Hora, a news- paper reportedly close to the administration, lastweek headlined a reported USSR offer of 1,000,000 tons of wheat for Brazilian products including rice and rubber. The generally pro-US and conservative 0 Jornal printed on its front page a. Reuter's dispatch from oscow quoting the Brazilian delegation on com- mercial offers from China, the USSR, East Germany, Rumania, Poland, and Hungary. 0 Jornal describes a three-way trade in which Brazil would sell ext es to China. and receive wheat from the USSR. Other reported trade arrangements would involve the sale of Brazilian cotton, textiles, rice, vegetable oils, hides, and industrial diamonds for wheat, petroleum, tractors, loco- motives, paper, synthetic rubber manufacturing equipment, and coals The US Embassy in Rio comments that, despite the impos- sibility of the Orbit's executing all such offers, the reports are likely to have some effect on Brazil which is having diffi- culty finding markets for the .products the Orbit offers to buy and with exchange roblems.in connection with the desired imports. 25X1 Comment. Anticipated expenditures for 1952 wheat imports alone equal 180 million dollars, and the nonavaila.bility of Argentine wheat has already created a serious dollar shortage in Brazil. A concrete offer along the lines of the cited ar- rangements might well have some appeal in Brazil. 23. Deteriorating economic situation in Paraguay affecting olit ca stab ity. Tfie rising cost of living and food with the Para- ti f i on ac s s ortages are a increasing public dissat guayan Government. The army is believed generally united behind President Chaves. The government, aware of the political implications of the economic situation, and, "sparked " is considering major by the President and Chief of Police, economic changes. Government preoccupation with the proximity of the recent Bolivian coup is evident; the Chief of Police states that the coup came at a most inopportune time for Para- 25X1 aiinv In view of the deteriorating economic situation. SECRET 11 22 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900160001-6 Approved F Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T0TWA000900160001-6 SECRET Comment: Generally the political and economic situation is more favorable to revolutionary attempts now than it was a year ago. Tension can be expected to increase with political machinations in anticipation of the coming presidential election. Maladministration, increased graft,and corruption have caused growing discontent, even, reportedly, in the higher army echelons. 24. Bolivian Cabinet rejects immediate nationalization of mines: The new o ivian Cabinet has rejected immediate nationalization of mines, as demanded by Juan Lechin, Minister of Mines and Petroleum and leader of the important mine workers' federation. The cabinet has decided to adopt President Paz Estenssoro's plan to study the whole problem, meanwhile exacting a higher share 25X1 of exchange receipts. Comment: While Paz has approved the principle of nation- alization-,-Ea would prefer to proceed cautiously, especially in view of the still pending tin negotiations with the United States, His stand, however, may be undermined by Lechin and other extreme nationalists who continue to inflame public opinion by demanding immediate nationalization. Strong pressure will also be exerted. by the Central Organi- zation of Bolivian Workers, which has just been formed to unify workers "in the fight for nationalization of mines and railroads, and agrarian reform." Lechin and the Minister of Labor are the top officials of this organization. 12 22 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900160001-6 Approved FRelease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01'446A000900160001-6 TOP SECRET 22 April 1952 CIA No. 49622 Copy No, 4 6 TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE. Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. TOP SECRET Approved For Release - 01146A000900160001-6 Approved Four Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01NA000900160001-6 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC9 SECS, 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. WESTERN EUROPE 25X1 n the London talks, provided the Italian press is not unduly stirred up over the need for a "political agreement," which is not covered by the draft. The Embassy suggests that the draft would be more use- ful to the Italian Government if only a document in general i uLll+asu t+vv +-~~ v ~__._ __ _ the Italian public will accept the substance of the Anglo- Aierican draft on Trieste as a satisfactory conclusion of Anglo-American draft on Trieste believed acceptable to terms were issued for public consumption: L_ I 2. Delay in Norwegian-American base negotiations explained: Accor ing to t e American Embassy in Oslo, the government *s delay in completing negotiations with the United States for the development and use of Norwegian military facilities is due partly to the impression received by a cabinet member at the UN General Assembly meeting last winter that the Russians were aware of the negotiations. The Norwegian Foreign Minister and Defense MiniQtmr f--till and the project as "provocative" 25X1 and dangerous. Comment: Norwegian alarm over Soviet knowledge goes back to the- formal reassurance given the USSR at the time of the formation of NATO and subsequently repeated -- that "bases" on Norwegian territory would not be granted to any foreign power in time of peace. Ultimate successful conclusion of the current Norwegian-American negotiations can nevertheless be expected. TOP SECRET 1 22 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000900160001-6 25X1 Approved Ft Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T011A000900160001-6 TOP SECRET LATIN AMERICA 3a Chile and Peru alarmeSe over unrest recognizing in the South America: I Bolivian Chile an Peru irm p~3The Chilean g' f- h t before there has eenv th roug investigation of foreign influence in the Boliian there Governmen and up Military Foreign Minister has has stated lmathats dur~ngstherco Attache in La Pa informed him t lies were of were more arms and amormunitiolo~~lyhhiddenetupphan in the arsenal, and that these prev foreign origin. The Chilean Foreign Minister is alsthalarmedoseerathe Peron general continental situation which, he , special threat to Chile ander Peru. He Paraguayan offbelieviescials that and over exerts strong influence a leading presidential candidate in Ecuador. Velasco Ibarray ge is alsoreatly disturbed by the unrest in Colombia. TOP SECRET 22 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900160001-6 UNCLASSIFIED when b bgaA8,S Eh iS%tt~l des/~jp:SLeyrt gr 19 rlt J i c or declassi- fied when filled in form s etac ed document. CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION REGISTRY SOURCE CIA CONTRO DOC. NO. D DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED DOC. DATE COPY NO. 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