TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT TO THE DAILY DIGEST(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000700140001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 21, 1952
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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TOP SECRET
21 January 1952
CIA No. 49506
Copy No. 4G
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence, Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
State Department review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
ARMY review(s) completed.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
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SYRIA. Syria presses for American military aid: Top Syrian officials have
increased their demands for US military aid. The American Minister in
Damascus states that the Syrian Chief of State will talk of nothing else
until he learns the US position in this matter. The Minister believes
that the influential Chief of Staff, Lt. Col. Shishakli, delegated to the
head of the government the task of pressing for arms, and that "only
military aid will really strengthen the US position" in Damascus.
approach in regard to military aid have proved fruitless to date.
Comment: Syrian military demands for Western arms have probably in-
creased as the result of the continuing clouded political atmosphere in
Damascus. 'While the Syrian Chief of Staff is believed to be friendly to the
West, his conference with Soviet diplomatic representatives in the past
indicates that he is sufficiently opportunistic to seek arms from any
quarter if his own dominant position in the country will thereby be
strengthened.
2. AUSTRALIA. Policy against Middle East troop commitment seen under review:
The US Embassy in Canberra has "reason to think" that Cabinet consideration
has recently been given to the question of commitment of troops to the
Middle East. Presumably as a result of the continuance of the difficult
situation in Egypt, there may be a softening or-change in the Australian
position.
Comment: Australia has thus far refused to agree to commit troops to
the Middle East in peacetime on the ground that its limited forces should
be retained in the Southeast Asia - Pacific area.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
3. GENERAL. Peruvian counterproposal to Soviet resolution might postpone vote
on Italy's admission to UN: The Peruvian delegation to the UN will present
a proposal in the General Assembly calling for all applicants for UN
membership to submit evidence of their qualifications to the Assembly as
well as to the Security Council. The proposal, which has been redrafted by
the American delegation, states that the only conditions for membership are
that applicants be peace loving, and that they be willing and able to carry
out their obligations under the UN charter. Belaunde, chief of the
Peruvian delegation, believes that, with US support, the proposal will
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circumvent Central American efforts to vote Italy a member at the current
session.
Meanwhile, the Italian representative at the UN reports that French
Foreign Minister Schuman has pledged his country's support for the Soviet
resolution calling for the simultaneous admission of all applicants
except Korea and Indochina.
Comment: The Peruvian proposal, which by implication excludes the
four Satellites from acceptability as members, could cause action on all
applicants to be postponed. The Peruvians have long supported Italian
admission to.the UN and doubtless hope by postponing action on all applicants
to forestall a Soviet veto of Italy's application.
Italy has urged the US to drop its opposition to the Soviet resolution.
Z,.. FRANCE. New government faces difficulty in financing present commitments:
Former Premiers Pleven, Bidault, and Reynaud have told Ambassador Bruce
in Paris that they believe the budgetary problem arising from present
commitments in Indochina and Europe is insoluble and that any French
government at this time will therefore be "comparatively short-lived."
Pleven believes that he can best promote the European Defense Force
plan and the idea of European federation by serving in the Assembly without
obligations to the coalition government. He expects Parliament to give
general approval of the European defense plan before the Lisbon NATO
meeting next month, but warns that full ratification will be.more difficult
25X1 to obtain.
Comment: Premier-elect Edgar Faure has won Assembly support by
giving in to the Socialists' objections to government economies by decree.
This ends all hope for balancing the 1952 budget without recourse to
seriously inflationary measures.
If France fails to get the US and the UN to share its financial
burden in Indochina. soon, a considerable increase in inflationary pressures
in France can be expected; this would further aggravate both the rearmament
problem and political instability.
5. UN pressure for alteration of France's Tunisian policy is
recommends : The US Consul General in Tunis considers that French policy
regarding Tunisia is threatening to make trouble in North Africa and the
Near East, and suggests that a UN debate to pressure France into changing
this policy would be advisable. The Consul General states that present
French policy is indefensible and warns that the US will share in Moslem
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resentment and difficulties "created by French stubbornness and incapacity."
Comment: Several natives have been killed and the most prominent
Tunisian nationalists arrested as a result of Tunisian demonstrations in
support of Prime Minister Chenik's petition to the UN Security Council.
Although the French have sufficient forces to subdue isolated riots by
unarmed natives, these forces would be severely taxed if widespread
sympathetic disorders should break out simultaneously in other North African
areas.
6. UNITED KINGDOM. Foreign office working on new compromise proposals for
Egypt: At Foreign Secretary Eden's request the British oreign Office has
drafted a new proposal for the Sudan which probably contains a formula for
recognizing Farouk as its king.
Foreign office officials, however, show "no great enthusiasm" for
redrafting the Middle East Command proposals at the present time as re-
quested after the Eden Acheson talks. They would prefer first to obtain
Egypt's conditional agreement to join the Command and then develop the
proposals as necessary to meet the specific problems of Anglo-Egyp~ian
25X1 defense.
Comment: Eden has apparently abandoned his previous opposition to any
compromise on the Sudan. British and American officials, as well as pro-
Western Egyptian political leaders have insisted that only recognition of
Farouk as King of the Sudan would persuade Egypt to consider the defense
proposals. There is still no evidence that once that concession had been
made-Egypt would give up its contention that it can defend the Suez Canal
in all circumstances except global war.
Britain sees chance for final liquidation of German assets
in Switzerland: Britain sees the Swiss reply to the recent German note on
liquidation of German assets in Switzerland as presenting an opportunity
for prompt settlement of the long dispute over this question. The British
believe that once the Federal Republic has been notified of the amounts due
the US3 France, Britain, and Switzerland, a four-power discussion should be
held in mid-February to make the necessary amendments to replace the
Washington Accord on the subject.
The US State Department, on the other hand, does not understand the
Swiss reply to be a definite proposal and believes that an ultimate Allied-
Swiss agreement on broad terms would be preferable to a protracted technical
discussion along the lines of the British proposal. 25X1
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Comment: The British estimate of the prospects for early liquidation
may be influenced by their desire to settle this knotty problem before
the Tripartite Commission on German Debts meets in London next month, and
also by their apparent willingness to accept any plan agreeable to the
Swiss and the Germans. It is not clear that the Swiss reply is an
acceptance of the German proposal, or that the Swiss are willing to isolate
this particular. question from the broader complex of Swiss-German debts.
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21 January 1952
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OCI No. 3855
Copy No. 183
DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
? This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
SECRET
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SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1. USSR. Soviet Union seeks concessions through UN discussion of Korean
war:? The American Embassy in Moscow states that-Soviet proposals for
UN discussion of the Korean problem represent tactical stalling to gain
further UN concessions or a better logistical position in Korea. The
Embassy suggests that the USSR is attempting to put UN negotiators under
added pressure from those members anxious for an early peace.
In a similar comment, the British-mission in Peiping adds its belief
that both the USSR and China'want an armistice. on "reasonable" terms and
that the Central People's Government was probably consulted on the Soviet
maneuvers in the UN.
Comment: There is evidence that, despite rumors of disunity, there
will be continuing coordination of Sino-Soviet strategy with respect to
the Korean war.
2. Soviet note to Austria clarified: The-recent Soviet note to Austria
mentioning "Austrian citizens. liberated by the Soviet Union" has been
clarified by the Austrian Minister in. Moscow, It apparently refers to
400 Austrians liberated in Poland toward the end of the war and repatri-
ated to Austria, for which the Austrian Government was to assume expenses.
The Soviet note thus refers entirely,to one of the previously agreed
upon articles, rather than, as originally interpreted, to an article still
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3. ALBANIA. Hydroelectric power project planned: Premier Enver Hoxha, in
a recent ceremony at Burrel, heralded the beginning of Albania's second
hydroeleetrical power project which will be built-on the River Mat in
northern central Albania. The 20 million kilowatt-station, one of the
largest public utility projects in the Albanian Five-Year Plan, is
scheduled for completion in 1955. It will control floods, conserve water
and generate power.
Comment: The Mat River project will provide electrical power to
exploit the rich copper and chrome mines in northern Albania. It will
also provide occupation for the traditionally restless, anti-regime pop-
ulation in the Mat River region. The Lenin hydroelectrical station serv-
ing the city of Tirana was opened in November 1951.
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4. YUGOSLAVIA. Britain to oppose larger tripartite aid program: The British
delegation to the forthcoming tripartite conference-in-Washington will main-
tain that the London Agreement which--was designed to correct Yugoslavia's
balance of payments deficit. should be reexamined in the light of the cur-
rent and prospective Yugoslav balance of payments position and possible
alternative financing methods, and, that the Yugoslav investment program
must be financed exclusively by the International Bank,
Britain will also oppose any suggestion that the three powers should
underwrite Yugoslav deficits directly or indirectly attributable to Yugo-
slavia'stmilitary effort. In addition, the Foreign Office proposes that
fourth countries should also be invited to discuss a common polio don-
cerning Yugoslavia's debts and. debt payments._ F 25X1
Comment: French, British, and American officials will meet in
Washington in February, to appraise the present adequacy and future re-
quirements necessary to assure an equilibrium in the Yugoslav external
account within the next few years.
The Yugoslavs contend that the International Bank program is unre-
liable and insufficient and have pressed the Allies to underwrite their
capital investment program on the grounds of extraordinary military ex-
penses. Britain, however, has consistently opposed any tripartite commit-
ments beyond the limits of a strict interpretation of the London Agree-
ment.
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the workers. The labor leaders consider that the good discipline of the
Communists will result in a total vote for Communist-supported candidates
of 150,000 to 200,000. Labor circles report further that if genuinely
free elections were permitted in the oil province of Khuzistan, Communists
SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. IRAN. 'Iranian Communists expected to win parliamentary representation:
Non-Communist Iranian labor leaders estimate that at least five. ommunist-
controlled deputies will be elected to the next parliament. The Communists
are backing a slate of twelve candidates who are making special appeals'to
or fellow travelers would defeat the National Front candidates.
Comment: The outlawed Tudeh Party is making a determined effort to
win representation in the Majlis through the use of front organizations and
candidates posing as Nationalists. Previous reports have estimated that
Tudeh sympathizers might win up to twelve seats.
While the Communists apparently are gaining strength among the workers
in all parts of Iran, there is no other indication that they are currently
as strong in Khuzistan as the labor leaders quoted above have asserted.
2. INDONESIA. Partial reparations agreement achieved: A member of the Indo-
nessiiandelega on engaged in reparations and is eries negotiations with
Japan informed Ambassador Cochran that although written agreement has been
reached on certain matters concerning reparations, the major questions of
the amount of reparations and the method of settlement have yet to be
determined.
The delegate stated that Indonesia's and Japan's respective positions
on fisheries are still far apart. However, he indicated that when negotia-
tions are renewed in Djakarta Indonesia would make an effort toward com-
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Comment: The Tokyo press announced on 18 January that Indonesia and
Japan had signed an "interim reparations" agreement.
The Indonesian delegation had been instructed to return to Djakarta
with concrete evidence of at least some progress toward a final settlement
of the reparations issue. The government hopes that the conclusion of
.reparations and fisheries agreements with Japan will ensure ratification of
the Japanese peace treaty when it comes before the Indonesian Parliament.
The government expects to submit the agreement and the'treaty to Parliament
simultaneously.
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3. BURMA. Burmese considering limited appeal to UN: In reply to the US Charge's
suggestion that Burma request an observation commission should it decide to
place the Chinese Nationalist problem before the UN, the Permanent Secretary
of the Foreign Office stated that his government had already recognized that
this was "one feasible line of action." He added, however, that Burma may
simply alert the UN to the possibility of a future request for assistance.
Comment: It has been pointed out to the Burmese that presentation of
the Chinese Nationalist problem to the UN would be as embarrassing to them-
selves as to other nations involved and would also be unlikely to produce
an effective remedy to the situation. This report indicates clearly that
the Burmese are attempting to develop a, course of action which would resolve
their dilemma by focussing the world's attention on the Nationalist problem
without admitting their inability to-deal with it.
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40. Burma to support Communist China for seat at ECAFE meetings: The
Permanent Secretary of the Burmese Foreign Office informea Me can
Charge that his country would attempt to avoid the issue of which Chinese
should be seated at the ECAFE Conference in Rangoon which begins on 29
January. He added, however, that should the situation require it, his
government would support the Communists. The Charge commented that the
Secretary left-no doubt +hat Burma does not agree with the US position.
Comment: Burma was the first non-Communist country to recognize the
Chinese Communist regime, and ever since has been obviously obsessed with
a fear of antagonizing or provoking its large and aggressive neighbor. This 25X1
report is further evidence of this condition,
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US Minister disturbed over French morale in Indochinas American
Minister Heath states that Marshal de Lattre's death has had a staggering"
impact on all sectors of French opinion in Indochina. He adds that the ap-
pointments of General Salan as Commander in Chief and of Gautier as High
Commissioner are viewed with misgiving and, in some quarters, with open
opposition to this division of authority. He foresees the possibility that
an attitude of defeatism will develop if, & "third-rater" is named as a
permanent successor to De Lattre or if"the military situation in Tonkin
becomes more critical.
Comments De Lattre provided French'officials and troops in Indochina
with a ndous psychological boost during the first half of 1951, but
his absences during the past six months had no noticeable effect on French
morale.
French forces in Tonkin, on the other hand, have been under constant
attack by the Viet Minh since the first week of December, and all reports
indicate continued and intensified pressure by the enemy, whose material
strength is being rapidly increased by aid from Communist China.
8a CHINA. Communists condemn iratin of workers by industrial firms An
article in an official Shanghai daily condemned the practice of employers
who recruit technicians and skilled workers by inducing them to leave
their present jobs. The situation was described as gravest in the machine
industries, where the pirating of workers has frequently out output.
Private employers were particularly guilty of hiring already employed
workers, since the private companies could offer better-wages than the
state enterprises.
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Counts The practice which the article condemns is evidence that
Shanghai workers--at least those with technical skills--are enjoying a
tight labor marlw t. A Peiping news broadcast in mid-1951 declared that
Shanghai's machine industry was expanding, with a backlog of orders suf-
fioient to maintain full operations for the next six months.
Peiping comments on Truman-Churchill talks: Peiping radio attri-
butes to unidentified local "observers" he view that the Truman-Churchill
talks revealed "ever-developing contradictions" between America and Britain.
At the same time, Peiping construes the talks as "further evidence" that
the UK is determined to serve as the "miserable satellite" of the US.
9?
Comment: Several sources have reported that Peiping, while hoping that
the Truman-Churchill talks would reveal important differences in US-UK?Far.
Eastern policies, expected the reverse and was consequently preparing to
stiffen its own policy toward the UK. Specific actions allegedly contemplated
.were expulsion of British officials and nationals from China and a demand for
retrocession of Hong Kong. There is no good evidence, however, that Peiping
plans to alter its policy toward the UK at this time.
10. New governor believes Macao would not resist Chinese attack: Captain
Joachim Esmarteiro, a new governor of the Portuguese colony of Macao, has
stated that he considers Macao "indefensible" and that Portuguese African
troops "would probably not fire_a shot" against attacking Chinese Communist
forces. The reporting officer concurs-in Esmarteiro's view but believes
that Portuguese troops would be sacrificed in a rear-guard action to permit
the evacuation of Europeans by ship. 25X1
Comment: Portuguese forces in Macao. are incapable of offering more
than brief resistance to a Chinese Communist force. Macao continues to be
valuable to Communist China, however, as a transshipment point and smuggling
base. There is no evidence that Peiping plans to extend its control over
the colony in the near future.
11. Deported Chinese allegedly threaten Hong Kong authorities: A Chinese
news agency alleges that five pro-Communist Chinese recently deported from
Hong Kong were heard to declare, over the Communist radio in Canton, that
Hong Kong is "part of Chinese territory" and that "we will return" on a
"not too distant day."
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Comment: So far as is known, the Peiping regime has never permitted
a propaganda vehicle under its control to assert China's claim to Hong
Kong or to threaten violence against the colony. The above report may
be a garbled version of a Peiping broadcast quoting eight deportees as
expressing confidence "that Chinese inhabitants of Hong Kong will carry
on the struggle against persecution and that ultimate victory will be
theirs."
12. Nationalist officials discuss Communist threat to Nationalist-held
coastal islands.-, The reported loss of Tungtou Island off the Chekiang
coast on 14 January and the flight the same day of fighter aircraft of
the 12th Division from Shanghai southward were the subjects of a Nationalist
staff conference on 15 January. The Nationalist G-2 and G-3 views were
that this attack on one of Ta Chen's "outlying" islands would precede an
attack on Ta Chen itself (one of two main Nationalist strongholds along
the coast). The Chief and Deputy Chief of Staff, however, believe that
an attack on Ta Chen is not imminent, and that a successful attack would
require participation by the Chinese Communist Air Force. The US Naval
Attache who attended this conference comments that an all-out Chinese
Communist attack on T a Chen would be successful and the Nationalists would
not support the defenders of Ta Chen in the event of such an attack.
Nationalist ground forces at Ta Chen total 200 and naval support con-
sists of six small auxiliary vessels. 25X1
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16. JAPAN. Tokyo reaction to Yoshida letter 'reported: Political reaction in
Japan to Yos a s letter to Dulles on China policy was generally favor-
able, according to US Political Adviser Sebald, although a Demooratiq
spokesman criticized the Prime Minister for "secret and dogmsatio dip]fo-
maoy." A right-wing Socialist spokesman termed Yoshidats`action "rash,"
while a left-wing Socialist said that entering into special relations
with Formosa "is to abandon the economic self-suffioienoy of Japan."
Although editorial opinion generally recognized the inevitability
of the policy outlined in the Prime Minister's letter, Asahi felt that
the government "should avoid making Red China more hostilee~."
Certain business groups reportedly feel that further US economic aid
17. Soviet "neutralization offensive" continues,: 'American Political
Adviser Sebald in Tokyo reports at immediatelyor the 17 January
meeting of the Allied Council for Japan the Soviet member held a press
conference at Which he released the text of his statement to that body.
A Soviet spokesman also indicated that the request of the Kyodo News Agency,
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to place a correspondent in Moscow had been "complied with."
Kyodo later denied making an official request but admitted to informal
inquiries. The Japanese press interpreted the Soviet statement and the
action on Kyodo as further USSR efforts to woo Japan.
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Comment: The Soviet member'of the Allied Council attacked the defense
provisions of the new Japanese budget as "unwarrantable" on the ground that
it would reduce the workers' real wages..
The French Press Agency reports from Tokyo that "high functionaries"
of the Soviet Mission in Tokyo recently have been in frequent contact with
leading Japanese-businessmen and diplomats. At these encounters the
Russians have allegedly dropped such hints as (1) it is difficult for the
USSR to settle relations with Japan as long as hostilities continue in
Korea because of the numerous US bases in Japan, (2) the USSR will offer
a peace treaty when the San Francisco treaty becomes effective, and (3)
the USSR is not opposed to Japanese rearmament but only to a Japanese
military alliance with the United States.
Of a parallel nature is the reported action of the President of the
People's Bank of Communist China, a member of the preparatory committee
of the proposed International Economic Conference in Moscow, who has in-
vited former Finance Minister Tanzan Ishibashi and nine other Japanese
financial leaders to attend the conference, according to Asahi.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
1. GERMANY. Allies and Bonn disagree over West German financial contribu-
tion to defense: In the current negotiations for contractual arrange-
ments, disagreements on the West German financial contribution to defense
are assuming an importance eclipsing the dispute on German arms restric-
tions, and are blocking establishment of European Defense Forces.
Although the Western powers have set a figure of 3 billion dollars
for the German contribution, the Adenauer government has demanded that the
TCC review this estimate. With French concurrence in doubt, the US-and UK
are now agreed that TCC hearings should be held and figures produced to
convince the Germans of the reasonableness of the estimate. The TCC will
only make recommendations; the final figure is to be negotiated by the
Allies and the Federal Republic. The British, however, hint that the TCC
may find the Germans capable of a contribution larger than the one now.
envisaged.
Aside from the dispute with the Germans, the Allied powers are in
disagreement among themselves as to how much of the German contribution
each of the three Allied powers is to receive and as to what agency should
review the exbendit
2. FRANCE. Military crisis fails to induce French concessions'to Viet nation-
alism: The French Minister for the Associated States believes that the
basic problem in Indochina is political rather than military, but apparently
has no policy changes in mind for dealing with the political situation. In
a conversation with the Far East director of the Mutual Security Agency, the
Minister charged that the Vietnamese are incapable of independence, but then
agreed that a more effective Vietnamese Government might create further dif-
ficulties for France.
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Comment: The Minister's statement reflects France's failure to rally
the Vietnamese to an anti-Communist effort within the French Union.
Despite increasing French concern over the financial burden of the war
in Indochina, there is no indication that France has any intention of modi-
fying its present political relationship with Vietnam. There is likewise no
indication that the Bao Dai government and the Vietnamese people will be will-
ing or able to contribute effectively to the military effort, so long as the
French make loyalty to the French Union a prerequisite for high-level office
in the Bao Dai government.
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3. N THERLANDS-SURINAM. Dutch Foreign Minister to discuss 10-year develop-
ment plan foam: Netherlands Foreign Minister Drees plans to devote
part of his visit to the US to discussing a 10-year development plan for
the semi-autonomous state of Surinam, The plan is designed to increase
bauxite production "for the common defense," to decrease Dutch dependence
on dollar imports and at the same time strengthen the guilder, and to bolster
the position of Westerners in the heavily Asiatic Surinam population. The
plan hinges on the construction of a dam to provide power-for processing
bauxite into aluminum and create a large lake for transporting lumber to the
prospective pulp and board industry.
Dutch officials are scheduled to discuss the plan with Surinam officials
Comment: At present, most of Surinam's annual 2 million tons of bauxite
is processed in the US, and the Dutch and other consumers must pay dollars
for the finished aluminum. Surinam has virtually no industrial activity and
must import almost everything it consumes, with the exception. of certain basic
food items and lumber.
1.. UNITED KINGDOM. Foreign Office will press immediately for West German mem-
bership in ECE: Britain will approach France immediately seeking support
for the admission of the West German Federal Republic as a consultative mem-
ber of the Economic Commission for Europe. The Foreign'Office believes that
there is virtually no possibility of a Soviet withdrawal from ECE over this
issue. If France is unable to support the Anglo-American position now, Bri-
tain wants to press other Western European governments to support the West
German candidacy.
In Geneva, ECE chairman Gunnar Myrdal has made a new proposal to the
US whereby he would -- upon request by the Allied High Command -- invite
the West Germans to join ECE when the contractual agreement becomes effec-
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Comment: The new British position is more positive than their earlier
proposal to ask France to join Britain and the US in a "fact-finding" ap-
proach to other governments to get their views on West German membership.
The French disagree strongly with the British analysis of the risk involved
and believe that the Russians might well withdraw from ECE. A Russian high
up in the ECE secretariat stated in December that the USSR had heard of the
forthcoming British proposal; but he did not indicate that the Russians
might withdraw, and various Western members of the secretariat doubt that
the USSR would withdraw.
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tive. East Germany mould also be invited to join if the Russians declare
it to be no longer occupied territory, but the Western countries would be
free to eject it at the 1953 plenary session.
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T'hrdal's proposal that the Allied High Command should request him to
invite the West Germans is not consistent with the Anglo-American view that
the Federal Republic should be treated as an independent nation.
5. CUBA. Communists experiencing financial difficulties: There is growing
evidence that the Communists are experiencing serious financial difficulties
and that the party is greatly alarmed at the small amount of funds available
to carry on further activities, particularly its election campaign. Com-
munist publications have carried pleas for party members to step up the pay-
ment of dues and to help increase the circulation of their papers and maga-
zines: These financial problems have been further heightened by the theft
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of 13.000 dollars of party funds by one of the party treasurers.
Comment: The serious financial straits in which the Communist Party
finds itself may be attributed to two factors: a probable reduction in over-
all party membership as indicated by the loss of affiliates during the re-
cent party registration period, and the withdrawal of advertisements from
several Communist publications by certain large firms. These difficulties
attest to the weakening position of the Communist Party as a political force
during this crucial pre-election period.
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