INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010024-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: December 27, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

National
ppmaigid For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00912A00 -
Assessment
Center
International
Issues Review
State Dept. review completed Secret
RP IIR 78-005
27 December 1978
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INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
27 December 1978
CONTENTS
DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL
THE LDCS AND DISARMAMENT
Disarmament has increasingly become a North-
South issue, with the LDCs tending to take com-
mon positions in opposition to those of the de-
veloped countries. This article examines the
roots of LDC diplomacy on disarmament and
forecasts the themes that LDCs will emphasize
in disarmament debates during the next several
years.
ASEAN: DYNAMICS OF ARMS TRANSFERS AND RECEPTIVITY
TO RESTRAINTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Military assistance from the US is regarded by
the ASEAN states as a barometer of US commitment
to their security and to stability in Southeast
Asia. Already apprehensive about the credibil-
ity of this commitment, they might react to at-
tempts to establish a formal CAT restraint re-
gime in Southeast Asia by increasing their arms
purchases generall and seeking new, non-US
sources of supply. 1 71
NORTH-SOUTH
THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AND US RELATIONS WITH
KEY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The North-South dialogue plays an important, al-
though secondary, role in the foreign policies
of developing countries that are of key concern
to the US. This article assesses the indirect
impact of the dialogue on US bilateral relations
with five countries--Venezuela, Jamaica, Ni-
geria, Indonesia and India--and on US interest
in other multilateral forums.
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The LDCs and Disarmament
Disarmament has become, in part, a North-South
issue. That is, the less developed countries tend to
hold in common certain positions that are opposed to
those of developed countries and that the LDCs try, as
a group, to advance in broad-based multilateral for-
unms. The first UN Special Session on Disarmament
(SSOD)--a proposal of the Nonaligned Movement--in May
and June of this year confirmed the addition of dis-
armament to the list of topics that have become ve-
hicles for the LDCs' dialogue with the industrialized
world. The LDCs saw the SSOD as an extension of the
6th and 7th Special Sessions (which addressed raw
materials, development, and international economic co-
operation) and a continuation of their efforts to es-
tablish what would be, in their view, a more just in-
ternational order.
The LDCs still tend to be less unified on dis-,
armament questions than on trade, resources, and most.
other economic matters. To the extent that a distinc-
tive LDC perspective on disarmament does exist, how-
ever, its significance in world politics has been en-
hanced by its role in the Third World's challenge to
the political, military, and economic power of the in-
dustrialized nations. Furthermore, the funneling of
such a perspective through the Group of 77 and other
LDC diplomatic caucuses gives it focus, prominence,
and support it would not have if it were only voiced
separately by individual governments.
This article discusses the roots of LDC diplomacy
on disarmament in order better to understand and an-
ticipate the LDCs' disarmament goals and how they will
be pursued during the next several years. These roots
are found mainly in four characteristics that the LDCs
share and that distinguish them from the industrial-
ized states, particularly the nuclear powers:
-- They are not major participants in arms con.-
trol negotiations.
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-- Their military forces have limited opera-
tional range and sophistication.
-- They have no role in managing the strategic
nuclear balance.
-- They are, by definition, economically less
developed.
Because the LDCs will generally continue to share
these characteristics during the coming years, their
posture on disarmament will remain largely unchanged.
In most respects, therefore, the second Special Ses-
sion on Disarmament, to be held in 1982, will resemble
the first. The LDCs will probably become more asser-
tive, however, and may, depending on the initiatives
of developed countries, change the emphasis they place
on individual issues.
The LDCs define responsibility for disarmament in a
way that accentuates the North-South dimension of the issue.
On one hand, they assert that it is up to the major powers,
and particularly the nuclear-weapons states, to undertake
unilateral measures to halt and reverse the arms race.
on the other hand, they contend that disarmament is the
legitimate concern of all states both because a nuclear
war would engulf everyone and because the arms race
diverts resources from economic development. They ex-
tend this reasoning to argue that LDCs are special
victims of this race because they have served as the
battlefields where developed countries have played out
their rivalries. These views enable the LDCs to
rationalize their full participation in disarmament
debates while placing most of the blame for the arms
race elsewhere.
Understanding the basis for LDC views on disarma-
ment matters is important for two reasons. First, these
views will henceforth be articulated in more forums than
ever before--not just SSOD II, but an expanded Committee
on Disarmament in Geneva, a resurrected UN Disarmament
Commission, and the regular sessions of the General
Assembly's First Committee. To respond constructively
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to the LDCs without damaging arms control efforts or
Western strategic interests will be a formidable diplo-
matic challenge, the success of which will influence
the course of other discussions between North and South.
Second, because the LDCs' collective perspective is the
principal ingredient of global opinion on disarmament,
it will largely determine what arms control initiatives
will appear politically profitable to the Soviet Union
or Western allies.
The following discussion describes general tenden-
cies of LDCs' disarmament diplomacy--that is, the themes
that their characteristics as LDCs lead them to pursue.
In practice, of course, indivi ucuaal states may depart
from these tendencies for particular political or stra-
tegic reasons. The general tendencies are probably more
noticeable than the departures, however, because LDC
representatives at multilateral forums often take their
cues more from their group than from their capitals.
Weak Partners in Disarmament
The LDC perspective toward global issues is, first
of all, the perspective of the weak, of states that
realize they have less influence on world affairs than
the industrialized nations. This is particularly true
with regard to disarmament, where the expansion of the
LDCs' role has lagged behind its increase on such issues
as trade and the management of natural resources. The
LDCs have bolstered their voice on disarmament matters,
but it is still a voice from outside the handful of
developed states that play a disproportionately large
role in disarmament because they manufacture and own a
disproportionate share of the world's armaments.
As the weak players in the disarmament process,
the LDCs favor some of the same techniques used by the
weak in other domestic and international political con-
texts. Specifically, they try to effect change by:
(1) mobilizing opinion; (2) applying binding, legal re-
straints on the strong players; and (3) democratizing
institutions.
Mobilization of mass opinion is a natural technique
for those who are not at the center of power but who feel
they have the force of n{imbers on their side. It is a
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populist, grass-roots technique of change, similar to
domestic populism except that the relevant masses are
spread over the globe and include both the public in
developed countries and the elites and governments of
LDCs. For the LDCs, disarmament diplomacy itself is
largely a matter of mobilizing global opinion against
the arms race. They intended the SSOD to be an exercise
in education and inspiration--a point made both literally
and symbolically by Colombia, which was represented by its
Minister of Education. In such gatherings, the LDCs push
certain themes because of their long-term value in shaping
global opinion even if they are clearly useless in wresting
direct concessions from the major powers.
Despite the LDCs' frequently expressed demands for
action, not talk, on the central problems of nuclear dis-
armament, their reliance on the mobilization of opinion
makes them enthusiastic about a variety of seemingly
peripheral informational activities, including UN-
sponsored studies, reports, yearbooks, periodicals, and
scholarships. In other words, talk that merely delays
or replaces action by the major powers is not acceptable
to the LDCs, but talk that broadens awareness of the
consequences of an arms race will enjoy their active
support. Their stress on dissemination of information
on disarmament dovetails with their campaign to enlarge
their role in the dissemination of all types of informa-
tion--an objective which they call the New World Infor-
mation order and pursue in forums like the UN General
Assembly and the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cul-
tural Organization.
The LDCs' concern with the global climate of opinion
also underlies their positions on more central issues of
disarmament. They give first priority to the reduction
of nuclear arsenals partly because of the beneficial im-
pact it would have on this climate. They contend that
such a highly visible action, by demonstrating good will
and increasing the momentum of disarmament, would en-
courage reductions in conventional arms and discourage
nuclear proliferation. The belief in this psychological
linkage is strong, even though the strategic linkage be-
tween these issues may work the other way in some cases.
For example, a reduction in the superpowers' arsenals
might lead an LDC to place increased importance on its
own conventional weapons or a nascent nuclear weapons
program.
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A second favored technique is the legal restriction
of the major powers' military programs and activities.
Those who are weak in a free market will often attempt
to make the market less free by legislating restrictions.
The L.DCs, therefore, favor binding international conven-
tions on such subjects as the use of nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear-weapons states and the development of
new weapons of mass destruction. Western arguments that
these proposals are not feasible do not convince many
LDCs because it is the principle of legislating restric-
tions on the military activities of the powerful, not
the effectiveness of any one convention, that is most
important to them. They will continue to call for con-
ventions even where a convention would not appear to
offer the LDCs any more security than they could receive
from the unilateral assurances of major powers. For
example, it seems dubious that the leader of a nuclear-
weapons state would feel more restrained in the use of
nuclear weapons by a convention than by his own previous
declarations on the subject. The LDCs' enthusiasm for
legal instruments is abetted by the Soviet Union, which
has drafted conventions on both of the subjects mentioned
above.
A third technique of weak states is to seek to im-
prove their relative standing by demanding greater par-
ticipation in international institutions. The LDCs have
placed heavy emphasis on the democratization of disarma-
ment machinery, with three specific objectives in mind.
The objective that has been most fully met to date
is that of making maximum use of broad-based forums, in
which the LDCs, by force of numbers, participate on a
more equal footing with the developed world than they do
elsewhere. In line with LDC wishes, the SSOD reaffirmed
the primacy of the General Assembly in disarmament matters,
provided for future special sessions on disarmament,, and
reactivated the UN Disarmament Commission (which includes
all UN members). The one additional step that could be
taken along this line would be the convening, and perhaps
institutionalization, of a World Disarmament Conference
(WDC). The LDCs would look upon a WDC as a counterpart
in the disarmament field to the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development. But a WDC, having been cham-
pioned by the Soviets in recent years, has become as
much a Sino-Soviet and East-West issue as a North-South
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one, and LDC demand for it is likely to remain muted as
long as periodic special sessions of the General Assembly
are held.
A second objective is to increase LDC participation
in the more restricted forums that negotiate disarmament
agreements. Several measures to democratize the Com-
mittee on Disarmament (formerly the Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament) in Geneva have recently been
taken to satisfy LDC wishes, including replacement of
the US-Soviet cochairmanship by a rotating chair, an
expansion of membership (with six of the eight newcomers
being LDCs), and greater access to the Committee for
nonmembers. The Committee's proceedings will also be
opened to public view--a change that supports the LDC
objective of mobilizing opinion. These reforms will not,
however, prevent the superpowers from continuing to nego-
tiate privately and involving the Committee only after
they have reached agreement between themselves. This
limitation is likely to generate frustration among the
LDCs in the coming months (especially if the negotiations
on chemical weapons limitation and a comprehensive test
ban stagnate) and to lead to demands for further democ-
ratization of the negotiation process, although it is
unclear what specific measures might be proposed.
The third objective, and one that has thus far not
been met at all, is to obtain greater LDC involvement in
monitoring arms control agreements. In fact, the LDCs as
a group have not yet clearly articulated this as a demand,
but it is the logical sequel to democratization of the
deliberative and negotiating bodies. It also is portended
in the favorable LDC response to France's proposal for an
international satellite verification agency. The French
scheme appeals to the LDCs because it asserts and applies
the principle that arms control is the legitimate con-
cern of all states, not just those with the technological
means to monitor the process unilaterally. This assures
continued LDC support for the proposal--which France
seems determined to press--even though few, if any, of
these states can confidently predict how such an agency
might impinge on their own military activities.
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The Military Technology Gap
The limited operational range and sophistication
of their military forces is the second characteristic
that shapes the LDCs' positions on disarmament. it is
clearly reflected in their priorities for disarmament
negotiations; they place the advanced weapons they do
not possess (nuclear, followed by chemical, incendiary,
and other weapons of mass destruction) at the top of
their list of weapons to be controlled or eliminated,
with conventional weapons and the reduction of armed
forces at the bottom. It.also leads them to favor
measures that restrict the long-ranee operations of
the major powers' forces--hence their support for zones
of peace and nuclear-weapons-free zones and their de-
nunciation of foreign military bases and overseas troop
deployments. Rooted in memories of the colonial era,
these positions continue to receive the LDCs' collec-
tive endorsement even though many of them maintain a
military relationship with a major power or turn a blind
eye toward Cuban intervention in Africa.
This is not just a tactic of keeping the burden of
disarmament off their own backs and placing it on those
of the developed countries. It also reveals a degree of
technological envy. The LDCs express more distress about
qualitative improvements in weapons--a game they have
little ability to play--than about quantitative arms
racing, even when the discussion is confined to the super-
powers' arsenals. This is why they often seem to give
higher priority to a comprehensive test ban treaty than
to a SALT II agreement. They see the first as a restric-
tion on further refinements in nuclear weapons but the
second as a framework that would permit such refinements.
It is also why they call for a prohibition of new weapons
of mass destruction, even though no one can adequately
describe such weapons. Conversely, they give little
attention to technologically irrelevant measures like
the reduction of military budgets, despite the rhetorical
mileage they get out of condemning total global military
spending.
LDCs view some arms control issues as technology
transfer issues as well. Conventional arms transfer:;
provide a case in point. Some LDCs view arms transfer
restraint as a device intended by developed states to
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restrict the dissemination of technology (including
that having commercial as well as military uses) for
their own benefit. This suspicion exists among customers
who wish to buy the most advanced equipment as well as
among budding arms producers who chafe over restrictions
accompanying licensed production and co-production ar-
rangements. Another technology transfer related issue
is nuclear proliferation, with even those LDCs that
support the Nonproliferation Treaty stressing the im-
portance of ensuring fair access to nuclear energy
technology. These concerns are likely to continue
unabated because they complement the campaign the LDCs
are waging in other forums to increase transfers of all
types of technology from the North to the South. The
issue will receive even more attention with the approach
of the UN Conference on Science and Technology for De-
velopment, scheduled for the autumn of 1979.
The Rejection of Nuclear Deterrence
The nuclear balance is the foundation of the stra-
tegic relationship between the superpowers (and between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact), but the LDCs have no direct
role in managing it. This leads them to doubt whether
such a balance can, or should, be managed at all. They
see themselves as sharing the dangers but not the bene-
fits of nuclear deterrence; they would suffer from a
nuclear war but the values that would be defended in
such a war would not be their values. The superpowers'
deterrent forces are, in fact, part of the very concen-
tration of military power that perpetuates what the LDCs
contend is an inequitable world order. They want to
change that order, not manage it. Consequently, they
deny the utility of nuclear deterrence and reject any
notion of "winning" a nuclear war.
From this basis, LDC spokesmen easily spin several
themes that appeal not only to themselves but also to
many people in Western countries. One is that a reliance
on nuclear deterrence violates the commitments in the
UN Charter to settle disputes peacefully and not to
threaten the use of force. A second is that the nuclear
balance is inherently unstable because each innovation
in weapons design begets another--'a theme that also
reflects the LDC concern over qualitative improvements.
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The LDCs are quick to denounce new developments in
nuclear weapons but slow to distinguish one development
from another or to consider how deterrence might be made
more stable. For example, they criticize the enhanced
radiation warhead ("neutron bomb") as yet another quali-
tative improvement, but LDCs that are not obvious Soviet
clients are reluctant to follow the Soviet lead in
singling it out from other qualitative improvements,
and few LDCs seem to care about its effect on stability.
They consider the warhead's impact on the military
balance in Europe and the course of any war there--
subjects of much concern in Western diplomatic and de-
fense circles--as irrelevant to their concerns. Pro-
posals intended to enhance stability without changing
the number or sophistication of weapons (so-called
confidence building measures, such as advance notifica-
tion of maneuvers) arouse little LDC interest at all.
Disarmament and Development
The LDCs' desire for accelerated economic develop-
ment and a greater transfer of resources from the indus-
trialized world shapes their multilateral diplomacy more
fully, in more forums, than any other goal or attribute
they share. Disarmament is less directly related to
these objectives than are the strictly economic subjects
that have been addressed in many international confer-
erences. Furthermore, any relationship between military
spending and economic development within the LDCs is
variable and complex, with some countries (South Korea
being the outstanding example) demonstrating that a
large defense budget is not necessarily incompatible
with rapid economic growth. Nevertheless, the LDCs
link disarmament to development by blaming the developed
countries' military spending, much more than their own,
for retarding their economic progress.
The LDCs point out, first, that arms and armed
forces consume resources that could otherwise be used
for development assistance. Second, a continuing arms
race with its accompanying tensions encourages the major
powers to distort the flow of aid so that it reflects
their political and strategic objectives more than the
economic needs of LDCs. Third, an arms race, by ham-
pering international cooperation generally, makes it
more difficult for the LDCs to promote and achieve a
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New International Economic Order (NIEO). Finally,
the LDCs contend that high military spending causes
economic dislocations (principally inflation) in the
developed countries that spread through the world
economy and, in a deleterious trickle-down process,
harm the LDCs as much as anyone.
By focusing attention on the developed countries'
spending even when the alleged harm occurs in the Third
World, these arguments promote LDC consensus and avoid
embarrassing questions about the LDCs' own military
spending. These same purposes are served by the LDC
responses to specific proposals that relate to military
spending. They show little interest, for example, in
participating in a universal system of reporting of
military expenditures, even though they welcome European
initiatives that acknowledge a link between development
and disarmament (such as a French proposal for an Inter-
national Disarmament Fund for Development). Similarly,
reluctance to discuss conventional arms transfers stems
in part from the fact that such transfers account for a
larger proportion of military spending by LDCs than by
developed countries, and thus any such discussion would
necessarily concentrate on LDC purchases.
The inclination of LDCs to talk more about military
spending in the industrialized world than about the
effects their own expenditures have on development high-
lights the extent to which they see disarmament in
North-South terms. This becomes even clearer when their
spokesmen turn the disarmament-development link around,
as they often do, and describe disarmament as not only
a precondition but a consequence of the NIEO. Reducing
the disparity between rich an poor and the vulnerability
of LDCs to external control, they believe, would remove
a source of instability and an impetus to arms racing.
This definition of the problem justifies their use of
disarmament forums to articulate economic demands and,
to this extent, brings arms racing into line with
population growth and pollution as problems that the
LDCs prefer to describe more as effects than as causes
of their principal grievance, that is, economic in-
equality.
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North and South in Future Disarmament Debates
The LDCs' interest in disarmament as a multilateral
issue will continue unabated for the foreseeable future
because, as discussed above, a distinctive group per-
spective on the subject is rooted in several of the at-
tributes that LDCs share and that set them apart from the
developed world. In addition, this perspective neatly
meshes with some favorite LDC themes, particularly the
NIEO. With broadened LDC participation in disarmament
forums, the subject will be an even more convenient
vehicle for the South to press its demands against the
North.
Because the LDC disarmament platform rests on
several sweeping proposals--aimed at disarmament in the
narrow sense, not just arms control--that are unlikely
to be adopted in the next few years, the platform will
probably remain largely unchanged during this time. In
most respects, SSOD II will resemble SSOD I. Any change
that does occur in the LDC posture, and in the tenor of
disarmament debates in the General Assembly, will be
largely due to three factors.
The first is the overall course of the North-South
dialogue on economic issues. Any acrimony in this dia-
logue is likely to spill over into the disarmament de-
bate, with LDC dissatisfaction in one arena encouraging
LDC inflexibility in the other.
A second factor is the arms control diplomacy of
developed countries. Progress in major East-West
negotiations--especially the comprehensive test ban and
SALT III--will temper the LDCs' sense of outrage and
urgency, while lack of progress will fuel it. Also,
LDC interest in many disarmament questions will continue
to be stimulated by initiatives of developed countries.
The sponsor may genuinely share an interest with LDCs
(for example, France and a satellite verification
agency), or it may be more concerned with scoring diplo-
matic points (probably the USSR's chief motivation in
proposing a treaty on mass destruction weapons). We can
expect more initiatives of both types in the coming
years.
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The third factor is the degree to which the LDCs can
maintain a united front on disarmament in the face of
the many differences that divide them. The group's
cohesion affects not only the degree to which the LDCs
can press their case against the developed world but
also their disarmament agenda. This is because the
most important issues for the group are not always the
most important ones for its individual members, even its
leading members. For example, the group emphasizes
the disarmament-development link because it complements
so well the economic demands it makes in other forums,
but this question receives less attention in many LDC
capitals than nuclear proliferation, arms transfers, and
regional arms control--issues that bear more directly
on the security of many states.
Although much will depend on these variables, SSOD
II is likely to be more contentious, perhaps with resort
to voting instead of consensus, than SSOD I. One reason
for this is simply the passage of time and the likeli-
hood that so many LDC demands will still be unfulfilled.
Those among the LDCs who favor a tough approach will
be able to argue that a more conciliatory approach has
already been tried and has failed to produce concrete
results. Their argument will fall on particularly re-
ceptive ears if the major powers appear to be approach-
ing the session, as they approached SSOD I, with the
intention of limiting diplomatic damage rather than
taking significant new initiatives. Another reason is
that there are many conflicts and tensions in world
politics capable of disrupting a world conference or a
UN General Assembly session, and it was perhaps only by
luck that none of them managed to disrupt SSOD I. In
fact, an initiative by radical Arab states to condemn
military and nuclear cooperation with Israel came peril-
ously close to destroying the consensus procedure at the
session. A US diplomat later described the achievement
of consensus as a "diplomatic miracle"; only an invet
ate optimist would expect two miracles in a row. 25X1
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ASEAN: D namics of Arms Transfers and Receptivity to
Restraints
A US-initiated or sponsored proposal to restrict
arms sales to Southeast Asia could have an adverse
impact on US relations with the ASEAN states--Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand. In the absence of a formal security
arrangement, the ASEAN states tend to measure the US
commitment to their security by the size of the flow
of US economic and military assistance to the region.
Some of these countries have already expressed appre-
hension about the credibility of the US commitment to
their security because of US arms sales restrictions
and human rights problems. Attempts to place formal
restraints on arms flows--not only from the US but
also from other suppliers--could heighten ASEAN fears
that the US is abandoning the region and could moti-
vate these countries to increase their arms purchases
enerall and to seek new non-US sources of supply.
Trends and Patterns
The five ASEAN states accounted for about 80 per-
cent--or US $2,015.8 million--of total arms sales to
Southeast Asian nations during the 1973-77 period; Indo-
nesia and Thailand received the most and Singapore the
least.* In 1978 the ASEAN states spent, on the average,
between 14 and 15 percent of their budgets and 4 percent
of their GNPs on defense, compared with an average of 6
percent of GNP for all LDCs. While the total volume of
defense expenditures has increased since 1975, the de-
fense portion of total government budgets has actually
stayed the same or declined in all the ASEAN states ex-
cept Thailand. Moreover, as a percentage of GNP, defense
*See table 1. The other Southeast Asian states are Burma,
Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam.
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Arms Sales to ASEAN
1973-77, By Recipient*
(Millions of US Dollars)
INDONESIA 17.6 99.5 194.7 255.1 124.3 691.2
MALAYSIA 41 61.2 22.1 102.3 49.4 276.0
Cl,
hn
r PHILIPPINES 31.5 48.3 78.5 71.7 93.9 323.9
9i
y SINGAPORE 20.2 17.5 20.8 58.7 120.4 237.6
THAILAND 88.6 58.6 47.4 141.8 150.7 487.1
$2,015.8
*Sales are understood as agreements reached not actual deliveries.
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expenditures for all these countries have declined
since 1975.* Purchases of missile boats, fighter and
transport aircraft, and tanks accounted for the bulk of
this spending.
The United States has dominated the ASEAN arms
market. During the 1973-77 period, its share was sub-
stantially higher (52 percent) than that of its nearest
competitor, the Netherlands (10 percent), and has been
steadily increasing. Total volume of US arms sales to
the five ASEAN states has also steadily grown from about
US $110 million in 1973 to US $397 million in 1977. The
remainder of ASEAN arms were provided by such other, pri-
marily non-Communist states, as Australia, West Germany,
France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Sweden Israel,
Yugoslavia, and South Korea (see table 3). 25X1
Motives for Acquiring Arms
Two major motives drive much of the arms acquisi-
tions by the ASEAN nations. These are to maintain internal
security and stability and to develop a limited but cred-
ible external defense capability. Like many other Third
World countries, the ASEAN states are concerned with in-
ternal challenges in the form of both active insurgencies
and endemic economic and political instability. The
process of modernization is inherently destabilizing and
sometimes releases forces that are difficult to control.
Ruling elites find their positions threatened whether or
not they succeed in stimulating development. The line
between threats to the nation and threats to themselves
is often blurred because they tend to view any threat to
their leadership as a challenge to national security.
Perception of a direct military threat, for example,
invasion by the Indochinese countries--and by Vietnam
in particular--increases in proportion to geographic:
proximity to these states. Thailand is very concerned,
at present, over Vietnam's intentions toward Kampuchea
There does not appear to be, however, a direct correlation be-
tween defense expenditures and the extent of military involvement
in or control of the government. In fact, two civilian govern-
ments, Malaysia and Singapore, spent a higher percentage of their
GNP on arms in 1978 than any of the military governments (see
table 2).
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Defense Budgets, 1973-78
(Millions of US Dollars)
FY
Percen
Defense Budget Govern
t of Central
ment Budget
Percent of GNP
BURMA*
1973
111.2
6.3
4.5
1974
4.5
0.4
0.3
1975
113.5
6.0
5.0
1976
132.6
5.8
4.8
1977
146.2
6.2
4.7
1978
155.2
INDONESIA
5.5
3.7
1973
433.7
20.8
3.0
1974
492.8
17.6
3.4
1975
708.7
18.9
3.5
1976
1,100.0
16.7
3.8
1977
1,261.9
14.0
3.0
1978
1,513.5
MALAYSIA
14.8
3.0
1973
296.7
15.8
4.1
1974
437.8
19.4
6.2
1975
477.1
15.5
5.5
1976
500.0
17.3
4.9
1977
547.6
12.5
4.4
1978
697.8
PHILIPPINES
13.4
4.1
1973
162.7
21.6
1.8
1974
294.6
18.5
3.3
1975
529.2
27.4
4.0
1976
524.1
16.8
3.1
1977
674.8
18.0
3.4
1978
793.1
17.2
3.1
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Table 2 (Continued)
SINGAPORE
1973
227.0
24.3
5.0
1974
236.1
19.0
4.2
1975
268.2
14.7
4.8
1976
386.3
18.5
6.1
1977
413.5
18.5
5.9
1978
413.0
THAILAND
16.6
6.0
1973
276.8
18.2
3.6
1974
326.5
17.0
4.2
1975
377.9
16.1
4.0
1976
515.1
16.7
3.2
1977
603.9
17.9
3.8
1978
804.2
20.3
3.6
*1973 data are for the period 1 October 1972 to 30 September
1973. Data for 1974 include only the 6-month transitional period,
1 October 1973 to 31 March 1974. Subsequent fiscal years end on
31 March.
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Major Arms Suppliers to Southeast Asia (1973-77)
Total Deliveries
Percent
FRG 3%- Other 5%
Israel 7%-
Spain 5%
Yugoslavia 5%i
Netherlands'
11%
4%
Australia
6% ...
Netherlands 3%
Yugoslavia
Sweden 3%-
Israel 3% FRG 3%
UK 4%
Singapore
Italy 3% -Other 6%
Other 3%\
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and the implications of this for Thai security. The
Philippines is concerned about potential confrontation
with Vietnam over rival claims to oil-rich islands in
the Spratly group, although China's involvement as an-
other claimant poses a reassuring deterrent to Vietnamese
aggressiveness. Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, how-
ever, feel that the Vietnamese threat will probably not
materialize for at least the next five years. Nor would
indirect external threats--such as outside support to in-
surgent movements, a possible sharp increase in Soviet
naval power in the region, or other forms of subver *--
necessitate a military response in the near future. 25X1
Although ASEAN governments justify the majority of
their arms acquisitions by the need to combat domestic
insurgencies, it is apparent that their purchases are
motivated at least in part by considerations other than
internal security. Much of the equipment presently
being considered or purchased--F-5E fighter planes, fast
patrol boats equipped with guided missiles, sophisticated
air defense systems--is clearly not appropriate for coun-
terinsurgency, jungle-type warfare. Moreover, Singapore,
which has consistently spent the highest percentage--6
percent--of its GNP on defense of all the ASEAN states,
has no insurgency problem at all. 25X1
It is more likely that the desire to bolster na-
tional pride, self-confidence and prestige, and to
achieve self-defined levels of force preparedness as a
hedge against future contingencies, are the primary im-
pulses behind ASEAN armed forces modernization and ex-
pansion programs. In addition, in several states, mili-
tary establishments play dominant roles in domestic
politics and their interests must be accommodated. In
the case of Indonesia, keeping the military satisfied is
also necessary to maintain the morale and status of an
institution deemed vital for social and economic devel-
opment. Similarly, the civilian government of the Phil-
ippines has acquired weapons as a means of guaranteeing
the loyalty and support of its senior military officers.
Finally, in many of these poor LDCs, the armed forces
are catered to because they provide employment aild thus
help to alleviate social and economic pressures.
*The Malaysians and Singaporeans are paranoid about Soviet KGB
activities--and the Indonesians about the CIA--in the region. All
are concerned about China's influence among the overseas Chinese.
27 December 1978
19
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The ASEAN governments are not now seeking large
amounts of military aid or equipment on cash or credit
terms. Given a large amount of money with which to buy
arms, many of these states would probably seek more
equipment. Political/economic priorities and financial
constraints, however, preclude such expenditures for the
foreseeable future. The overwhelming majority of the
ASEAN countries have clearly given priority to economic
development. Civilian and military leaders alike recog-
nize that the solution to problems of insurgency and
instability demands social and economic development pro-
grams in at least equal proportions to military opera-
tions. Hence, their limited financial resources have
been allocated to development, which reduces signifi-
cantly the amount available to purchase arms. In some
cases, too, ASEAN governments are reluctant to seek
major new foreign military assistance for fear of pro-
voking domestic political criticism of "dependence" on
the supplier and/or of generating a counter-buildup of
Indochinese military forces. As a result of these con-
straints, most of these governments have decided to re-
place outmoded equipment as resources become available,
to weigh carefully new purchases for cost-effectiveness
and suitability to existing levels of technical know-how,
and, as in the case Indonesia, to defer more ambitious
programs.
Military Cooperation and Indigenous Production
The ASEAN members have eschewed the use of force in
their relations with each other and with other regional
states. The five countries have forged ties of economic,
political, and military cooperation that have enabled
them to resolve their territorial conflicts without resort
to arms. The last armed conflict--between Indonesia and
Malaysia--ended in 1967. Within the ASEAN group, there
is also no hegemonic aspirant or recognized regional
leader.* Moreover, despite their political and economic
*Indonesia, by reason of its sheer size, its revolutionary and
Third World credentials, and its strongly anti-Communist military
government, considers itself the natural leader in non-Communist
Southeast Asia. Other ASEAN members, however, remain suspicious
of Indonesia's historical penchant for expansionism and feel that
they have stronger political and economic credentials to be the
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differences, there is a genuine appreciation on the part
of all five that they stand or fall together and that co-
operation is not only a cheaper but also a more effective
defense a ainst each other and against external enemies.
Military cooperation among the ASEAN states has
grown but is confined to bilateral or, at most, tri-
lateral agreements outside the ASEAN context. The five
countries have firmly rejected the idea of a collective
military pact, at least for the time being. They be-
lieve such an alliance would not only goad Vietnam but
would also be pointless since they see the primary
threat to them as being one of domestic insurgency
rather than external aggression.
One form that military cooperation has taken is
pursuit of a limited degree of complementarity of mili-
tary equipment and weapons. Indonesia has taken the
lead in promoting standardization of ASEAN equipment to
make mutual help easier and arms purchases more economi-
cal. Nonetheless, even though the ASEAN countries often
exchange experiences and information before purchasing
certain equipment, they do not always take complementar-
ity into consideration when deciding on specific arms
purchases. For example, the fact that two of the five
possess the US-made F-5E fighter aircraft is based more
on their preference for American equipment than on a de-
sire for common weapons. In addition, constrained by
scarce funds, the individual countries often sacrifice
desires for complementarity for the best deal they can
make. Even the Indonesians are contemplating purchases
of a French Mirage instead of the F-5E because the fi-
nancial terms are better and the delivery time shorter.
Motivated partly by nationalistic resentment of de-
pendence on foreign economic and military assistance and
partly by doubts about security of supply, a number of
the ASEAN members--Indonesia, and to some extent also
Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines--have considered
creating individual and regional arms self-sufficiency
through local production. Only Singapore currently has
the industrial capacity and financial resources, however,
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to produce small arms for export. Other members are at-
tempting joint produc arms and ammunition
for their mutual use.
Expectations that ASEAN arms factories will produce
major quantities of military goods for export in the near
future are premature, but the member states will probably
pursue coproduction to develop both higher technological
capabilities and self-reliance and to generate additional
foreign exchange. The profit possibilities of arms sales
are especially appealing to Indonesia's military leader-
ship. Indonesia already produces light arms and ammuni-
tion for its own use at a military-owned and operated
factory in Bandung, and would like to sell abroad to
supplement the funds available for military salaries and
to finance long-tern modernization programs that cannot
be budgeted out of government revenues. In addition,
both Indonesia and the Philippines want to develop
aviation industries and sell to other countries.
Receptivity to Voluntary Conventional Arms Transfer
Restraints
The ASEAN countries at present perceive no need for
a formal regional agreement to control conventional arms
transfers, and it is likley that they would resist efforts
to negotiate one. Thus far, the ASEAN nations as a group
have not formally addressed the issue of conventional arms
control. Most have expressed individual opinions on dis-
armament in general, but their emphasis has been on
nuclear-weapons-free zones and on East-West arms reduc-
tions. The three states that are members of the Non-
Aligned Movement--Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore--
supported that group's resolution at the UN Special
Session on Disarmament (SSOD), which placed control of
nuclear, chemical, incendiary, and mass-destruct'
weapons ahead of conventional arms in priority. 25X1
Malaysia has been the major spokesman for ASEAN in
UN and nonaligned disarmament forums. It has, however,
been largely concerned with nuclear disarmament and with
promoting its initiative for a zope of peace, freedom
and neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southe4st Asia--a scheme in-
tended to remove that region from the area of great power
rivalry. ZOPFAN, however, has remained vague and unde-
fined since the ASEAN states agreed to support it in
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principle in 1971; it is not likely to be pursued seri-
ously until ASEAN and the Indochinese states resolve
their differences. At th}s stage, the Malaysian scheme
consists of principles for intraregional cooperation and
great power guarantees, and it would not be a suitable
foundation for conventional arms transfer restraints.
Philippine participation in a regional arms control
agreement, particularly if US-initiated, would be com-
plicated by the presence of US bases in that country.
The Philippine Government has managed thus far to soften
the effects of unilateral US curbs on conventional arms
transfers through exploitation of Washington's interest
in maintaining military bases in the Philippines. From
Manila's point of view, establishment of a regional con-
ventional arms transfer control regime would be likely to
deprive it of at least some of the benefits it currently
derives from its favorable bargaining position.
Thailand's major concerns are the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and the competition between the arms-
producing superpowers. Thailand supported the SSOD dec-
laration but expressed concern that limiting international
arms sales might affect its ability to urchase weapons
for its own defense and for combating i.licit narcotic
traffic.
Singapore, the sole regional arms exporter, produces
small arms, ammunition, and patrol boats for its own use
and, increasingly, for export to Qther ASEAN members under
the guise of military cooperation. It has a co-production
arrangement with Thailand and is negotiating one with
Malaysia. Arms sales to Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Thailand amounted to US $40.6 million from 1973 to 1977
and accounted for 2 percent of total transfers to the
ASEAN countries. (Singapore has also sold arms worth
about $1.8 million to Kuwait.) A handicap to the further
expansion of Singapore's arms exports is that some of the
equipment it makes either includes foreign-made compon-
ents--such as the Israeli Gabriel guided missiles on the
patrol boats sold to Thailand--or is manufactured under
foreign license. In both cases, Singapore is required
to obtain permiss on from another supplier before it can
conclude a sale.
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Singapore is the only ASEAN state to advocate con-
trolling arms transfers to the region, reflecting its
sense of extreme vulnerability as a small and wealthy
city-state surrounded by large and poor countries. Sing-
apore is also better armed than its neighbors and would
obviously like to maintain this status. In it speech
during the SSOD general debate, Singapore acknowledged
that all nations--not just the superpowers--are respon-
sible (albeit to different degrees) for the arms race
and emphasized that all states must examine their own
conduct critically. Singapore also praised the Latin
American regional initiative to control acquisition of
arms for offensive purposes.* Privately, the Singaporean
Government has expressed its willingness to examine the
possibility of negotiating a similar agreement in South-
east Asia.
The success of any arms control agreement in South-
east Asia would require the full participation of Indo-
nesia, which is at present the least likely to agree to
restrict its purchases of arms. Political and psycho-
logical factors would make it extremely difficult for
the military government to agree to arms restraints.
Nationalist sentiments and xenophobic fears of foreign
manipulation, plus the military's own sense of pride
as a revolutionary force, would make Indonesia reluctant
even to participate in discussions initiated either wholly
by nonregional states or by other ASEAN members (and
Singapore, in particular) with nonregional support. In
addition, the necessity of placating junior officers who
are dissatisfied with the slow pace of upgrading military
equipment has caused the Suharto government and senior
military leaders to plan to accelerate military modern-
ization programs over the next several years. 25X1
Implications for ASEAN-US Relations
The ASEAN states, two of which are former members
of the SEATO security agreement (Thailand and the Phil-
ippines), are generally nonaligned but pro-West, and have
sought to maintain constructive relations with the United
States while keeping the USSR and China at arm's length.
They have responded positively to US policies encouraging
*A commitment undertaken by the eight Latin American signatories
of the 1974 Declaration of Ayapucho.
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them to maintain friendly relations with other states in
the region and to pursue responsible economic and fiscal
programs. Consequently, they feel that the United States
has a moral as well as a security responsibility to sup-
ply the military assistance they require, and continue
to look to the United States to uphold its stated commit-
ment to regional stability by providing a counterweight
to Soviet assistance to Vietnam. Hence, military assist-
ance from the United States has always been regarded by
the ASEAN states as a key symbolic barometer of US con-
cern for stability in Southeast Asia.
During the past few years, however, the ASEAN states
have voiced an uncertainty about US commitment to their
security, and about US military capabilities (naval
forces in particular) within the region. Under these
circumstances, US advocacy of regional arms transfer re-
straints could further undermine confidence in Washing-
ton's reliability and thus could even trigger something
of a local arms race. Moreover, while the ASEAN states
clearly prefer US equipment they have already demon-
strated a readiness to turn to other suppliers.
Nevertheless, the ASEAN states might be inclined to
support controls on the introduction of highly sophisti-
cated or clearly provocative types of weapons to the
region--largely because none currently plan to acquire
them. They would, however, probably oppose any restric-
tion on their abilities to improve the quality of their
forces in accordance with their own assessments of their
requirements for individual and collective self-defense.
Gaining a sympathetic hearing by the ASEAN states on
arms matters will depend not only on the substance of a
conventional arms transfer restraint proposal, but also
on the manner in which it is presented and the extent to
which the ASEAN states are consulted during the process.
Their preference for relying on the United States, not
only for arms but also for political and security sup-
port, their general dislike of the USSR, and their de-
sire not to antagonize Vietnam (which has the largest mil-
itary establishment in Southeast Asia) or China (whose
intentions they suspect) would make the ASEAN states es-
pecially sensitive to extraregional initiatives without
close prior consultation. Moreover, these factors would
probably lead them to insist on the inclusion of Vietnam
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and China in any regional scheme. Finally, Japan, al-
though not an arms supplier, is viewed by the ASEAN
states as an important economic and security partner,
and thus would probably also be considered as a neces-
sary participant,in any conventional arms transfer re-
straint scheme.
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The North-South Dialogue and US Relations With Key
Developing Countries
Since early 1974 the United States, with its OECD
partners, has engaged in a series of multilateral dis-
cussions and negotiations with developing countries
over various aspects of their demands for a New Inter-
national Economic Order (NIEO). The nature and sub-
stance of these talks--which have collectively come to
be called the "North-South Dialogue"--has shifted sev-
eral times during that period. It has moved, for ex-
ample, from moments of acrimonious confrontation over
the vaguest and most broadly defined issues to almost
complete consensus on certain limited technical issues
such as that reached last spring to provide debt re-
lief to the poorest developing countries. This article
assesses the impact of the North-South dialogue on US
bilateral relations with key developing countries and
on US interests in other multilateral forums. The
assessment focuses on the role of the dialogue in the
foreign policies of five key developing countries--
Venezuela, Jamaica, Nigeria, Indonesia, and India--and
is not directly concerned with the impact of the dia-
logue on the development needs of LDCs.
For the five developing countries in this assess-
ment, and for most other LDCs, participation in the
North-South dialogue is an integral part of their for-
eign policy. But the dialogue inevitably competes with
other issues for the attention and support of key LDC
policymakers, and thus often plays a secondary, although
still appreciable, role in the overall context of their
foreign policies and of their relations with the United
States.
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Decisions on North-South issues are generally
made in relative isolation from policies on other
multilateral issues or on bilateral diplomatic or com-
mercial relations with the United States. Senior of-
ficials, however, take a broad interest in the dialogue,
are aware of its overall status, and approve or oversee
policies in the dialogue at least in principle.
There is some, but not a great deal, of overlap
between the North-South dialogue and other multilateral
forums in the sense that success or failure in securing
objectives in one area is affected by progress or lack
of it in another. A protracted series of setbacks in
negotiations on NIEO issues would prompt certain LDCs
to express their dissatisfaction in multilateral and
bilateral forums, and would thus have a limited effect
on the atmosphere of these other meetings.
Nevertheless, one of the key LDC objectives in the
dialogue is to keep the United States and other indus-
trialized countries engaged in negotiations on issues
that the LDCs consider important to them. Only a US
decision to back off from participation in the dialogue
altogether--which would be interpreted as a calculated
rebuff--would significantly degrade US-LDC relations
Venezuela
Venezuela, under the leadership of President Carlos
Andres Perez, has made the New International Economic
Order one of the primary goals of an assertive foreign
policy that seeks new international influence and
prestige for Venezuela. Its policies on North-South
issues are based more on ideological and political mo-
tives than on a calculation of economic costs and
benefits. It is likely, however, that when a new ad-
ministration takes office in March 1979, other issues--
particularly the question of maximizing gover ent oil
income--will gain in relative importance.
The decisionmaking process in Venezuela is heavily
based on the principle that one man sets the general
tone and guidelines for national policies, which are
then implemented by the bureaucracy. That power is now
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concentrated in the hands of Perez and is delegated to
a handful of officials who will also lose their positions
with the change in administration.
While Venezuela will continue to be concerned with
most of the issues covered by the NIEO, its interest
in such issues as technology transfer to help reduce
its dependency on a dwindling oil supply, and growing
domestic economic concerns, will generally prevent
Caracas from seriously challenging in-
terests in bilateral or multilateral orums.
Jamaica
Jamaican political leaders believe that the North-
South dialogue has significant long-range importance
for their country, but they place a much higher priority
on bilateral relations with the United States. The
Jamaican Government will not allow North-South disagree-
ments to weaken these relations so long as the United
States supports the dialogue in principle.
Prime Minister Michael Manley, the chief architect
of Jamaica's foreign policy, has been in the forefront
of the demand for a New International Economic Order..
His views have been backed strongly by his influential
foreign minister, by Jamaica's highly respected perma-
nent representative to the United Nations, and by the
country's moderately inclined opposition leaders. Vir-
tually all informed Jamaicans instinctively approve of
the NIEO because of its apparent benefits for their
nation.
Most Jamaicans, however, are far more concerned
with the country's serious economic decline under Manley.
Because he believes that his best hope for help in
shoring up the Jamaican economy lies with the West,
Manley has been working energetically to improve rela-
tions with the United States, the largest potential
source of bilateral aid. Manley is unlikely to jeopar-
dize that relationship through bilateral actions or
moves in other international forums because of lack of
progress or even stagnation in the North-South dia-
logue.
27 December 1978
25X1
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Nigeria
Nigeria sees its participation in the North-South
dialogue primarily as a means of supporting its claim
to political leadership in Africa. Lagos sees rela-
tively few direct benefits accruing from its participa-
tion in the dialogue and gives priority to other
foreign policy goals. Lagos' view of the United States
is shaped mainly by its perceptions of US policy toward
southern Africa. Over the longer run, however, North-
South relations could have a growing impact on govern-
mental attitudes toward the United States.
Most foreign policy decisions in Nigeria are made
by senior members of the 24-man Supreme Military Council.
Most economic policy decisions are made at a somewhat
lower level by senior civil servants whose technical
expertise gives them the final say. With the scheduled
shift to civilian rule next October, Nigerian policies
in the North-South dialogue could become somewhat more
strident, although their relative importance in the
overall forei n polio framework would be unlikely to
increase.
As long as the problem of southern Africa persists,
the North-South dialogue is unlikely seriously to affect
US-Nigerian relations. If the North-South dialogue suf-
fered massive setbacks, Nigerian rhetoric would become
sharper. Should Western initiatives on the Rhodesian
and Namibian issues fail, Nigeria could well use North-
South forums to vent its frustration, and could become
increasingly hostile, suspicious, and reluctant to co-
Indonesia
Participation in nonaligned Third World forums has
always been a basic tenet of Indonesian foreign policy.
Under the Suharto government, however, the key foreign
policy relationships have been bilateral ones, princi-
pally those with the United States. Barring a serious
domestic political challenge that revived antiforeign
nationalism, the present regime is unlikely to permit
difficulties that arise in the context of the North-
South dialogue to affect its bilateral relations with
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Most North-South policies are formulated by a small
number of technocrats who are responsible for economic
development policies. Although its basic inclination
is toward modernization and compromise, the Foreign
Ministry stresses that Indonesia must maintain soli-
darity with other developing countries. This tension
is reflected in Indonesia's role as a "leading moderate"
th
"
ra
er than a
moderate leader."
Jakarta is already concerned that the United States
is becoming less interested in Southeast Asia in general
and Indonesia in particular. The Suharto government
would therefore be likely to react more strongly to a
negative US attitude in regional economic negotiations
than to US unresponsiveness in North-South negotiations.
It would also react strongly, however, to a US decision
to reduce or suspend its par icipation in the North-
South dialogue. I A
India
Active participation in the North-South dialogue
is, for India, a natural extension of a broadly based
foreign policy that calls for India to assume a leading
role in the Third World. Its regional position and re-
lations with the United States and the USSR are, however,
of more immediate concern to most Indian policymakers
than the North-South dialogue. India is a force for
moderation in the dialogue, in part because of its
interest in maintaining good relations with industrialized
countries that are potential markets for its ex
ort
p
s.
I
Indian policies on North-South issues are made at
the subcabinet level in both the Ministries of Finance
and External Affairs. Only major policy changes would
be determined by the top leadership. Indian representa-
tives to the UN in New York and Geneva apparently do not
play a major part in the policy formulation process, but
they have, as do other Indian representatives to North-
South meetings, broad discretion to adjust to tact'
circumstances during international meetings.
India's pragmatic approach to most issues suggests
that the North-South dialogue would rarely be a deter-
minant of Indian positions in other multilateral meetings,
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although it could be used as an excuse. India is
especially pleased with the recent increased frequency
and level of consultations with the United States on
North-South issues and could thus feel slighted if
the United States were to decrease or suspend its par-
ticipation in the dialogue.
The North-South Dialogue and Other US Multilateral
Interests
A fundamental aspect of the foreign policies of
almost all members of the Third World, particularly
those with a colonial experience, is the desire to se-
cure an increased measure of control over international
forces that affect them. They see this as an essential
next step in their pursuit of national independence and
self-determination and it is reflected in a broad range
of LDC efforts to increase their wealth and power. The
pursuit of a New International Economic Order is thus
linked to other LDC efforts to increase their ability
to influence, if not control, issues that are important
to them--such as the international dissemination of
nuclear-power technology or the control of conventional
arms sales. Support for the concept of an NIEO, in the
eyes of most LDC leaders, is one of the least contro-
versial stands they can take, even while the developing
countries fight almost endlessly among themselves in
the LDC caucus, the Group of 77, over specifics tactics,
and strategy for the implementation of an NIEO.
LDCs participate in the dialogue for a number of
political and economic reasons. Their economic aspira-
tions often provide motivation, but do not satisfactorily
explain their apparent preoccupation with the dialogue.
While many LDCs, for example, recognize that some aspects
of the NIEO may be either of no economic benefit, or
even detrimental to them, they continue to give general
support to Group of 77 demands for its implementation.
The motivations underlying political support for the
NIEO range from the obvious and direct to the obscure
and subtle. Virtually all LDC leaders, for example,
can get some domestic mileage out of support for the
NIEO because it is a widely popular concept. For some
of these leaders, the notion is more important, and
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sometimes more palatable, than its actual content. For
some LDCs, supporting or even leading the struggle for an
NIEO is a necessary ingredient of their effort to boost
their regional or international status, and supporting
it in international meetings provides a good opportunity
to flex their diplomatic muscles. For others, the bloc
politics of the Group of 77 and the nonaligned movement,
which depend on reciprocal support of demands that may
be of no immediate interest to some members, provides
the rationale to support the NIEO. Finally, the pursuit
of the NIEO in UN and other forums holds symbolic value
for many LDC leaders. Because it forces industrialized
countries to negotiate with them, on an agenda the LDCs
have chosen, and in forums that are more congenial to
them than any others, they see it as a model for future
relations with the industrialized countries on all is-
r__ I
07e
s
Multilateral Spillover
The multiplicity of conflicting objectives that
most LDCs attempt to reconcile occasionally leads some
of them publicly to advocate a multilateral position
Conflicting objectives also contribute to an incon-
sistency between LDC policies on the North-South dia-
logue and their policies in other multilateral forums.
The structure of the system of international organiza-
tions, as it has evolved through the period of decoloniza-
tion, has often pitted industrialized countries against
newly created developing countries in virtually all
multilateral forums. It would thus be relatively easy
to detect an apparent "North-South" polarity in virtually
all international meetings--including such forums as the
UN General Assembly, the World Food Council, the UN
Disarmament Committee, the International Atomic Energy
Agency, and the UN Educational, Social, and Cultural
Organization. The alliances that appear in these
forums are often superficially simil4r to those in the
North-South dialogue. But in these other settings the
proceedings tend to reflect particular political, se-
curity, and economic concerns rather than the status of
negotiations on an NIEO. Moreover, LDCs also have in-
terests directly related to non-NIEO issues that arise
in other multilateral forums, and they are likely to
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allow them to be influenced by the current state of the
North-South dialogue only when it serves their objective
in those forums. Thus, the individual logic, agenda,
and dynamics of these meetings are more likely to de-
termine the acceptance or rejection of US positions
than is spillover from the North-South dialogue.
Many LDCs would certainly be disappointed by a
series of setbacks to their demands for various aspects
of a New International Economic Order, and their level
of dissatisfaction would increase with the number of
setbacks. Their displeasure with slow or nonexistent
progress in negotiations would be reflected in some in-
crease in the level of rhetoric, making the atmosphere of
most LDC meetings with the US, bilateral or multilateral,
somewhat more contentious. Moreover, setbacks in the
North-South dialogue provide the opportunity for ex-
pressing, at relatively low cost from the LDC point of
view, a certain amount of_dissatisfaction with the US
position in other forums. In this context the North-
South dialogue becomes more an excuse for, than the
cause of, a deterioration in an LDC's relations with the
US. ~_ 7
Only a declaration by the United States that its
future participation in any NIEO-related matters would
be restricted--for example, subject to case-by-case re-
view--would have a significant degrading impact on US-LDC
relations. Many would view such a move as a sharp re-
versal of a policy of engagement in the dialogue that
the United States has maintained since the Seventh
Special Session of the UN in 1975. Even for those LDCs
who pay only lip service to the NIEO, such a move would
be viewed as a direct challenge to their right to use
multilateral diplomacy to satisfy their policy objectives.
US curtailment of its participation could therefore
raise doubts in the minds of many LDC leaders, including
those inclined to be well disposed toward the United
States, concerning US willi ness to negotiate sincerely
in any multinational forum.
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