INTERNATIONAL ISSUES MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: December 20, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

National Secret
p V or Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002 - 25X1
Assessment
Center
International Issues
Monthly Review
State Dept. review Secret
completed RP All 77-012
20 December 1977
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INTERNATIONAL ISSUES MONTHLY REVIEW
20 December 1977
CONTENTS
ARMS TRANSFERS
ARMS TRANSFERS AND LEVERAGE. . ... . . . . . . . . .
one issue raised by current efforts to restrain
conventional arms transfers is their role as
a form of leverage--a means for a supplier to
influence the policies of a recipient. This
article provides a framework for assessing
the likely outcome of attempts to use arms
to exert influence, revealing the reasons
a manipulation of arms transfers often fails
to achieve its objective.
NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS
THE COMMON FUND NEGOTIATIONS: SOME TIME,
NEXT YEAR? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
The Group of 77 decision to suspend the com-
mon fund negotiations at Geneva will probably
lead the West Europeans and Japanese to ac-
cept limited direct government contributions
to the fund and voluntary financing of develop-
ment measures. The LDCs would probably agree
to reopen the negotiations on the basis of
these concessions, even though they fall short
of their demands.
JAMAICA AND THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE . . . . . . . .. 15
There are conflicting pressures on Jamaican
leaders as they formulate that Caribbean
country's policy in the North-South dialogue.
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As these forces sort themselves out, there
will be an uneven character to Jamaican policy
that will affect its relations with the US
as well as with the LDCs.
HUMAN RIGHTS
REFUGEES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN ISSUE IN
US-ASEAN RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
The five members of the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN) are concerned that
the growing numbers of Vietnamese refugees
Landing on their shores will cause serious
domestic problems. Such concern has Zed most
of the governments to adopt hostile policies
despite US and UNHCR criticism that such
policies violate the refugees' human rights.
PSYCHIATRY AND DISSENT IN THE USSR. . . . . . . . . . 26
This article examines the Soviet practice of
using psychiatry as a means of suppressing
dissent. It explores the historical roots of
this policy and projects its likely continua-
tion despite international censure.
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
THE POLITICS OF UN RESTRUCTURE: THE ISSUE OF A
SECRE'PARIAT DEVELOPMENT POST . . . . . . . . . . . 33
The controversy surrounding the appointment of
a high-level secretariat position for de-
velopment did not end with the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on Restructure's compromise on the
issue. The months ahead promise increased
political pressure from the LDCs, who want
the post to rank second only to the Secretary
General.
This publication is prepared by the international Issues Division, Office of Regional
and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
National Foreign Assessment Center. The views presented are the best judgments of
individual analysts who are aware that many of the issues they discuss are subject to
alternative interpretation. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be
directed to the authors of the individual articles.
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Arms Transfers and Leverage
One issue raised by current efforts to restrain con-
ventional arms transfers is their role as a form of lever-
age--as a means for a supplier to influence the policies
of a recipient. This article provides a general assess-
ment of the factors at work that influence the efficacy
of arms transfer as a means to exert leverage. Articles
in subsequent issues of this monthly will attempt to apply
the framework to individual regions and countries. Thus,
the reactions of readers to the present article will be
particularly appreciated.
Although Leverage varies from one case to another,
three general factors can be identified that generally
tend to enhance leverage or diminish it. The first is
the overall relationship between supplier and recipient.
(What other Levers of influence can each side use against
the other?) The second is the objective for which Lever-
age is being used. (How important is it to each side
that its will prevail?) The third is the arms transfer
itself. This is mainly a matter of assessing the stake
that each side has in a transfer of arms. It also re-
quires one to take account of the peculiar characteris-
tics that set arms transfers apart from other possible
means of influence.*
A review of these factors reveals why arms transfers
have often failed to provide suppliers with sufficient
Leverage to accomplish their objectives. Arms transfers
generally can be successfully exploited on matters of
*In using this framework, however, it should be remembered
that Leverage ultimately depends not on how the analyst or
any third party perceives the supplier-recipient relation-
ship, but on how the recipient perceives it. Mispercep-
tions often are more important than material facts in
determining the outcome of an attempt at influence. It
is useful to know how another government should be think-
ing (that is, to note the bargaining chips and resources
available to it), but this is not a substitute for exam-
ining how it actually does think.
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small importance to the recipient, but seldom on issues
that it sees as involving threats to its security. And
what influence arms transfers do provide does not neces-
sarily require a previously nurtured patron-client rela-
tionship; a promise of future supply is apt to be at least
as effective in influencing another state as a threat to
interrupt an existing flow of arms.
The Overall Bilateral Relationship
An assessment of the extent to which an arms trans-
fer will be effective as a means of influence must begin
Dy placing the supply of arms within the context of the
overall relationship between supplier and recipient. Even
a large arms transfer constitutes only part of that rela-
tionship; nonmilitary commerce, diplomatic initiatives,
and the sundry other opportunities one state has for co-
operating with or placing demands on another are also
parts of it. A government, in deciding whether to resist
or to yield to another's pressures, must consider all of
the ways each side may impose costs or bestow benefits
on the other. Even if arms transfers themselves furnish
a supplier with substantial leverage, the advantage they
afford in any individual case may be offset by counter-
leverage possessed by the recipient. A recipient's con-
trol over vital natural resources is an example of such
counterleverage; the possibility of an interruption in
supply of the resource may well negate the effects of a
possible interruption in the supply of arms.
The Supplier's Objective
The outcome of an attempt to exert influence also
depends upon the nature of the supplier's objective, and
especially upon the importance each party attaches to the
issue at hand. The more vital a state believes an issue
to be, the less likely any form of leverage--whether based
on arms transfers or on anything else--will be sufficient
to induce it to accede to the demands of another state.
This is one reason arms embargoes have so frequently
failed to achieve an objective for which they have often
been used: to induce a recipient to desist from using
arms to wage war against, or to occupy, a neighboring
country. It is precisely in such a circumstance that the
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recipient believes that its central interests are at stake
while those of the supplier are not. Furthermore, the
recipient is likely to perceive a cut-off of arms during
this kind of emergency as a hostile act in itself,
making the recipient even less susceptible to any kind
of influence. The probable response is a stiffening of
resistance rather than compliance. This was, for example,
the response of Turkey to the embargo of US arms follow-
ing Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974.
A manipulation of arms transfers generally is in--
effective in attaining this kind of objective even though
it offers the possibility of directly affecting the re-
cipient's ability to carry out the unwanted action.
After all, restricting the flow of arms may make it harder
for the recipient to prosecute a war. This means the
recipient must consider an interruption of supply not
just as one more cost to weigh against the benefits of
persisting in its course of action, but also as a possible
impediment to attaining the benefits in the first place.
It also means the supplier might be able to inhibit the
recipient's war-making even if the latter never does de-
cide to yield directly to diplomatic demands. But even
these additional pressures on the recipient may prove
insufficient to achieve the desired result. In addition
to the considerations already mentioned, the direct
effect of an embargo (even one universally applied) on
the recipient's military capability may simply be too
little or too late. The arms that are being supplied
may not be those most crucial to the military effort.
And the recipient might be able to attain its chief
goals through a short victorious war before the effects
of any arms embargo could be felt, as Turkey was able
to do in Cyprus.
The leverage inhering in arms transfers is more
likely to be effective on matters that, though important
.to the supplier, are of relatively little consequence to
the recipient. A small but very helpful favor will appear,
to the recipient, to be a cheap price to pay if it helps to
purchase subsequent military cooperation. It may seem
a small price even if the supplier's future help is only
a possibility that is not backed up by a formal promise.
Pakistan's cooperation in arranging Henry Kissinger's se-
cret visit to China in 1971 was probably extended in the
hope of being somehow repaid in the form of future US favors.
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It was in Pakistan's interest to pay the tiny costs in-
volved (providing a cover story for a US official) on a
matter of great importance to the United States. A more
recent example was Somalia's permission to West Germany
to assault a hijacked aircraft at the Mogadiscio airport.
Again, the costs of granting the favor were modest (having
to tolerate a single, small foreign operation on Somali
territory), while the benefits to West Germany were large
(rescue of the passengers and a major setback to the
terrorists). Even though Bonn evidently made no explicit
promises of West German arms, the possibility of military
support from Bonn or its allies made cooperation seem a
worthwhile investment to the embattled Somalis.
A promise to initiate or increase a flow of arms is
likely to be more effective than other forms of leverage
when a bolstering of the recipient's conventional military
strength would make compliance seem less dangerous to it.
For example, the assurance of further shipments of US arms
helped to induce the Israelis to withdraw in the Sinai
because an augmentation of their arsenal made withdrawal
seem less dangerous to them. Similar reasoning would
apply to efforts to dissuade a nonnuclear state that feels
militarily vulnerable (such as Pakistan, Taiwan, or South
Korea) from acquiring nuclear weapons. The promise of
additional conventional arms may be more effective than
other types of leverage in accomplishing this objective,
because the conventional arms would help to serve the
defensive or deterrent function that nuclear ones might
otherwise serve.
Each Side's Stake in an Arms Transfer
Once the supplier's objective and the other aspects
of the supplier-recipient relationship are taken into
account, an assessment of the leverage obtainable through
arms transfers focuses on the nature of the arms transfer
itself. This is chiefly a matter of gauging the stake
each party has in the particular transfer of arms, whether
this be the continuation of an existing arms flow, or the
initiation of one not yet started.
Other things being equal, the greater the recipient's
stake in a particular transfer of arms, the greater is the
leverage which the supplier has over it. The recipient's
stake has two aspects. One is its need for arms generally.
For most states, this is a matter of maintaining the ability
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to defend against armed attacks from possible enemies.
In some cases, however, other motives may be involved,
such as prestige or a concern for preserving the military's
internal political position. The other aspect is the
recipient's reliance on a particular supplier--the extent
to which it cannot satisfy its need for arms by turning
to other states or to its own industry. Such reliance
has several possible causes. A given type of weapon may
simply not be built anywhere else. Or, even if a com-
parable weapon is available elsewhere, the prior commit-
ment to the present supplier's training, doctrine, and
supply of spare parts can make it prohibitively costly
and time-consuming to switch. The financial terms of
one offer, including pricing, credit arrangements, and
acceptable currencies, might be more attractive than
those of competing offers. And there may be other reasons
for wanting to do business with a particular supplier,
such as to reinforce a security tie.
But just as the recipient's dependence on arms transfers
establishes the supplier's leverage, so does the supplier's
own dependence diminish it. The more the supplier relies
on its exports of arms to protect or promote its interests,
the less free it feels to forgo these exports. This in
turn lowers the risks to the recipient of resisting the
supplier's demands. The supplier's dependence might
assume either or both of two forms: a perceived general
need to export arms (because of economic concerns like
its balance of payments or a desire to achieve economies
of scale in equipping its own forces) or a desire to supply
a particular recipient.
The supplier may place importance on furnishing arms
to a particular country for several possible reasons.
First, it may be motivated by the same kind of economic
concern that can lead it to value arms exports generally
(a reason likely to increase in importance with the size
of the projected sale). Second, it may wish to preempt
an adversary, preventing it from becoming the patron of
this particular recipient. Third, it may want to preserve
a regional military balance. And finally, the supplier
may wish to provide arms for the same reason the recipient
wishes to obtain them, whether this reason be the pro-
tection of a ruling group's internal position or the pro-
tection of the state from external enemies. Any of these
motives, if present, will inhibit the supplier from manip-
ulating an arms flow and therefore will reduce the leverage
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it might otherwise derive from arms transfers. Further-
more, the more that other facets of the supplier's foreign
policy, such as the promotion of human rights or a concern
over the reaction of important third parties, impinge upon
its arms transfer decisions, the less flexibility it has
to use those decisions to influence the recipient.
When the interests of supplier and recipient converge--
that is, when the former provides arms for the same reason
the latter asks for them--another important implication
follows. Disputes are relatively less likely to arise
between states with a longstanding relationship of military
cooperation. But when a dispute does occur, a supplier
may find that it has the least leverage over the very
recipients with which it has the closest ties, since they
are the ones whose interests it tends to accept as its
own. For example, any influence the US might hope to
gain over Israel through hints of manipulating the supply
of arms would be limited by the obvious American acceptance
of Israeli security as an important US interest.
Identity of the Decisionmakers
Although "supplier" and "recipient" are convenient
shorthand expressions for two states, it is important
to be precise about exactly which individuals or groups
are involved when considering the stakes in an arms transfer
and the decisions to comply or resist. Costs and benefits
do not affect leverage unless they are somehow felt by
the leaders who make the diplomatic decisions. The analyst
of the individual case therefore must determine who those
decisionmakers are and how they value arms transfers.
It is particularly important to discover whether
the individuals in the recipient government who would
view an interruption in the supply of arms as costly have
sufficient power to steer that government in the direction
of compliance with the supplier's wishes. If they do not,
leverage will be ineffective. Arms transfers may be useful,
for example, in influencing senior military officers (or
civilian politicians who rely on their support) if these
officers place a high value on the continuing import of
arms during peacetime. In fact, the direct entry into
a recipient's military establishment is one thing that
sets arms transfers apart from nonmilitary commerce or
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other forms of leverage. But if the leaders whose wills
are likely to prevail in most major decisions have only
grudgingly accepted a program of military expansion pushed
by service chiefs or other parts of the government, they
may be little upset by an interruption in the flow of arms.
(They might even welcome it privately.) As a result., they
may actually be less pliable than a much stronger leader
(like the Shah of Iran) who not only makes the important
diplomatic decisions but also has personally planned. the
acquisition of arms.
Longer Term Effects
In addition to assessing each side's immediate stake
in an arms transfer, it is necessary to consider the likely
longer term impact of: (1) the arms transfer itself; and
(2) any attempt to manipulate arms transfers in order to
exert influence. Both have side effects that can alter
each side's vulnerability to pressures from the other.
The more extensive a supply of arms and the longer
it continues, the more each side tends to become dependent
on the continued cooperation of the other. On one hand,
heavy reliance on a single supplier's arms may make it
more difficult or expensive for the recipient to switch
to a different source of supply because of its commitment
to the present supplier's training, doctrine, and spare
parts. On the other hand, large sales of arms tend to
increase the vulnerability of the supplier to counter-
pressures from the recipient. For one thing, the loss
of orders from a longtime foreign customer can seriously
disrupt production lines that are important in keeping
the supplier's own forces equipped. For another, the
presence of training and technical personnel on the
recipient's soil makes them potential hostages in the
event of a major dispute. Both of these considerations
are likely to be involved when large quantities of advanced
weapons have been sold, as with US military sales to Iran.
Finally, sales on credit over a period of years lead to
an accumulation of debt. The option of renouncing this
debt or at least of suspending payments (as Egypt recently
did with its debt to the USSR) gives the recipient an added
lever for use in later disputes.
Probably the most important side effect a supplier's
political manipulation of the flow of arms is apt to have
is a decision by the recipient to reduce its dependence
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on that particular supplier in the future (thus reinforc-
ing an existing trend among arms importers to diversify
their sources of supply). The recipient may accede to
the supplier's immediate demand while at the same time
resolving to take steps to avoid a repetition of the un-
pleasant experience. These steps may include an intensi-
fication of efforts to build a domestic arms industry (as
exemplified by the responses of South Africa and Commu-
nist China to past cut-offs of arms by their principal
suppliers) as well as a turn to other foreign suppliers
(the responses of Pakistan and Turkey to US arms embar-
goes). The resulting loss of leverage for use in later
disputes--on issues that might be more important to the
supplier--thus is a potential cost to be weighed against
the benefits of bending the recipient's will now. A
turning to alternative sources by other recipients or
would-be recipients who have witnessed the event and do
not wish to be manipulated in the same way is another
potential cost. All of this can limit the supplier's
freedom to manipulate arms transfers and consequently
can reduce the risks to the recipient of resisting.
Conclusion
Analyzing a supplier's ability to influence another
state's policies by exploiting its dependence on arms is
inevitably a complex task that requires attention to
many matters besides the arms transfer itself. It is
made especially difficult by the fact that some attri-
butes of a bilateral relationship can be expected to en-
hance the supplier's leverage on one count but diminish
it on another. For example, the existence of close cul-
tural, ideological, and security ties between supplier
and recipient can mean a scarcity of alternative sources
of supply (enhancing leverage) but also a convergence of
interests (diminishing leverage). This roughly describes
the US-Israeli relationship, and any impact arms trans-
fers have on that relationship depends in large part on
which of these two effects will predominate.
Although assessing the leverage conferred on a sup-
plier by the transfer of conventional arms is ultimately
a task for individual case studies, some general conclu-
sions emerge. Arms transfers can be useful in quietly
nurturing friendly relations with a recipient, particu-
larly its military establishment. But a direct attempt
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to manipulate supply in order to bend the recipient's
will is a different matter. For one thing, the reasons
even a major transfer of arms may not provide leverage
are numerous. Any one of them--whether it is a matter
of the supplier's stake in an existing flow of arms,
the longer term side effects, or the recipient's deci-
sionmaking process--may be sufficient to prevent the
supplier from effectively exploiting a recipient's de-
pendence on arms. Second, even where an arms transfer
itself does provide leverage, it is generally insuffi-
cient to alter the recipient's position on matters the
latter deems to be of high importance. Although it seems
an appropriate matching of means to ends to use a manip-
ulation of arms supply to try to curtail the recipient's
use of conventional arms (specifically, their use in
warfare or military occupation), this is the very sort
of issue on which such manipulation is least likely to
be effective. Finally, where leverage is effective, the
promise or possibility of furnishing arms is at least. as
likely to be responsible as a cut-off, or threatened cut-
off, of supply. In short, leverage derives not so much
from past deliveries of arms as it does from the possi-
bility of future transactions.
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The Common Fund Negotiations: Some Time, Next Year?
The negotiations at the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on the establishment
of a common fund for commodities were suspended on 2
December at the initiative of the LDC caucus (the Group
of 77). A statement issued by the group Zeft open the
possibility of resuming talks at a later date, but not
until the industrial countries (Group B) showed the
necessary "political will" for progress in the negotia-
tions. For its part, Group B acceded to the suspension
with regret and stated its willingness to participate
in further discussions.
The common fund is one of the most important ele-
ments of the "New International Economic order" sought
by the LDCs. After years of debate on the issue, the
LDCs finally won industrial state acceptance in principle
of the fund at the Conference on International Economic
Cooperation (CIEC) last spring. The recent UNCTAD meet-
ings were the first discussions since CIEC on the im-
plementation of. the concept.
The outcome of the common fund issue will have a
significant impact on other North-South economic nego-
tiations. The following article assesses the pressures
that contributed to the suspension of the UNCTAD con-
ference and the effect of that decision on the future of
the common fund talks.
The Group of 77 Position
The call to suspend the UNCTAD conference was made
to preserve Group of 77 solidarity and to pressure the
industrial countries into making greater concessions.
During the previous four weeks of negotiations, basic
differences among the LDCs, and between them and Group
B, over the shape--or even the existence--of a common
fund put a major strain on Group of 77 unity.
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Some of the wealthier LDCs are either opposed or
indifferent to the idea of a common fund. Those who
support it are interested only in establishing buffer
stocks to stabilize commodity prices. Nevertheless,
when the original LDC negotiating position was formu-
lated, the wealthier LDCs agreed to support not only the
idea of a common fund, but also two other important de-
mands of the poorer states. The majority of poor de?-
veloping countries, who have little to gain from the
fund's role as a stabilizing influence on commodity
prices, want the fund to assume a development role and
finance, through a "second window" such "other measures"
as export diversification, infrastructure development,
and market promotion. In addition, they demand that the
fund be financed through direct government contributions
as well as through the pooled resources of individual
commodity agreements.*
The industrial countries participating in the con-
ference generally resisted the demands for a second win-
dow and for direct government contributions to the fund.
The poorer LDCs feared that their wealthier partners in
the Group of 77 might give in to the Group B position.
At the same time, they observed that the resolve of many
of the West Europeans and the Japanese to oppose the two
demands had been weakening. They therefore chose to sus-
pend the negotiations, hoping to force the industrial
countries into making concessions and at the same time
preserve Group of 77 unity. The tactic is likely to prove
successful on both counts.
Algeria, Ethiopia, Libya, Sudan, and Tanzania were
the strongest advocates of suspending negotiations. They
were openly supported by Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, and
Peru of the Latin American bloc, and by Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan of the.Asian
bloc. Most of those countries have consistently pressed
for direct contributions to the fund and a broad fund
role in financing development. They also played an im-
portant part in shaping the Group of 77 proposals ham?-
mered out earlier by a smaller group chaired by the In-
donesian representative.
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Only Argentina and the Philippines spoke out against
suspension of the conference. Most of the wealthier LDCs
probably felt that, in view of the wavering shown by the
industrial countries, they had nothing to lose by sup-
porting a unanimous Group of 77 decision to suspend the
conference until industrial countries were ready to ne-
gotiate on LDC terms.
The Group B Position
Of the industrial countries, only the Netherlands
and the Nordic states support the LDC version of a com-
mon fund--just as they do most other Group of 77 economic
demands--reflecting primarily a humanitarian commitment
to the poor countries. Most other Group B governments
are internally split over the issue. Their foreign min-
istries, concerned above all with maintaining good rela-
tions with the LDCs, generally argue for accommodation,
while the budget-sensitive economic ministries take a
harder line.
The industrial countries generally suffer from slow
economic growth, high unemployment, and shaky political
positions that are not strengthened by generosity to the
LDCs. Major new financial commitments to these countries
would thus incur only costs on the domestic political
level. At the same time, however, the industrial states
are subject to strong international political and eco-
nomic pressures to accommodate LDC demands.
The industrial states' economic stake in the Third
World provides them with a positive incentive to accom-
modation in the North-South economic dialogue. With
slow growth in industrial markets, the West Europeans
and Japanese have an increased interest in selling goods
and technology to the LDCs. In theory, the political
goodwill earned from an accommodating position in multi-
lateral economic negotiations would yield economic bene-
fit through increased exports. Such a result, however,
would not be certain and would probably at best be ob-
served only in the long run.
More powerful are the negative incentives that make
the industrial states wary of appearing recalcitrant in
the common fund negotiations. Joining in a general Group
B consensus in support of direct contributions and a
second window would not earn any one state special credit
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among the LDCs. Being singled out as a roadblock to
Group B agreement on these issues, however, would cer-
tainly earn it discredit among the Group of 77. For the
West Europeans, that would conflict with their aim of
increased political influence in the Third World. In.
addition, the West Europeans and Japanese want to avoid
political conflict with the LDCs because of their con-
cern with the security of non-oil raw material supplies.
A final negative incentive arises from the fact that the
Netherlands has threatened to break EC solidarity if the
other members do not accept the LDC demands. France,
West Germany, and the United Kingdom would be extremely
reluctant to allow that to happen.
The Evolution of the Group B Position
Most industrial states have already privately ex-
pressed a willingness to compromise on financing of other
measures and direct government contributions to the com-
mon fund. Only the US and West Germany have officially
remained inflexible. There is considerable debate over
the issue, however, within the West German Government:.
Now that the Group of 77 has served notice that it in-
tends to stick to its demands, the West Germans will prob-
ably alter their position. They are not likely to hold
out, either alone or with the US, and risk being blamed
by the LDCs and other EC members for the failure of the
negotiations. The West German fear of being identified
as a key impediment to the success of the common fund
talks is probably heightened by their uncertainty about
the evolution of the US position.
Domestic political and economic problems will still
place important limits on the concessions that the West
Europeans and Japanese can make to the LDCs. They will
probably agree to limited direct contributions and vol-
untary financing of other measures, in an effort to avoid,
as best they can, the political costs of recalcitrance
and the economic costs of accommodation. In doing so, they
would hope that acceptance of the principles behind the
LDC demands would satisfy the LDCs in the short run,
putting off the difficult decision about how to react
if and when the Group of 77 insisted upon larger, manda-
tory government contributions.
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Outlook
The Group of 77 will probably agree to reopen the
common fund negotiations on the basis of the concessions
that the West Europeans and Japanese seem willing to
grant. Even though these concessions fall short of their
demands, the LDCs probably recognize that the industrial
countries will not go any farther at this point. If the
Group of 77 refused to resume the talks until even greater
concessions were extracted, they would obtain no common
fund at all in the foreseeable future. While some LDCs
would prefer that outcome, they would not be willing to
pay the costs involved in terms of spoiling relations
among LDCs.
By agreeing to limited contributions and voluntary
financing of other measures, the Group of 77 would have
taken a major step toward a common fund and also gained
an opening for more substantial mandatory funding arrange-
ments at a later date. In addition, they would be able
to preserve Group of 77 unity by partially satisfying
the disparate aims of the poor LDCs and of the commodity
producers, the states who advocate confrontation with
the developed countries and those who counsel moderation.
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25X1
Jamaica and the North-South Dialogue
Jamaica's activities during recent North-South meet-
ings such as the UNCTAD common fund negotiations suggest
that over the medium term it will often pursue accommoda-
tion with the industrial countries in general and the US
in particular. Nonetheless, there will continue to be
conflicting pressures on Jamaica's leaders as they formu-
late their North-South policy. On one hand, domestic
political and economic pressures discourage the use of
radical confrontational tactics in international meetings
and encourage the search for practical solutions to
LDC--and Jamaican--problems. On the other hand, Prime
Minister Manley feels Jamaica must show distance from
the US. He believes that he has a mandate to take his
country on a different and more "equitable" path of
development than that prescribed by conventional Western
modelE and he advocates bold redistribution of interna-
tional poZiticaZ-economic decisionmaking power. Thus,
the distinctive feature of Jamaica's posture in multi-
lateral economic forums will be an unevenness, as it at-
tempts to balance its staunch belief in LDC solidarity
with its pursuit of bilateral benefits from the US and
other industrial countries.
Domestic Pressures
Manley's options for attaining rapid development
and greater economic independence for Jamaica have been
constrained by an assortment of economic problems. Ag-
gravated by soaring oil bills and the slowdown in the
industrial economies since the 1973 OPEC oil price in-
crease, these include lagging growth, capital flight,
inflation, high unemployment (especially among youth),
and severe balance of payments difficulties. The global
recession has cut into bauxite sales (the major source
of government revenues), and world sugar prices have
20 December 1977
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fallen two-thirds below previous levels.* Moreover, local
crime and violence have contributed to a dropoff in the
Jamaican tourist industry. While bauxite/alumina sales
may benefit from currently rising demand, the expansion
of output will be difficult because of capacity constraints.
Also, foreign investors, dissatisfied with Jamaican efforts
to nationalize their operations, are exploring the feasi-
bility of shifting some of their bauxite investment out-
side of the Caribbean. One aluminum company official has
stated that his organization will not invest further in
Jamaica.
Manley's support of radical attempts to restructure
Jamaican society along Cuban lines has come under increased
criticism from moderates in his own party as well as from
the opposition party, and the party-based trade union re-
cently took the unprecedented move of criticizing the
government's handling of the country's economic problems.
Manley's weakened situation was demonstrated in September
1977, when party moderates successfully forced the resigna-
tion of an influential radical leader from key party and
government posts and blocked the election of several
other radicals to the powerful party executive council.
Manley has cooperated with the moderates by adopting
a flexible posture toward the US, a more subdued attitude
toward nationalization of the foreign bauxite companies
in Jamaica, and negotiating in good faith with the World
Bank and the IMF. He has also stated that his plans for
transforming Jamaican society leave room for private
enterprise and democracy. In early 1977, his administra-
tion reached agreement with US bauxite/alumina companies
over tax and other issues.** Manley also appointed a
*Combined earnings from the bauxite, sugar, and tourist
industries make up approximately 70 percent of foreign
exchange earnings of the Jamaican Government.
In 1974 Manley's government imposed a 600 percent in-
crease in tax levies on foreign bauxite/alumina com-
panies in Jamaica in order to help pay his country's
soaring oil bi7Z. The companies have been contesting
the government's action ever since.
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moderate leader as Foreign Minister and sent him on a
goodwill mission to the US. Subsequently, after pro-
tracted negotiations, the Jamaican Government concluded
an agreement with the US for $63 million in bilateral
assistance. The Manley government also adopted a fiscal
and economic austerity program that met most World Bank
and IMF' criteria in order to receive major loans from
these agencies. Manley had previously scorned sugges-
tions by party moderates that he negotiate loans from
the World Bank.
Radical. Views
Despite the economic dilemmas and domestic pressure
that will encourage Manley to seek wider areas of mutual
accommodation with the US and other industrial countries,
there still are factors at work that will tend to make
his country's policies in international forums at times
radical. and confrontational.
Manley requires the organizational talents of the
radicals in his party--as well as their ties to Jamaica's
youth---to survive Jamaica's electoral politics and there-
fore cannot afford domestically to be seen as under US
influence. In part, he arranged Cuban President Castro's
visit last October to relieve pressure on his administra-
tion from the radical wing. Castro's visit was intended
to assure the radicals that Manley's tactics to placate
the moderates and shore up the economy would not jeopard-
ize the party's ties to Havana.*
*At the same time, Castro's restrained and conciliatory
activities and speeches underscored for Manley 's moder-
ate opposition the value of Cuban assistance to Jamaican
development. Castro played down the idea that Cuban
ties to ManZey's party are contingent on ideological
congruence between Kingston and Havana, acknowledging
that Jamaica could take its own road to development.
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An equally strong force for radical Jamaican poli-
cies is Manley's belief that cooperation between the
developed and developing world is a necessary but tem-
porary feature of international relations. He views the
broad range of North-South issues as a fundamental dis-
pute over the redistribution of wealth and power between
the industrial and developing countries. He equates
the relationship between them to a master-slave rela-
tionship that is under constant stress. There must be
radical change, he argues, because the present relation-
ship of LDCs to the international system is detrimental
to their efforts to develop indigenous, self-reliant
economic systems.
International Pressures
Jamaica's dependence on good relations with the US
is the most significant moderating force on Manley's
policies in the North-South dialogue. The importance
he attaches to a leadership role in the Third World
meanwhile serves as the principal external factor en-
couraging a more radical Jamaican posture.
Manley is a strong advocate of LDC unity and soli-
darity as a tool for achieving the objectives of the New
International Economic Order. His desire to promote LDC
solidarity is balanced, however, by the necessity of
pursuing national interests. During the 1977 Conference
on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), Kingston
exploited the discussions on substantive issues to make
progress in its own negotiations with the IMF and the
US. Dissatisfied with the austerity restrictions de-
manded by the IMF, the Jamaican delegation tried to in-
clude on the CIEC agenda the issue of reforming loan
requirements for LDCs. It also used the occasion to
engage the US in detailed talks on bilateral assistance
to Jamaica.
Jamaica has also contributed to the volatile po-
litical dynamics of the Group of 77 that stem from
traditional differences of political and economic in-
terests within this LDC caucus. At the CIEC, Jamaica
argued that OPEC policies are contrary to the LDC's
long-term interests and openly criticized OPEC dominance
in the G-77. Jamaica and some other LDCs were also
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critical of the OPEC states' reluctance at the 1976
UNCTAD Conference to use their $800-million special aid
fund to support LDC demands for an integrated program
for commodities.
Jamaica has itself been criticized by some of the
more radical African countries. Algeria at one point led
a move---supported by a number of Africans--to prevent a
Jamaican from representing the Group of 77, alleging he
was untrustworthy because of his close personal rela-
tions with certain industrial country leaders. The move
may have been prompted by Kingston's criticism of OPEC
and fueled by longstanding African distrust of the
Latin American countries; Manley nonetheless recognize
that he must maintain close relations with these states
to preserve his leadership and will be careful to sup-
port them as often as he can.
The competing domestic and international forces
that shape the direction and style of Jamaican North-
South policy seem to favor moderation for now, although
the forces that encourage radical demands and tactics
should prevail often enough to give the Jamaican policy
a somewhat erratic appearance.
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Refugees and Human Rights: An Issue in US-ASEAN
Relations
Developing Third World nations--generally those
most affected by large numbers of refugees--are concerned
about attempts by developed Western nations, and the US
in particular, to guarantee the legal and civil rights
of refugees by tying international financial and re-
settlement assistance to a country's acceptance and
treatment of refugees. Such a policy, the developing
nations believe, would seriously impair their ability
to resolve the difficult domestic problems that refugees
pose. One region where Western emphasis on the human
rights of refugees has become a major issue in US-
developing world relations is Southeast Asia, where con-
cern is mounting among the members of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) over the growing in-
flux of Vietnamese refugees into their countries.
For domestic political, economic, and security
reasons, and also out of concern over harming relations
with Vietnam, all five states (Thailand, Malaysia, Singa-
pore, Indonesia, and the Philippines) are reluctant to
accept Vietnamese refugees. In addition, Thailand,
Malaysia, and Indonesia have adopted hard-line tactics
to discourage new refugees and put pressure on the US
and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to take immediate
and long-term steps to resettle them outside the region.
Out of fear of being swamped by refugees turned away by
their neighbors, Singapore and the Philippines will
probably ultimately adopt similar antirefugee policies--
which in effect deny even temporary asylum. Thus far the
individual ASEAN nations have dealt with the problem
largely in the context of bilateral relations with the
US and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Recent
pronouncements, however, could indicate a growing inclina-
tion among the ASEAN nations to act in concert in order
to strengthen their collective hand. This article exam-
ines the refugee policies of the ASEAN states, with par-
ticular regard to the Vietnamese "boat cases," and the
implications of these policies for the broader issues of
human rights and ASEAN-US relations.
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The five ASEAN nations have been affected in varying
degrees--depending on their geographic proximity to Viet-
nam--by the growing number of "boat cases." There are
some 9,500 "boat cases"--Vietnamese who escaped by boat
and are in temporary asylum--4,400 in Malaysia, 3,800 in
Thailand, 1,150 in the Philippines, 100 in Indonesia,
and 50 in Singapore. During 1977, refugees have been
arriving on Southeast Asian shores at the rate of 200-
500 a month.*
Contrary to earlier indications that the number of
fleeing Vietnamese would remain stable or decline toward
the end of 1977, there has been a sharp increase in boat
cases, despite adverse seasonal weather conditions and
increased Vietnamese security patrols. Poor economic
conditions (including food shortages), conscription for
the armed forces, and government economic and security
policies (such as forced resettlement of urban dwellers
in new economic zones) are cited among the most compel-
ling reasons for taking the risk of setting out to sea in
small, dilapidated boats. In addition, it is possible
that many Vietnamese who were considering flight were
encouraged by the announcement in late summer (broadcast
by international radio) that the US would accept more
boat case refugees.
Domestic and Diplomatic Concerns
Throughout Southeast Asia there is a longstanding
and intense ethnic animosity toward the Vietnamese,
which makes it difficult for the individual ASEAN gov-
ernments to offer more than temporary humanitarian as-
sistance to the refugees. The ASEAN nations, moreover,
are concerned with their internal security and are
worried. that Communist agents, posing as refugees, might
stimulate Communist and dissident movements in their
countries. The present Thai Government has made clear
that it will not attempt to resettle any Vietnamese, al-
though it has planned a program to absorb Lao and Cambodian
refugees in its northern provinces. The Malaysian Gov-
ernment: has found many Chinese among the Vietnamese
refugees** and fears that the presence of both ethnic
*A record 1,271 boat cases arrived in Malaysia in Octo-
ber. There are an additional 85,000 Lao and Cambodian
refugees who crossed river and land borders into Thailand.
**Most of those fleeing Vietnam are from urban, not rural,
areas, and many are Chinese with enough money to provi-
sion boats and bribe Vietnamese patrols.
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groups would exacerbate existing communal tension be-
tween Chinese and Malays. The Indonesians dislike the
Vietnamese almost as much as their own Chinese minority,
whom they treat largely as unwelcome resident aliens.
The ASEAN governments are also concerned about the
economic problems that any increase of refugees would
pose. The financial burden for Thailand has been
especially heavy, and the government has been criticized
by farmers who believe that the refugees are receiving
better treatment than they and are consuming scarce de-
velopment funds. Malaysian authorities cite the social
and economic problems they face with the growing refugee
influx. Although not a financial burden, the care of
large numbers of refugees strains local government man-
power and facilities in several Malaysian states. Both
Thailand and Malaysia claim that the newest refugees
appear to be unskilled farmers, motivated by monetary
factors, who would compete for land with local farmers.*
Indeed, the status and cost of the refugees may become
a political issue in the forthcoming Malaysian general
elections.
Faced with serious problems of overpopulation, food
shortages, and unemployment, the Indonesian Government
finds it difficult to justify offering even temporary
asylum to refugees and has turned away many attempting
to land. The Philippine Government has sought to capi-
talize on the presence of the small number of refugees
in its borders by widely publicizing--primarily for US
consumption--its humanitarian aid. Faced with a serious
armed rebellion in its southern province, however, the
Marcos government is not likely to extend more than
temporary asylum and may, in the future, find the pros-
pect of additional refugees intolerable. Singapore has
felt that it cannot offer even temporary asylum because
of its small size and dense population. It has no room
for a separate camp and has housed its few refugees
either in a prison or in a fishing village.
In the wake of the Communist victories in Indochina
and a reduced US role in Southeast Asia, the non-Com-
munist ASEAN nations have been very sensitive to main-
taining Vietnamese good will. All the ASEAN nations
This has not been substantiated. If true, there has
been a significant change in the reasons for Zeaving
Vietnam.
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have been careful to inform the Vietnam Government of
their policies with regard to accepting, even temporarily,
refugees. Thailand and Malaysia have unofficially raised
the idea of repatriation with Vietnam.
The Vietnamese Government continues to equivocate,
however, on the subject of repatriation. Although it.
has stated that "political" refugees will not be taken
back, the broader issue of repatriating the Vietnamese
in Thailand has been under discussion with the Thai.
For the most part, Vietnam has not made an issue of the
refugees in its bilateral relations with the other four
ASEAN nations. Diplomatic considerations are secondary,
however, to the common ASEAN concern with domestic dis-
locations.
Refugee Policies
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines
have agreed to accept Vietnamese refugees for temporary
asylum until arrangements are made by the US and the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for them to leave
the country. Singapore, thus far, has been unwilling
to grant even temporary asylum, although it is currently
negotiating an agreement with the UNHCR. None has
offered to resettle--i.e., give permanent asylum to---any
Vietnamese, and several are beginning to impose tougher
measures denying temporary asylum in many cases.
Critical of the slow pace of US and UNHCR efforts
to resettle refugees in other regions and of the absence
of any concrete, long-term US or UNHCR program to bear
the burden of future refugees, the ASEAN nations have
begun to discuss concerted measures to deal with the
refugee situation. The issue was raised at the ASEAN
summit conference in August and again at the recent
standing committee meeting, where it was discussed in
terms of urging the UNHCR to accelerate efforts to re-
settle Indochinese refugees in third countries.
In November, Thailand and Malaysia announced
policies aimed at discouraging new refugees and en-
couraging the international community to take effective
steps to grant permanent asylum to the refugees and
reduce the number presently in camps. The new Thai and
Malaysian policies involve treating all refugees.as
illegal immigrants; classifying them into "political"
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and "economic" categories and forcing repatriation of
those determined to be motivated by purely economic
factors; and turning away those attempting to land by
boat.
Indonesia already has such guidelines, and it is
likely that Singapore and the Philippines will ultimately
adopt similar policies to avoid being swamped by refugees
turned away from neighboring countries. Unpublicized
negotiations between the UNHCR and Singapore over the
latter's offer to designate an island for temporary
asylum may be adversely affected by the announcement of
the Thai and Malaysian policies. The Singapore Govern-
ment has already placed stringent conditions on an agree-
ment--an ironclad written guarantee that refugees will
be moved out at a reasonable rate and under no circum-
stances be permitted to remain permanently--and may find
it necessary to reconsider its offer.
Implications for ASEAN-US Relations
The strict policies announced recently by Thailand
and Malaysia are strongly opposed in principle by the US
and the UNHCR, which argue that enforcement of the meas-
ures, especially turning away boats, could violate human
rights and, thus, both tarnish the countries' interna-
tional image and jeopardize the willingness of third
countries and the UNHCR to provide further financial
and resettlement assistance.* Nevertheless, the ASEAN
nations--Thailand and Malaysia in particular--will weigh
their concerns over domestic dislocations and relations
with Vietnam against the possibility of international
disapproval and will probably decide to enforce, at
least on a case-by-case basis, tougher antirefugee meas-
ures. Despite objections on the grounds of violating
human rights, these policies--including forced repatria-
tion and return to sea--will probably be enforced when
the number of refugees in camps is high in order to
induce the US and UNHCR to reduce the numbers immediately
and implement serious follow-on programs. Tactically,
the ASEAN governments probably believe that they can
*The UNHCR, through its representative in Southeast
Asia, has assumed the responsibility of providing finan-
cial support for refugee relief efforts by ASEAN gov-
ernments and of persuading third countries to take
refugees.
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shift the blame for any violations of human rights onto
the US and the international community and apply moral
pressure on them to accelerate resettlement programs.*
In so doing, the ASEAN nations will argue that the
situation is not of their making, that they have carried
more than their share of the burden, and that the US and
UNHCR are ultimately responsible (by written guarantee)
for resettling the Vietnamese elsewhere. From the ASEAN
nations' point of view, the only viable long-term solu-
tion will be permanent resettlement of the Vietnamese
refugees in other, non-ASEAN countries. Consequently,
they are not likely to consider suggestions that they
attempt to share the burden among themselves or offer
permanent asylum and resettlement.
The ASEAN nations will probably also seek other
means of solving the refugee problem. They may reach
an understanding with Vietnam and the UNHCR that would
provide for repatriation of some refugees (under UNHCR
supervision), and they may privately encourage Vietnam
to tighten its border patrols and prevent people from
leaving.
Finally, in the councils of the UNHCR, they will.
oppose measures to give refugees legal rights, and they
will seek to lobby in developing nation caucuses to in-
fluence the choice of a new UN High Commissioner for
Refugees. ASEAN nations (along with many other develop-
ing nations) will seek to ensure that the commissioner
and deputy commissioner will be sympathetic to their
particular situations and points of view and not have
the "Western preoccupation with human rights."**
*For instance, in southern Thailand some 400 refugees ar-
riving in seaworthy boats were reprovisioned and towed
back to sea, while some 500 in unseaworthy boats were
forced into a detention center. Later boat cases were
allowed to Land at the urging of the US and the UNHCR
and in response to US promises to speed up processing
and to take all boat cases out of the camps, if not the
country, by the end of 1977. Malaysia has similarly been
mollified temporarily by US promises to reduce the number
of refugees in camps by the end of the year.
The European nominee, Poul Hartling, was recently elected
as commissioner. He is under pressure from the developing
nations to replace the incumbent deputy--an American--
with an African.
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Psychiatry and Dissent in the USSR
International attention recently has been increas-
ingly focused on the Soviet Union's abuse of psychiatry
for political purposes. In August 1977, the World
Psychiatric Association passed a resolution condemning
Soviet practices. This article briefly explores the origins
and nature of psychiatric abuse in the USSR and assesses
the outlook for the continuation of such practices.
Soviet Practices
Soviet abuse of psychiatry has its roots in pre-
revolutionary times, when criticism of the regime could
lead to a judgment of insanity. Under Stalin, commit-
ment to a mental hospital was one of many means of ex-
tending political control and probably was considered
by the victims to be preferable to imprisonment or con-
signment to a labor camp. Since the mid-1960s there
has been a steadily increasing stream of information
that use of forced psychiatric hospitalization has con-
tinued in the post-Stalin era. The publication of
Valery Tarsis' Ward 7 in 1965 was primarily responsible
for the initial focusing of international attention on
the issue. Bloch and Reddaway's Russia's Political
Hospitals (1977) is the latest and probably most author-
itative treatment of the subject.
While there are no firm figures on the number of
dissenters interned in mental hospitals for political
reasons, 210 documented cases have reached the West since
1962. This is probably only a small fraction of the
total. Information on Soviet abuses comes from dissi-
dents in the USSR, from emigres, from ex-patients, and
from Soviet psychiatrists who have recently emigrated
to the West.
There are a number of reasons for the Soviets' use
of psychiatry against political dissent. Placement of
dissidents in mental institutions both reduces publicity
that might be generated by other kinds of actions against
them and undermines the credibility of nonconformist
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ideas and actions. It is calculated that the dissidents
will be silent and inactive. even after their release be-
cause of the ever-present possibility of recall for
further "treatment."
International Scrutiny
Prior to the 1971 meeting of the World Psychiatric
Association (WPA) in Mexico City, Vladimir Bukovsky, a
former internee in a Soviet psychiatric hospital, sent
to Western psychiatrists records of the forensic psy-
chiatric examinations. of six Soviet dissidents. Bukovsky
said that friends and relatives of the dissidents con-
sidered them sane, and he asked for an evaluation of the
need for their forced hospitalization.
West European psychiatrists who studied the docu-
ments concluded that the diagnoses had been made on the
basis of the dissidents' attempts to exercise fundamental
freedoms stated in the Soviet Constitution", that is,
for political rather than medical reasons. The Western
doctors called on the Mexico City congress to discuss
the issue.
Despite considerable lobbying by those interested
in having the matter aired, the issue of Soviet psy-
chiatric abuses never reached the WPA agenda. The or-
ganization's secretary-general concluded that the WPA
charter did not allow it to become responsible for the
ethical. aspects of psychiatry. Nor, he stated, were
there statutes or bylaws governing the handling of com-
plaints made by one member of the society against
another. .
Soviet dissidents, emigres, and Western psychia-
trists intensified their efforts to publicize Soviet
abuses during the six-year interval. between WPA confer-
ences.- The campaign coincided this year with the gen-
erally increased international attention to human rights
prompted by the Carter administration's interest in the
issue. At the 1977 WPA congress in Honolulu in August.,
a resolution condemning the Soviet Union for using psy-
chiatry to repress political dissenters was passed.
The resolution called on the WPA to "take note of
the abuse of psychiatry for political purposes and con-
demn those practices in all countries in which they
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occur." It specifically committed the organization to
look at the "extensive evidence of the systematic abuse
of psychiatry for political purposes" in the Soviet
Union.
The Soviets rejected Western allegations of psychi-
atric abuses, charged that the vote was rigged,* and
warned that they would counterattack if Western attempts
to "interfere" in Soviet internal affairs continued.
Countercharges could, they suggested, involve the cita-
tion of malpractices in the West, including, for example,
experiments on prisoners. The Soviets also threatened
to withdraw from international psychiatric organizations.
The Outlook
The Soviets are unlikely to abandon their practice
of committing dissidents to mental hospitals. KGB chief
Yury Andropov recently reiterated publicly the official
Soviet position that "psychic instability" sometimes
explains the "appearance of individuals whose actions
do not tally with the ethical or legal framework of
Soviet society." Psychiatric abuse of dissidents will
continue at least until the Soviets conclude that the
costs in terms of international outcry exceed those in-
curred by the use of other methods.
0
*The vote was 19 national psychiatric societies for and
33 against, although under the bloc system it was passed
by 90 votes to 88. Each vote is weighted by the size
of its membership; the larger blocs of Western psychi-
atric societies overrode those of the Soviet Union, its
Communist allies, and some Third World countries.
28
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The Politics of UN Restructure: The Issue of a
Secretariat Development Post
The increasing scope and complexity of economic and
social problems confronting the UN system, coupled with
pressures for fiscal austerity, have prompted a major
effort to restructure the UN. One of the most visible
results of this exercise will be the creation of a high-
level Secretariat post to oversee activities affecting
LDC economic development. Despite the adoption this
month of a compromise on the issue, the controversial
question of the post's authority remains unresolved. The
months ahead promise increased pressure from the LDCs to
define the mandate of the new position to their benefit.
There is at present no formal structure to oversee
the development activities in which the UN engages. The
numerous; bodies and funds established over the years in
response to LDC demands for assistance often duplicate
efforts and place heavy administrative demands on the UN
system. Currently, each of the UN specialized agenciep,
controls its own budget and competes for direct voluntary
funds from donor governments. Both the LDCs and the in-
dustrialized countries have recognized the need for re-
form, but each group approaches it from a different per-
spective. The industrialized states want better coordina-
tion and planning of development activities. While the
Group of 77 (the LDC UN caucus) agrees in principle with
the need for reform, it insists on concomitant recognition
of the necessity for greater contributions to development
activities and, more importantly, of the right of LDCs to
increased decisionmaking authority.
The Ad Hoc Committee on Restructure, established
after the 7th UN General Assembly Special Session in 1975,
was tasked with identifying ways to mobilize UN machinery
to promote development and international economic coopera-
tion. What many participants hoped would be only a mana-
gerial overhaul of an unwieldy system took on a political
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dimension because of LDC frustration with the fact that
their majority voice in the UN does not readily translate
into economic benefits.
The final recommendations of the Committee represent
two years of sometimes very difficult negotiations. Of
the eight areas covered in the recommendations, the pro-
posed creation of a high-level Secretariat position to
oversee development activities has proven one of the
most contentious.*
Originally an LDC bargaining chip for other conces-
sions, the idea of a Director General for Development
and Economic Cooperation took on symbolic importance to
the Group of 77 in their quest for more decisionmaking
authority in the international system. The priority
attached to the post by the LDCs was reiterated at the
G-77 Ministerial meeting in October. Among representatives
of the industrial countries, there is concern that the
proposal may create an "economic czar" and might split
the UN, with the Secretary General controlling political
issues and the new post economic ones.
Initially, however, the issue caused more tension
among the industrialized countries than between them and
the Group of 77. France was the most active opponent of
the proposal, which it regarded as a threat to the
authority of the traditionally French-held post of Under
Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs. This position
is particularly important to the French in view of their
perception of US domination of other major multilateral
institutions concerned with developmental matters (e.g.,
the World Bank and the UN Development Program). France
finally agreed to the creation of a position, but sought
to have the title changed to "special assistant" and its
holder's authority limited. Other industrialized countries,
realizing that the LDCs could force adoption of the pro-
prosal without Western support, preferred to argue about
its mandate rather than its title.
*The eight areas covered in the report of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee are: the effectiveness of the General Assembly;
the role of the Economic and Social Council; other UN
forums; the role of regional organizations; operational
activities for development; planning and programming;
interagency coordination; and Secretariat support.
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In the G-77 view, the title "director general" is
critical to giving the incumbent the possibility of
exercising systemwide influence, while "special assistant"
would place the position beneath the Under Secretaries
and take away any independent authority.
The compromise reached by the Ad Hoc Committee called
only for the Secretary General "to be invited to appoint
a high-level official to assist him in carrying out his
responsibilities in the economic and social fields." Sub-
sequently, the General Assembly approved the title of
"director general," but left to the Secretary General
the responsibility for making the appointment. This con-
sensus in part responds to the concern of some industrial
countries that the authority of the Secretary General
under the Charter to staff the UN Secretariat might be
infringed upon by hasty General Assembly action.
The controversy is not over. In the-months ahead
pressures will build from the G-77 to get the maximum
authority for their position. Despite the possibly
limited mandate, the post offers an ideal trainingground
for officials from developing countries aspiring to the
Secretary General position. More importantly, the G--77
is sure to continue to view the position as an important
step in their overall push for greater influence in
multilateral organizations.
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