WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: November 15, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

National
r r Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600
?j Assessment
Center
Western Europe
Review
State Department review completed
Secret
RP WER 78-016
15 November 1978
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WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW
15 November 1978
CONTENTS
The French Socialists: The Succession Struggle . . . 1
The struggle for leadership of the Socialist
Party, which began in earnest last March with
the defeat of the left in the legislative
election, has taken on a new intensity in
recent weeks with the emergence of what the
press has dubbed the "Rocard phenomenon."
UK: Callaghan Government Survives Test of
Confidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The test of confidence won by Prime Minister
Callaghan's minority Labor government should
improve its chances of surviving through the
winter.
NATO: Consultations on the French Call for a
European Disarmament Conference . . . . . . . . . . 8
The North Atlantic Council held consultations
last Thursday on the French call for a European
disarmament conference.
EC-ASEAN Ministerial meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A ministerial-level meeting between the EC
and ASEAN will probably produce a joint
"Declaration of Principles" aimed at facil-
itating region-to-region development aid,
business investment, and trade promotion.
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The French Socialists: The Succession Struggle
The struggle for leadership of the Socialist Party,
which began in earnest last March with the defeat of the
left in the legislative election, has taken on a new
intensity in recent weeks with the emergence of what the
press has dubbed the "Rocard phenomenon." Polls unex-
pectedly have shown that 48-year-old economist Michel
Rocard may be a more attractive leftist presidential
candidate in 1981 than Socialist leader Francois
Mitterrand--although both would be defeated by President
Giscard if the elections were held now. More important,
Rocard equals or has a slight edge over Mitterrand in
popularity among the electorate as a whole, as well as
among Socialist voters. At stake in the succession
struggle is not only the leadership of what is potentially
France's largest party but also a new political equation
for the post-1981 period.
The Socialist Party has changed in some important
ways since the March elections. Mitterrand still rules,
but both his style and his authority, so long unchal-
lenged, are now being questioned. Mitterrand can no
longer claim to be indispensable, for the Socialists
showed strong gains in recent by-elections at a time
when Mitterrand's personal popularity had fallen sharply.
Yet the Socialist first secretary remains popular among
party militants, has no intention of giving up the party
leadership, and still clearly believes that only he can
best unify and incarnate the entire left.
There has been a revision and relative "democratiza-
tion" of party statutes recently--certainly not as much
as Rocard would have liked but more than the Mitterrand-
ists would wish. Leadership posts in the party are now
elective rather than appointive, which means that a
beginning has been made at undercutting the Mitterrand-
ists' domination of party organization. The delegates
to the party directing committee, the party's key leader-
ship body, will, however, be delegates of the officially
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Mitterrand and Rocard. The rose and the fist are symbols of the Socialist Party.
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recognized party factions--the uneasy Mauroy-Mitterrand-
Rocard majority and the left-wing CERES minority--which
will assure the continuing domination of party chiefs.
Although Rocard may have the support of as many as 25
percent of the party members, he controls only one of the
95 federations--his own. CERES can count on 24.2 percent
of party votes, but this is not a solid anti-Rocard bloc
for a minority of this group now appears to lean toward
Rocard.
Although Rocard is also disliked by the Communist
leadership, which endlessly accuses him of plotting
right-wing deviationism, a majority of Communist voters
have a favorable opinion of him. Sixty-nine percent be-
lieve that the Socialist Party under his direction would
either take the same tack or move more to the left.
Rocard's image as a Socialist, longtime leftist militant
and modern reformist-technocrat is solid among the voters.
That he has managed so far to reassure center-right
voters without antagonizing Communist voters is quite an
accomplishment, attributed by his detractors to a de-
liberate ideological fuzziness.
An opposition led by Rocard would be less dogmatic
and probably more pragmatic and innovative. Rocard, how-
ever, would be equally unlikely to take the party into
an alliance with the center-right, for all party factions
agree on a strategy of autonomy, aimed at an eventual
Socialist/Communist coalition. (Rocard is quieter on
this issue than the Mitterrandists, who continue to as-
sert that the Communists will eventually be forced to co-
operate with a strong Socialist Party or sink into ob-
livion.) In the meantime, the Socialists will continue
to honor the traditional ground rules of left unity in
electoral contests and expect the Communists to do the
same. Autonomy for now excludes collaboration with
Giscard's governing coalition, but a stronger Socialist
Party could probably accept the support of those elements
of the coalition that might eventually rally to a revised
Socialist program.
The party's presidential candidate will be designated
by vote by the approximately 200,000 party members, prob-
ably in late 1979. If no candidate obtains an absolute
majority, the party congress will choose the candidate.
In the meantime, the battle for control of the party and
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its organization has begun, as factions--and factions
within factions--jockey for position. Pierre Mauroy, the
comparatively obscure number two man of the party, holds
major cards.* Neither of the two presidential hopefuls
can do without his support, yet his support has not been
given fully to either but is conditioned upon the issues
involved. Although most of Mauroy's lieutenants lean
towards Rocard, Mauroy has probably not decided whom to
back and will probably not make a decision until his
hand is forced.
The pro-Mitterrand forces have been comforting them-
selves with the analysis that Rocard has made his pres-
idential ambitions known too early and that he will burn
himself out before 1981. All factions of the party have
been counseling the militants to devote themselves to
preparing a Socialist manifesto to be voted on at a
party convention in February and mobilizing for the
cantonal and European elections in March and June 1979.
As head of the Socialist list for the European Parlia-
ment, Mitterrand will be able to take full credit for
what could be a very good socialist showing; just drawing
up the list gives him considerable clout in party coun-
cils. The onset of the cantonals and the European Par-
liament elections will also place a premium on maintain-
ing at least a facade of party unity and conflicting per-
sonal ambitions are likely to be kept below the surface.
Yet with all his advantages, Mitterrand has obvi-
ous problems: he will be 65 in 1981 and making his
third try at the presidency. It is unlikely that he
would seek or get his pasty's nomination a fourth time,
should he once again fail, as he is likely to do and in
a political system dominated by an elected and powerful
presidency, a party leader who is not a presidential
candidate has a hard time holding on. Rocard, on the
other hand, more reassuring and less compromised by the
alliance with the Communists, could lose in 1981 and
still run strong in the next presidential election
against a candidate like Gaullist leader Jacques Chirac.
*Mauroy's federation, the second largest, had 47 delegates and 466
votes at the party congress out of a total of 688 delegates and
5,914 votes. Mauroy supporters are also strongly embedded in the
party structure.
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The relative decline of the Communist and the labor
unions they dominate, a new nonpartisan spirit in some
of the other unions, the decline in Mitterrand's popu-
larity, and an emerging tendency to question ideologies
appear to be in Rocard's favor, but he will have an up-
hill battle against a Mitterrand tenaciously clinging-
ing to power.
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filh:
UK: Callaghan Government Survives Test of Confidence
The test of confidence Prime Minister Callaghan's
minority Labor government won last week should improve
its chances of surviving through the winter. Although
the Conservatives will continue to press issues on which
the government is most vulnerable, the Tories will be
preoccupied for the next few weeks with recovering from
recent instances of internal party dissension that have
thrown the party off balance.. A greater threat to the
government will come from potentially divisive wage ne-
gotiations with the trade unions and from the possibil-
ity of an economic slowdown.
Party discipline held for the Conservative and Labor
parties during the vote on the Queen's Speech, so the
future of Callaghan's fragile parliamentary support
rested with the sometimes unpredictable minor parties.
The Liberals, as expected, voted with the Conservatives
against the government, but the unexpected threat of de-
fections by the Scottish and Welsh Nationalists and Ul-
ster Unionists indicated that the outcome would be very
close. Abstentions, coupled with some support from the
three small parties, ensured the government's survival
by a scant 12 votes and forestalled a general election.
Callaghan's legislative package for this session
has been designed deliberately to placate the minor par-
ties and minimize controversial debate that could lead
to confidence votes. This tactic will not ensure the
government's survival, but it will provide the Tories
with fewer opportunities to try to bring the government
down. Still, the Conservatives will continue to look
for any issue that could lead to a loss of confidence in
the government and, given Callaghan's precarious support
in Parliament, they may succeed. The Tories, among a
broader public audience, are likely to concentrate their
attacks outside Parliament, primarily on the government's
economic policies. Party leaders hope this will help
the Conservatives regain their lead over Labor in the
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public opinion polls. The Tories, who recently lost two
parliamentary by-elections, suffered a sharp decline in
the public opinion polls in October.
The Conservatives will be preoccupied during coming
weeks with clarifying party positions on pay policy and
Rhodesia. Many Tory leaders still feel that former
Prime Minister Heath's virtual endorsement of the gov-
ernment's pay policy at the Conservative Party's annual
conference last month damaged party unity and undercut
Tory hopes of attracting trade union support.
A bitter split within the Conservative Party over
policy on Rhodesia recently led more than 100 Tories--
from both front and back benches--to vote against the
continuation of economic sanctions against Rhodesia in
defiance of party policy to abstain. Although the gov-
ernment's legislation to continue sanctions was never
threatened, the rebellion within Conservative ranks,
which is likely to surface again, has led party leader
Thatcher to reshuffle the shadow cabinet.
The strongest test for the government will come
from efforts to maintain economic growth and to enforce
its controversial policy of limiting wage increases to
an average of 5 percent. An increase in the inflation
or unemployment rates could severely weaken the govern-
ment's maneuverability in scheduling a general election.
The pay policy has not yet received a major test, but
strikes by several important unions are now in progress
and more are expected. Talks between the government
and the Trades Union Congress aimed at ironing out dif-
ferences over the pay policy--even if successful--ma
have very little effect on individual unions.
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NATO: Consultations on the French Call for a European
Disarmament Conference
The North Atlantic Council held important, unpubli-
cized consultations last Thursday on the French call for
a European disarmament conference, the centerpiece of the
multifacet disarmament initiative announced by the Elysee
in January. The lengthy session produced no consensus
on the merits of the proposal, which the French have tem-
pered somewhat in an effort to obtain broader support
within the Alliance. The Soviets remain generally unen-
thusiastic about the idea but have not foreclosed the
possibility of accepting it in some form.
While all of the Allies welcomed Paris' increased
interest in arms control negotiations, a number of them
joined the United States in expressing misgivings about
the European disarmament conference proposal, particu-
larly its relationship to the East-West force reductions
talks in Vienna and to the periodic reviews of compliance
with the Helsinki agreement signed in 1975. The French,
who do not participate in the Vienna negotiations, claim
that a growing imbalance in conventional weapons and
equipment is not being addressed there and maintain that
effective disarmament agreements must cover a larder area
than Central Europe. They also assert that the disarma-
ment conference must be held outside the Helsinki frame-
work in order to avoid disturbing the "delicate balance"
of the latter.
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Although the French have publicly asserted that
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had "shown interest" in
the conference idea when he visited Paris late last
month, they have privately admitted that Gromyko reiter-
ated the Soviets' reluctance to accept the broader geo-
graphic area Paris has in mind and their wariness about
the impact on the negotiations in Vienna. Gromyko sug-
gested again, however, that Moscow might be more favor-
ably inclined to attend a conference if nuclear weapons,
specifically US forward-based systems, were a conference
topic.
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EC-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
The EC and ASEAN will hold their first ministerial-
level meeting in Brussels on 20-21 November. The meeting
will probably produce a joint "Declaration of Principles"
aimed at facilitating region-to-region development aid,
business investment, and trade promotion. Consultation
procedures for settling trade disputes may also be es-
tablished, but the meeting will probably be remembered
for its symbolic value rather than its concrete achieve-
ments.
This latest round of negotiations is another example
of the EC cautiously moving further afield in its external
relations. The EC has come to look upon ASEAN as a poten-
tially significant force in Asia in political as well as
economic and commercial terms, and next week's ASEAN ex-
change can be seen as a complement to the Community's
longstanding economic links with Japan and recent over-
tures toward China. ASEAN also offers a secure source of
raw materials and a small but growing market for European
products.
For ASEAN, the meeting with the EC is part of a
series of dialogues it has initiated with the major in-
dustralized nations during the past three years. ASEAN
ultimately wants recognition as the organization in South-
east Asia that, through integration, will give impetus to
the development process and thus help bring non-Communist
stability to the region. It is precisely this sort of
political commitment that the EC wishes to avoid at this
meeting. ASEAN wants to be recognized and treated as an
equal partner by the major industrialized nations in terms
of trade, investment, and industrial diversification and
development. In particular, they want more economic and
political contact with the EC to balance the overwhelming
presence of Japan and the US in their economic affairs.
ASEAN leaders see the EC as an important source of tech-
nological and developmental aid as well as a potential
market.
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There are varying levels of enthusiasm for closer
ties with ASEAN within the EC. West Germany has been
the primary force behind the new West European initiative
and has come to look upon ASEAN as a major factor in
maintaining and consolidating the economic and political
stability of Southeast Asia. Although they share similar
impressions, France, Italy, and the UK continue to in-
sist on a go-slow approach. They are concerned that
such an undertaking could weaken the traditional EC pos-
ture toward Africa and arouse unrealistic expectations
in the ASEAN states. They also want to avoid establishing
new precedents that could generate demands from other
areas, such as Latin America.
The conference will consider trade development prob-
lems and will also discuss integration theory in hope of
discovering some lessons from the EC experience that
might be applied to ASEAN. ASEAN's ministers are expected
to press the EC delegation for concessions on several
trade issues--probably without much success. Several
months ago there were reports that some EC officials
were in favor of establishing a formal "contractual"
link with ASEAN along the lines of a trade cooperation
"framework" agreement. This position apparently has
been abandoned for the time being. In a similar vein,
ASEAN delegates to the conference plenary sessions have
attempted to persuade the EC to negotiate an export
earnings stabilization system (STABEX) covering timber
products, palm oil products, sugar, molasses, tea, cof-
fee, rubber, and other selected products. The EC will
continue to reject ASEAN's STABEX proposal, but may be
more forthcoming toward the UNCTAD Common Fund for financ-
ing commodity agreements, currently under negotiation in
Geneva. The ASEAN countries also plan to express their
concern over the unabated flow of Indochinese refugees
to their shores and will seek the cooperation of the EC
nations in expeditiously resettling these refugees in
third countries.
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