LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010014-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: January 4, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Secret
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Foreign
Assessment
Center
Latin America
Review
4 January 1979
Secret
RP LAR 79-001
4 January 1979
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LATIN AMERICA REVIEW
4 January 1979
CONTENTS
Cuba-US: Castro's Revolution Anniversary
Speech . . . . . . . . . . . .
President Fidel Castro used his 1 January
speech to deliver his strongest condemnation
of the US since the Carter administration
took office.
Ecuador: Blows to Army's Power
The recent dismissals of Minister of Govern-
ment Jarrin and of the head of the national
police strengthen the hand of President
Poveda and others who favor a return to
civilian rule next year.
The new radical party launched last month
will provide a forum for Marxist views that
have become increasingly unpopular in the
ruling party, but it will not have a signif-
Jamaica: New Marxist Party
icant impact on the political oituation.
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Cuba-US: Castro's Revolution Anniversary Speech
President Fidel Castro used his 1 January speech
commemorating the 20th anniversary of the "Triumph of
the Cuban Revolution" to deliver his strongest condemna-
tion of the US since the Carter administration took
office. The harshness of Castro's rhetoric, reflecting
his frustration over what he sees as Washington's fail-
,q/ ure to respond to his friendly gestures during the last
several months, indicates that Castro has all but writ-
ten off the possibility of improved relations in the
near term. Castro refrained from criticizing President
Carter personally, however, and was careful to leave
of relations.
t
ion
open the door for eventual normaliza
ware for some time that Cuba faces
b
een a
Castro has
a period of prolonged austerity unless it can sell its
major export products--sugar and nickel--to the US. The
importance of the US market to Cuba has been underscored
by poor prospects of the world sugar market for the
foreseeable future, Cuba's reduced access to its large,
traditional, sugar markets in Japan and Spain, and its
limited success in finding hard currency markets for ex-
panding nickel exports, particularly nickel sulfide
slurry. Havana's hopes that the economic embargo would
be lifted to allow access to the US market has been the
chief motive behind its recent humap rights gestures to
the US, and Castro was particularly bitter about the
Carter administ 's failure to respond positively
on this issue.
Castro's biting remarks about the decision to
normalize US-Chinese relations arise from his awareness
that Beijing (Peking) now stands to take advantage of
an economic relationship with the US that is denied to
Cuba. Castro emphasized, however, that Cuba--unlike
China--will not abandon its revolut.onary principles to
obtain the benefits of commercial relations with the
US. He also blasted the West for trying to use China
against the USSR.
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Castro's statements indicated that he apparently
sees no opportunity in the near future for diminishing
Cuba's military presence in Africa. He made no mention
of local conditions that might allow a reduction of
Cuban troops :in Ethiopia or Angola. He implied, in
fact, that Cuba will continue to stand ready to help
its friends in Africa and elsewhere by saying that Cuba
will be "unflinchingly loyal" to its "revolutionary ob-
ligations."
Having used many of the bargaining chips available
to him in dealing with the US, and unwilling to alter
his policy of military involvement in Africa to accom-
modate Washington, Castro seemed reduced to trying to
shame the Carter administration into making concessions.
Castro contrasted his government's accomplishments in
overcoming Cuba's social ills with the failure of US-
supported regimes elsewhere in Latin America to redress
these problems. He accused the US of trying to impose
its "rotten and hypocritical pseudo-democracy" on Latin
America and implied that the US was responsible for
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thousands of deaths there as a result of helping to
bring allegedly repressive regimes to power.
In a related event, the military parade on 2 January
displayed weapons that contribute both to Cuba's defense
and to its military commitments abroad. The parade of
mobile and amphibious weapons, engineering equipment,
and personnel transport illustrated the growth of the
concept of mobility in the Cuban armed forces, and was
highlighted by the first public showing of MI-8 armed
helicopters and it unit of naval infantry. The anti-
cipated fly-by of swing-wing MIG-23 fighter-bombers
took place but could not be seen because of low clouds.
A television documentary shown on the same day made a
point of saying that all Cuban military equipment has
been provided free by the USSR. The commentator valued
the, equipment :provided since 1959 at, several billion
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V
Ecuador: Blows to Army's Power
The recent dismissals of Minister of Government
Jarrin and the head of the national police are serious
blows to the political power and influence of the Army
and of Army General Luis Duran, a member of the Supreme
Council of Government. The dismissals strengthen the
hand of President Poveda and others who favor a return
to civilian rule next year and appear to make the Navy
the Ascendant mi 1 i t
y. _. _
r
When the present ruling three-man Supreme Council
was formed in January 1976, Admiral Poveda was made head
.of state--he is the only naval officer in Latin America
serving in this capacity. Duran did not get the post in
part because he was widely mistrusted by his fellow Army
officers and, since that time, Duran has plotted relent-
lessly not only to overthrow Poveda but also to thwart
the promised return to constitutional government. I
The appointment of Victor Garces, a Navy admiral 25X1
and an intimate of Poveda, as Minister of Government--
together with the abrupt nature of Jarrin's dismissal,
his reassignment to an obscure position in the Army's
personnel department, and the Navy's effective assump-
tion of control over the country's 12,000-man police
force--points to the 's declining fortunes.
The Supreme Council has ordered Garces to carry out
a thorough investigation of the assassination. The probe
could produce damning information against other general
officers, including Duran. It seems unlikely, however,
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that Duran will actually be dropped from the Council
because he publicly vowed several months ago to retire
from active duty when the aovernment
as-
sumes office next August. 77
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S
Oz
Jamaica: New Marxist Party
A new radical party launched in Jamaica last month
will provide a forum for Marxist views that have become
decreasingly popular in the ruling People's National Party
(PNP) and will offer a refuge for PNP leftists disen-
chanted with Prime Minister Manley's growing political
moderation. The new party's ambitious leader, Trevor
Munroe, will also try to unify radical groups across the
Caribbean and tighten their links with Cuba and the
Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the new party will not be
able to win a Jamaican election or have a significant
impact on government policy for the foreseeable future.
Background
Munroe has initiated his Workers' Party of Jamaica
(WPJ) in a period of eclipse for local radicals, who
have generally supported
Manley during his nearly
seven years in office.
Munroe would probably prefer
to continue the cooperatve
relationship with Manley
while further failures of
moderate policies work to
the radicals' advantage.
The young leftist leader
apparently fears, however,
that ruling party moderates
will force Manley to ease
his longst din ties with
the left.
Although the Prime Min-
ister has carried out re-
forms approved by the left
and has remained sympa-
thetic to the radicals, the
serious deterioration of the
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island's economy-.-and the USSR's refusal to provide
aid--have impelled him in the past year t.o backtrack on
social programs and to impose harsh austerity measures.
Nearly all of Manley's once-influential radical advisers
have been displaced by moderates committed to a tough
three-year agreement with the International Monetary
Fund that has saved the government from collapse. F -1 25X1
Munroe's party has announced conditional support
for Manley, and the Prime Minister has publicly hailed
it as a progressive force, but his relations with the
i le.ft are obviously coolie .
unroe, tor is par as sternly warne e
Prime minister that the left will desert him if he con-
i
nues to yield. to pressure from the moderates.
t
The new party is a threat to Manley primarily be-
cause it could siphon off the left wing of th
PN
e
P--a
development that would greatly embarrass the Prime Min-
ister. We have no evidence, however, that any of the
prominent radicals still in the ruling party are yet to
exchan e th
IJV1.L I,.YC d_L system at oxford in the late 1960s.
is JUL.) Security for the id logical integrity
offered by Munroe. I 9i
The Founder of the WPJ
The 33-year-old Munroe is a university professor
whose mixing of radical politics with scholarly research
has apparently hurt his reputation in both fields. Like
most leading Jamaican radicals, Munroe is a child of
privilege--the son of a prominent -jurist.. Jesuit-
educated in Jamaica, Munroe won a Rhodes fellowship that
enabled him to complete a malor qt, Axy n f .T=m ,4--
When he returned home, Munroe turned quickly to
leftist politics and gradually allowed Marxist polemics
to pervade his published works. Munroe's organiza-
,,.-tions--a university-based union formed in 1972, and a
political association that laid the groundwork for his
new radical part.y-?-have never mobilized a significant
following. Munroe's stature has risen largely because
of Manley's protection and not be ny appreci-
able mass support.
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Despite his weak political performance to date,
M still has ambitions to replace Manley as the
e
unro
leader of the Jamaican left and to unite Caribbean radi-
cal groups.
A oug heas apparen y ex-
aggerated is oca and international reputation, Munroe
has managed to attract Soviet, Cuban, and numerous other
Caribbean delegates to the inauguration of his new party.
It is clear, moreover, that he will work energetically
to increase Cuban and Soviet influence among the dis ar.-
ate radical groups in the region. 25X1
Prospects
Munroe may well become a nuisance for Manley and
the Workers' Party could become a rallying point for
Caribbean radicals isolated from political power. He
will probably increase his small following among disaf-
fected youth--60 percent of Jamaica's population is under
21 and 50 percent under 16. Nonetheless, the new party
will not become a major political force for the foresee-
able future.
Despite his high profile during Manley's rule,
roe commands a following probably no larger than 1,000
M
un
among a generally conservative electorate of over 800,000.
Moreover, the WPJ will make little headway against the two
major parties, which are based on unions that control
about 98 percent of organized labor and that have ex-
cluded all other parties from parliament since its estab-
lishment in 1944. Munroe has never contested a Jamaican
election and his abortive effort to woo port workers
away from the major unions in 1974 resulted in violence
d
.
in which Munroe himself was seriously injure
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In breaking with Manley, therefore, Munroe would
also have much to lose for the sake of Marxist principles.
As a political historian, he is aware that minor parties
have a record of dismal failure in Jamaica. Twenty-one
minor parties--including two previous leftist groups in-
augurated with as much early fanfare as the WPJ--have
accumulated only about one percent of the total vote in
17 general elections under universal suffraap _
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