LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010009-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 24, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Foreign
Assessment
Center
Latin America
Review
Secret
RP LAR 78-013
24 November 1978
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LATIN AMERICA REVIEW
24 November 1978
CONTENTS
Arr entina-Chile: Stalemate in the Beagle Channel
Buenos Aires and Santiago have made no prog-
ress toward resolving their differences
over the Beagle Channel, despite their con-
tention earlier this month that they were
willing in principle to accept outside medi-
ation.
Cuba: Preparing for the Nonaligned Summit. . . .
Cuban leader Fidel Castro, aware that he has
a major public relations job on his hands,
has begun campaigning to persuade heads of
state to attend the sixth Nonaligned Summit
meeting in Havana next September.
Colombia: Favorable Prospects for Drug Control . . . 8
President Turbay's firm personal commitment,
together with the recent actions of his gov-
ernment to halt Colombia's expanding illicit
narcotics industry, are a welcome contrast
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Argentina-Chile: Stalemate in the Beagle Channel
Argentina and Chile have made no progress toward
resolving their differences over the Beagle Channel
despite their contention earlier this month that they
were willing in principle to accept outside mediation.
0 Neither country wants to give the impression that it is
caving in to pressure and each is now accusing the other
of acting in bad faith.
Buenos Aires apparently seized upon the third-party
mediation formula proposed by Chile in order to allay
international fears that Argentina was preparing to at-
tack. Last week, however, it publicly conditioned its
acceptance on a prior round of strictly bilateral negotia-
tions--a condition Chile is unwilling to accept.
Although the Argentine Ambassador to Chile has been
recalled twice for high-level consultations, there is
no evidence that serious efforts are under way to select
a mediator. Argentina has hinted that it is willing to
approach Spanish King Juan Carlos during his state visit
later this month, but Santiago reportedly views the King
as biased in Argentina's favor and, therefore, unaccept-
able.
Despite the apparent stalemate, Argentina's con-
ditional acceptance of mediation indicates that President
Videla is making every effort to defuse the issue. He is
still under strong pressure, however, from conservative
generals and younger officers to resort to arms if the
/""impasse is not broken. Tensions reportedly have subsided
somewhat, but both nations are maintaining their military
forces in a high state of readiness.
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In spite of Argentina's obvious military superiority,
the Chileans apparently are willing to risk a brief clash
rather than concede their territorial claims. Indeed,
Santiago has become increasingly adamant in its refusal
to compromise and its diplomats are pressing to take the
issue back to The Hague for a new arbitration ruling.
president Pinochet and his advisers know that they have
strong international support and see the Argentine Gov-
ernment as becoming increasingly isolated by its own
tactics.
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Cuba ; Preparations for the Nonaligned Summit
Fidel Castro is already campaigning to persuade heads
of state to attend the sixth nonaligned summit meeting in
Havana next September. Castro knows that he has a major
public relations job on his hands since several countries--
Egypt, Senegal, and Yugoslavia among them--are questioning
Cuba's nonaligned credentials because of its large mili-
tary presence in Africa. As an obvious part of his cam-
paign, Castro has dispatched Foreign Minister Isidoro
Malmi.erca and two experts on nonaligned matters to Africa
and the Middle East. The Cuban President also hopes to
strengthen bilateral relations.
Malmierca and his group have already visited Mada-
gascar, Tanzania, Mozambique, Ethiopia (a short stop),
Sri Lanka and India, and next go to Afghanistan. The
visits have followed a general pattern: Malmierca spends
about four days in each country, meets with the head of
state, visits schools or developmental projects with his
counterpart, signs any cooperation protocols that have
been previously negotiated, and issues a joint communi-
que at the end of the stop. So far, the communiques have
stressed similar themes. These include solidarity with
southern African liberation groups, support for the
Polisario Front, reunification of Korea, promotion of a
new international. economic order and the nonaligned move-
ment's role in international affairs, and support for
Havana as the site for the coming summit.
The Cubans' visits to Sri Lanka and India were prob-
ably somewhat sensitive. India was an especially active
behind-the-scenes force for moderation at the Belgrade
nonaligned meeting in August. It sided with countries
such as Yugoslavia and Egypt to water down Cuba's attempts
to radicalize the final communique. The best Malmierca
could do during his visit was to sign agreements on tech-
nical and scientific cooperation and cultural exchanges,
both of which had been negotiated about a week earlier.
The Cubans feel that such agreements, especially those
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concluded with the major moderate members of the non-
aligned movement, will be of some benefit in demonstrating
Cuba's nonaligned status. At a press conference in
Colombo, Malmierca portrayed Cuba as a victim of "China
and the US who are leading a campaign to weaken the move-
ment." He also made a vigorous call for defense of the
objectives of the movement by all its members.
During the visit to Tanzania, which was scheduled
well before the outbreak of fighting on the Ugandan bor-
der, Malmierca stressed at a press conference that "Tan-
zania had not sought military aid from Cuba to push back
the Ugandan invaders." Malmierca waited until he was in
Mozambique to condemn Ugandan aggression against Tanzania
and to declare Cuba's support for the principle of'ter-
ritorial integrity.
The stop in Mozambique probably resulted in more
work and less ceremony than the others because the foreign
ministers' coordinating bureau will meet in Maputo in
January. In addition, Malmierca met with representatives
of Cuban internationalist contingents who are serving in
Mozambique. Relations between the two countries are
close, and they have just agreed on an extensive economic/
technical cooperation package.
If Fidel Castro is to get a good turnout in Havana,
where he hopes to assume tacit leadership of the non-
aligned movement, he will probably try to project a mod-
erate image, avoid controversy and accentuate the positive.
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Colombia: Favorable Pros ects for Drug Control
President Turbay's firm personal commitment, and
the recent actions of his government are encouraging
signs in the campaign to halt Colombia's expanding
illicit drug industry. Bogota's passage of a strict
aviation-control. 'law that includes shooting down air-
craft violating restricted airspace and its increased
enforcement actions in the Guajira drug center are a
welcome contrast: to the unfavorable drug-control cli-
mate that seemed to exist earlier this year.
During last summer's presidential campaign, Turbay
was alleged to have connections with--or be politically
indebted to--Colombian drug-smuggling syndicates. The
main issue from the US point of view, however, was not
whether Turbay was guilty or innocent, but whether as
president he would subvert the drug-control coopera-
tion between Washington and Bogota that had been
initiated during his predecessor's administration.
Press leaks and journalistic accounts of Turbay's al-
legedly "nefarious reputation" created an atmosphere
of diplomatic sensitivity that also threatened to
jeopardize bilateral drug-control relations.
As it turned out, however, several factors served
to promote rather than to impede Bogota's anti-narcotics
program. First., the attention focused on Turbay and
on Colombia by international and local media forced
the new president to take a strong stand--not only to
vindicate his personal reputation, but also to polish
his country's tarnished image. Second, Turbay--who is
an astute politician--undoubtedly recognized the
importance that. Washington attaches to the problem of
international drug smuggling. If for no other reasons,
he took advantage of the drug issue to demonstrate
his political leadership at home and to boost his
political standing abroad. Finally, and most important,
the anti-narcotics program in Colombia has gained mo-
mentum for a reason that may be :incongruous to many--
namely, that Turbay genuinely believes the drug problem
is a serious threat to the social, economic, and even
political fabric of his country's democratic government.
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Turbay's beliefs are not necessarily inconsistent
with the fact that previous charges against him might
conceivably be true. Even if he has personally
benefited in the past or continues to profit from the
drug trade at present, his present political position
demands that he serve the interests of his country and
his people.
Turbay perceives that the drug industry has drawn
untold thousands out of the productive work force and
made them dependent on a black market economy that
spawns inflation and robs Bogota of taxable legal rev-
enues. At the same time, the drug trade breeds addi-
tional lawlessness that adversely affects Colombia's
already deteriorating internal security. In addition,
the virtual autonomy of some drug trafficking regions--
particularly the Guarija peninsula, where the majority
of Colombian marijuana is cultivated--poses a serious
political threat to the central government.
Turbay undoubtedly intends to follow through on
his "crusade" against drugs, but not necessarily in a
mutual drug-control program that also serves US in-
terests. The extent to which he will continue to co-
operate with the US may depend on his perception of
Washington's willingness to cooperate with him.
Turbay, who is independent and strong-willed, re-
fers to the present drug campaign as the "war of the
two peninsulas"--referring to the Guajira peninsula in
Colombia and to Florida in the US. He clearly expects
that while he moves against the Guajira region, US
authorities will take simultaneous steps against the
drug industry that flourishes in southern Florida. He
also expects that if the US Coast Guard is allowed to
board and search Colombian-flag ships suspected of
transporting marijuana and other drugs in international
waters, then Colombian authorities will be granted
similar leeway by Washington to conduct enforcement
actions against US-registered planes and ships operat-
ing illegally in Colombia.
Officials in Colombia and other South American
countries have frequently been puzzled by what they re-
gard as an inconsistency between the foreign and
domestic drug policies of the US--specifically, the
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disparity bet -Teen US desires to see hars!r drug penalties
imposed in oLlcer countries while promoting "decrimi.nali--
zation" laws at home. Colombia's present momentum in
the drug-control area, and Turbay's inclination to take
bold and innovative measures against drug smuggling,
may well be dependent, at least to a degree, on a
demonstration of similar resolve from other countries .
24 November 1978
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