LATIN AMERICA REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010013-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: July 14, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Latin America
ONAL AND
ITICAL ANALYSIS
State Dept. review completed
Secret
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LATIN AMERICA
14 July 1977
CONTENTS
Guatemala-UK-Belize: Crisis Forestalled . . . . . 1
Chile: Return to Civilian Rule. . . . . . . . . . 4
Peru: Leaders Divided Over Economic Policy. . . . 7
Jamaica: Impact of Economic Crisis. . . . . . 9
Brazil: Reactive Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Argentina: Improved Foreign
Financial Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Latin America: Nuclear Energy Facilities
and Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Cuban Chronology for June 1977 . . . . . . . . . . 22
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by
the Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with oc-
casional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence and
from other agencies within the Intelligence Community. Comments and queries are
welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
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Mexico
Honduras
El alvador
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Guatemala-UK-Belize: Crisis Forestalled
The decision by the UK to reinforce its defenses
in Belize last week capped a series of events that
brought the long-festering issue of Guatemala's claim
on Belize closer to open hostilities than at any time
in the past two years. The military buildup came as
British and Guatemalan negotiators met in Washington to
seek an arrangement that would give Belize full inde-
pendence from the UK while at. the same time assuring
some compensation for Guatemala. By week's end, mili-
tary tensions began to ease and the Washington negotia-
tors agreed to continue to pursue a settlement, sug-
gesting that the two days of talks had brought about
some meeting of the minds on the emotional question of
a territorial cession to Guatemala.
Even before the talks began in Washington on July
6, the British had decided to reinforce the Belize gar-
rison in anticipation of a military move by Guatemala,
should the negotiations founder. Reinforcements, which
began to arrive as the talks got under way, included a
British frigate, 6 Harrier VTOL jet fighters, a good
deal of equipment and munitions, and a large number of
troops. The volume of air transport from the UK to
Belize suggests that London could have introduced about
1,000 to 1,500 troops, effectively doubling the Belize
garrison.
The Guatemalans were immediately aware of the Brit-
ish move, though their estimates of the extent of the
buildup were exaggerated. At first, President Laugerud
accused the British of provocation, suggestin they were
trying to intimidate Guatemala at the talks.
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In the charged atmosphere that developed, there
were widespread reports that Guatemala was rushing troops
to the border and that many border residents were fleeing
in expectation of war. The US embassy in Guatemala re-
layed to Laugerud British assurances that the reinforce-
ment was merely defensive and in response to Guatemalan
military exercises in late June, the call-up of reserves,
and belligerent public statements by the government. In
Washington and Guatemala, US representatives urged Guate-
mala to show restraint, though there was concern that US
credibility might have suffered when British aircraft
bringing troops and equipment refueled at US facilities
in Bermuda.
All evidence indicates that President Laugerud showed
great restraint in keeping his more aggressive army col-
leagues under leash. He apparently did not send any new
troops to the border area, but instead ordered all troops,
except two platoons normally stationed at border outposts,
to pull back 8 kilometers. While Guatemalan air force
units were placed on alert, no sorties were flown.
A joint communique issued by the negotiators in
Washington on July 7 signaled an amicable conclusion to
the talks, and strains in Guatemala and Belize eased
rapidly. Both sides agreed to study proposals and work
to reduce tensions. The British assured that there would
be no sudden move to grant Belize independence, which the
Guatemalan media billed as a triumph for their cause.
Finally, chief British negotiator Rowlands agreed to
visit Guatemala,, perhaps as early as next week, to dis-
cuss the next stage of negotiations.
While the results of the talks have not been re-
leased, the pending visit by Rowlands, the reduced ten-
sions, and Guatemala's public acknowledgment that it
might accept a territorial compromise all suggest that
the Washington talks may have achieved a breakthrough on
the question of Belize ceding land in exchange for Guate-
mala's acceptance of independence. Before this could
succeed, however, the UK would have to overcome expected
opposition from Belizean Premier Price. Another sticking
point could be Guatemala's public insistence on withdrawal
of the British reinforcements.
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Barring a border incident, the military situation
will probably remain calm, at least until after Rowland's
visit. The bolstered British defenses are in effective
deterrent to potential Guatemalan aggression, and the
UK has allayed the major Guatemalan concern of a sudden,
unilateral grant of independence. If the two parties
are making progress on a settlement, or even if they
simply agree to hold another negotiating round, the mil-
itary confrontation should continue to subside. But if
an impasse arises over terms of a settlement or the with-
drawal of British reinforcements, tensions could quickly
escalate.
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Chile: Return to Civilian Rule
Chilean President Pinochet's announced plans to re-
turn the country to civilian rule IBM. AV,
by 1985 represents a significant
policy departure. His blueprint
for a return to "normality," the
delivery to Washington of an ad-
vance text of his speech of last
Saturday, and recent reports that
he is considering restricting the
power of the notorious National
Intelligence Directorate (DINA),
all suggest that Pinochet has fi-
nally become convinced that dra-
conian measures are no longer nec-
essary in Chile and that it is
time for a new image.
minates in limited popular elections in 1985. These
elections would choose two-thirds of the delegates to
a legislative assembly that would then appoint a new
president. Prior to this, the junta in 1980 will name
the members of a single legislative chamber that will
rule jointly with the armed forces for four or five
years.
Pinochet's suggested schedule
President Pinochet
for a return to civilian rule cul-
Pinochet warned that the entire plan depends on
continued signs of "recuperation" from the Allende years.
If the announced time frame is followed, Chile will be
on a similar but slower schedule of the constitutional
changes announced by the military governments of Bolivia
and Peru.
The reasons for Pinochet's surprise announcement
are obscure, but he has been under considerable pressure
from the military and the government establishment to do
something about Chile's human rights image and begin
some process toward returning to political normality.
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Complaints by members of the junta and the military ser-
vices about the poor human rights image and DINA's ex-
cessive power have increased in recent months. Many
senior officers reportedly have told Pinochet that sub-
version is under control, the state of siege should be
lifted, and DINA's arrest power should be terminated.
Pinoc et, undoubtedly reflect-
ing is aversion to e chaos of the Allende years, has
been dragging his feet on the DINA issue. He probably
believes that it is premature to curtail DINA or to re-
turn the country to civilian rule before 1985. Charac-
teristically, he lashed out during his speech against
foreign intervention in Chilean affairs under the guise
of defending human rights.
Pressure from his colleagues in recent months has
made Pinochet's stance increasingly unsupportable. The
fact that political normalization will be supervised
closely by the armed forces probably increased his will-
ingness to make the election announcement. In addition,
internal security is well in hand and the country is on
the road to economic recovery. An added inducement, of
course, is the announcement's expected beneficial effects
on the government's popular support and its human rights
image.
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Very little! in the present operation of the govern-
ment will actually change, at least for the present. It
is always possible that Pinochet will backslide on re-
forming DINA or ending the state of siege. The fact is, 25X1
however, that there is now an announced specific plan to
return the civilians to a political role and the mili-
tary to the barracks.
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Peru: Leaders Divided Over Economic Policy
A continuing dispute among Peru's military rulers
over economic policy, which led to the resignation of
Finance Minister Piazza last week, now poses a political
threat to President Morales Bermudez. The President
must persuade his cabinet to accept austerity measures
that the International Monetary Fund requires for
balance-of-payments loans that Peru sorely needs. Should
his efforts at personal lobbying fail, Morales Bermudez
could either resign or be ousted in favor of someone
more acceptable to the country's economic hardliners.
The departure of Piazza--one of only two civilians
in the cabinet and the second finance minister to re-
sign in eight weeks--was prompted by persistent oppo-
sition in the cabinet to a new austerity program, promul-
gated on June 10, to satisfy IMF demands. His resigna-
tion was followed by those of top officials of the cen-
tral bank, who had been the chief negotiators with the
IMF.
A government announcement on July 12 that new eco-
nomic and financial guidelines would be set forth in 10
days may indicate that pressure from cabinet dissidents
neral Ibanez O'Brien
G
i
t
i
,
e
er,
s
n
led by the industry m
will bring about key changes in the economic program.
Continuing protest demonstrations over price increases
in Peru's major cities, six of which have now been placed
under curfew, lend support to the demands of the Ibanez
O'Brien group.
Although the cabinet dissenters objected most
strongly to cuts in the military budget, they also re-
portedly proposed to relax restrictions on other public
,expenditures and to resort to other inflationary measures
to stimulate economic growth. Such changes are unlikely
to receive a favorable hearing from the IMF, and further
talks will be complicated by the presence of a new and
inexperienced Peruvian negotiating team.
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Morales Bermudez' chances of success in this effort,
as well as his personal prestige, have been badly weak-
ened by the resignations of two successive finance min-
isters and the central bank officials, all of whom
strongly supported his economic policies. He faces for-
midable opposition in the cabinet, where there are rum-
blings of discontent over his leadership. He has indi-
cated in the past that he is willing, and perhaps even
eager, to relinquish the presidency; the present clash
may leave him with no alternative.
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Jamaica: Impact of Economic Crisis
Jamaica is increasingly feeling the impact of its
economic crisis. Incipient food shortages have already
led to one near riot, labor unrest temporarily shut down
the country's only oil refinery, and violence is spiral-
ing in response to growing unemployment only a month
after the government lifted the state of emergency.
Jamaican officials reached a tentative agreement
with the International Monetary Fund earlier this month
concerning a reported $35-million loan this year. If
approved--as appears likely--this loan will give the
~? 3 government of Prime Minister Manley a psychological boost,
but will go only part way toward meeting the island's
immediate cash needs. Venezuela apparently has also of-
fered up to $20 million in balance-of-payments support
this year.
Kingston has been under pressure from the IMF to
cut the level of government spending, modify the exchange
rate system, and implement a stringent wage and incomes
policy. The Manley government will be hard pressed to
satisfy such conditions. The two major labor unions have
already begun to press for higher wages to offset in-
creases in the cost of living and rising inflation.
The ruling People's National Party's national execu-
tive council met in late June in a mood of somber pessi-
mism to discuss the economic situation.
Ruling party radicals generally maintained a low pro-
file at the council meeting, but they are waiting in the
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wings ready to blame Manley's moderate advisers for the
state of the economy.
The most prominent radical, D. K. Duncan, who serves
as minister of national mobilization and party secretary
general, has been carefully strengthening his ties with
local party leaders in hopes of tipping the balance
against the predominantly moderate parliamentary wing
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Brazil: Reactive Politics
Brazilian President Geisel is continuing to take a
hard line with civilian critics of his administration.
Since he stripped the opposition party of most of its
influence last April, Geisel has suspended the political
rights of two opposition party politicians, including
the leader of the Chamber of Deputies for 10 years.
Geisel's recourse to these harsh measures reinforces an
already widespread belief among political observers that
he is increasingly unsure of his objectives and overly
sensitive to criticism.
in mid-June, he removed a minor opposition figure
from office for having quoted an illegal communist news-
paper in a congressional speech. While it is a basic
tenet of the "Brazilian Revolution" that the communists
shall not exercise any role, even indirectly, in Brazilian
politics,
ian security officials were pressing Geisel to to e
punitive action. If true, such efforts could have per-
suaded the President to act, especially since his pop-
ularity is waning and he wants to control the choice of
his successor--which must be decided by the military high
command within the next year.
Geisel's latest move against his opponents came after
opposition leader Alencar Furtado and two of his colleagues
criticized the government on nationwide television. As is
customary, Geisel gave no explanation for singling out
Furtado, but it is obvious that his criticism--which
strongly condemned the government's arbitrary use of power
and its record on human rights--struck raw nerves.
The opposition has not formally elected a successor
to Furtado because the Congress is now in recess. The
probable choice, however, Freitas Nobre, has already told
3/X US embassy officials that, if chosen, he intends to lower
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the volume of political rhetoric, but to continue on a
firm ideological course against the government. Freitas
Nobre may be overly optimistic about the influence he
will be able to exert--given the severe setbacks the
opposition has received--but he is known to be a man of
principle and a skillful tactician and could be a diffi-
cult figure for the government to control or censure.
Most Brazilian politicians, however, seem resigned
to the belief that. the Geisel administration will continue
to move to the right. There are still a few effective
voices within the opposition, but they may well be
silenced if they overste the regime's limits, which are
becoming less distinct.
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Argentina: Improved Foreign Financial Situation
. The military junta that took over last year has
brought Argentina back from the brink of international
bankruptcy to a state of comfortable solvency. Interna-
tional obligations are being met, and reserves have
reached an all-time high. The government must now induce
industry to exploit the favorable foreign balance by im-
porting more of the materials needed for raising domestic
production. Economic prospects for the remainder of 1977
are good even though the government still faces serious
domestic problems--inflation, a large budget deficit, and
lagging industrial production. Its handling of these
problems over the next year or so will help determine
whether it remains in power long enough to consolidate
its gains.
Inherited Problems
When the military ousted the Peronist government in
March 1976, the economy was approaching disaster. The
trade balance had registered $0.5 billion deficit in 1975--
compared with a $1.3 billion surplus two years earlier,
when a good grain harvest boosted exports, and an $800
million surplus in 1974. The. 1975 drop resulted from a
poor grain harvest, the loss of EC markets for meat, and
;- an unrealistic exchange rate that made Argentine manu-
factures uncompetitive while encouraging importers to
buy heavily abroad in anticipation of a major devaluation.
Although the higher cost of oil imports also contributed
to the trade deficit, oil costs are less significant for
Argentina than for most oil-importing countries because
domestic oil production covers 85 to 90 percent of re-
quirements. In addition, poor debt planning had allowed
a concentration of foreign debt payments to build up in
1976. Reserves were near the vanishing point.
Domestic production was stagnant. Government poli-
cies had discouraged agricultural output, while manufac-
turers found themselves in a profit squeeze between rising
costs and regulated prices. Inflation was spiraling up-
//" ward so rapidly that, if left unchecked, the 1976 rate
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would have approached 1,000 percent. With a bloated
bureaucracy and an inadequate revenue structure, the
government deficit was rising rapidly, and the regime
was increasingly covering expenditures by issuing more
currency. b'or their part, workers were demanding and
getting sizable wage increases in an effort to offset
rising prices. Argentina's foreign credit rating was
poor, and the Peronist government had not yet lined up
funds to cover its foreign financial gap.* This gap had
widened from a $0.5 billion in 1974 to $2 billion in 1975.
Argentina: Foreign Financial Gap
1974 1975 1976' 19772
Million US $
Exports, f.o.b. 3,266 3,931 2,961 3,895 4,500
Imports, f.o.b. 1,983 3,160 3,431 2,652 3,500
Net services and transfers -563 -644 -815 -632 -790
Current account balance 720 127 -1,285 611 210
Debt amortization -573 -600 -800 -1,000 -1,000
Financial gap 147 -473 -2,085 -389 -790
Medium- and long-term
capital inflows 594 723 NA 1,300 NA
Net short-term capital
inflows 180 -301 NA 290 NA
Change in reserves 921 -51 -791 1,201 -300
External debt, yearend 4,672 4,873 4,695 5,189 4,679
Percent
' Preliminary.
2 YLO]eCY.C(l.
'Financial gap is defined as the current account deficit
plus amortization of medium- and Zong-term debt; shifts
in short-term capital are not included.
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1976--The Bail Out
The new junta immediately focused on the need to
stimulate exports, with emphasis on agricultural products.
It reversed the previous policy of keeping agricultural
prices low to benefit urban workers. Sharply increased
prices for farm products, improved availability of cred-
its, and abolition of the marketing monopoly of the
state grain board led to a 10 percent increase in grain
areas planted. Favorable weather during the growing
and harvesting seasons then contributed to a bumper crop.
Although world wheat prices dropped, aggressive market-
ing by private Argentine grain sales agencies--pushed
by a shortage of facilities to store the record crop--
accounted for a large share of the $900 million increase
in total exports in 1976. This trend continued into
1977, when the remainder of the harvest was marketed.
Meat exports nearly doubled in 1976 compared with
the depressed 1975 level, aided by more realistic ex-
change rates. With continual. "microdevaluations" of the
peso to offset inflation and the gradual elimination of
the dual exchange rate, the government also succeeded
in stimulating exports of nontraditional products by the
end of the year. Imports dropped 23 percent in 1976 as
inventories were drawn down and as demand was dampened
by recession.
In addition to initiating the export promotion pro-
gram, Economics Minister Martinez de Hoz launched a world-
wide effort to obtain foreign loans. In personal approaches
to banks and international financial institutions in the
US, Canada, Western Europe, and Japan he succeeded in
l 1i lining up nearly $1 billion in four- to five-year loans.
/ Together with $300 million from the International Monetary
Fund, these loans enabled Argentina to meet debt
obligations and to improve the debt maturity profile.
By the end of 1976, debt. payment coverage was as-
sured. Moreover the trade balance had swung from a $500
million deficit in 1975 to a $1.2 billion surplus. The
current account balance totaled $600 million, compared
with a $1.3 billion deficit the year before. International
/ reserves had trebled. Gains on the domestic front promised
further improvement in the general economic climate and
the restoration of foreign confidence in Argentina's fi-
nancial soundness:
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--GDP, although down 2.9 percent for 1976 as
a whole, was rising in the last quarter.
--The inflation rate was down from more than
400 percent (annual basis) in the first
half 1976 to about 100 percent in the second
half.
--The national budget deficit, which equaled
13.5 percent of GDP in the first half of
1976, was down to about half that level in
the second half; for the year as a whole,
41 percent of expenditures were covered by
revenues, compared with only 23 percent in
197.5.
1977--Maintaining the Pace
The foreign financial situation has remained highly
favorable so far. Exceptionally large grain shipments
boosted exports to $1.8 billion in the first four months,
double the level of imports. More than 85 percent of
imports consisted of industrial inputs and capital goods,
signaling an upturn in industrial output. To encourage
this trend, the government has removed practically all
restrictions on imports. If production picks up, imports
should be considerably larger in the remainder of the
year; exports will decline until the next harvest begins
in November. The government's economic team projects
the year's exports at $4.3 billion to $4.5 billion, the
trade surplus at close to $1 billion, and the current
account surplus at $200 million.
The junta is continuing its program of incentives
for agriculture and expects another large grain harvest
in 1977-78. It is also counting on realistic exchange
policies to boost exports of manufactured goods.
Debt payments due in 1977 are close to the 1976
level of $1 billion and will require additional borrowing
to cover. Although an improved credit rating will make
loans easier to obtain, new borrowing is expected to to-
tal less than one third the 1976 level because of record
. foreign reserves. Argentina almost certainly will choose
to reduce its external debt rather than accumulate addi-
tional reserves.
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Farther Down the Road
Longer range prospects for the Argentine economy
are clouded by political uncertainties. If the present
economic team remains in power and adheres to current
h policies, the economic recovery is likely to accelerate
and the foreign financial situation should continue im-
proving. In light of past Argentine experience, however,
it cannot be assumed that this will happen.
The well-organized and traditionally influential
labor sector has been a major factor forcing previous
military governments to abandon promising economic re-
form programs. Much of the burden of the present eco-
nomic readjustment has fallen on the working class,
whose purchasing power--as the regime concedes--may have
dropped by one third in the past year. Labor organizations
have lost most of their political influence and lack a
central rallying point since Juan Peron's death. If
public opinion turns against the junta, however, labor
elements could probably exert: enough pressure to force
the government to ease restrictions on wages and union
activities. Continuation of the present economic pro-
gram would then be impossible. If changes were made
that favored urban labor at the expense of agriculture,
the problems that characterized much of the last three
decades would reappear.
Another possible development would be the ascendancy
of a more hard-line group within the military that would
replace the present gradualist, free enterprise approach
with stricter controls. Although this policy might bring
down inflation more rapidly, it could stifle the reviving
manufacturing sector and cause extensive unemployment.
Any change from the present government would probably
have a generally destabilizing effect.
Foreign investors are wary because of past experi-
ence with Buenos Aires' vacillating economic policies
and are waiting for more solid evidence of political
stability before investing heavily. They are favorably
impressed, however, with the junta's liberalization of
foreign investment laws and with its efforts to settle
outstanding disputes with several foreign firms. In-
creasing numbers of businessmen are visiting Argentina
to study investment opportunities. Some foreign firms--
especially oil companies--are increasing their exposure.
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The financial gap should decline moderately over
the next few years, as annual debt payments diminish
with better debt scheduling. The current account surplus
may not increase substantially, since rising imports
will probably limit trade surpluses. Agricultural ex-
ports--in which Argentina has a comparative advantage--
should remain large; exports of manufacturers, especially
autos and other transport equipment, probably will in-
crease. Covering even a sizable financial gap should
present no problem.
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Latin America: Nuclear Energy Facilities and Programs
Several Latin American countries have nuclear pro-
grams, but only Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have nu-
clear power together with fuel cycle facilities under
construction or planned. Chile, Venezuela, and Cuba
have modest nuclear research programs focused on develop-
ing nuclear power in the near future. Colombia, Peru,
Ecuador, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Paraguay are just begin-
ning to develop nuclear research programs and are looking
for outside assistance.
Argentina has the most advanced and comprehensive
nuclear energy program of any Latin American country and
is seeking to become self-sufficient in nuclear energy.
Because it possesses relatively abundant reserves of
uranium, Argentina is basing its power program on natural
uranium-fueled reactors. One such power reactor is in
operation, another is under construction, and negotia-
tions are under way for a third; if completed on sched-
ule, these three plants will give Argentina 1,600 mega-
watts of nuclear electric generating capacity in 1985.
The Argentines plan to construct or are already building
facilities for chemical reprocessing, fuel fabrication,
and heavy water production.
Most other Latin American nations consider Argentina
not only the regional leader in nuclear development but
also a possible supplier of nuclear equipment, materials,
and technology. Four Latin American countries already
receive nuclear assistance from Argentina. The Argen-
tines are supplying research reactors to Peru, design-
ing a pilot chemical reprocessing plant for Mexico,
training Chilean personnel, and constructing a uranium
ore treatment plant in Bolivia. Ecuador, Uruguay, and
Paraguay are seeking nuclear assistance from Argentina.
Brazil's nuclear program is less advanced but more
ambitious than Argentina's. Westinghouse is construct-
ing a nuclear power reactor in Brazil that is scheduled
for completion next year. The Brazilian nuclear program
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is based on a nuclear assistance agreement with West
Germany that provides for eight power reactors as well
as facilities for uranium isotope separation, fuel fab-
rication, and chemical reprocessing.
If the agreement is fully implemented and if an
adequate uranium supply can be developed, Brazil will
have a complete nuclear fuel cycle and will be self-suf-
ficient in nuclear energy. Brazil, however, will be al-
most totally dependent on imported technology for its
nuclear program,, and proven uranium reserves are inade-
quate to meet oro-jected needs.
Mexico's nuclear power program, like Brazil's, is
heavily dependent on foreign assistance. The program
is less developed than the Argentine and Brazilian pro-
grams, and Mexican officials are disappointed with it.
Construction of two US-supplied power reactors, which
began in 1972, has been delayed, and the completion date
for the project has slipped to 1982, some five years
behind schedule.
Mexican scientists are now independently designing
nuclear fuel cycle facilities including uranium process-
ing, fuel fabrication, chemical reprocessing, and plu-
tonium fabrication. Mexico has substantial uranium de-
posits and is operating a pilot ore concentration plant.
Chile has a small nuclear program consisting of two
operating research reactors that mainly produce radio-
isotopes. The government is examining nuclear power as
an alternative to fossil-fueled power plants and is con-
sidering the purchase of the smallest size nuclear power.-
reactor available commercially.
Venezuela, Cuba, and Colombia have research reactors
and rudimentary nuclear research programs devoted mainly
to production and application of radioisotopes and to
training. Cuba is the only one of this group and the
only Caribbean nation with specific plans for nuclear
power; the Cuban program includes planned construction
of two Soviet-supplied power reactors.
Uruguay, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Ecuador are
just beginning nuclear research. All have uranium de-
posits and are receiving or plan to obtain nuclear as-
sistance from Argentina.
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Latin America is the only continental region that
has a nuclear-free-zone treaty. The treaty forbids de-
velopment, manufacture, or stockpiling of nuclear wea-
pons, but does not preclude the development of peaceful
nuclear explosives. The treaty is not now in effect in
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, or Cuba, and it is unlikely
that this situation will change in the foreseeable fu-
ture.
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have not signed or
ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, nor have
Cuba, Guyana, and Belize. Of these countries, only Ar-
gentina and Brazil are potential developers of nuclear
explosive devices in the foreseeable future.
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CUBAN CHRONOLOGY FOR JUNE 1977
June 1 Cuban Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca
departs for Nigeria and other African
nations.
AZ--.hram carries article critical of Pres-
ident Qadhafi and alleges Libyan financing
of Cuban mercenaries in Angola and Ethi-
opia.
Cuban Communist Party workers from Santi-
ago de Cuba visit Leningrad. Meet with
Soviet Politburo member G. V. Romanov,
head of the Leningrad party organization.
2 US Congressman Dellums returns from week-
end with Fidel Castro; states that "Cuba
plans to send 311 doctors to Ethiopia."
Dellums relays message from Castro to
President Carter.
Team of Cuban sugar experts conclude 10-
daay visit to Guyana.
Cuba-Finland mixed commission talks open
in Havana.
Havana International Service reports Ethi-
opia's denial of the presence of Cuban
military personnel.
Pedro Luis Torres, Cuban ambassador to
Czechoslovakia, meets with Deputy Premier
Vaclav Hula for economic talks in Prague.
Trade to increase.
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June 3 The governments of Cuba and the US announce
agreement on the opening of special in-
terest section in each other's capitals.
Fidel Castro announces forthcoming release
of 10 Americans jailed in Cuba on drug
charges. No mention of other Americans
jailed there.
5 Delegation of League of Communists of
Yugoslavia arrives in Havana.
Cuban Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca
arrives in Nigeria.
Mozambique and Cuba sign cooperation agree-
ment for Cuban technicians to work in Mo-
zambique and Mozambicans to work in Cuba
on health, public works, transportation,
fishing, and agriculture.
6 Fidel Castro sends "message of solidarity"
to Angolan President Neto (after coup at-
tempt in Luanda).
Ethiopian Ministry of Education announces
grant of five scholarships by Cuban gov-
ernment to Ethiopian youths.
7 Paris AFP reports the arrival of 1,800
Cuban troops in Cabinda. (FLEC communi-
que)
Cuban Communist Party delegation arrives
in Pyongyang, North Korea.
8 Nigerian-Cuban communique issued in Lagos
following visit of Foreign Minister
Malmierca. Supports African Peoples'
liberation struggles.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meets in Havana
with Puerto Rican socialist party delega-
tion headed by Secretary General Juan
Mari Bras.
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June 8 Fidel Castro chairs closing session of
Constituent Congress of National Union
of` Cuban Journalists.
9 Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca and del-
egates are feted by Benin government.
Malmierca meets with Minister of Foreign
Affairs Michael Alladaye and other ministry
officials.
Fidel Castro interviewed on American tele-
vision. Puts numbers of political pris-
oners in Cuba at "near 3,000."
Fidel Castro receives Puerto Rican Social-
ist Party delegation.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meets with Mexican
Secretariat official Rodolfo Echeverria
in Havana.
Raul Castro in Angola. Delivers supportive
message to Neto from Castro.
10 In Benin, Foreign Minister Malmierca says
"there is a reciprocal desire between
Benin and Cuba to expand their coopera-
ti_on. "
PCC Politburo member Arnaldo Milian Castro
appointed member of Secretariat.
PCC Central Committee holds 4th plenum.
Fidel Castro presides. Central Committee
approves Castro's report on national and
international events.
Cuba appoints Manuel Agramonte Sanchez
ambassador to Angola.
Armando Hart meets with Jamaican Culture
Minister Arnold Bertram in Havana.
June 13 Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca visits
Guinea. Meets with President Sekou-Toure.
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June 13 Cuba releases 1.0 US citizens arrested in
.Cuba on drug charges.
Day of Solidarity with peoples of Angola
and Mozambique observed in Cuba.
14 Panamanian Peoples' Party delegation ar-
rives in Cuba.
16 Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meets US Communist
Party delegation visiting Cuba.
Graca Machel, minister of education and
wife of President Machel of Mozambique,
arrives in Cuba with educational delega-
tion.
17 Fidel Castro attends reception for Graca
Machel.
18 Fidel Castro and Raul Castro attend re-
ception for delegates to ECLA-sponsored
meeting held in Havana. Subject of meet-
ing is integration of women into Latin
American economic and social development.
19 Jamaican Prime Minister Manley visits
Cuba on way home from Commonwealth Con-
ference. Meets with Fidel Castro.
20 Radio Havana charges US human rights cam-
paign is "hypocritical."
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez departs Cuba for
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
meeting in Warsaw, Poland.
Cuban Deputy Foreign Minister Jose Raul
Viera in Budapest, Hungary for discussions.
21 Cuba and Guinea sign communique at end
of Foreign Minister Malmierca's visit.
Pedro Miret, Politburo member, meets with
delegation headed by Rashid Mustapha Tahir,
member of executive committee of Polisario
Front.
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June 21 Fidel Castro receives Luis Corvalan, ex-
iled secretary general of Chilean Com-
munist Party.
22 Foreign Minister Malmierca in Zambia. De-
livers personal message from Castro to
President Kaunda. Reaffirms Cuban support
for front-line states and liberation for
South Africa.
Granma says US human rights situation is
"most embarrassing."
23 Fidel Castro meets with large group of
American businessmen. Castro reiterates
full lifting of embargo essential for
better relations.
.Acting Foreign Minister Rene Anillo Capote
.meets with C. T. Sharland, Canadian In-
dustry and Commerce vice minister in Ha-
vana.
24 Cuba and Zambia sign communique on Mal-
mierca's visit. Solidarity with Zimbabwe/
SWAPO is stressed.
25 Cuban television broadcasts an uncut ver-
sion of the ABC/Barbara Walters interview
,with Fidel Castro.
27 Fidel Castro meets with Polisario Front
delegation visiting Cuba.
Raul Valdes Vivo, chief of Foreign Re-
lations Department of the Cuban Communist
Party, meets with Guyanese Foreign Minister
N'rederick Wills in Georgetown. Valdes
also meets with Cheddi and Janet Jagan,
Leaders. of Guyana's opposition People's
?rogressive Party.
;Foreign Minister Malmierca returns to
Cuba.
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June 27 Cuban planning ambassador to Cuba, Lamine
Conde, is received by Foreign Minister
Malmierca in Havana.
Cuban planning commission delegation ar-
rives in Prague, Czechoslovakia, for dis-
cussions of further economic cooperation.
Cuba recognizes government of Djibouti.
28 New Guinean ambassador to Cuba, Lamine
Conde, is received by Foreign Minister
Malmierca in Havana.
30 Guyanese Prime Minister Burnham meets
with Raul Valdes Vivo who delivers per-
sonal message from Fidel Castro.
I I
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