SOVIET UNION- EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002300420001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 17, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
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Soviet Union-Eastern Europe
Secret
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December 17, 197
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
December 17, 1975
USSR-US: More on Schlesinger Dismissal. . . . . 1
USSR/CBMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Soviets Acknowledge Aid to Angola. . . . . . . . 5
Soviet Grain Transshipment Plans Expand. . . . . 6
Sihanouk Visits Romania . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Intellectual Dissidents in Poland. . . . . . . 8
Bulgaria: 1976 Economic Plan. . . . . . . . . . 9
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USSR-US: More on Schlesinger Dismissal
In a recent assessment of the dismissal of Sec-
retary of Defense Schlesinger, a USA Institute offi-
cial concludes that US adherence to detente with the
Soviet Union will probably be substantially unchanged.
The author of the article relies heavily on the
American press to make his points. Using numerous
quotes, he points out that President Ford probably
wished to strengthen his position on the eve of the
election campaign, but he places the burden of the
dismissal primarily on Schlesinger's attitude to-
ward detente. The former Defense Secretary is called
a "stubborn opponent" of detente who had attempted to
use the "old bugaboo" of national security to block
arms limitation agreements. The Soviet author also
alleges that Schlesinger's "noise" against defense
budget cuts contributed to his downfall. The removal
of the Defense Secretary is seen as a victory for
Secretary of State Kissinger and a reflection of the
President's desire to "move further down the path of
detente."
The article warns, however, that the installa-
tion of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld does not mean
that the Pentagon will change its position on detente.
The new Secretary and his predecessor are seen as
holding similar ideological views of the world, and
White House denials that Rumsfeld would follow a
softer line are underlined. The author ends by
pointing out the President's pledge to continue US
foreign policy unchanged and to continue trying to
reach a second SALT agreement with the Soviet Union.
The USA Institute official's article cautiously
replays, with only slight distortions, the discus-
sion in the US press of the significance of the cabi-
net changes. The former Defense Secretary is, how-
ever, tied directly to the obstacles in the way of a
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new SALT agreement. The article, moreover, identifies
more clearly than did initial Soviet coverage of the
personnel change, the views of the new Defense Secre-
tary with those held by Schlesinger. This portrayal
of Rumsfeld asa "hardliner" may reflect a Soviet
need to maintain the Pentagon as a believable scape-
oat for US actions that Moscow does not approve.
I I
December. 17, 1975
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USSR/CBMs
Moscow is still perplexed over how to respond
to the military-related "confidence-building measures"
approved at the European security conference. In
a conversation with US, British, and French diplo-
mats on Monday, Roland Timerbayev, a Foreign Minis-
try official concerned with arms control, confirmed
that the Soviet government has not yet decided how
to deal with the issue. Timerbayev seems to hold
a responsible position in the Soviet arms control
bureaucracy and has given an accurate view of Sov-
iet concerns in this area during previous conver-
sations with Westerners.
Timerbayev advised the West to "prod" the Sov-
iets on confidence-building measures. This highly
unusual step suggests strongly that there is a contro-
versy over the subject within the Soviet bureaucracy
and that Timerbayev is looking for outside support.
He suggested, however, that the West delay the
prodding until after the Soviet party congress, when
the Soviets will presumably be less sensitive to
outside "interference."
During the negotiations leading to the European
security conference, the Soviets opposed most confi-
dence-building measures; the most important of these
is the provision for advance notification of military
maneuvers which meet certain criteria. The Soviet
side succeeded in inserting language into the confer-
ence document to the effect that adherence to the
confidence-building measures is voluntary. There
is, however, considerable tacit pressure on Moscow
to preserve the facade of detente by not entirely
rejecting these measures.
So far, Moscow's response to Western imple-
mentation of confidence-building measures has re-
flected its mixed feelings on the issue. The Soviets
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did not subject NATO's observance of the confidence-
building measures to the same intense criticism they
directed at NATO's autumn exercises themselves.
Moscow has not accepted any of NATO's invitations
to send observers to exercises--another confidence-
building measure--but has not rejected the invitations
outright. The Warsaw Pact has not provided noti-
fication of any of its exercises, but has apparently
not conducted any that meet the threshold for noti-
fir-;;t-inn since conclusion of the conference.
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Soviets Acknowledge Aid to Angola
The Soviet central press has, for the first time,
indirectly admitted that both Moscow and Havana are
providing military support to the Popular Movement in
Angola.
Earlier this month Pravda, in reporting on a
press conference held by President Nyerere in Brussels,
cited the Tanzanian President's statement that he was
"certain" the USSR was providing the MPLA with the
"necessary arms" for its struggle against the "inter-
ventionists" from South Africa. In an accompanying
commentary, Pravda stated inter alia that the Soviet
Union, which stands "among the loyal friends" of the
Angolan people and which was one of the first to wel-
come the birth of an independent regime?'is providing
help and support to Angola during these difficult
days."
Last weekend, moreover, the Soviet news agency
Tass took the unusual step of publicizing MPLA leader
Neto's expression of gratitude for Moscow's "all-
round help" to the Angolan people. At the same time,
Pravda provided the first hint seen thus far in the
Soviet press that Cuba is furnishing substantial
assistance to the MPLA. The communist party daily
said that Cuba "always supported all national libera-
tion movements in Africa, including the MPLA--the
sole legitimate representative of the Angolan people."
Moscow's decision to make public, even in an
unofficial way, its role in Angola coincides with
recent MPLA gains in the military and diplomatic
arena and suggests that the Soviets may want to get
their fair share of the credit for these successes.
The decision also dovetails with recent revelations
in the American press of allegedly substantial US
support for the MPLA's rivals; hence, the Soviets
may now feel less compelled to mask the dimensions
of their own involvement.
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Soviet Grain Transshipment Plans Expand
The Soviet Union is planning to transship nearly
7 million tons of grain next year through West Euro-
pean ports, which is about 25 percent of estimated
Soviet grain purchases. Deliveries through Antwerp
and Hamburg amounting to 5 million tons will begin
in early spring and continue through the end of 1976.
Acquisition of storage and handling space at
these ports will help the Soviets control the flow of
grain to congested Soviet ports. These West European
ports can handle larger ships than most Soviet Baltic
ports, allowing transshipment to smaller ships or in-
land transport for delivery to the USSR. The Soviets
may use their smaller ships for temporary floating
warehouses as port and inland storage problems de-
velop.
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Sihanouk Visits Romania
Cambodian Prince Sihanouk's visit to Romania
last week was long on atmospherics but short on sub-
stance. The two most significant developments--
from the Romanian viewpoint--were the agreement for
Bucharest to open an embassy in Phnom Penh and pub-
lic Cambodian endorsement of observer status for
Romania at the nonaligned summit in Colombo next
year.
No new accords were signed. This may reflect
Sihanouk's limited mandate which, according to the
embassy in Bucharest, did not even permit him to
extend an invitation to Ceausescu for a return
visit. Sihanouk did, however, hold private talks
with Ceausescu, Premier Manescu, and party secre-
tary Uglar. Sihanouk's public rhetoric was subdued
and stood in marked contrast to the anti-American
pronouncements made by North Vietnam's Le Duan dur-
ing his visit to Bucharest last month.
The final communique notes that the "experi-
ence of socialist Romania is followed with particu-
lar interest by those developing countries which
have opted for the flourishing of their economic-
social independence." This language clearly implies
the existence of a Romanian model for socialism and
twist to Bucharest's communique repertoire.
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Intellectual Dissidents In Poland
A Reuters report from Warsaw on Tuesday claims
that 59 intellectuals have signed a manifesto pro-
testing proposed amendments to the Polish constitu-
tion and calling for increased civil liberties and
a more independent role for the trade unions. One
of the signers of the document says it was sent to
a number of party and government leaders.
The manifesto is the most recent example of
increased political activity by a small group of
intellectuals, many of whom were involved in the
student disturbances of 1968. The US embassy re-
ported last month that a group of dissidents had
sent a memorandum to party leader Gierek and Premier
Jaroszewicz demanding constitutional rights, in-
cluding the right to strike and freedoms of assembly
and religion. The same people were probably re-
sponsible for an open letter congratulating Soviet
dissident Andrei Sakharov on his Nobel Peace prize.
the dissidents
are diarerul to confine themselves to petitioning
and similar actions that are technically not illegal.
the police have made it clear that
r-ney are watching the group and that a false step
could finish them.
Increased activity by dissidents could be em-
barrassing but not dangerous to Gierek. Discontent
among workers over shortages of consumer goods is
a much more immediate problem, and it is highly un-
likely that the intellectuals could interest the
workers in their cause.
December 17, 1975
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Bulgaria: 1976 Economic Plan
In contrast to scaled-down Soviet economic
goals for next year, there will be virtually no
slowdown in Bulgarian growth, according to the am-
bitious economic program that Sofia announced on
December 4.
Next to Romania, Bulgaria's annual economic
growth rate is the highest in Eastern Europe, and
the regime has not lowered its sights for 1976.
Targets in almost all sectors remain high, and some
have increased slightly over 1975. Agriculture is
the main exception; last year's ambitious goal of
a 9.3 percent growth has been trimmed to a rise of
only 5 percent. The growth rate of public services
will also drop slightly next year.
Despite this modest cutback, the 1976 outlook
for consumers is favorable, and the government has
promised to make more goods available. The Bul-
garian public has experienced a slow but steady
rise in the standard of living for several years,
and Sofia has reaffirmed its commitment to con-
centrate on "the further satisfaction of the peo-
ple's growing needs." There will probably be some
rise in prices for consumer goods, however, as
Premier Todorov suggested in a speech last August.
To achieve its goals, the regime is stressing
"labor productivity" coupled with "labor discipline."
An intense campaign against "idlers" and marginal
workers began last February and has been a mainstay
in the drive to whip up popular enthusiasm for
overfulfillment of the plan before the party con-
gress next March. Premier Todorov, in his speech
introducing the 1976 plan, asserted that practi-
cally all of the 1976 growth in industrial output
and in agriculture must come from increased labor
productivity. He declared that strengthening of
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labor discipline is an "immediate obligation," and
added that violators of working discipline will be
denied those privileges and benefits given con-
scientious workers. The regime has also called for
more shift work, modernization, and capital invest-
ment in new equipment to stimulate the economy.
Todorov reported that the regime had developed
a "new economic mechanism," which features a greater
role for the central government. For the first
time, the 1976 plan establishes obligatory produc-
tion indexes on a territorial basis. Although
Todorov provided few details, these indexes are
probably designed to minimize uneven economic de-
velopment in various branches of the economy. He
added that Sofia will demand unconditional imple-
mentation.
According to preliminary estimates, all eco-
nomic sectors except agriculture met or overful-
filled their established quotas for 1975. Sofia
will probably repeat this successful performance
in 1976, but will still depend heavily on the So-
viets, especially for fuels and materials. De-
spite Moscow's veiled warnings that its allies must
either wean themselves from such dependence or share
development costs, Bulgaria will probably continue
to receive preferential treatment not accorded
other East European countries. For example, the
Soviets may have offered Bulgaria technical assist-
ance under terms of an agreement that calls for
Moscow to supply 120 complete plants worth over
900 million rubles from 1976-80.
Sofia seems relatively unconcerned about
higher Soviet prices for raw materials--particularly
for oil--and Moscow has reportedly assured adequate
supplies at least through 1976. The Bulgarians
also view the Soviet Union as a guaranteed market
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for the country's industrial output--often of in-
ferior quality and thus not competitive in the
West--though Moscow has warned that the quality of
Bulgarian exports must improve. In return for So-
viet help, Bulgaria may have to participate in more
development projects in the Soviet Union. In addi-
tion, Sofia will probably send more Bulgarian work-
ers to the USSR, despite a chronic labor shortage
at home.
December 17, 1975
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Secret
Secret
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