WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001700010016-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: April 18, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

rc k r Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01700
Assessment
Center
Western Europe
Review
18 April 1979
State Department review completed
Secret
01
Secret
PA WER 79-016
18 April 1979
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WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW
18 April 1979
CONTENTS
France-USSR: Agreeing to Disagree
French President Giscard's three-day
visit to Moscow next week will prob-
ably produce nothing more than an
agreement to disagree.
France: The Shadow of the Presidential Elec-
tion . . . . . . . . . . 8
The European Parliament election next June
is being increasingly viewed in France as
a primary for the presidential election in
1981.1 1
Spain: The New Cabinet
The composition of Prime Minister Suarez's
new Cabinet, which was sworn in on 6 April,
will strengthen his hold on the government
and enhance his ability to act decisively.
Changing the Structure of the Nuclear Planning
Group . . . . . . . . . . 14
The Dutch Government has been gathering sup-
port for its proposal to replace the rota-
tional membership system of the NATO Nu-
clear Planning Group with Permanent seats
for all members.
Turke : Population Growth and Economic
Strains . . . . . . . . 16
Turkey's current economic troubles, which in-
clude a slowdown in economic growth, burgeon-
ing unemployment, and accelerating inflation,
are associated with the nation's drive for
rapid modernization.
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France-USSR: Agreeing to Disagree
French President Giscard's three-day visit to Moscow
next week will have about it a sense of the theater. De-
spite some serious differences, centering mainly on the
French desire for closer commercial and military rela-
tions with China, both sides have a strong interest in
underscoring the durability of long-term prospects for
Franco-Soviet ties. But in the end Giscard and his hosts
may find it difficult to do much more than agree to dis-
agree.
Looking Back
Giscard's last visit to Moscow, in October 1975,
was a troubled one. He and Soviet President Brezhnev
failed to develop any feeling of rapport, and the Soviets
made some last-minute changes in the meeting schedule
that the French interpreted as signs of Soviet displeas-
ure with the new French leadership. An Elysee official
who accompanied Giscard to the USSR told the US Embassy
that the Soviets were displeased that "Giscard does not
share Pompidou's anti-Americanism." By the time Foreign
Minister Gromyko visited Paris in 1976, both sides were
making an effort to erase the disagreeable impressions
left by Giscard's Moscow visit. 25X1
Brezhnev's visit to Paris in the summer of 1977 was
the high-water mark of that effort. Since then, the road
has been very rough in places. In the months following
Brezhnev's trip, the French proposed a European Disarma-
ment. Conference and a UN-sponsored international satel-
lite verification agency, both of which aroused Soviet
concerns about possible negative effects on the MBFR
talks. During the same period, Moscow became increas-
ingly irritated over what it viewed as French readiness
to defend their own interests--often at cross-purposes
to the Soviets'--in Africa. F77 I 25X1
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By May 1978, relations had clearly deteriorated. In
fact, the sharp French criticism of Soviet human rights
policies and of the Soviet-Cuban role in Africa, coupled
with Soviet allegations about French involvement in Shaba
and Moscow's cancellation of a visit to Paris by Chief
of Staff Ogarkov, brought relations to the lowest point
since former French President de Gaulle initiated his
rapprochement with Moscow in 1966.
But neither side would allow relations to founder.
The long-term value of the "special relation" prompted
both the French and the Soviets to maintain at least a
facade of understanding, while substantive problems were
either worked out or finessed. For the Soviets, French
insistence on an independent foreign policy represents
the most important cleavage within the Western Alliance.
For France, relations with Moscow continued to be an
essential element of its independence.
In October 1978, both sides hoped that another
Gromyko visit to Paris would demonstrate that relations
were back to normal. During Gromyko's stay, both sought
to mask their criticisms of the other in the most polite
terms, but beneath the veneer of bonhomie a .good deal of
coolness lingered.
French Domestic Politics and the Timing of Giscard's
Visit
25X1
It lingered to such an extent, in fact, that Giscard
demurred at Gromyko's suggestion that he visit Moscow
during the first half of 1979. Giscard's excuse was that
such a trip would be impolitic during the period of the
French EC presidency. But later in the fall, the French
abruptly changed course and reopened discussions about
the visit; realizing that his calling of the Guadeloupe
summit could expose him during the campaign for the
European Parliament to charges of being too much of an
"Atlanticist," Giscard was trundling out the proven bal-
ancing device: a trip to Moscow. 25X1
Foreign Minister Francois-Poncet's restatement in
late March of French allegiance to de Gaulle's concept
of East-West relations reflects the same Giscardian con-
cern. Francois-Poncet said that France, while remaining
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a faithful friend and ally of other countries, intends
to follow an independent policy, an important part of
which is cooperation with the USSR. 25X1
Prelude to the Giscard Visit: An Attack on
Francois-Poncet
But if domestic exigencies encouraged a more posi-
tive French approach toward Moscow, they could not alter
the underlying reality of serious bilateral differences.
This was dramatically underscored by the publication in
an important Soviet journal of allegations about Francois-
Poncet's objectivity as foreign minister. The attack,
coming just three weeks before his 11-13 February Moscow
trip, hinted at sinister overtones to his family's ties
to German steel interests. Despite diplomatic efforts
on both sides to smooth ruffled feathers, the publication
of the story has been taken by Paris as a Soviet warning
that relations could deteriorate seriously if the French
do not restrict sales of weapons and sensitive technology
to China and restrain development of political ties with
Beijing and Bucharest. 25X1
China
Disagreement over French policy toward the People's
Republic of China is presently the main point of friction
between France and the Soviet Union. Paris avidly de-
s ires improved commercial and political ties with Beijing
and believes that China must be :reintegrated into the
international community. For France this means several
things, such as Chinese participation in various inter-
national bodies, including disarmament discussions,, and
the aggressive marketing of French technology in China.
Major deals are currently pending on peaceful nuclear
technology and certain kinds of so histicated military
equipment.
The Soviets--profoundly disturbed by the specter of
a China not only welcomed into the international community
but provided with more sophisticated technology and
weapons--have brought considerable pressure to bear on
Paris. Seeking to prevent these deals from going through
and arguing that detente is at stake, Moscow has warned
Paris repeatedly of the dangers inherent in moving closer
to China. The French, who do not share Soviet fears
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about Chinese aggressiveness, point out that they do not
plan to sell "offensive" weapons to the Chinese and argue
that all necessary precautions have been taken with
respect to the nuclear plants. Paris also points out
that the Soviets sell weapons to countries unfriendly
to France. Moreover, yielding to Soviet pressure would
'
run counter to France
s independent foreign policy.
Thus, while Paris is sensitive to the potential ef-
fect on detente of closer Franco-Chinese ties, there is
no sign that the French are going to back off. In fact,
the increased commercial competition likely to flow from
the normalization of US-Chinese relations could spawn
greater French efforts to sell Beijing advanced technology.
Perhaps in an effort to mollify Moscow without giv-
ing in on substance, Paris signaled in late February a
change in its line on the China-Vietnam war. A govern-
ment statement made specific reference to "events on the
Sino-Vietnam border" without a similar reference to the
Vietnam-Kampuchea situation. It also called implicitly
for a Chinese withdrawal. Previously, Paris had criti-
cized Vietnam's attack on Kampuchea, and the new French
position was a definite tilt away from China, perhaps
motivated by a desire to improve relations with Moscow.
Francois-Poncet frosted the cake in mid-March when he
publicly flattered the Soviet Union for its restraint
during the China-Vietnam conflict. The Foreign Minister
clearly put the major onus for the fighting on China.
There also is evidence that for reasons having to do
with the French desire to use China's interest in French
arms as leverage to get the Chinese to agree to major
economic exchange, Paris is letting the timetable for
the conclusion of arms deals slip. Giscard may try in
Moscow to explain this slippage as a concession to the
Soviets.
Agreeing to Disagree
Compared to the China issue, other conflicts between
Paris and Moscow--although certainly important--are less
likely to mar the atmosphere of Giscard's visit. There
remains, however, a whole range of issues on which the
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two sides may agree to disagree. The Soviets, for ex-
ample, are annoyed by French attention to Romania--
Giscard made a state visit to Bucharest last month--at
a time when the Romanians are flouting Soviet authority.
Moscow probably took little comfort in the news from
the visit that Romanian leader Ceausescu shares Soviet
objections to the French disarmament proposals. But
the low-key nature of Giscard's visit--Giscard avoided
mentioning issues on which Romania and Moscow have
clashed--was probably in large part the result of French
desires to minimize the Soviets' annoyance.
Africa and disarmament probably are two other sub-
jects where differences will be played down during the
visit. Regarding Africa, Paris is in the process of
retrenching and rethinking some of its commitments. This
has been made easier by the relatively low profile as-
sumed lately by the Soviets or their proxies in Africa.
I I
Both the French and the Soviets, who share a be-
lief in the desirability of an international disarmament
effort, consider disarmament a primary topic for bilateral
discussion, but there is unlikely to be a meeting of
minds during Giscard's visit. The French continue to
press for a conference on disarmament in Europe, which
they see as giving Paris a greater say than it has in
existing forums. The Soviets are genuinely discomfited
by the French proposal, no doubt out of concern at the
thought of a conference in which they would not play a
leading role. They continue to press the French to
participate in discussions on nuclear disarmament, but
Paris refuses, particularly in the context of a SALT III.
The French argue that their nuclear forces are funda-
mental to French defense and do not fall into the "gray
area" that will probabl be the focus of discussions at
another SALT session.
Neither side seems likely to change its disarmament
position in the immediate future? Nevertheless, the
two sides are apparently trying to develop a general
statement on disarmament for inclusion in the summit com-
munique.
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Trade and Industrial Cooperation
The best chance for positive results from Giscard's
visit is probably in the area of trade and industrial
cooperation, although even here there are differences
over means to the end. The present Franco-Soviet trade
agreement expires this year, and there is a good possi-
bility that a new agreement will be signed during the
visit because both sides want increased bilateral trade.
The two sides may also reach agreement on a long-term
industrial cooperation pact for 1981-90. These negotia-
tions may reflect a Soviet desire that economic rela-
tions with the French be restructured and expanded. So-
viet Ambassador to Paris Chervonenko remarked recently
that the French want to import only raw materials from
the Soviets in exchange for manufactures. According
to Chervonenko, the Soviets now want to stress coproduc-
tion.
No major industrial contracts are expected to emerge
from the visit, but several future projects will be dis-
cussed, including a $500 million aluminum smelter for
the Soviets. Last month the Soviets signed two major
contracts with the French, one for telephone equipment
and the other for a computer system for TASS. 25X1
EC Environment Session
Detente will underlie much of the discussion during
Giscard's visit. Moscow has hoped for some time to win
French approval for a high-level conference on the en-
vironment under the auspices of the UN's Economic Com-
mission for Europe. The French may have been keeping
their options open on this as a possible concession to
Moscow. On a related issue, the Soviets agreed during
Francois-Poncet's visit to hold bilateral consultations
before the Madrid meeting of the Conference on security
and Cooperation in Europe to discuss French concerns
about implementation of provisions of the final act of
the Helsinki Conference. 25X1
Stage Managers, Both
Given the range of sticky bilateral issues, it seems
unlikely that Franco-Soviet relations will show much
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substantive progress in the immediate future. And, in-
deed, there is some chance that relations could cool
significantly in the short run. Over the longer term,
however, there is much that will continue to draw the
two countries together, and there is no indication that
they intend to abandon the "special" link that has existed
between them since de Gaulle's day. Paris and Moscow are
highly skilled at putting the best face on things, and
even if they clash both sides will go to considerable
lengths during Giscard's visit to show that at least
superficially relations are on an even keel.
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France: The Shadow of the Presidential Election
The European Parliament election next June is being
increasingly viewed in France as a primary for the presi-
dential election in 1981. The main duelists are the Gis-
cardian Union for French Democracy (UDF) and Jacques Chi-
rac's Gaullists. Economic and social policies have be-
come highly politicized, with Chirac claiming that the
governing coalition will lose the 1981 election if it does
not change present policies. On the left, the Socialist
Party, buoyed by its strong showing in local elections last
month, has begun to nurture a frail hope that a good score
in June might give it a chance to beat Giscard in 1981.
Local Elections and "Marginalization"
Much of this emphasis on the presidential contest
stems from the results of last month's cantonal elec-
tions, in which the Communists and the Gaullists were
the psychological losers. The Communists held their
own, but saw themselves outdistanced by their Socialist
rivals, who got 27 percent of the vote in the first round
and 33 percent in the second, and the Communists dropped
to 17 percent. The Gaullists got barely 12 percent in
the contest, an improvement over their score in the last
such election but distressingly far below Giscard's UDF,
which polled more than 20 percent. The UDF has been crow-
ing that the governing coalition has now been rebalanced
in favor of the Giscardians.
Small wonder that as the nominal coalition partners
of both left and right settled into what appears to be a
long period of internecine warfare, the cries of betrayal
from Communists and Gaullists sounded the same. Both par-
ties have the same fear: political extinction through
what the French call "marginalization"--being pushed to
the edge of the political arena by a more powerful coali-
tion partner. Marginalization sets in when parties drop
below 15 percent, at which point the smaller coalition
partner serves as a springboard for the larger to gain
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seats. Both the Communists and Gaullists are taking the
warning of the cantonal elections seriously. Marginali-
zation would favor the eventual evolution of two large
left and center-right blocs hopefully at peace with each
other--President Giscard's long-range goal, still a long
way off but less farfetched than it seemed two years ago.
The Gaullists
In the past few weeks Chirac has repeatedly esca-
lated his psychological warfare campaign against the
governing coalition he has pledged to support at least
through the European election. More and more it is Gis-
card himself who is the target. Chirac has variously
threatened to run a Gaullist candidate in 1981 if the
President does not change his policies, to block the ex-
tension of a controversial bill legalizing abortion be-
cause of the dangers presented by French's low birth rate,
and to expel Gaullist ministers now sitting in Giscard's
government if they indicate support for the UDF list in
the European election. F7 I
Chirac's goal clearly is to block Giscard's reelec-
tion, not just because he wants the presidency himself
and not just because he may genuinely believe that Gis-
card has misjudged the social costs of unemployment and
will be unable to defend French interests in the EC with
sufficient ferocity. Behind these issues is a concern
for the party's continuation as a major French political
force. One of Chirac's principal advisers has been widely
quoted as saying that if Giscard is elected in 1981, the
Gaullist Party will ':disappear like a teas oon of sugar
in a glass of water."
Chirac has been trying to make the European elec-
tion a referendum on government domestic policy and in
this he has succeeded. Polls indicate that a majority
of French voters will be judging domestic policy when
they cast their ballots. The increasing stridency of
Chirac's criticisms, his failure to recognize external
constraints on French policies, and his hints that he
knows better than anyone else how to control inflation
and unemployment all make the government's already dif-
ficult task harder. Already there is speculation in
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the press that the Gaullists might introduce a motion of
censure against the government, possibly as early as this
June, but more likely in the fall.
Logic argues against such a move, for the Gaullists
have no reason to believe that they would do any better
in a new election than in March 1978, whereas the Social-
ists could expect to emerge stronger--perhaps even strong
enough to make possible a left majority. Should Chirac
precipitate early legislative elections that produced a
left victory, his political career could be seriously dam-
aged. On the other hand, he cannot wait indefinitely for
a political opening. The economic situation, should it
deteriorate markedly next fall, and the Gaullist score in
the European election will weigh heavily in his decision.
Should a majority of the French appear to be condemning
government policy in the European election, Chirac may
feel he has some 'u ification for a motion of censure.
Giscard and Chirac are due to meet on 20 April as
part of Giscard's efforts to reestablish unity within
the governing coalition, but it is unlikely that the
meeting will alter he antipathy between the two men.
The Socialist Party
The 1981 presidential contest also affected the
Socialist Party congress earlier this month, apparently
producing a polarization within the party that was favor-
able to the party's two most likely presidential candi-
dates--Francois Mitterrand and Michel Rocard--and worked
to the disadvantage of party wheelhorse Pierre Mauroy and
leftwing CERES leader Jean-Pierre Chevenement. Mitter-
rand was confirmed as party leader by a plurality of 47
percent and later was unanimously elected secretary gen-
eral, but his authority has been weakened, as has the
strength of the CERES faction of the party with which
Mitterrand is apparently hoping to arrange an alliance
that would give him a majority.
Mitterrand has named a. new party leadership that re-
wards younger, loyal supporters and excludes Mauroy and
Rocard and all those who backed them in challenging his
leadership. Lionel Jospin, more of a Marxist than his
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predecessor Robert Pontillon, will take over the foreign
affairs portfolio. Paul Quiles, an engineer and newly
elected deputy from Paris, will be charged with organi-
zation and party federations, the important job held by
Mauroy until the campaign. Laurent Fabius, the new 32-
year-old party spokesman, is apparently Mitterrand's
choice as the Socialist presidential candidate in 1988,
assuredly a long shot in a system that rewards candi-
dates with "superstar" status.
These changes mean that the party now has a strong
and articulate internal opposition, representing 38 per-
cent of the party and including both Mauroy and Rocard.
Rocard has a good base throughout the party and should
be able to stake out positions that accord better with
the basically moderate outlook of the Socialist elector-
ate than do those of Mitterrand, whose views have been
moving leftward. Rocard has said he will not be a candi-
date for the presidency if Mitterrand presents his candi-
dacy; he will, in fact, have to be discreet on this and
other issues in order to avoid antagonizing elements
within the party--the "clan Mitterrand"--who suspect him
of wanting to collaborate with the center-right. Rocard
will, of course, have stronger cards after 1981 if Mitter-
rand runs and is defeated in his third presidential at-
tempt.
The Socialist Party will now be run by a more mono-
lithic leadership, reduced in size, lacking a widespread
constituency, and totally committed to Mitterrand. This
is in line with Mitterrand's long-range plan of turning
the party over to a new generation--younger than Rocard
or Mauroy--which he has helped mold. The party has in
the past, however, flourished on diversity and its catch-
all appeal. Mauroy has 30 years of loyal service to the
party and Rocard is the party's biggest vote getter. Mit-
terrand is admittedly struggling for his political sur-
vival and for the future of a party he is determined to
shape by himself. The price may be high, affecting the
party's long-range credibility with the electorate and
its ability to challenge a center-right presidential can-
didacy in 1988 as well as 1981. 25X1
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Spain: The New Cabinet
The composition of Prime Minister Suarez's new
cabinet, which was sworn in on 6 April, will strengthen
his hold on the government and enhance his ability to
act decisively. Socialists and Communist leaders are
charging that the new Cabinet represents a move to the
right. Although possibly undeserved, this perception
will increase the minority government's difficulties
in securing the opposition's cooperation on the press-
ing problems of re ional autonomy, the economy, and
labor reform.
Suarez's dominance is assured by the plurality his
party won in the 1 March election--the party is only
eight seats short of an absolute majority in the lower
house--and the continued prominence of his closest as-
sociate, Second Deputy Prime Minister Abril. Abril re-
tains overall responsibility for both political and eco-
nomic affairs, ending speculation that he would lose his
economic role. The dropping of Finance Minister Fernan-
dez-Ordonez and Interior Minister Martin Villa, together
with the relegation of Public Works Minister Garrigues
to the vague status of Assistant Minister to the Prime
Minister, means that the Cabinet now contains no full
ministers with real political stature from the center
or center-left portion of the government party. The US
Embassy believes that a desire to tighten control rather
than ideological considerations led to the moves against
Abril's principal rivals. Nonetheless, the left insists
that the government has moved to the right and that the
Cabinet is now dominated by two former Francoist offi-
Abril's role is further strengthened by the eleva-
tion of two of his proteges--Perez Llorca to head a
strengthened Ministry of the office of Prime Minister,
and Arias Salgado, Secretary General of the government
party, as Minister for Relations with Parliament.
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Suarez also made some significant changes in the
fields of defense and public order--changes that may por-
tend an eventual reorganization of the Defense and In-
terior Ministries. General Gutierrez Mellado, who had
been both First Deputy Prime Minister for Defense Af-
fairs and Minister of Defense, was relieved of the post
of Defense Minister and received responsibility for secu-
rity matters. Apparently he will act as a sort of na-
tional security adviser to Suarez, coordinating inter-
nal security operations under the Minister of Interior
and the operations and organization of the armed forces
under the Defense Minister, while leaving the day-to-day
running of those ministries to their respective heads.
His role should help lessen the longstanding rivalry
between them. Former Industry Minister Rodriguez Saha-
gun, a businessman, was moved to head the Defense Min-
istry. These moves may be designed partly as a sop to
the military, which has long been deeply unhappy with
Gutierrez; at the same time, by bringing in a civilian
for the first time at the top of the military hierarchy,
Suarez is signaling his intention to keep the military
in its place.
In a related move that has received mixed reactions,
Suarez named a lieutenant general to head the Interior
Ministry. Suarez undoubtedly hoped to placate some in
the military who considered Martin Villa too soft in deal-
ing with terrorism. But the moderate general who was
named to the job may not be firm enough for the hardline
military, while the left and particularly the Basques
object to the naming of a military man to the post.
The responsibilities of the ministers of Interior
and of Defense and their relationship to First Deputy
Prime Minister Gutierrez Mellado have to be worked out.
The effectiveness with which the three individuals in-
volved carry out their responsibilities will have con-
siderable influence on the efficacy of the new Spanish
democracy.
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Changing the Structure of the Nuclear Planning Group
The Dutch Government has been gathering support for
its proposal to replace the rotational membership system
of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) with permanent
seats for all members. The Planning Group's other non-
permanent members--Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Canada, Tur-
key, and Norway--have all come out in favor of such a
move. The Dutch plan to put forward the proposal at the
'
rou
s ministerial meeting on 24 and 25 April.
A similar proposal was made almost two years ago
by the Canadians, who abandoned the discussion when the
United States and West Germany voiced objections. Bonn
initially had reservations about the Dutch plan because
it thought that NPG exchanges might become less candid,
but the West German Government has now decided to support
the proposal. West German officials have grown increas-
ingly sensitive to the need to give the smaller NATO mem-
bers a larger say in Alliance councils. They see this as
a way to induce the smaller Allies to make larger finan-
cial contributions to defense and stimulate them to take
their NATO obligations more seriously. The West Germans
are also aware that the further formalization of decision-
making resulting from a broadening of the consultative
process will help to offset: Bonn's growing role in Alli-
ance affairs. In addition, Bonn recognizes that opposing
the change could cause resentment among the smaller Al-
lies and possibly hinder the theater nuclear force moder-
nization program. Finally, West German officials are con-
vinced that bilateral contacts could compensate for any
cutback in the amount of information obtained through the
NPG and allow for informal exchanges between the rinci al
members of the Alliance.
Under the present system, the United States, United
Kingdom, West Germany, and Italy hold permanent seats,
and the other seven participating Allies rotate their
membership at 18-month intervals. Iceland and Luxembourg
have remained outside the group by choice. Portugal has
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bowed to the security concerns of the other Allies and
kept its representative at home. All three would be
eligible to participate under the Dutch plan but are
likely to maintain their present status. France, which
is not part of the integrated command, would remain out-
side the group.
25X6
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Turkey: Population Growth. and Economic Strains
Turkey's current economic troubles, which include
a slowdown in economic growth, burgeoning unemployment,
and accelerating inflation., are associated with the na-
tion's drive for rapid modernization. These problems,
along with the relentless growth of population, are pro-
ducing social tensions that will test Tue Is democra-
tic institutions in the next few years. rk 25X1
The populaton, estimated at 43.7 million, is growing
at a rate of 2.5 percent or more than a million a year.
This rate, typical of other middle-income countries, com-
pares with less than 1 percent for most developed coun-
tries. Turkey's high rate of growth is unlikely to change
substantially in the next decade; 40 percent of the popu-
lation is now under 15 years of age. By 1990, the popula-
tion probably will have increased by a third to more than
57 million. The government has shown little inclination
to take a vigorous role in. trying to limit population
growth, and the political sensitivity of the issue re-
duces the prospects for effective family planning poli-
cies.
Turkey's society and economy are in a transitional
stage. Growing industrialization, rapid urbanization,
migration of workers abroad, and a rising level of educa-
tion have contributed to changes in social values and to
demands for a better life. Rapid population growth is
placing a strain on the country's resources. Probably
less than a third of secondary school-age children, for
example, have schools available to them. 25X1
Unemployment
Despite impressive growth in the past 30 years,
the economy has failed to provide enough jobs for the
growing labor force. The official unemployment rate,
which understates the problem, has been more than 10
percent throughout the 1970s, and the outlook is for a
long-term trend of rising unemployment. The current
rate approaches 20 percent. 25X1
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A strong demand for migrants to work in western
Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s eased the unemploy-
ment problem for a time, but migration abroad peaked in
1973 and is unlikely to provide much relief in the future,
despite new opportunities for some migrants in oil pro-
ducing Middle Eastern countries. Many migrants have now
returned to Turkey from Europe; if economic conditions
in Western Europe weaken further, returning migrants
will add substantially to the problem. 25X1
Urbanization
Urban growth has been rapid--as much as 6 percent
a year in the largest cities--further intensifying the
unemployment problem. The percentage of the population
living in cities increased from less than 20 percent
in 1950 to more than 40 percent by 1975. During that
time the population of Ankara mushroomed from less than
300,000 to 1.7 million, and Istanbul went from less
than 1 million to more than 2.5 million. The popula-
tion of metropolitan Istanbul is now about 4.5 million.
Growth has severely strained urban facilities and
services. Water has periodical) been in short su ly
in the cities for some years. 25X1
The migration from rural to urban areas has created
an explosive force in the cities by bringing together
members of different sectarian or ethnic groups with
longstanding mutual animosities and distrust. They must
compete for jobs in a deteriorating employment market.
Violence, some of it politically inspired, has become
common in the crowded cities and suburbs, where left-
right conflict a ravates traditional group hostilities.
Other Socioeconomic Pressures
Heightened social tensions also stem from growing
dissatisfaction with the traditional urban elite, which
dominates the highly centralized government bureaucracy.
The urban middle class includes entrepreneurs of con-
siderable wealth and a privileged group of organized
skilled laborers; all are zealous in guarding their
interests. Agrarian, religious, and ethnic minority
groups have challenged the influence of the elite.
Cooptation often occurs but tends to make the elite
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more diverse and makes consensus more difficult.
Student unrest--reflected in increasing outbreaks of
violence--is fueled by dissatisfaction with the in-
adequate educational system and with bleak employment
prospects.
All groups are likely to feel the effects of eco-
nomic stress in the next few years. Current economic
problems stem to a large extent from rapid industriali-
zation, which has not made efficient use of Turkey's
abundant labor supply or other resources. Economic
growth has failed to eliminate wide economic dispari-
ties among regions and between the cities and rural
areas. Agriculture has been relatively neglected.
Balanced and sustained development will require a major
i
sh
ft in the orientation of ov nt policies.
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