WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001700010005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 31, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

ro g r Release 2006/03717: CIA-RDP79T00912AO017000
Assessment
Center
Western Europe
Review
State Department review completed
Secret
RP WER 79-005
31 January 1979
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WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW
31 January 1979
CONTENTS
UK: Trade Unions, Governments, and Political
tl Parties--Round and Round We Go
Revising Britain's labor laws and curbing
trade union power probably will be the
dominant issues in the runup to a general
election that is likely to come this spring
but must be held by the middle of November.
NATO: Recent Developments in the Theater Nuclear
Weapons Debate I . . . . . . . . 14
The strategic implications of the theater
nuclear weapons issue are increasin 1 being
debated in Europe.
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Foreign Policy in the Finnish Election
Foreign policy will be an issue in the
parliamentary elections in Finland sched-
uled for 18-19 March, much to the displeas-
ure of President Kekkonen, whose formula-
tion of foreign policy traditionally has
been unquestioned. F _1
Switzerland: The Politics of Defense
The visit to the United States next week
of Swiss Defense Minister Gnaegi under-
scores the growing uneasiness in Bern
about Switzerland's future in Europe.
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UK: Trade Unions, Governments, and Political Parties--Round
and Round We Go
Revising Britain's labor laws and curbing trade union
power probably will be the dominant issues in the runup
to a general election that is likely to come this spring
but must be held by the middle of November. The recent
rash of strikes and industrial disruption, the collapse
of Prime Minister Callahgan's pay policy, possible con-
frontation over future contract negotiations, and the
threat of a worsening economy in 1979, will provide the
framework of debate. But these issues, as important as
they are in themselves, are also catalysts for a debate
over the fundamental questions of how unions have func-
tioned in the past and by what rules they will operate
in the future. Although the problem can be traced back
to well before World War II, it has grown significantly
during the past decade. Both the preelection debate and
the outcome of the election will have an important pact
on how the question is resolved. impact
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Now You See It, Now You Don't: 1969-1974
In 1969, after nearly four years of government at-
tempts to enforce incomes policies and restrictions on
union power, Labor Prime Minister Harold Wilson proposed
legislation that was intended to establish a clear legal
framework for union activity. But Callaghan, who was
Home Secretary at the time, opposed the legislation and,
with the cooperation of the leadership of the Trades
Union Congress (TUC), swung most of the Cabinet to his
point of view and the bill was killed. The same basic
legislation surfaced again, however, when the Conserva-
tive government of Edward Heath took office in 1970 and
passed the Industrial Relations Act the following year.
The Act, which was an attempt to outline the responsi-
bilities of management, trade unions, employers associ-
ations, and individual employees, established firm pro-
cedures for industrial relations, including a government-
run conciliation service, a cooling-off period before a
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strike, legally binding collective bargaining, registra-
tion of union rules, optional union membership, and, with
some exceptions, a rohibita:nt on closed shops and sym-
pathy strikes.
The legislation, which was passed over TUC and Labor
Party opposition, was coupled with renewed efforts to
enforce anti-inflationary incomes policies. This led to
a series of bitter and violent confrontations between
the government and the trade unions. Strikes were
launched by several unions in support of wage settle-
ments that violated government guidelines, new left-
leaning leaders were elected in the country's two largest
unions, the Industrial Relations Court set by the Act
was condemned and ignored by the unions, union assets
were confiscated, and some union leaders were served with
arrest orders. In November 1973, when the coal miners
staged their second work stoppage in two years, the
government declared a state of emergency. When negoti-
ations collapsed, Heath dissolved Parliament and called
an early general election in February 1974 which his
party lost.
Buying the Peace:
The Rise of the Social Contract
The Labor government under Wilson and later Callaghan
gradually changed direction from that followed by the
earlier Wilson government. The Industrial Relations Act
and, more importantly, the philosophy behind it, had
been rejected already by the party. By 1972 the compo-
sition of the party's National Executive followed the
leftward swing in union leadership and the unions received
official party support to defy the Act. The emphasis on
nationalization and socialist programs was more pronounced
than anytime since immediately after World War II.
Against this backdrop, Callaghan, who was determined
to end the confrontation, promote industrial peace, and
control the spiraling inflation, became Prime Minister
in April 1976. The result was a "social contract," based
to some extent on the continental model, that was intended
to foster cooperation among the government, employers,
and unions.
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Initially, the social contract proved effective.
Strikes subsided and inflation, which had reached nearly
26 percent a year in 1975, was cut in half by the end of
the following year--partly because a formal deal with
the trade unions helped keep wage increases down. The
traditional structural and operational links between the
Labor government and the trade unions were strengthened.
Union leaders had constant access to the upper echelons
of government and influenced policy. The last vestiges
of the Industrial Relations Act was repealed by 1976 and
replaced by the Trade Union and Labor Relations Act,
which had been introduced originally in late 1974 under
Wilson. The rules governing trade union activity were
liberalized beyond what they had been before passage of
the Industrial Relations Act; they now ensured union im-
munity from certain civil action and contract obligations
and encouraged secondary picketing. 25X1
Losing the Peace: The Decline of the Social Contract
During the 1977-78 pay round, however, the social
contract began to show signs of disintegration, and during
the present series of contract negotiations it has fallen
apart completely. In fact, the harmony and cooperation
between the trade unions and the Labor government that
followed the fall of the Heath government had only masked
serious problems in industrial relations. Although basic
and long-term changes in British industrial society underlie
the problems, the difficulties in the present relationship
between the "industrial and political wings of the labor
movement"--between the TUC and the Labor Party--can be
traced to two reasons. First, the close cooperation
between the Labor government and the upper echelons of
the trade union leadership--especially the leaders of
the TUC--is not a guarantee that the behavior of in-
dividual unions and the rank and file will conform.
Thus, during the 1977-78 pay round, union leadership
was still able to acquiesce informally in the govern-
ment's largely successful anti-inflationary wage
guidelines and to finesse a decision of the 1977
TUC annual conference to reject the pay policy in favor
of free collective bargaining. The same resolution
passed the 1978 conference, but this time the union
leadership, reacting to increasing pressure from below,
rejected the fourth round of incomes policy generally
and the average 5-percent limit on wage increases
specifically. Second, sharp contradiction within the
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body of labor law and regulation over the past decade
have confused the roles of the unions, employers, and
the government and blurred their relationships. A period
like the present, when policy interests and options
diverge markedly, discourages union discipline and fuels
antagonism among the government, employers, and the unions
that is absent or at least less obvious during periods,
such as the early days of the social contract, when
policies are more uniformly accepted.
The current series of contract negotiations and
attempts to enforce the pay policy, which began last
August, have been the most difficult for the Labor
government since it took office in 1974. The wave of
strikes during the past two months by several important
groups of workers has brought the government to the
brink of declaring a state of emergency, led to a sharp
government defeat in Parliament last month, and has left
Callaghan's tough pay policy in shambles.* Wage settle-
ments during the rest of the current pay round, which
almost certainly will be in excess of the guidelines,
are likely to reinforce the trend toward double digit
inflation and force the government to introduce unpopular
contractionary fiscal and monetary measures in the April
budget.
Although the effects of the current strikes--particu-
larly on the economic side--probably have been exaggerated
in the press, they are serious, and the political impact
is likely to be considerable. The government's seeming
inability to handle the situation has damaged its credi-
bility. Callaghan's popularity has dropped and the Con-
servatives, who have jumped more than seven points ahead
of Labor in the polls, are effectively adding to the
government's misery.
The current truckers' strike is the most serious and debilitating,
but strikes and industrial action are either in progress now or are
threatened by workers in the water supply industry, manual workers
employed by local communities, health service workers, railroad
workers, civil servants, coal miners, electricity workers, and
others. Although the situation eased somewhat this week because
an end to the truckers' strike seems imminent and rail and water
workers have temporarily agreed not to strike, the government's
troubles are far from over and are likely to intensify again in
the next several weeks.
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The Government's Dilemma: Which Way to Jump
The government is in a difficult position as it
attempts to deal with the strikes and, more importantly,
to find some common ground with the unions on a broad
number of issues. On the one hand, Callaghan has gotten
tough with the unions, hoping to shore up the government's
faltering electoral prospects and preempt Conservative
attacks. He reminds the unions of their responsibility
to the community, warns against seeking excessive wage
demands, and promises that the government will attempt
to pursue its anti-inflation goals by other means--even
if this means a stiff tax increase and a wage and price
freeze. In the truckers' strike, he has condemned
"secondary picketing"--the picketing of firms not directly
involved in the strike--and attempted to get unions vol-
untarily to stop the practice.*
Callaghan can only go so far with the tough approach,
despite its apparent popularity with the electorate,
since he runs the risk of alienating further both the
Labor Party's already aroused left wing and its powerful
trade union section. In an attempt to placate the unions,
restore a measure of industrial peace, and keep the party
together, he has offered relaxed guidelines for the lowest
paid workers, promised to extend comparability (by which
public employees would be allowed to violate the wage
guidelines in order to equalize their pay with private
sector employees), and said a bill would be introduced
soon to curb price increases. To date, these programs
have not been acce ted b union leaders or employers.
As in 1974, however, Callaghan hopes to resurrect
the social contract as the main vehicle in trying to
calm the situation, define the broad working relationship
with the unions, and convince a skeptical public in a
runup to the general election that he and the Labor Party
are still the best qualified to handle the unions. The
basic ideas for a revived social contract are contained
*During the weekend, a high court declared secondary picketing il-
legal and ordered the truckers to cease. In the past, however,
court decisions have not restrained union activity. 25X1
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in the TUC - Labor Party joint paper "Into the Eighties:
An Agreement," and negotiations are going on with the TUC
leadership now in an attempt to find a common formula for
wage and price increases and union conduct. Union leaders
have been cool toward the idea of a social contract for
several months, however; in addition, even if an agreement
can be reached, it is not at all certain that the individual
unions and the rank and file will accept it. The union
leaders, who are extremely sensitive in pressure from below,
already have rejected renewed government suggestions to
abandon free collective bargaining and will be reluctant
to enter future restrictive agreements.
The Conservatives: Also, Which Way to Jump
During the past year, Conservative policy toward the
unions, which is spelled out broadly in the party's elec-
tion manifesto, has been to foster reconciliation and
dispel the lingering effects of the hostility of the early
1970s. Looking toward the election, and hoping to pick
up substantial support among rank-and-file trade unionists,
party spokesmen have insisted that no major industrial
relations changes are planned. They have also claimed
that a Tory government, while keeping open the option to
impose wage restrictions, would be more sympathetic than
the Labor government to free collective bargaining,
especially if linked to increased industrial efficiency
and productivity. Party leaders clearly were attempting
to emphasize that the Tories could get along with the
unions and dispel the a t 's "union bashing" image.
During the current crisis much of this Conservative
strategy has become suspect. The party has attempted to
capitalize on Callaghan's dilemma and the potential
electoral benefits--which now seem more promising than
reconciliation with the unions--by attacking the govern-
ment's handling of the situation, condemning what it sees
as the serious abuses of union power and offering to
help restore order for the sake of the country. In
several recent, highly effective appeals--intended to ex-
ploit popular discontent with union tactics--the Conserva-
tives have raised issues reminiscent of the arguments used
to justify passage of the ill-fated Industrial Relations
Act and, indeed, of the legislation that had been proposed
to curb union power in 1969 under the Laborite Wilson.
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Arguments about the basic rights and responsibilities
of unions, which had been absent from the recent Tory
arsenal, again have begun to surface: no right to strike
in essential services; the use of secret ballots in union
voting (intended to scale down the authority of leftists);
outlawing of secondary picketing; and so on. If the
Conservatives win the next election, they probably will
attempt to convert some of the tough rhetoric into law.
It is unlikely, however, that they would attempt to do
so via a highly controversial, single, all-encompassing
piece of legislation such as the Industrial Relations Act.
They are much more likely to attack some of the more
glaring abuses of union power, especially those the Pub-
lic has found particularly offensive.
Impact on the Election Schedule
Callaghan will attempt to gauge the impact of the
current industrial crisis--both in Parliament and on the
electorate--in determining when to schedule a general
election. For the next several weeks, particularly if
the strike situation subsides, a threat to the govern-
ment's survival in Parliament appears to be minimal.
Callaghan has been able to rely on support from the
Scottish and Welsh Nationalists and the Ulster Unionists
to defeat several recent Conservative attempts to unseat
the government. But minor party support will become in-
creasingly unreliable as time passes, and the government
probably will not be able to rely on it past the spring.
I I
Callaghan's ability to survive in Parliament and to
call an election at a time favorable--or at least less
damaging--to the Labor Party depends in large measure
on public perception of the government's handling of the
trade unions, the industrial crisis and the economy.
There is no doubt that the government's standing in the
polls has dropped, but if the strikes subside and the
industrial scene remains relatively calm, the government
may be able to regain some of its lost popularity quickly
enough to hold an election in the spring, just after the
registry of new voters is published and before the economy
sours and an unpopular budget is introduced. If Labor
fortunes are still low in the spring, Callaghan may be
tempted to postpone the election to the fall, despite the
risk of losing minor party support in Parliament. I I
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NATO: Recent Developments in the Theater Nuclear Weapons
Debate
The strategic implications of the theater nuclear
weapons issue are increasingly being debated in Europe.
Political commentators assert that the issue raises ques-
tions about the firmness of the US commitment to the
defense of Europe, and they are beginning to link the
question of theater nuclear weapons to the shape of NATO's
nuclear doctrine and the future of French and British
nuclear forces. As the debate broadens, it is likely to
be conducted on moral and environmental as well as stra-
tegic grounds; it could become linked with the unsettled
neutron bomb question
The Alliance itself is wrestling with many of these
questions. A report of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group's
political implementation team, issued last month, stressed
that the modernization of theater nuclear forces should
not blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear
war and that the purpose of these forces will still be
to deter an aggressor, not to engage him. The report
suggests that reduced collateral damage will make these
systems serve this role even better, since NATO will pose
a more credible threat to advancing Warsaw Pact forces.
Implicit in this report is an emphasis on the continued
close linkage between theater nuclear forces and the US
strategic deterrent, and thus on the continued strength
of the US involvement in the defense of Europe. 25X1
In a recent Le Monde article, however, security
affairs analyst Jacques Isnard suggests that the United
States is using new theater nuclear programs to loosen
its commitment to Europe. Isnard charges both super-
powers with trying to make their allies assume larger
battlefield roles and spend more on defense. He raises
the specter of a Europe mutilated while the superpowers
assess their positions from afar. 25X1
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Isnard also questions the process of strategic arms
limitation talks (SALT). SALT I, he argues, permitted
each superpower a small anti-ballistic-missile force for
protection against small (that is, British and French)
nuclear forces; SALT II would protect the security of
each side's central systems; SALT III may be designed to
monitor and neutralize smaller nuclear powers. Thinking
of this sort could be one of the reasons France is refus-
ing to have its s stems included in SALT III negotiations.
A Manchester Guardian editorial takes a very dif-
ferent view. Recognizing the need for new strategic and
theater weapons, the editorial urges Britain to modern-
ize its own deterrent by means of air-launched cruise
missiles deployed on a version of the European airbus.
While admitting that some will see larger European forces
as enabling the Americans to modify their commitment, the
Guardian claims that new theater nuclear weapons will
actually be better integrated into Alliance planning than
their predecessors. In order to ensure US involvement,
the editor suggests that relatively few systems be built
and that these serve as replacements for present Euro can
deployments, not additions to them. 25X1
Both Isnard and the Guardian editorial writer are
arguing issues that will require decisions fairly soon,
since both France and Britain are in the process of
choosing follow-on systems for their present nuclear
deterrents. Prime Minister Callaghan estimates that the
British decision (cruise missiles versus submarine
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)) will be made within
two years. French choices (mobile ICBM's vs. cruise mis-
siles) have already come under scholarly as well as pub-
lic discussion.
Inevitably, however, the debate on these issues will
take on an ethical as well as a strategic dimension.
NATO Secretary General Luns recently made it clear that
he is aware of this when he referred to theater nuclear
modernization in the course of comments on a Dutch demon-
stration against the enhanced radiation warhead. The
development of new or modernized theater systems will
probably be fought by the same people who oppose the
neutron bomb and with the same fervor. If the enhanced
radiation warhead is still an issue--either because a
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decision to deploy has been made or because the question
is still up in the air--linkage between the two debates
will be logical. In fact, even if enhanced radiation
warheads are rejected, memories of the previous contro-
versy could be dredged up for public consumption. Piet
Heil, a columnist for the leftist Dutch paper Vrije Volk,
recently urged demonstrators to remember that the neutron
bomb issue is only one part of the general disarmament
question. F_ I
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Foreign Policy in the Finnish Election
Foreign policy will be an issue in the parliamen-
tary elections in Finland scheduled for 18-19 March,
much to the displeasure of President Kekkonen, whose
formulation of foreign policy traditionally has been
unquestioned. Kekkonen believes his good performance
in last year's presidential election once again regis-
tered approval of his personal conduct of foreign af-
fairs and his decision to keep foreign policy out of
partisan politics. A series of events involving the
USSR, however, may have convinced the voters that for-
eign policy requires their attention.
Finnish Foreign Policy
The Finnish Constitution gives the President pri-
mary responsibility for foreign policy. Since Kekkonen
became president in 1956, he has worked at establishing
close personal association and regular communications
with Soviet leaders in the belief that this approach
would provide maximum independence for Finland. He has
accepted Moscow's need for security on its borders and
has taken Soviet sensitivities into account by maintain-
ing a military establishment capable of denying Finnish
territory to would-be invaders of the Soviet Union,
muffling anti-Communist expression and accepting some
economic and cultural ties with Moscow. At the same
time, however, Kekkonen has tried to balance these re-
quirements with the development of Western ties, in-
cluding close relations with the other Nordic countries,
association in the European Free Trade Association, and
an active neutral posture in international organizations.
The Soviet Presence
The Finns have had a series of reminders of the So-
viet proximity in the past year or so. Moscow's propa-
ganda efforts linking the 60th anniversary of the
Bolshevik revolution and the birth of an independent
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Finnish nation certainly reinforced perennial Finnish
anxiety about Soviet hegemony. Then at the Finnish na-
tional celebrations in Helsinki, Soviet Premier Kosygin
publicly harangued the Nordic Prime Ministers and espe-
cially Norway's Nordli about NATO activities in the Nor-
dic area. The outburst was read in Finland as a threat
to invoke the 1948 Fenno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which provides for
military cooperation in the event of a threat to the
USSR through Finland. Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov
underscored this interpretation last summer when he pro-
posed joint military exercises as a response to NATO
exercises in Norway.
The Finn's
sensitivities about Soviet connections were further
raised by the repeated use of the term Finlandization as
a pejorative word implying servility toward Moscow by
West German politicians in preelection debates last fall.
The Finns probably also feel that their country's
international status as a neutral has slipped from the
high point achieved during the Helsinki Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Western response
to Kekkonen's renewed drive for a Nordic nuclear free
zone, which implied the proposal served Soviet ends, may
have fed the feeling.
Voter Opinion
Although polls have shown increasingly conservative
responses on party affiliations, most observers believed
that the electorate was generally trying to convey its
desire for a more conservative domestic policy. In a
Gallup poll published in December, however, direct for-
eign policy questions were asked, and responses showed
an overwhelming opposition to closer ties with the East.
More than one in three of those polled thought Finland's
present foreign policy alread tilted too far in that
direction. I
Parliamentary candidates from the major parties
will not debate foreign policy openly or formally. Voters
will identify candidates' positions by past activities
and current associates. Each party, even the Communist
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front, has members identified to some extent with the
West who have shown support for specific positions in
foreign policy that would fit the voters' present mood.
Monthly polls on party preference indicate most voters
still believe they will be able to express their conser-
vatism within their traditional party, but some will
move to the right. The movement could add two or three
seats to the Moderate Party's parliamentary representa-
tion and that would make it difficult--or embarrassing--
continue to exclude it from a post-election cabinet.
I I
Excluding the Moderate Party from government has
been a basic part of Kekkonen's policy out of deference
to the Soviets since the mid-1960s. For the past year,
however, he has tried to help the Moderates cast off
their anti-Communist roots to make them acceptable as
part of a governing coalition. He believes the govern-
ment should represent a national consensus to deal with
the country's severe economic problems and to weather
the possible tumul;L as political leaders try to agree
on his successor.
The Soviet Hand in the Election
The Soviets let their position on the coming Finnish
elections be known in an article this month in the propa-
ganda journal Novo ye vremya that associated the Moderate
Party with anti-Soviet, even Nazi, policies. Although
the article claimed that Finland's socialist parties
were the ones opposed to the party's participation in
government, Moscow underscored the "negative consequences
for foreign policy" that would likel result should the
Moderates come into the government.
The independent Finns probably will not shift their
votes to accommodate Soviet views. The strength of con-
servatism in the vote will undoubtedly influence deci-
sions by Kekkonen and others in the Finnish Government
i
i
es_
t
in the postelection period, but Soviet sensitiv
l
.
will continue to influence those decisions as wel
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Switzerland: The Politics of Defense
The visit to the United States next week of Swiss
Defense Minister Gnaegi underscores the growing uneasi-
ness in Bern about Switzerland's future in Europe.
Gnaegi will be shopping for an extensive array of so-
phisticated arms and weapons systems for the moderniza-
tion of the Swiss armed forces over the next five years.
The new accent on a strong military capability is in
line with the activist approach adopted in foreign pol-
icy in 1976 and reflects the determination of the Swiss
to safeguard their interests in international affairs.
Gnaegi, who is scheduled
to be in Washington from 4 to
8 February, is certain to play
up Switzerland's strategic po-
sition on NATO's southern flank.
The Swiss are worried about the
unsettled situations in Turkey
and Iran, the uncertain futures
of Spain and Portugal, and the
strong Communist movements in
France and Italy. Bern sees
Europe--particularly West Ger-
many and the Scandinavian coun-
tries--increasingly threatened
by Soviet arms expansion at a
time when it believes the major
West European powers show scant
determination to meet the
threat. Leery of becoming in-
volved with the West Germans,
the Swiss find themselves with little alternative but
to turn to the United States.
Last year the Swiss defense program focused on im-
proving antitank defense and expanding the tank force.
A Swiss Army study released in November, however, calls
for improvement in air defense and acquisition of air-
mobile antitank forces. Such improvements are necessary,
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according to Swiss military commentators, if the Swiss
hope to prevent the Soviets from using Switzerland as a
shortcut through NATO's southern flank.
This study, citing the potential strategic and
technical challenges of guaranteeing Swiss security
into the 1990s, calls for modification of the tradi-
tionally passive role that Swiss military forces have
played for the past 20 years. Civil defense programs,
with the accent on hardened facilities, have long
served as the cornerstone of the country's defense
policy. Switzerland has fully equipped shelters for
80 percent of its 6.3 million residents. In addition,
all strategic materials, munitions, petroleum supplies,
food, and medical facilities are in hardened shelters
scattered throughout the country.
The civil defense measures are supplemented by a
small, well-trained army of nine divisions, backed up
by 600,000 reservists--equivalent to 12 divisions and
the largest reserve force in Western Europe. The re-
serves can be mobilized in two to three days and, be-
cause they keep their weapons and equipment at their
homes, can be deployed quickly. They are also well-
trained; virtually every Swiss male undergoes intermit-
tent service and training between the ages of 19 to 50.
These programs do not come cheap. In 1977, the
Swiss spent 3.2 percent of their gross national product
on defense; this total does not include the sums ex-
pended by the cantons and communities for maintenance
of local military installations.
Diplomatic Activism
The shift to a more aggressive military strategy
is consistent with recent changes in Swiss foreign pol-
icy. In late 1976, the Swiss Government concluded that
Bern would have to take on a more activist role if
Switzerland intended to remain in the mainstream of in-
ternational affairs. Up to that point, economic con-
siderations had been predominant, with government offi-
cials responsible for economic affairs actually deter-
mining substantive foreign policy. 25X1
31 January 1979
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There are many critics of this so-called new style
in foreign policy, particularly in the Swiss Parliament,
which by and large continues to favor the traditionally
passive role. There also is considerable resistance
from the Swiss public; in 1976 voters rejected a pro-
posal to increase aid to developing countries, and in
1977 public opinion polls showed that the populace re-
mained skeptical about the v ue of joining the United
Nations.
The Swiss Government, however, concerned that Swit-
zerland will be left out of West European and US calcu-
lations as institutional channels of cooperation prolif-
erate, is determined to play a more active role, includ-
ing joining the United Nations. Foreign Minister Aubert
frequently has publicly stressed the merits of UN member-
ship, which he declares is needed if Switzerland is to
"remain in the game." The Swiss are also worried about
losing their voice in such issues as the North-South
dialogue and the debate over South Africa, topics in-
creasingly argued in the United Nations.
31 January 1979
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Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01700010005-6