WESTERN EUROPE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00865A001200330001-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
21
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 22, 2005
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 30, 1975
Content Type:
NOTES
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Body:
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CONTENTS
Italian Christian Democrats Reassessing
Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cypriot President Completes Arab Tour .
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Canadian NATO Delegation Urges Detailed US
and West German Comments on Ottawa's
Defense Review . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Belgian Leader Snubbed in Moscow . . . . . . . 10
Fishing Issues Again Dominate Icelandic
Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
EC Research Council Holds Inconclusive
Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Lisbon Restructures the Armed Forces
Revolutionary Unit . . . . . . . . . .. . . 14
French Leftist Rally Flops in Paris . . . . . 16
Alleged Soviet Instructions on Subversion for
Western Communist Parties Drawing Interest
in France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
DOS review(s) completed.
June 30, 1975
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Italian Christian Democrats Reassessing Strate
The national council of Italy's Christian
Democratic Party is meeting today to assess
party strategy in the light of the Socialists'
refusal last week to begin negotiations immediately
for a new four-party center-left government.
The two smaller center-left parties--the
Social Democratic and the Republican--accepted
the Christian Democrats' offer. The Socialists,
who emerged from the recent regional and local
elections with the possibility of joining the
Communists in more local governments, are holding
out for more time to avoid having that option
b
ecome part of the bargaining for a new nati
The Christian Democratic meeting today is
likely to be stormy. Six key members of the
Christian Democratic left wing announced over
the weekend that they will resign from the
party's central committee at today's gathering.
For the past two weeks, the left has been urging
party chief Fanfani to step down; it hopes the
resignations will help provoke a reevaluation
of the party's leadership and policies.
Three of the left-wingers are ministers
in the Moro government. One of them claims
the three will also resign from the cabinet,
causing a government crisis, if their demands
are not met.
June 30, 1975
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The other Christian Democratic factions
agree that something has to be done soon, but
they have not yet agreed to any clear policy
line. The Socialist refusal narrows their
options. In addition to the left's proposal
for an across-the-board reassessment, some of
the options that will probably be under dis-
cussion today include:
Leaving the Moro government in place
until the Christian Democrats and
Socialists have had time to hold party
congresses.
--Replacing Moro with an all-Christian
Democratic caretaker government that
would serve the same purpose.
--Taking a hard line against the Socialists
even at the risk of rovokin an earl
national election.
June 30, 1975
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Cypriot President Completes Arab Tour
Last week, President Makarios completed
a tour of several Arab states aimed at winning
Arab backing for the Greek Cypriot case against
the Turks. Makarios received some rhetorical
support for his cause but few offers of concrete
assistance.
Makarios' wooing of the Arabs began last
March when he recognized the Palestine Liberation
Organization and granted it permission to open
an office in Nicosia. The Archbishop followed
this up with a trip to four Persian Gulf states
in May and visits to Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and
Libya this month.
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Turkish Cypriots also are bidding for Arab
support. Last week, a high level Turkish Cypriot
official went to Saudi Arabia in the first of
several visits to Arab states while Turkish
Cypriot leader Denktash is set to visit :Libya
and Iraq soon. Turkish Cypriots will also be
represented at the Islamic countries conference
to be held in Jidda in mid July.
June 30, 1975
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Relations between the two ethnic communities,
meanwhile, worsened over the weekend following the
expulsion of several hundred Greek Cypriots from
the Turkish Cypriot zone and Denktash's threat today
to expel the remaining Greek Cypriots unless all
Turkish Cypriots living in the Greek Cypriot zone
who wish to move north are allowed to do so.
Although Denktash is upset about the alleged rough
treatment of some Turkish Cypriots recently caught
making their way to,the north, his demand may be
the beginning of an effort to achieve the complete
separation of the two communities. There are less
than 10,000 Turkish Cypriots still left in the
south and an equal number of Greek Cypriots in the
north. Should the explusion of Greek Cypriots
continue, it may well lead to the cancellation
of the third round of intercommunal talks set
to begin in Vienna on July 24.
June 30, 1975
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Canadian NATO Delegation Urges Detailed US and
West German Comments on Ottawa's Defense Review
Canadian NATO officials, in separate bilateral
consultations in Brussels, have urged the US and
West Germany to provide written comments on the
effect of Ottawa's current defense review on its
NATO force levels. Sub-cabinet officials in both
the External Affairs and Defense departments note
that such responses must come soon if the cabinet
is to be dissuaded from cutting Canada's NATO
contribution.
The Canadian officials indicated that the review
has now moved to the critical stage of determining
the force level needed to meet the nation's defense
tasks. Particularly urgent is a decision on the
level of expenditures necessary to support Canadian
forces in West Germany. While it may be another
year before the entire review is completed, a cabi-
net decision on the type and level of the European
NATO contribution is likely much sooner.
No sub-cabinet plan has yet been proposed and
all options--a continuation of the current mix of
land and air forces, an all-land force, or an all-
air contingent--are still open. There are numerous
variations within these general options; for example,
a land-air mix with the land contingent changed
from the current tank brigade to a less expensive
light-armored or anti-tank unit. The Canadians
said that a reequipped all-air contingent would
result in a reduction of about 1,500 men in their
European force.
The Canadians reiterated their promise to
consult with all the NATO allies as soon as
specific plans are ready for cabinet consideration.
June 30, 1975
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They said Bonn supported modernizing the current
land-air mix and they were sure the US would have
similar views.
Canadian sub-cabinet officials recognize the
serious political and military implications of the
proposed force reductions. These officials believe
they will need all the allied support they can
muster to influence a cabinet beset with inflationary
budget pressures and determined to limit government
expenditures. The Trudeau government may face dif-
ficulty on the question of whether to maintain and
modernize Canada's relatively small force that is
committed to NATO, particularly if this means cut-
ting back on popular domestic programs.
June 30, 1975
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Belgian Leader Snubbed in Moscow
Prime Minister Tindemans returned from Moscow
last Friday wishing that he had never gone. Soviet
leaders went out of their way to snub and criticize
him. The resultant publicity embarrassed Tindemans
and could damage him politically at home.
e visitors curing eir
week-long stay in Moscow and Kosygin, who met the
party when it arrived, departed for Hungary before
bilateral talks got under way. Before he left,
however, Kosygin found time to lecture the delega-
tion on what the Belgians have described as the
presumptions of small vassal powers.
The Belgians successfully sidestepped Soviet.
attempts to pressure them into endorsing a July
CSCE summit and Tindemans rebutted Soviets criticism
of the EC. Four routine bilateral agreements were
concluded and the King made a tough speech during
a formal dinner in which he asserted Belgian
national policy and the commitment to Europe and
the Atlantic alliance.
The overall impact of the visit was to portray
Belgian foreign policy as completely subservient
to Atlantic doctrine. As for Tindemans, the
Belgian Communist newspaper depicted him as "faith-
ful to his image of good student, Atlantic or
European."
June 30, 1975
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Fishing Issues Again Dominate Icelandic Politics
A meeting on June 23 between Icelandic
Prime Minister Hallgrimsson and British Prime
Minister Wilson concerning fisheries issues has
created a stir in Iceland.
In what was described as a "courtesy call"
on his way home from a meeting of Nordic ministers
in Stockholm, Hallgrimsson outlined Iceland's
intentions to extend its fishing limits to 200
miles and discussed plans for a new fishing agree-
ment to replace the one that expires on Novembet
13.
In the meantime, the Communist-dominated
Peoples Alliance, which was a member of the govern-
ment during the cod war with the British, has
denounced the Hallgrimsson-Wilson meeting. The
Communists insist that there should be no agree-
ment with any country which would permit foreign
fishing within Iceland's present 50 mile zone.
They believe, moreover, that when Iceland extends
its fishing limits, foreign fishing should also
be banned from the 200 mile zone. At present,
the UK is permitted to fish, with certain restric-
tions, within the 50 mile zone.
Hallgrimsson reportedly would like to reach
an amicable agreement with the British and avoid
the kind of emotional atmosphere which has
dominated past sessions with the British. The
Communists' reaction to the Hallgrimsson-Wilson
talks, however, suggests that hammering out the
next agreement will be long and difficult.
I I
June 30, 1975
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EC Research Council Holds Inconclusive
Session
Last week the Nine held their first Council
meeting devoted entirely to community scientific
research and development programs. Bonn is in-
creasingly adamant against new community expendi-
tures and it stood alone in blocking additional
funds for the Joint Research Center (JRC). The
West German action led Rome to stall implementa-
tion of a proposed EC energy research and develop-
ment program, which Bonn also opposes.
The JRC, with installations in four member
countries, was set up in compliance with a Eura-
tom treaty provision commiting members to joint
research activities. The current four-year pro-
gram adopted in 1973 emphasizes such community
energy and environment priorities as nuclear re-
actor safety, treatment of radioactive waste,
and the development of new energy sources. The
Commission proposed that about $60 million--
already earmarked in 1973--be released largely
to offset inflationary cost increases, and that
a 9300 million budgetary increase be authorized
for new programs. Although the other members
agreed, the Germans questioned whether JRC's
costs did not far exceed its usefulness and
claimed that control over its finances is inade-
quate, its programs poorly-defined, and that
labor problems at the Italian facility severely
hamper the program. As agreement proved impos-
sible, the matter was referred to Bonn for fur-
ther consideration.
The Council also discussed Commission pro-
posals--separate from the JRC activities--for
a $78 million, four-year energy program to in-
clude research on saving energy, hydrogen
June 30, 1975
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production and utilization, solar and geothermal
energy, and systems analysis and model building.
Germany again stood alone in refusing to agree
to these expenditures. The Italians, eager to
protect the large JRC facility in their country,
put a formal hold on these proposals until Bonn
should acquiesce in the JRC matter.
The direct contributions to the EC budget,
which are set percentages, are in proportion
to the size of the member states' economies.
Germany's share in 1975 is 28.1 percent as com-
pared with 23 for France and 17.2 for Italy--
the next largest contributors. Bonn, therefore,
has been increasingly reluctant to agree to new
EC expenditures, particularly during a time of
economic recession.
In related decisions, the Commission was
instructed urgently to draft community regula-
tions to improve nuclear safety practices and
the Council adopted a $27 million five-year
environmental program concerning stockpiling
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June 30, 1975
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Lisbon Restructures the Armed Forces
Revolutionary Unit
Portugal's leaders have announced a structural
reorganization of the ruling Armed Forces Revolu-
tionary Council. The changes seem designed at
least in part to improve government efficiency.
It is too soon to determine whether they will
affect the power balance between moderates and
radicals.
After a night-long session, the Revolutionary
Council issued a statement early on Saturday
saying it will create a central committee, with
subordinate political, military and executive
committees. General policy lines will still be
decided by the full Council, but the central
committee will make decisions on current matters
and make recommendations to various government
bodies.
The new central committee, which is to handle
day-to-day Council business, is to be composed of
11 senior members of the Council. President Costa
Gomes, Prime Minister Goncalves, security chief
Otelo de Carvalho, and Admiral Rosa Coutinho will
be joined on the committee by the chiefs of the
general staffs of the three military branches.
The four others, who will also be members of the
political committee, were not named.
The political committee will maintain con-
tacts with the political parties, as well as
with unions and "mass organizations." The
Council statement does not discuss the functions
or list the members of the military or executive
committees.
June 30, 1975
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The Council statement also announced approval
of two decree laws--one creating a judicial
police service under the Council's supervision,
and another establishing regulations for a
revolutionary military-tribunal to judge those
implicated in the coup attempt of March 11. The
opening of the next session of the Armed Forces
Movement General Assembly was set for July 8.
Another decree law promulgated recently
prohibits members of the government from making
statements in disagreement with government policy
and requires any member of the government to
obtain the prime minister's approval before
traveling outside the country.
These measures appear directed against
Socialist Party leader Mario Soares, who has
conducted a public discussion of government
policy and made frequent trips to other European
capitals to seek support for his party.
The Revolutionary Council has also approved
a decree law providing sanctions against military
personnel who contribute to discord within the
armed forces, commit or encourage acts of violence,
or disrupt public order. This law is not only
aimed at combating lack of discipline in the
armed forces, but is also probably directed at
certain military units that have shown sympathy
with radical leftist groups.
June 30, 1975
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French Leftist Rally Flops in Paris
The first mass rally of the year sponsored
by the Left Alliance of the Communists, Socialists,
left Radicals, plus the two largest unions and
the national education union, was a dismal failure.
Billed as a protest against alleged government
escalation of "repression and violence to undermine
trade union freedom and rights," the 26 June rally
drew only about 20,000 persons, despite favorable
weather.
The last such rally was held in December 1974--
quite a long interval given the aggravation of
the economic situation. Communist-Socialist
squabbling set back any such public displays of
common militancy, but the basic reason for the
failure of the left to capture the interest
of the people is that the government has been
successful in depriving them of mobilization
themes.
Allegations of government repression and
violence carry credibility only with hard-core
Communists. The organizers of the rally were so
desperate for examples that they cited the use
of police dogs by the guards of premises of major
enterprises facing strikes as a major instance of
government condoned "fascism." The general public,
however, simply does not believe that the government
is using repressive measures to reduce worker resis-
h th
i
e
t
tance to the sacrifices necessary to deal w
nation's economic problems.
June 30, 1975
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Alleged Soviet Instructions on Subversion for
Western Communist Parties Drawing Interest
in France
Early last week a mildly Socialist oriented
French newspaper,. the Quotidien de Paris, began
devoting part of each issue to articles drafted
by writers from Republica, a Portuguese Socialist
paper closed by s Communist-dominated union. One
of the first articles printed was a summary of a
series of alleged Soviet instructions to Communist
parties seeking to take power in the West. French
press sources have stated that the text had pre-
viously been published in an article by Boris
Ponomarev, who is in charge of the Soviet party's
ties with non-ruling Communist parties, in the
Russian and English versions of the World Marxist
Review of June 1974. The Republica manager said
tip e material had also appeared, at an unspecified
time and place, in Italy.
A text of the Quotidien/Republica item is
not yet available andtiFe versions carried by
other French papers and the wire services vary.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the Ponomarev
article, if it is the ultimate source of the
"instructions," has been, at the very least,
broadly interpreted. The Ponomarev article
was one of a number of items that appeared in
commemoration of the fifth anniversary of a
meeting of several Communist parties in Moscow.
Two of its 15 pages deal with the lessons to be
learned from the events in Chile, and it is from
this section that the "instructions" may have
been lifted. The Ponomarev article deals in a
dispassionate, theoretical manner with the
problems of consolidating political power won
by Communists in Western states. Its tone,
June 30, 1975
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unlike that of the Republica text, is not
hortatory and covers the issues in considerably
less detail than the "instructions."
The Republica text is variously reported
as having
--indicated that the "-instructions" were,
at least in part, directed specifically
toward the Portuguese Communists. Ponomarev's
article is directed-to no specific party.
--called for control of-the mass media to
be denied to anti-Communist forces. This
point most closely follows the Ponomarev
text. He indicates that the importance
of the media in political struggles nowadays
makes it essential that it be Communist-
controlled.
--directed parties to form power centers
outside the existing government to engage
in sabotage, defamation of political leaders,
and to consolidate party power; to create
a single, party-controlled union; to destroy
the "private sector" of the economy; and to
subvert military leaders in order to form
an alliance with the army.
The Portuguese Communists have, in fact,
pushed through a unitary labor law that has given
them dominance over Portuguese labor. They have
also been successful, together with other radical
elements in the Portuguese regime, in nationalizing
two-thirds of Portugal's industry. It is also clear
that the Communists have a better relationship
with and more influence in the Portuguese Armed
Forces Movement than any other Portuguese party.
It seems likely that the Portuguese Communists
would have done all these-things without specific
"instructions" from Ponomarev. In any case, Soviet
sources quickly disowned the Republica text as did
June 30, 1975
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the French Communists, who even sent a delegation
to try to look over the original documents. After
being told by the Quotidien.that such evidence was
not available, the French Communists have been
grumping self-righteously about their policy of
refusing to take orders from anyone. Le Monde,
France's most respected newspaper, has more
logically noted that the dissemination of such
printed instructions--signed by a candidate member
of the Soviet politburo no less--has never
been Moscow's style. And, indeed, previous effort
to exploit alleged Soviet documents have turned
out to be based on forgeries. What is not clear
is whether the Republica text was recently con-
structed by anti-Communist Portuguese or whether
it had appeared already elsewhere.
On the surface, French Socialist leader
Francois Mitterrand might be expected to try
to use the issue to play for advantage against
the Communists. He is fully committed to his
party's alliance with the French Communists,
however, and has to walk a careful line between
distinguishing his party from its ally and pre-
serving his credibility in continuing the alliance.
While the French Communists have been attacking
the Socialists for several months, Mitterrand
has not responded in kind. The recent events in
Lisbon have brought him to the defense of the
Portuguese Socialists, but he has also been care-
ful to reiterate his basic support for Communist-
Socialists alliances and to urge his opposite
numbers in Portugal not to break their ties with
the Communists there. Mitterrand, moreover, has
serious problems holding the right and left wings
of his own party together right now and the
Republica matter would only add to the strain if
it should become an issue-between the two parties.
Mitterrand has already moved to keep the lid on the
issue. Within hours of-when the Quotidien
hit the newsstands in France, he told a press con-
ference that he was confident that the "instructions"
were a forgery.
June 30, 1975
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