SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000300170001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 7, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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op Secret
~4pf~~ aO~C~~~
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
State Department review completed
Tap Secret
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February 7, 1975
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CONTENTS
February 7, 1975
Berlin: The Endless Negotiation.
1
Moscow's Unofficial Artists
Plan Another Exhibit.
6
Polish Views on Soviet-US Relations
8
Bulgaria: Tightening the
Screws on Youth
9
Romanian Defense
Minister in Yugoslavia.
11
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Berlin: The Endless Negotiation
In a time of detente, Berlin is no longer the
bunion that the Soviets, in Khrushchev's phrase,
could step on whenever they wanted to give the West
a pain. The passing of the age of sharp confronta-
tion, and the signing of the 1971 Quadripartite Agree-
ment on Berlin, do not mean, however, that the Berlin
question has disappeared, merely that the debate is
now conducted on a different level and in more muted
tones. The Quadripartite Agreement incorporates each
side's philosophy--stating with benign inconsistency
that West Berlin is not a constituent part of West
Germany and shall not be governed by it, but ties be-
tween West Berlin and the FRG shall be strengthened.
Differences in interpretation of the agreement are
therefore inevitable, and, in fact, were anticipated.
In recent weeks, the Soviets have made a number of
complaints about Berlin matters in conversations with
West German and Allied diplomats. They have protested:
--Plans to establish an EC vocational center in
West Berlin. The Soviets maintain that since West Ber-
lin is not itself a member of the EC, establishment of
the center can be interpreted to mean that it is a con-
stituent part of the FRG, a violation of the Quadripar-
tite Agreement.
--Establishment last year of the FRG Federal En-
vironmental Agency office in West Berlin. The issue
here is similar to the EC vocational center, but more
direct since it is a purely FRG institution. As far as
the Soviets are concerned, the environmental office is
still operating illegally, although they are not trying
to keep it from functioning.
--West German extension of the 1972 FRG-Austrian
consular treaty to "Land Berlin." The Soviets contend
February 7, 1975
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that the extension of this and other FRG treaties
to west Berlin is .illegal. They regard the designa-
tion "Land Berlin" as invalid because it impa.ies that
West Berlin is a constituent part. of the Federal
Republic.
--Nomination of West Berlin Governing Mayor
Schuetz as a plenipotentiary in cultural. matters under
the 1963 French - West German friendship agreement.
The Soviets, as might be expected, protested the in-
volvement of a West Berlin official in a Federal Ger-
man agreement. The French have responded that the
plenipotentiary has only limited functions and, at an~~
rate, is appointed by individual Lands, not by the
West German Federal Government.
--Decisions by the Western Allies to grant landing
:rights in West Berlin to air Ines not three-powers.
This is a .long-standing controversy. Occasionally
the Soviets claim that the Allies are letting the com-?
mercial airlines of other countries use the established
flight corridors to West Berlin, but generally their
complaints are limited to the grant of landing rights
in the city. This, then, raises the question of whether
East Germany will grant overflight rights to these air-
lines; the result is often sterile debates over which
permission should be obtained first.
--Allied toleration of the right-wing Bund Freies
Deutschland party in West Berlin. The Soviets have sug-
gested that this group should be banned as a fascist
party, but have not pressed the issue when the Allies
have denied it was fascist.
The Soviets have also expressed disappointment
over the cool Western response to their proposals for
a lavish celebration in Berlin of the 30th anniversary
of V-E Day. The Soviets apparently intended these
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ceremonies to take place entirely in West Berlin,
thereby strengthening their role there without a
corresponding increase in the residual Allied pres-
ence in East Berlin.
With these protests as a backdrop, Soviet Deputy
Foreign Minister Zemskov recently told West German
Ambassador Sahm that the FRG was violating the Quadri-
~3artite Agreement by "creating precedents." Sahm was
taken aback by Soviet accusations that the FRG had
reneged on agreements reached during the Schmidt visit
to Moscow Xast December. Indeed, the West Germans
thought that Schmidt had obtained the Soviets' agree-
ment that individual West Berliners would be covered
by agreements the FRG made with third countries.
In a broader sense the sniping on Berlin issues
reflects a nagging Soviet suspicion that the idea of
a united Germany is still a long way from extinction
in the minds of West Germans. Recent West German pro-
tests over the concept of an East German citizenship in
the consular treaty between the GDR and Austria may have
aroused underlying Soviet concerns that the German re-
unification issue can still influence West German policy
and, indeed, may never vanish. The FRG-Soviet dispute
over the "peaceful change" formulation at CSCE has prob-
ably had a similar effect, since the problem essentially
concerns West German efforts to leave open a legal path.
to eventual reunification of the two Germanies.
The foreign policy line of detente and their desire
far good relations with West Germany. affect the means
the Soviets employ, but Moscow's basic objective of de-
fining West Berlin as a separate entity will remain un?
changed. The Soviets may tolerate certain actions with
which they disagree, such as establishment of the Fed-
eral Environmental Agency in West Berlin, but they: will
never legally recognize any step that seems to violate
the dictum that West Berlin is not a const~.tuent part
of the FRG. In a sense, the adversary process of seek-
ing precedents and establishing limits amounts to a con-
tinuous renegotiation of the Quadripartite Agreement.
February ,
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Moscow's Unofficial Artists
Plan Another Exhibit
Dissident artist Oscar Rabin told a US embassy
officer on February 6 that an exhibit of works by
Moscow's unofficial artists has. been approved "in
principle" by city officials. According to Rabin,
who arran ed two such exhibits last September
a group of unofficial
artists has bean negotiating over the past several
weeks with the city Committee of Graphic Artists for
authorization 'to stage an exhibit in Moscow's Exhi-
bition of National Economic Achievements. At this
stage, the major sticking point seems to be the selec-
tion of an exhibit hall. The hall offered by the com-
mittee, Rabin said, is not ideal for an art exhibit be-
cause of poor lighting and inadequate space. Rabin
apparently believes this problem can be resolved soon,
however, and he expects the exhibit to open the first
part of next week.
Some 20 local non-conformist artists are expected
to exhibit their works, and they have allegedly been
promised that the exhibition will run for about one
week. In contrast to September's art show at Izmaylovo
Park, not all non-union artists will be allowed to par-
ticipate. The artists' works are being reviewed, and
only the "best" will be included. The city committee,
also, has rejected the works of several. artists.
some, if not a.ll,
artis s w o par icipa a in a ex ibit will be invited
to join the Graphic Artists Committee, which is con-
sidered one step below the Moscow Union of Artists-.
Authorization for the exhibit seems to be a posi-
tive step for the artists, but has caused further split:
in the ranks of unofficial artists. Some have argued that
February 7, 1975
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the offer should be accepted only ~f al.l artists
are allowed to participate. Others do not wish to
miss the chance to attain greater acceptabil,it.y in
the eyes of the autho.rik.~.es and thereby more oppor-
tunities to show their wor7cs p~a.blicly. At this ,point,
however, both. groups seem t.o be willing to accept a
compromise with city offici.a.ls. the aim of the au-
thorities seems to be to bring the most prominent
artists into officially sanctioned structures in or
to eacert greater control. over them.
February ~, 195
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Polish Views on Soviet-US Relations
Immediately after Moscow's rejection of the
1972 US-Soviet trade agreement., Polish media were
noticeably reluctant to discuss US-Soviet relations.
In the last two weeks, however, the media have
picked up the theme that detente prevails despite
the temporary setbacks caused by a "minority of
congressmen."
Although proclaiming the "correctness" of the
Kremlin's decision to renounce the agreement as an
unwarranted attempt at interference in Soviet in-
ternal affairs, the media have emphasized that the
US administration is still working to improve re-
lations with the Soviet Union.
Warsaw's low-key approach to Moscow's abroga-
tion of the trade agreement was to be expected.
Gierek has based his program of economic develop-
ment and modernization on creating a balance be-
tween increased trade and contacts with the West
and a strong alliance with the Soviet Union. The
Poles will look for ways to play down the signifi-
ca
f
nce o
any event that might, make this balancing
February 7, 1975
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Bulgaria: Tightening the Screws on Youth
The Council of Ministers has recently announced
tough new regulations to improve the "labor educa-
tion" of Bulgarian youth. These restrictive mea-
sures seem indirectly aimed at two problems--a nag-
ging labor shortage and a fear of ideological de-
generation among Bulgarian youth.
Each young person upon completing his primary
.education or military service must now register with
a bureau of manpower, which will give out job as-
signments according to the "needs of the national
economy." Aspiring students must hold a "steady
job" for at least eight months--and in some cases up
to two years--before they are eligible to enroll in
higher educational institut.~.ons. Failure to regis-
ter or the abandonment of assigned positions makes
either the young people or their parents liable to
a sizable fine.
The regulations are designed to correct prob-
lems that the regime has recently stressed in press
commentaries:
--The lax and parasitical attitude of young
people who neither work nor study and who are
supported by their parents.
--The distaste of youth for "socially useful
labor . "
--The growing gulf between young Bulgarians
who consider themselves white-collar bureaucrats
and "socialist workers."
--The need to improve labor productivity, which
was stressed at a national party conference and sev-
eral BCP Central Committee plenums last year.
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Sofia i.s worri.ed about the commitment. to Com-
rnunism of Bu.lga:rian youth, particularly in an era
of expanding East-West contacts. "Tdle youths"
are thus warned against assimilating Western ways
and losing th.ei.r socialist militancy.
The new legislation also betrays the regime's
concern with manpower problems. The country's
chronic .labor shortage ha.s been aggravated because
young Bulgarians remain in school longer and thus
enter th
l
e
abor force at an older age. The as-
signment to the USSR of some 15,000 Bulgarian
workers, who could find employment at home, com-
pounds the problem. The regime probably expects
that the new decision wi.ll_pump at least some new
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Defense Minister lonita arrived in Dubrovnik on
Thursday for what has been announced as three days of
talks on cooperation between the "friendly armies" of
Yugoslavia and Romania.
lonita's visit follows on the heels of top-level
party talks in Romania last weekend between Romanian
party-boss Ceausescu- and the number-two man in the
Yugoslav party, Sterne Dolanco Dolanc and Ceausescu
probably discussed a wide range of issues of mutual
concern, including:
--The state of US-Soviet relations and their
implications for stability in the Balkans.
--Preparations for the European Communist
Conferencem
--The unstable situation in the Middle
East.
Tonita is spending his time on the Adriatic
coast, not far from Tito's current residence at a
Montenegrin spa. The Romanian Defense Minister could
meet the Yugoslav President before h.is departure on
Saturday.
There is no firm explanation of the upsurge in
Yugoslav-Romanian contacts, but we may soon have more
information Some Romanian chiefs of mission in the
West have been recalled to Bucharest for consulter?tions
next week? When they return to their posts
raar~incr c'9 ?F ?h11~ ~~~~~ ion c~~ld fil r? of
February "7, 19'15
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