THE DOMINICAN POLITICAL SITUATION ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001800010031-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: April 7, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
THE DOMINICAN POLITICAL SITUATION
ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT
State Dept. review completed
Secret
23
7 April 1967
No. 0801/67
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting thr national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
wTOMATIC
MON
i
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
7 April 1967
The Dominican Political Situation
on the Eve of the Summit
Political tensions are on the rise in Santo
Domingo and the situation is sufficiently fragile
in the Dominican Republic that the regime's sta-
bility could be threatened with little warning.
There are no signs at present, however, that anti-
Balaguer elements plan to move during the Presi-
dent's attendance at the hemisphere summit con-
ference in Uruguay next week. There are, however,
deep tensions in the country that are certain to
cause Balaguer serious trouble in the near future.
NOTE: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the office of Current
Intelligence and coordinated with the office
of Research and Reports, the Office of Na-
tional Estimates, and the clandestine services.
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1. Balaguer's scheduled journey to the sum-
mit conference next week in Punta del Este comes
at a time when Dominican political tensions are
on the rise. The attempted assassination of Antonio
Imbert on 21 March and its aftermath have added
new dimensions to the divisive issue of "trujilloism"
that could disrupt the regime's fragile political
stability.
The Aftermath of the Imbert Affair
2. The attack on Imbert, one of Trujillo's
assassins, followed a series of charges--some of
them well founded--that Balaguer was employing
"trujillista" personnel and tactics in his govern-
ment. The Communist and non-Communist left have
made such accusations the focal point of their
criticism since last fall. Recently, elements of
the anti-Trujillo right--the political aggregation
that governed the country during the 1962 Council
of State and during the Reid administration that pre-
ceded the 1965 revolt--have picked up the theme.
Thus, the attack on Imbert produced expressions
of distress, consternation, and outrage from these
elements; moreover suspicions immediately developed
that the assailants were in or sheltered by the
government.
3. Balaguer moved quickly to forestall im-
mediate serious antigovernment repercussions from
the incident. He announced that a special, high-
level commission would investigate the assault,
established a $25,000 reward for information on
the would-be assassins, and voiced his personal
repudiation of the attack. His most dramatic step,
however, was the appointment of the other surviv-
ing assassin of Trujillo, Luis Amiama Tio, to the
sensitive post of minister of interior and police.
Amiama, who saw in. the attack a danger to his own
personal security, agreed to. take the post on con-
dition that he be given a free hand to conduct the
investigation.
4. Although the appointment at least tem-
porarily silenced criticism of Balaguer from most
quarters, it planted the seeds of discord within
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the government. Amiama, who is not identified
with the more extreme and intractable right, had
become increasingly disenchanted with Balaguer
over the last few months. He has privately voiced
concern over the President's methods and tactics,
which he finds reminiscent of those of the late
dictator, and has demonstrated a deep sensitivity
over the presence in the government of some un-
savory leftovers from the Trujillo era. In par-
ticular, he has singled out Balaguer's coterie of
palace aides for criticism. At the top of Amiama's
"bad guy" list is controversial presidential aide
Colonel Nivar, but close behind are "special in-
telligence adviser" Perez-Sosa and legal adviser
Polibio Diaz. The background of Balaguer's per-
sonal bodyguard and adviser, Melido Marte, sug-
gests why Amiama and others are upset. In 1961
Marte was described as "a poorly educated strong-
arm thug who is trusted by the Trujillo family."
Although Balaguer occasionally has voiced dis-
satisfaction over the often independent conduct
of such aides as these, he apparently regards
such long-time supporters as completely loyal to
him and is reluctant to sever ties with them.
5. In accepting the cabinet post, Amiama
said he would work for the elimination or down-
grading of "trujillista" officials, He quickly
came into conflict with one enemy, police chief
Tejeda, whom he accused of "unjustifiable errors"
in the investigation of the Imbert shooting and
in effect pressed Balaguer to dismiss him. The
replacement, General Soto, however, was once police
chief under Trujillo, is considered incompetent
and dishonest, and has had close ties with those
officials Amiama finds so objectionable. It may
well be that Balaguer named Soto to balance Amiama's
influence. In any event, Amiama's handling of the
investigation and the direct control he, would
like to exercise over the police seems likely to
bring him into conflict with Soto, who. has already
said he is unaware of any police deficiencies in
the Imbert case.
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6. The new minister of interior and police
has already come into conflict with Balaguer over
the disposition of outgoing police chief Tejeda.
Amiama has threatened to resign unless Balaguer,
who had named Tejeda to his palace staff, removes
the ex-police chief from active duty. If Amiama
resigns, this might be followed by the resignation
of his brother--Foreign Affairs Minister Fernando
Amiama Tio (who is slated to be a member of the
Dominican summit delegation)--and be accompanied
by a great glare of publicity and bitter recrimina-
tions. Some weeks before the attack on Imbert,
Amiama.threatened that if Balaguer forced an open
break with him he would have no alternative but
to make common cause with other anti-"trujillista"
elements of both the left and right--including,
the left-of-center Dominican Revolutionary Party
(PRD) and the Communists. In fact, Amiama already
has held a series of meetings with the PRD sec-
retary general over the past two months.
7. Imbert himself may pose additional po-
litical problems as he recovers from his wounds.
Even more rightist and opportunistic than Amiama,
he had been sounding out various political ele-
ments with regard to an anti-Balaguer coalition
when the assassination attempt boosted his pop-
ular image. Imbert's heroics after the attack--
such as the driving of his own car to the hospital
while wounded in both shoulders--probably elicited
admiration in certain circles, including the mili-
tary. Amiama's concern over Imbert's ambitions
may have been behind his suggestion to the US
Embassy that Imbert be invited to the US for med-
ical treatment. Such a move would remove one ir-
ritant from the scene, at least for a while.
Attitudes Among the Military
8. The attack and resulting investigation
has introduced an. element of strain into Balaguer's
relations with the military. Minister of Defense
Perez has said that the intense investigation
Amiama has conducted within the armed services has
produced some resentment among military officers
who remain jealous of their prerogatives and
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privilegesa This could provide an opening for
disgruntled military officers, such as those whose
political cliques have been disrupted by Balaguer
or who have been removed from choice assignments,
to coalesce under the guise of protecting the mili-
tary establishment. Another factor for. instability
would develop if military elements came to believe
that BalaguerBs performance in a period of polit-
ical turmoil showed irresolution and vacillation.
Other Political Factors
9. These various charges and maneuvers on
the issue of.trujilloism are taking place against
a mixed pattern of other developments,. some fa-
vorable and some adverse for the Balaguer govern-
ment. On the one hand, the left-of-center polit-
ical parties---particularly those on..the extreme
left--are in serious disagreement and disarray.
On the other hand, they have been keeping up a
drumfire of criticism of Balaguer for the failure
of his government to control and prevent violence.
Particularly active in this role are the radical
leaders of the PRD who succeeded Juan Bosch when
he went into voluntary exile in Europe. Govern-
ment officials continue to provide the left with
new ammunition for their charges; most recently
the government's director of telecommunications
was accused of armed assault for entering a PRD-
oriented radio station on 29 March and destroying
transmitting equipment.
100 Balaguer has had considerable success
in reducing the influence of the PRD and of the
extreme leftist parties in the labor movement.
There is strong labor resentment, however, over
the government's wage freezes, The Dominican Presi-
dent has managed to wean some moderates away from
the PRD, and so far the small Revolutionary Social
Christian Party has adhered to a policy of "con-
structive opposition." On the other hand, the
Social Christians have recently suggested they
would abandon that policy unless Balaguer allows
their party a more influential role, and the PRD
has said it will not support the government in the
event of a coup.
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The Economic Scene
110 Economic developments have not helped
to offset Balaguer's political problems. In fact,
available signs indicate that the pace of economic
activity has been disappointing thus far this year.
This sluggishness has taken place against a back-
ground of high and chronic unemployment, and poten-
tially explosive social conditions, particularly
in Santo Domingo. Further, the persistent balance
of payments deficit has recently shown signs of
getting worse and the inflation potential may be
growing because of the current trend toward in-
creased government deficits. These economic prob-
lems will require politically difficult policy
choices involving further import restrictions,
higher taxes, and devaluation. Uncertainties over
the economy's short-term future compound the prob-
lem of choosing among these alternatives.
The Outlook
12. All things considered, the difficulties
facing Balaguer seem serious but not yet critical.
There are no indications that antigovernment ele-
ments are planning to take advantage of Balaguer's
expected absence during the summit meeting, but
there are deep currents of tension and emotion with-
in the government that could suddenly surface with-
out warning. In addition, Vice President Lora is
neither widely respected nor considered to possess
great political acumen, and someone could try to
test his control of the situation.
13. Balaguer probably believes that he can
reap domestic political dividends from the sum-
mit trip in the form of favorable publicity; he
may hope to establish an image as a recognized
hemisphere statesman. He is likely to seek assurances
of continued US economic and political backing--
a factor that carries considerable weight with
many potential Dominican dissidents.
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7 April 1967
Talking Paper for DDI Memorandum, The Dominican political
Situation on T R a of the mmi
1. This memorandum discusses the current fragile
situation in the Dominican Republic and the
problems which could arise while President Balaguer is
attending the Punta del Este summit meeting. Although
tensions are on the rise in Santo Domingo, And the
situation is sufficiently fragile that the regime's
stability could be threatened with little advance warn-
ing, we believe that anti-Balaguer elements are not
presently planning to take advantage of the President's
absence. There are, however, deep currents of tension
in the country which are bound to cause Balaguer serious
trouble in the near future.
2. This memorandum was coordinated with the clandes-
tine services, ONE, and O RR. We recommend it receive
routine dissemination both inside and outside the Agency.
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