CURRENT POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001700010051-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: March 15, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
15 March 1967
No. 0799/67
Current Political Dynamics in South Vietnam
1. Saigon's present military leaders exercise
more effective control of the government than has any
group since President Diem's overthrow in late 1963.
Virtually all evidence indicates that the current
military leaders strongly desire to retain, and to
use, the power they have accumulated during the past
20 months. However, they are committed to the es-
tablishment of a constitutional, popularly elected
government later this year. From the military's
point of view, then, the most important political
task at present and in the months ahead is a dual
one of carrying out the promised transition in an
acceptable manner while preserving both the unity
and political supremacy of the military establishment.
The Military Leaders
2. Most of today's military leaders were below
flag rank when the Diem government fell. Some, like
Premier Ky and III Corps commander Lt. General Khang,
were still lieutenant colonels. Thus, the current
military leadership includes both officers with rela-
tive longevity, who have survived the numerous mili-
tary purges since 1963, and those--the "Young Turks"--
who have risen rapidly through the various political
upheavals. Members of the latter group are primarily
NOTES This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current
Intelligence and coordinated with the Di-
rector's Special Adviser on Vietnam Affairs.
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of northern origin, and their rapid advancement within
the past few years attests in part to the character-
istic initiative and energy of the northerner.
3. The consolidation of power by the current
military leaders during the past 20 months is due to
several factors, not the least of which is the vast
expansion of the US military presence during the
period. However, the US presence and the improved
military situation could have not exerted such a
strong stabilizing effect on the Saigon government
had it not been for the general unity and coopera-
tion which has prevailed between the military leader-
ship's younger activists and its relatively "older"
members. Although the initiative of the younger
leaders has provided the impetus for most of the
major changes in command during this period--the dis-
missals of General Thi, Quang, and Co--the ultimate
success of such actions has depended upon continuing
cohesion of the military leadership.
4. An important factor in the cooperation be-
tween these broad military factions has been the
balancing of commands and assignments among their
supporters. The promotion of officers to fill the
positions vacated by Generals Thi, Quang, and Co, as
well as advancements resulting from more normal ro-
tation in command, appears to reflect such a balance,
or the selection of officers acceptable to both fac-
tions. This distribution of power, however, could
well become a major problem in the formulation of a
new government, which will undoubtedly bring some
major command changes.
5. The first and most obvious problem to be
resolved if military unity is to continue under a
new government is the power relationship which has
existed between Premier Ky and Chief of State Thieu,
who head the "Young Turk" and "older" military fac-
tions, respectively. All evidence currently points
to the likelihood that the military will run one or
the other as a presidential candidate. The associated
problem of where the noncandidate will fit in the
future government may prove to be a thorny one.
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Political Maneuvering Within the Military
6. Present reporting suggests that Chief of
State Thieu would become the military's presidential
candidate if the choice were left strictly up to the
Directorate, and political considerations were omitted.
This is perhaps because of his background in army com-
mand positions as opposed to Kr's air force experience,
and Thieu's consequently greater appeal among army
officers who form the majority in the Directorate.
General Thieu apparently has not yet made a firm de-
cision to push hard for the nomination, but he is
certainly trying to keep the door open.
7. As in the past, however, Thieu's over-all
ragge of activities, his relationships with many key
individuals, and his specific sources of strength re-
main somewhat obscure. One ource has
reported that General Thieu Is Ut-LUM g to set up
a national political front consisting of the leaders
of various:power groups such as the Catholics, Bud-
dhists, Hoa Hao, and the Cao Dai. The southern and
central factions of the Dai Viet Party, and Hoa Hao
leaders, reportedly have been contacted. Thieu is
said to believe that such a front should be estab-
lished for the purpose of making a pro forma endorse-
ment of the military's predetermined presidential
candidate. Thieu is naturally using his own sup-
porters to do the preliminary spadework, and some of
these men, according to the source, are actively
soliciting support for Thieu. Thieu's younger
brother, back in Saigon from a diplomatic assignment
in Korea and himself a Dai Viet member, has also re-
portedly discussed the presidency in general terms
with Tran Van Huong, an influential southerner and
former premier who is a potential presidential can-
didate. What horse-trading is actually transpiring
is not yet clear.
8. General Thieu himself has publicly been more
active of late. He has made two recent trips to the
delta, the first coinciding with Premier Ky's well-
publicized visit to Australia and New Zealand. Thieu's
initial swing through this heavily populated area ap-
parently was quite successful; Van Phu, secretary
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general of the
remarked later
saw many people
popular than Ky
Hoa
Hao
Central Executive Committee,
to a
US
Embassy official that Thieu
on
his
trip and was generally more
in
the
delta.
9. In addition, Thieu has been entertaining
groups of deputies from the Constituent Assembly, as
has Ky. The degree of personal support for Thieu
within the assembly remains difficult to determine.
For example, a Dai Viet source claimed that Le Quang
Liem, a prominent Hoa Hao member of the Assembly's
Democratic Bloc generally believed sympathetic to Ky,
actually favors Thieu. On the other hand, many
deputies insist that the adoption of a constitutional
minimum age requirement of 35 rather than 40 for the
presidency represented an assembly preference for Ky,
who is 37. Thieu, however, may not have exerted pres-
sure for a 40-year age minimum, and this issue as a
clear-cut test of strength between Ky and Thieu ap-
pears to have been diffused by crosscurrents in the
assembly.
10. General Thieu has in the past shown a pref-
erence for operating behind the scenes and for avoid-
ing the political exposure likely to accompany the
future presidency. At the same time, he apparently
desires to retain the political power he now holds.
It is thus possible that Thieu will not press strongly
to be a presidential candidate unless it seems to be
the only way he can ensure his present power.
11. Thieu has been toying with the idea of an
armed forces council in the future government which
would have considerably more than an advisory func-
tion, and which might offer him a "behind-the-scenes"
position of substantial authority should he not run
for president. There is little information on the
extent of support for this idea within the Directorate
and some indication of civilian opposition. Moreover,
in line with consistent advice from US officials in
Saigon that the future president must "control" the
military, the idea of a "special" armed forces coun-
cil as such was not ratified by the Constituent As-
sembly. However, the assembly did agree to create a
military advisory council, and the delineation of its
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organization in future legislation may allow enough
latitude in fixing its reponsibilities to satisfy
Thieu.
12. Two other important factors which will in-
fluence Thieu in deciding whether to run for the
presidency are the degree of civilian support which
he can attract--particularly in terms of vice-presi-
dential and prime-ministerial running mates--and his
potential civilian competition. These two variables
will largely determine the relative ease or difficulty
of a military victory in the presidential election,
and it is quite possible that Thieu would prefer to
avoid a campaign in which extra-legal pressures be-
came a necessity.
13. Thieu is, of course, also concerned with
the issue of continuing military unity. In this re-
spect, the question of a future position for Premier
Ky should Thieu become the military's presidential
candidate also probably weighs on the present chief
of state. Ky, unlike Thieu, could not very well be-
come chief of the armed forces with behind-the-scenes
influence. Ky lacks seniority and also lacks an army
background. Moreover, Ky does not appear inclined to
serve as the future prime minister, a position which
apparently will have little real. power under the con-
stitution. A Thieu-Ky president; - prime minister com-
bination in the future government seems highly un-
likely.
Ky's Position
14. From Ky's point of view, the ideal solution
would be for him to run for president and for Thieu
to head the armed forces. All evidence suggests that
Ky has committed himself to seeking the military
nomination and, in the process, perhaps is willing
to risk strains on military unity. According to sev-
eral sources, Ky said in January that he would await
Thieu's decision on this question, perhaps until
after the constitution is promulgated. However, in
a meeting with Thieu on 26 February, Ky reportedly
took the position that the ruling Directorate should
decide between them. Then, shortly after this meet-
ing,,Ky apparently agreed with General Khang, his
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close associate, that the Armed Forces Congress--
comprising 40 or 45 of the ranking military officers--
should vote to decide the military's presidential
nominee. Both Ky and Thieu are reportedly trying to
line up support among senior officers. There is little
information available on the political loyalties of
the individual members of the congress.
15. Ky's changing position on how the military
should choose its candidate probably stems from his
own increasing determination to run, his awareness
of Thieu's maneuvering in this regard, and finally
from the conclusion that the congress;'"-even though
it also contains a majority of army officers--affords
him the best opportunity of emerging victorious in a
confrontation with Thieu. It also points up the po-
tentially sticky problem that Ky and Thieu may well
not even be able to agree on which military body
should choose between them.
16. In the meantime, Ky has been extremely ac-
tive as an undeclared candidate, despite his public
comments to the contrary. There is considerable
evidence that he has done an especially good job with
Constituent Assembly groups, as illustrated by the
assembly vote on the presidential age minimum which,
of course, was vital to his candidacy. There are
also some indications that Ky may be dealing with
civilian members of his cabinet regarding his can-
didacy, but specifics are not available. Finally,
Ky has also reportedly appointed a civilian "cam-
paign manager" to help line up civilian support. In
a recent conversation with this adviser, Ky is said
to have downgraded the candidacies of other presi-
dential hopefuls, including General Thieu whom he
referred to as an opportunist without the necessary
military support to gain the nomination.
17. Among Ky's close military supporters, Police
Director General Loan has been the most active in
various projects associated with future elections.
Loan's election spadework reporte.dly~has been ap-
proved by the Directorate but, as in the case of
Thieu's supporters and the lining up of a civilian
front for the military candidate, some of the work
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may well be exclusively intended to benefit Ky. One
F _____report referred to a. survey of province
c ie s o etermine their willingness to support Ky
for president. Another source reported that the
duties of Ky's "campaign" chairman included identi-
fication of persons who could be appointed province
chiefs in order to help Ky get elected.
18. Loan is also reported to have ordered a
survey discreetly conducted by police officials in
December to ascertain national support for a military
man contesting the presidency against a civilian.
The results of the. survey--which are not available
in detail but which must have been very general in
nature--indicated that a military candidate would
run about even in I, II, and III Corps, and slightly
behind a civilian in IV Corps. Loan and his as-
sociates on this project, who included Mai Den--one
of his more shadowy assistants--as well as the mayor
of Saigon and the deputy information minister, con-
cluded that the large population in the Saigon area
would be the determining factor in the presidential
elections. As a result, Loan and Saigon mayor Cua
reportedly began in January to reorganize Saigon's
administrative units by increasing the number of wards
from 54 to 176, and by carefully selecting the new
ward chiefs. Loan and his associates expect these
ward chiefs to use their authority to organize a
large vote for the military candidate.
more extreme measures to ensure the election
o a military candidate have also been discussed by
Loan and his same supporters, should it appear that
more subtle tactics are ineffective. Such measures
range from obvious election-day pressures on the
voters to outright harassment of civilian candidates
and the switching of ballot boxes. According to
another source, Loan has ordered the establishment
of political "situation rooms" in each province, and
has warned that it might become necessary to use force
to ensure a military election victory. Loan is also
said to be compiling dossiers on potential presi-
dential candidates.
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20. Besides Loan, there are other members of the
military ruling group who are in key positions to in-
fluence the election. These include the four corps
commanders and Generals Thang, Tri, and Chieu, who
are in charge, respectively, of revolutionary develop-
ment cadres, information cadres, and veterans, all
reaching extensively into the grass-roots level. The
corps commanders exercise considerable authority
within their respective areas, and will undoubtedly
be called upon to implement election programs. The
Ministries of Revolutionary Development, and Infor-
mation and Chieu Hoi, under Thang and Tri played im-
portant roles in organizing the ConstituentiAssembly
election in September 1966 and are certain to do so
again, with opportunities to influence the outcome.
General Chieu's position as head of the veterans'
organization opens up the prospect of an unofficial
military party; indeed, it was. so envisioned at one
time. Thus far, however, there is".little evidence
that these officers have begun to work actively to
influence the elections. Moreover, there have been
no recent reports on consultations between the GVN
and South Korean officials who were conferring on
such subjects last summer.
21. In most cases, the loyalties of these gen-
erals to either Thieu or Ky. are not entirely clear,
and, indeed, may not be firm. General Khang, III
Corps commander, has lined up with Ky consistently,
while generals Chieu and Thang generally appear to
favor General Thieu. General Tr.i appears to be
caught in the middle; a recent Station assessment
puts him in Ky's camp, although he has in the past
been considered a protege of General Thieu. General
Vinh Loc, II::Corps commander, is chiefly concerned
with maintaining his own position, but the Station
believes that he would probably prefer to deal with
Thieu rather than Ky. Generals Lam and Manh, I and
IV Corps commanders, respectively, probably lean to-
ward Thieu. Few of them have been known to express a
personal choice or an opinion on the relative strength
of Ky or Thieu as a candidate.
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Civilian Groups
The Constituent Assembly
22. This body, which includes most of the tra-
ditional civilian factions, is the current focus of
civilian politics. As such, its relations with the
government reflect the over-all degree of civilian-
military cooperation. Thus far these relations have
been fairly good, and there are reasonable prospects
that they will continue to be good. In attempting to
guarantee civilian interests in the future government,
the assembly by and large has.-favored a strong legis-
lature, which many delegates may think would be less
subject to military control than would the executive.
This notion has been reinforced by the fact that many
assemblymen picture themselves as future legislators.
At the same time, the military leaders have generally
been concerned with ensuring that the future presi-
dent has sufficient power to operate effectively, with
the implication that the military identify themselves
with the future executive branch. Thus assembly-GVN
relations may be described as revolving around the
issue of the sharing of power between civilians and
the military in the future.
23. This bargaining process between the assembly
and the government has also included the issue of ex-
tending the life of the assembly beyond the drafting
of the constitution. Various reports indicate that
the Directorate is willing to have the assembly act
as an interim legislature if the assembly acts favor-
ably on constitutional modifications suggested by the
Directorate. Thus far, reports generally indicate
that the assembly is so acting. Information Minister
Tri appears to play a prominent role for the Direc-
torate in its relations with the assembly, but little
information is available on the actual give-and-take
behind the scenes.
24. At present, the largest grouping within the
assembly is the Democratic-Alliance Bloc, which is
composed of Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Nationalist (VNQDD),
and Catholic delegates--the latter mostly northerners.
This bloc is generally conservative in outlook, but
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also contains many delegates who are favorably dis-
posed toward Premier Ky. Le Phuoc Sang, a Hoa Hao
spokesman and a former adviser to Ky, is the main go-
between in this respect.
25. The Greater Peoples Bloc, at one time the
assembly's largest, now retains little more than its
original core of Revolutionary Dai Viet delegates.
Various reports have.indicated';that the Directorate
(through General Tri) ordered military delegates and
other assemblymen sympathetic to the Directorate to
withdraw from the Greater Peoples Bloc. The major
reason for this withdrawal apparently was that Dai
Viet delegates who controlled the bloc did not prove
to be as responsive to government influence as gov-
ernment leaders had originally hoped. A
claims that the government origins ly
e pec to form the Greater Peoples Bloc under the
screen of Dai Viet leadership, but that Premier Ky
later objected to some of the stands taken by Dai
Viet members on various issues and ordered the dis-
solution of the bloc.
26. Other current groups in the assembly include
the Movement for Renaissance of the South, a bloc of
about 12 delegates with strong southern regionalist
sympathies who are cohesive but who have not been able
to exert much influence on other southern delegates..
About 40 members of the assembly are currently inde-
pendent of any organized bloc. The independents in-
clude such prominent figures as assembly president
Phan Khac Suu and former Gia Dinh Province council-
man Phan Quang Dan. Suu and Dan are among the ci-
vilians mentioned as presidential candidates or as
possible running mates for a military nominee.
27. It is not yet clear whether groupings in the
assembly have much potential as the basis for sig-
nificant political associations in the future. Tug-
ging at the large Democratic-Alliance bloc is the
issue of regionalism. Hoa Hao and Cao Dai delegates
are attracted by southern sentiments, while VNQDD
delegates tend to represent the interests of central
Vietnam. Many of the Catholic members of the bloc
are refugees from North Vietnam. The cohesiveness
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of the bloc in assembly voting is not clear, since
voting records have not been systematically reported.
Former Dai Viet leader Dang Van Sung, who is a mem-
ber of the Democratic-Alliance bloc, has shown in-
terest in the development of meaningful political
parties through the future legislature. He has most
recently been reported as working on the development
of a convention of civilian groups which would draft
General Ky as a presidential candidate.
Other Civilian Groups
28. Denied a voice in the assembly because of
their own boycott, the Buddhists as an entity are
outside the current p.olitical evolution process. The
political power. of Buddhist religious groups remains
fragmented along regional lines, following last year's
ill-fated "struggle"movement. Thich Tam Chau, whose
major source of strength lies among northern refugees
in and near Saigon, has been cooperating with the mili-
tary government, or more particularly with General
Loan as Ky's principal executive officer. Chau has
been active in attempting to create a new--and thus
far unsuccessful--national Buddhist organization, but
apparently is not involved'.in other political ac-
tivities at present. Chau and his Buddhists prob-
ably would tend to support a northerner for president,
perhaps including Premier Ky. The government's
strategy toward the Buddhists, however, has generally
been one(of "divide and rule," and it is possible
that Chau may react negatively in the future.
29. Tri Quang, whose power base is in central
Vietnam, remains in. Saigon presumably under close
police scrutiny. Some recent reports have suggested
that Quang might be trying to make a political "come-
back" by seizing on the issue of peace. Should Quang
attempt to play ?'a major role in the coming elections,
he would undoubtedly try to join forces with an anti-
military political grouping. In this respect, Quang
has been linked with retired General Tran Van Don,
although Don's presidential candidacy is now much in
doubt. Quang would also have to return to central
Vietnam in order to reorganize his forces there; at
present, he and other militants from this area have
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little strength in Saigon. Should Quang return to
Hue and decide to support a presidential candidate
actively, he could probably exert considerable in-
fluence, and the political positions of the Dai Viet
and VNQDD parties in central Vietnam would be under-
cut somewhat.
30. Southern or delta Buddhists, traditionally
less well organized or politically active, have ex-
hibited no signs of coming to life in the near future.
They probably will remain susceptible to the blandish-
ments of other southern political organizations.
31. The Catholic community is also split some-
what along regional lines, with the large, highly
organized northern refugee group enjoying considerable
influence in the Saigon area. Catholic leaders have
gotten along fairly well with the military govern-
ment, and would probably not offer objections to the
candidacy of either Premier Ky or Chief of State Thieu.
Many northern Catholic leaders appear to favor Ky over
Thieu despite the fact that Thieu is at least a nominal
Catholic. Should former premier Tran Van Huong be a
presidential candidate, he would undoubtedly receive
the support of most southern Catholics, and would
probably cut heavily into the northern Catholic vote
as well. Otherwise Catholic leaders.do not appear
inclined to form any meaningful. political associations
with other large groupings for the present.
32. In the I Corps, the Dai Viet and VNQDD
parties are engaged in an apparently bitter contest
for political control. Genera]. Lam, I Corps com-
mander, was reported earlier to have been working
with selected Dai Viet delegates in the Constituent
Assembly, but it is not clear if this relationship
still persists. Within I Corps, General Lam ap-
parently has been trying to remain above the dispute.
33. Ha Thuc Ky, Dai Viet party leader in I Corps,
has made no secret of his presidential candidacy, al-
though he reportedly has admitted privately that his
chances are rather slim. It is possible that he may
be biding his time, and will decide later to trade
his support for a vice-presidential nomination or some
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other secondary position. Although there is still
some hesitancy among older party members, the Dai
Viets also have apparently decided to engage openly
in political activity in accordance with future
legislation reorganizing the rights of political
parties.
34. Our current knowledge on the other Dai Viet
factions--the northern refugee group and southern
splinter factions outside the control of Ha Thuc
Ky--is fragmentary at best. Various individuals with
past or present Dai Viet labels are active within
and outside the government, but relationships be-
tween them or the current existence of viable or-
ganizations is not clear. In this connection, re-
ported Dai Viet ties of General Thieu and certain
other ranking military leaders remain obscure. Gen-
eral Loan is apparently harboring certain once-
discredited southern Dai Viet officers in his intel-
ligence apparatus.
35. There have been indications that VNQDD
leaders established some kind of working relation-
ship with the government during the "struggle" move-
ment last year. The status:Of current relations be-
tween the various'VNQDD factions and the government
is unknown. Nguyen Huu Chi, former Quang Nam Prov-
ince chief and a VNQDD member, reportedly is working
for Premier Ky as a "civilian" campaign manager.
36. In the delta, the Hoa Hao leaders are also
factionalized at present. Some, such as Le Phuoc
Sang, are solidly behind Premier Ky, but their
ability to deliver the Hoa Hao vote for Ky is at
least open to question. Others, such as Van Phu,
apparently lean toward General Thieu. Both Van Phu
.and Le Phuoc Sang are connected with the Hoa Hao
church organization, which, judging from the con-
stituent assembly elections last fall, apparently
wields more influences than the sect's provincial
officials or small political parties. The Hoa Hao,
however, are also southerners at heart, and a strong
southern civilian candidate such as Tran Van Huong
would undoubtedly attract a good deal of Hoa Hao
sympathy.
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37. The strongest civilian candidate is Tran'Van
Huong. Although he has not openly declared his can-
didacy, US officials believe that he will run. Huong
generally can be characterized as forceful and deter-
mined, and the chances of his working under a mili-
tary president as premier (or vice versa, for that
matter) appear doubtful. If Huong runs, he would un-
doubtedly do well in the delta; in fact some south-
ern-born military officers including the present
Ranger commander have indicated interest in Huong's
candidacy. He might also receive considerable Cath-
olic support because of his previous strong stand
against the Buddist Institute. Vo Long Trieu, former
youth minister who resigned during the cabinet crisis
last fall, has been attempting to line up support
for Huong. Trieu does not expect any support from
Ha Thuc Ky's Dai Viet organization in central Viet-
nam, but hopes to draw some support from VNQDD fac-
tions there. In fact, Huong told an embassy officer
that he is considering asking Phan Khoan, an influ-
ential civilian who is a member of the VNQDD and of
the Directorate, to be his vice presdiential candidate.
Trieu also told the embassy that Tri Quang's central
Vietnamese Buddhists would not oppose Huong's can-
didacy, but he did not indicate that they would of-
fer positive support. Tam Chau's northern Buddists
would probably work against Huong, as they did when
he was premier.
38. There have also been various indications of
a potential political front 'being formed by former
premier Phan Huy Quat, former deputy premier,Tran
Van Tyen,,." labor leader Tran Quoc Buu, publisher
Dang Van Sung, and other prominent civilian politi-
cans. Quat and Tuyen have thus far been noncommittal
on the question of whom they might support as a pres-
idential candidate. Tran Quoc Buu, on the other hand,
originally indicated. support for Huong, but recently
has reportedly switched to Premier Ky. Buu's change
of heart may have been predicated on the conclusion
that a civilian candidate cannot hope to win. Re-
gardless of whom the front supports for president,
they do plan to sponsor candidates for the legislature,
as well.
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39. The primacy of the military establish-
ment in South Vietnamese politics today is perhaps
best illustrated by the increasing number of prominent
civilian political figures who have stated that the
military's candidate for president will be elected.
These prognoses vary somewhat in their estimates of
how the military will win, whether through use of
the government's machinery and financial resources
or by the construction of a political base with civil-
ian support.
40. There is evidence that the military is work-
ing on both approaches, with General Loan making some
preparations to exert extra-legal pressures ranging
from subtle methods to outright rigging, if necessary.
Efforts to create political associations with civil-
ians are also under way, but so far, these appear to
be independent efforts by supporters of Ky and Thieu
rather than a coordinated attempt to gain backing for
a military candidate in general. All in all, it does
not appear at present that the military establishment
as a whole is planning to do any more than is necessary
in order to win the election. Until the military's
candidate has been chosen, and until.the extent of
both civilian competition and civilian support for
the military becomes clearer, it may not be possible
to gauge the amount of extra-legal pressures the gov-
ernment will employ during the campaign.
41. Within the military establishment, the unity
of the military leaders remains a key issue. If Gen-
eral Thieu does not step aside and let Ky run for
president, the energies and.activismof Ky and his
northern supporters. could buildup serious pressures
in the military. At any rate, the kind of settlement
to be reached between Ky and Thieu regarding the
presidency--and how it affects military unity--will
be a crucial issue.
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 ^ NOTICE NO 22-0
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SUBJECT: art ?oUtical I rnam.ca in South Vietft=
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Dates: Dissem
SUBJECT: Political Dynamics in South
Vietnam
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