DEAR SENATOR STENNIS:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A000100090008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: LETTER

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The Honorable John Stennis
United States Senate
Dear Senator Stennis:,
In response to your.telephone request on.March 15th and the
the Director, DIA, and'the Chiefs of Army, Navy, and Air Force?
the detailed information provided to the Preparedness Subcommittee by
the appended report on Cuba.
This appraisal, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supplements
confirming letter from Mr. Kendall of the same date, I am forwarding
Intelligence. The evaluations and estimates of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on the current'military situation in Cuba have Direct relation-
you will appreciate that the content of the report is highly sensitive
ship to existing US military contingency plans. Accordingly, I am sure .
information.
I trust the appended report is responsive to the needs of the
Freparednes s',Sulicornmittee a
DIA, JCS. Declassification/Release Instructions on File:
GROUT'
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Since rely,
MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
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1 DING ANIJ 17C:"ftDay~A
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APPRAISAL OF CUBAN AND SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH IN CUBA
INTRODUCTION
Since the missile/bomber crisis of October 1962 and the subsequent
withdrawal of Soviet strategic weapons and associated personnel, the
military posture in Cuba remains essentially a significantly improved
Cuban military establishment backed by Soviet air and ground units, r.'
highlighted by air and coast defense systems, particularly`atrintegrated
,..
island-wide air defense network of high-performance aircraft and
surface -to-air -mis Bile s.
SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH IN CUBA
Since mid-February, substantial numbers of passengers have
departed Cuba on route to the USSR.
that some 2, 500 have been withdrawn.
indicate
been determined how many of the outgoing Soviet passengers are civilian
ibly offsetting in part these withdrawal$ several hundred new Soviet
arrivals in Cuba have been reported. Evidence presently on hand thus
or military. In addition, some of the outgoing passengers may have
r
been Cubans on the way to the USSR for training. Moreover, also poem-
does not permit 'a firm conclusion as to the actual numbers 'of Soviet
military personnel that have been withdrawn. In view of the foregoing.
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and coupled with the fact that no basic changes have been observed in the
Soviet military establishments in Cuba, we have not yet revised the estimate
of Soviet military strength as being in the magnitude of 17, 000.
We have no indications that Soviet personnel and equipment are being
withdrawn from the four Soviet military camps at Holguin, Remedios,
Artemisia, and Santiago de las Vegas.. About 5, 000 Soviet troops have
been estimated to be in four highly mobile armored groupings at these
camps, well equipped with modern, sophisticated weapons, and about 5, 000
involved in the 24-site SA-2 missile system. The remainder are manning
the- other Soviet-controlled installations and equipment or are attached
to Cuban ground, air, and naval units as advisors and.nstructors. There
are also Military personnel from other Bloc countries, principally
Czechoslovakians, probably totalling not more than a few hundred. Based
on all available evidence, we believe basic Soviet capabilities in Cuba have
our estimate of Soviet troop strength in Cuba remains essentially unchanged.
not' been diminished since the withdrawal of the strategic weapons, and
The precise Soviet intentions for their continued military presence
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in Cuba are not definable at this time, particularly since the scope and
phasing of the projected Soviet troop withdrawal are not yet clear. How-
ever, Moscow apparently hopes to maintain a sizable military presence
in Cuba. The Soviets probably calculate that such a military presence
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serves'as a politico-psychological deterrent to a possible US/OAS inter'-
vention in force. They also probably value possessing a means to apply
.pressure and assert influence on Cuban policy in any critical stage of
disagreement with Moscow. The Soviet troops in Cuba could play a key
role in the maintenance of a Communist regime. The Soviets also pro-
bably assess that a prolonged military presence in Cuba will establish a
-precedent in the Western Hemisphere.
of their ability to intervene in Cuban affairs.
of Soviet combat groupings may also strain Soviet-Cuban relations because
o the Soviet failure to challenge continued US overflights. The presence
Retention of sophisticated weapons systems under Soviet control - -
such as the MIG-21 aircraft, SA-Z's, coastal defense cruise missiles,
and the KOM'AR guided-missile boats - may eventually raise irksome
questions of Cuban sovereignty and some Cuban resentment of the Soviet
.role in Cuba. Castro, on occasion, has already indicated his opposition
The Soviet military presence in_Cuba could have some restraining
influence on anti-Castro elements who desire to revolt against the regime.
However, Castro's internal security apparatus is in itself highly effective
and, to date, has proved quite capable of suppressing the sporadic anti-
government actions attempted thus far in Cuba. Castro's present ability
to control the Cuban population would not be greatly degraded, by the
removal of all Soviet troops,
I
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reserve. In addition, there are some 100, 000 home-guard militiamen
CUBAN MILITARY STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES
The numerical strength of the Cuban ground forces is about 175, 000
approximately 75, 000 in the standing army and 100, 000 in the ready
of insignificant combat capability but useful as a police reserve. The
standing ground forces have completed basic unit and combined arms train-
a contingency, they would have to revert -fairlyy, quickly to static defense
or guerrilla operations, ,but only a relatively small proportion of-the uban
military establishment would be able or'likely to carry out prolonged
The capabilities of the standing army and ready reserve have been
enhanced by new equipment brought in during 1962 and by further training
and experience, including mobilization during the crisis. The Cuban
ground forces are probably well able to control internal resistance and
to repel small-scale attacks from abroad. Their ability to defend against
a large-scale US military invasion would be limited by their lack of
training and experience and joint operations on the division level. In such
ing at battalion combat team level.
operations of this type.
The most significant change in the Cuban military situation since
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July 196Z, other than the introduction and removal of Soviet strategic
weapons, is the improvement in air defense capabilities resulting from
the presence of the Soviet-rranned radar and communications networks,
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SA-2 missile sites, and MIG-21 fighters. The strong Soviet air defense
presence - - supplemented ley the Cuban-manned jet fighter force composed
of 67 MIG-15/17/19'gand a considerable quantity of Cuban anti-aircraft
Cubans may be trained eventually to operate the more advanced Soviet
artillery - - now gives Cuba an integrated air defense system. Although
air defense equipment
or some time Soviet manning will be
required for ,effective use of the equipment.
Considerable improvement has occurred within the past year in
Castro now has a "vertical envelopment" capability involving the use of
land-based. helicopters and paratroopers, thus severely restricting the
ability of anti-Castro guerrilla elements to carry out sustained operations
Castro's capabilities to combat guerrilla elements within his own country.
to undertake military operations of this nature.
POSSIBLE MILITARY THREATS FROM CUBA
The principal conventional military actions against the United States
from Cuba which can be envisioied are possible air raids on Southern
could only undertake an overseas operation in limited strength of some-
what less than a battalion. .,However, for political as well as military
reasons, the Castro regime is most unlikely, under present circumstarnes,
Cuban capabilities for military operations overseas remain severely
limited by the lack of the requisite air or sea lift., The Cubans probably
insignificant strength.
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sabotage carried out by squad-size,d groups using motor torpedo boats or
the KOMAR guided-missile, boats. Although $uch possibilities are
recognized, these actions are considered highly unlikely because of the
risk involved in provoking a retaliatory response from the United States.
However, Castro has demonstrated a fanatic's zeal and unpredict-
able terrmperament. We cannot totally discount the possibility that, should
he deem it necessary to sustain his cause or his position, he might
Based on the conclusion that, with the 1962 withdrawal of missiles
attempt aggressive actions against US shipping, the Guantanamo Naval
Base, or possibly even the Southeastern portion of the United States.
a nuclear threat from- Cuba currently exists.
and bombers, no such systems are, presently in Cuba, we do not believe
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 In, general, we believe that situations are unlikely to develop in which-
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action. Castro probably prefers to continue his extensive propaganda
Castro would openly intervene in the Western Hemisphere with substantial
forces in the face of prompt and vigorous US and probable OAS counter-
campaign and to concentrate on rendering clandestine support to insur-
gency in other Latin American countries, with particular emphasis on
guerrilla training and ideological indoctrination of revolutionary leaders
invited to Cuba and sent back to lead anti-government activities in their
homelands.
Inc onclusion, while current Soviet/Cuban military capabilities do
not constitute a direct.threat to the United States, continued Soviet mili-
tart' support and: presence' will progressively strengthen Communist Cuba as
an active, relatively secure base for subversion and as a potential mili-
tary operatiqnal base.
US DEPLOYMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE CUBAN/SOVIET THREAT
As has been previously discussed, the continued presence of Soviet
military units in Cuba do not, er se, pose an immediate threat to the
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presence ofSoviet troops in this hemisphere and of weapons systems that
could conceivably be employed in a hit-and-run attack against the United
nificant -impact on our deployments to provide for the security of the
Southeastern United States. What is of significance is toe continued
United States, nor.will their departure at some future .date have any sig-
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States, our aircraft or our shipping. The recent "shrimp boat" incident
lends credence to such a potential. On balance, however, it is difficult
to envision circumstances in which either the Castro regime or the Soviet-
authorities would find such a course of action to their advantage. Never-
theless, the defenses of Southeastern United States have been significantly
strengthened.
Iowever, the bulk of US forces deployed
during the October crisis have returned to their normal stations. Our-'
continuing analysis reveals that present arrangement of forces planned for
.'Cuban contingencies is appropriate, regardless of, whether Soviet units,
remain or depart Cuba.
US FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR POSSIBLE INVASION OF CUBA
In the event the invasion of Cuba becomes necessary, it is contemplated
r
that most or all of the strategic reserve forces in CONUS, including Army,
Navy, Air and Marine forces, will be employed if and as required.
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The time required to overthrow the Castro government cannot be
estimated prior to the commencement of hostilities. The initial assault
may cause the collapse of organized Cuban resistance. However, plans
are based on the worst possible. outcome of the initial operation, namely,
Cuban reaction is such that the initial US assault forces must await
reinforcement before proceeding with assigned tasks. Based on estimated
Cuban capabilities, it is possible that major combat operations might
terminate.in a matter of days. However, the duration of possible subse-
quent operations to eliminate pockets of resistance, overcome guerrilla
.forces, and to establish full control of the island could last for a much
longer. period. The, exact length of this period cannot be accurately fore-
seen.
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