SOVIET REPORTED WORKING ON BOMB FIRED FROM ORBIT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP70B00338R000300110015-7
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 9, 2006
Sequence Number:
15
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 4, 1967
Content Type:
NSPR
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP70B00338R000300110015-7.pdf | 209.32 KB |
Body:
rpved _FQ,r__,e //3 Ip-Rnp7~ 0 3 000110015-7
:Heen sal uner que's
hi-ib 3@v21i5en of'(lrould not sim 1 u
SOVI ing that this warhead was about could be initiated at any time, [moo FOSS wea oris tin norbii
the same size as those carried ,for relatively rapid deployment, C
lour anal ses conclude `that itY around the earth disguised as
" on o of the 650 submarLne-_,
wouid? not improve our stra ordinary space satellites _ and
1tJRK1I6 ON BOMB launched Polaris missiles the tegic offensive posture and hen fire their warheads at the
United States has deployed. consequently we have no in- LUnited States at the last minute
Polaris warheads are often `ention of revising the decision jin a surprise attack, Mr. Mc-
11 It nade ears a "' Nara said thatthis would do
FIRLI!1 n FI0M ORBIT referred to as City DUSLers, Mr. J McNamara mara said that
and d one to three megatons is is once the warhead was fired,.
considered sufficient to demol- ,;here would be only about three.,
'Nuclear Weapon Could Be
Put in Operation by Next
Year, McNamara Says
BUT HE ISN'T CONCERNED
Defense Chief Sees Serious
Disadvantages in System
and Rules It `Out for U.S.
ish the city of. New York. minutes' warning before it hit
The Soviet tests have been in its target.
progress since September of The Intercontinental Ballistic
1966. Soviet military leaders IMsssile System that is now de-
talked as early as November, ployed, Mr. McNamara ex-
a
1965, about an "orbital missile" piained, fires a warhead into
high trajectory above the earth
that could deliver nuclear war- I like a bullet until the warhead
s,..:,.
the fi
n
other 41reaches a
eak alt;+?de of
e,_i'
'--- d- "_
n
r
a
y
p
p
Ulu- {back into the. atmosphere o- give us more warning time'
Uncertainty Conceded ward its target. against a full-scale attack using.
Mr. McNamara said it was But the orbital bomb, he said,' FOBS missiles than BMEWS
still "impossible to be certain" is initially launched "into a does against the ICBS launch."
exactly what the tests were very low orbit about 100 miles Under subsequent questioi
bove the earth"
in
h
w
h
id
h
g,
a
o
ever,
e sa
t
at th
for and that the Russians could
Abe "testing space vehicles for Re-entry Path Followed over-the-horizon radar could
J conceivably provide "roughly
some re-entry program." "At a given point generally 15 minutes" of warning of, a
I "I think it more likely," he before the first orbit is com- FOBS weapon attack, about the
lete-
rocket en
ine is fir
d
a
g
e
said, however, ""that they are P
'could warning time the BMEWS
Text of McNamara statement h FOBS they which slows down the payload' could give of an ICBM assaut:
ra
is printed on Page 2.
By NEIL SHEEUAN
$pecial to The, New York Times
WASINGTON, Nov. 3 - The S
Soviet Union is almost certainly
developing an orbital nuclear s
bomb that could be put into
operation as early as 1968, Sec:
retary of Defense Robert S..
McNamara said today at a?,
Pentagon news conference.
working on t e
and causes it to drop out of Mr. McNamara said that the
than on re-entry vehicles. It's orbit," he said. "The navload
too early to be sure, but the
weight of the evidence points
toward the former.
"If this turns out to be true,
it is conceivable that they
could achieve an initial opera-
tional capability during 1968."
Despite this prospect, Mr.
McNamara. said that he was
cpntinurd nn Page 2. Column.2
gence information gathered by ?
the United States about a series not concerned,? nulnber~
of,reasons and that the Unit-
of space tests now being con- ed States had no Intention of
!ducted by the Soviet Union
developing its own orbital nu-
I
hd l
d to th
l
th
on
i
e c
usion
e
e
c
n
a
. clear bomb.
month or so that the testy .
, were aimed at "the possible He asserted that the FOBS
development by the Soviet of weapon had serious disadvan-
:ages compared with the Inter-
something we have called a continental Ballistic Missilei
Fractional Orbital Bombardment System, which, along withI
System or FOBS. manned strategic bombers, the
He explained that the FOBS. United States depends on for
was called a Fractional Orbital its nuclear offensive capability.
Bombardment System because AdvBnntages Offset
the warhead would normally, The deployment of a new
not make a full orbit, or com- lRussians long-range, over-the-horizon ra-
,plete circuit of the earth,' before dar by hte, United States in
it was fired at a target on the February of 1968 would also
gr und. offset whatever advantage the
P would,gain from the
W, arhead Weight Estimated deployment of the FOBS weap-
on, he contended.
Asked how heavy 'a warhead "Some years we our-
the FOBS could . ari , Mr. Mc- selves examined
INamara` said it could war 1`roth i ty of the FO ere
Iequivaler t o" q r mil land military le alders ttiat there[
as no need for our country
lion tons o __
-__ ?
such
Appr'rwed Tor, Release 2006/01/
then follows a re-entry-path
similar to the re-entry of a bal-
listic missile."
The long, low trajectory of
the orbital bomb gives it the
advantage of being able to
avoid detection by the Ballistic
Missile Early Warning System
radar, which the. United States
has deployed. The EEMEWS is
designed to detect incoming
. warheads at a much higher tra-
jectory.
The other principal advan-
tage of the FOBS weapon, he
said, is that the defending
forces could not determine the
target "until ignition of the
rocket engine that deboosts t"he
payload out of orbit-roughly
three minutes and 500 miles
from the target'"
But the FOBS weapon has
the two serious disadvantages,
Mr. McNamara said, of being
"significantly less" accurate
than an ICBM and of being
limited to a nuclear warhead
"but a fraction" of the weight
of an ICBM payload.
Because of its capability to
detect warheads or other space
vehicles approaching on a long,
low trajectory, Mr. McNamara
said, the new American over-
the-horizon radar will negate
both advantages of the B
weapon.
The over-the-horizon. _.radhr
would detect the FOBS weapon
the Soviet Union no good.
To be effective, he said, 'the
Russians would have to launch
a large number of FOBS weap-
ons simultaneously, and the
over-the-horizon radar would
give the United States adequate'
warning of this obviously, hos-
tile development.
In a statement at the begin-
ning of the news conference,
Mr. McNamara asserted that
ment of the over-the-horizon
radar about 60 days ago after
several. years of development'
and used the system to help
provide intelligence on the ap-
parent Soviet development of a
FOBS weapon.
Accuracy Questioned
He also contended that the
FOBS weapon "would not be
accurate enough for a satisfac-
tory attack upon United States
Minuteman missiles, protected
in their silos."
Mr. McNamara was then
asked why the Russians would
conceivably develop such a
weapon if It was going to be
of so little use to them.
"I think the most logical ex-
planation," he said, "is that we
have maintained a very large
bomber force in contrast to
their relatively smaller bomber;
force and we will continue to
maintain them (the bombers) in'
the future.
"They think they can eliml
nate the bomber force by elimi-
nating the warning time that
the bomber force needs to
survive."
TThI~y Irnited;States has about
]630 "B12 and B-58 strategic1
soon after it is launched rj4
would therefore provide much
more warning time than Amer-
ican defenders might have if
they had to wait until the war.
00300110015-7
$
Ilen,asked if the Russians
Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300110015-7
bombers in servilce i'- tg A
z s
to maintain 465 B-52's an d new
F-111 bombers in operation
through the early nineteen-
seventies. The Soviet Union has
20a to 250 strategic bombers.
Mr. McNamara explained that
the 15-minute warning of an
ICBM attack provided by the
early-warning radar system en-
able the bombers on a perma-
nent 'airborne alert to move
toward their targets and those
on ground. alert to take off.
"What the FOBS does," Mr.
McNamara said, "is to circ~nn
vent the BMEWS. But we coun-
ter their action with a reaction
to gain early warning with the
over-the-horizon radar and sol
we recapture the warning time." I
mation -here this morning to'
confirm the statement by Mr.
McNamara that the Soviet
Union was developing an orbital
nuclear bomb.
Moscow Silent
MOSCOW, Saturday Nov. 4
(Reuters)-Theie,w0 no
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