WASHINGTON: THE ANTI-REPUBLICAN MISSILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300100080-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 80
• Publication Date: September 22, 1963
• Content Type: NSPR

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Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300100080-6
Washing ton The Anti-Republican Missile
By JAMES RESTON
WASHINGTON, Sept. 21 -
The Presidential election cam-
paign has not only started, but
is beginning to influence ex-
ecutive decisions of the most
delicate and fundamental na-
ture. The trend is not new-
policy divorced from politics is
heresy in Washington-but it
is starting early this time and
touching the most important
issues of the age.
The Administration's deci-
sion to build a limited missile
defense-not against the So-
viet Union, which has intercon-
tinental missiles, but against
China, which doesn't-is only
the latest illustration of the
point. In military terms, the
arguments for doing so, as Sec-
retary of Defense McNamara
has said, are "marginal." But
in political terms they are prac-
tical if not logical.
Defense or' Deterrent?
Mr. McNamara knows all the
military considerations as well
as anybody in the world. He
has argued with more facts and
passion than anybody else that
the best defense against mis-
siles is a sophisticated devas-
tating missile offense; but the
best, and probably the only, re-
liable guarantee against a mis-
sile attack on the United States
lies in persuading the enemy
that a missile attack on this
country would result in an im-
mediate nuclear counter-strike
that would destroy the at-
tacker.
Militarily, the case is fairly
plain. The entire policy of the
United .States rests on it. The
present and foreseeable possi-
bility of protecting the United
States from a deranged enemy
-who can attack us with mis-
siles from ships near our coasts
regardless of missile defense-
is out of the question.
But politically, the case is not
plain. It is not only the Demo-
cratic Administration but the
Republican opposition that is
playing politics with this ques-
tion. Johnson and McNamara
are being asked whether they
are "indifferent" to the defense
of the American people. How
do they know the Chinese will
not be "irrational"? Why should
they not assume the worst from
the Communists?
These are hard questions to
answer in the emotion of a
Presidential campaign, so the
Administration has compro-
mised. It has agreed to a $5-bil-
lion missile., defense program,
assuming the worst from the
Chinese, but It has warned
against a larger $50-billion mis-
sile defense program, assuming
the best from the Soviets.
This is an awkward political
argument to make. But it is
also quite a gamble. What the
Administration is really doing
is building, not an anti-missile
system for the Chinese but for
the Republicans; and in the
process it is not blocking an
anti-missile system for the Rus-
sians, but by assuming the
worst it is encouraging the
very people who would pour all
our resources Into the external
war no matter what happens to
the war in our own cities.
Politics and Policy
It Is the old story of this
Administration. From the very
beginning It has dealt primarily
not with the problems before it
but with the politics of the
problems. It is a fallacy to
think of Johnson as a wilful
man who imposes his opinions
on others and ignores advice.
The opposite is the case. His
problem is not that he decides
but that he does not decide.
He compromises with every-
body, which is what a majority
leader does, but what a Presi-
dent must not do.
Hisz entdec,ions under-
score this political approach to
policy. The doves want a Magi-
not Line between North and
South Vietnam. Most of his
military advisers say it is costly
deception and will not block
supplies from the North; but
after opposing it, he accepted.
The hawks want to bomb Hai-
phong and other targets he has
previously put off limits as too
dangerous, but as the frustra-
tions of the stalemate continue,
he bombs the targets.
Politically, it is understand-
able. He is determined to hold
"the middle ground" of Ameri-
can political life. The Republi-
cans are condemning him for
committing too many troops
and for not bombing more--
they too are trying to have it
both ways-so he does what he
always did as majority leader
on Capitol Hill. He appeases one
group of his critics and pla-
cates the other, and hopes this
compromise will appeal to the
uncommitted majority as "rea-
sonable."
The result, unfortunately,
seems to be that it is neither
good policy nor good politics.
For it perpetuates the notion
that he is playing politics with
everything, and this has always
been his most serious personal
and political problem.
Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300100080-6