CHARLES BARTLETT MCNAMARA VISIT TO MOSCOW STUDIED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300090040-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: March 4, 1967
• Content Type: NSPR

Wc$f4 5771- +Mf--7
Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300090040-2
CHARLES BARTLETT
McNamara Visit to Moscow Studied
The Russians show such
marked reluctance to face the
full implications of their plans
for an anti-missile defense that
the remarkable step of a
mission to Moscow by Secre-
tary of Defense Robert Mc-
Namara is being contemplat-
ed.
Soviet Premier Alexei
Kosygin met last week with
U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn
Thompson on President John-
son's proposal that both
nations agree to postpone the
costly construction of ABM
systems. Kosygin did not close
the door on the idea but he
dwelt at length upon the
difficulty of dissuading his
people from any practical step
to increase their security.
Kosygin had previously
dropped a public hint of his
government's negative reac-
tion to the ABM moratorium
at a press conference in
London. A few days later a
Pravda columnist came out
with an indorsement of the
Johnson proposal but Soviet
officials took prompt pains to
notify Westerners that the
piece had been written without
official sanction.
McNamara's eagerness to
go to Moscow is inspired by
signs that the Russians are
badly hung up on the ABM
question. It is a crucial aspect
of the military-civilian strug-
gle over the allocation of
resources. Its sensitivity was
indicated by the sudden
demotion of the commander of
Soviet air defense, Marshal
Sudets, after he disclosed last
April that the ABM system
exists only in the model stage.
One of McNamara's prime
missions has been to poke
realism into the illusions that
begird the facts of nuclear
life. His plain talk persuaded
the West Germans that they
do not need nuclear weapons
to survive. He has managed
thus far to keep Congress
from rushing into the deploy-
ment of a $40 billion ABM net.
The urgent need for realistic
talk in Moscow is evident in
the confused public debate
over whether the ABMs can
supply Soviet cities with
complete protection against
enemy attacks. Two signifi-
cant Soviet generals asserted
flatly on Feb. 20 that they
could. One said that missiles
fired at the Soviet Union
would never reach their
targets.
Marshal Chuykov, head of
civil defense, straddled the
issue when he spoke Feb. 23 on
Army-Navy day. He said an
opportunity exists "to exclude
completely or to cut down
considerably" the losses from
a missile attack. But the
defense minister, Marshal
Malinovsky, was even more
restrained when he spoke the
same day. He said the defense
forces insure the destruction
"of any aircraft and of many
rockets of the enemy."
It is inevitable that the
Kremlin would be gripped by
this debate because security
has been the keystone of
Soviet foreign policy since
Khrushchev's ouster. All the
past adventurism has been
sublimated to diplomacy
aimed at stabilizing relations
with the rest of the world. The
success of this diplomacy has
made the Russians more
sensitive than ever to the
Sword of Damocles represent-
ed by American nuclear
superiority.
The injection of McNamara
into the Moscow debate would
be unconventional but illumi-
nating. No one else can ex-
pound as convincingly the
doctrine of "Assured Destruc-
tion Capability," which means
simply that the United States
intends to preserve her poten-
tial to inflict unacceptable
destruction in the face of any
foreseeable kind of missile
screen.
No diplomat can argue with
as much force that a total
defense against missiles is
impossible despite the ad-
vances in radar and comput-
ers or point as knowledgeably
to the multiple means by
which penetration will be
facilitated after the screen is
up.
The divergences in Moscow
are better understood, by
examining the ones in Wash-
ington. The Joint Chiefs argue
that a missile screen must be
built because it will cut down
American casualties if the
Soviets fail to adopt more
sophisticated methods of
penetration. McNamara
argues that their penetration
methods will inevitably be
adapted to the challenge of the
screen, just as ours will.
But McNamara may not
secure an immediate chance
to impress the Soviets with the
futility of their ABM plans. A
visit by him to Moscow would
be embarrassing to the Rus-
sians as long as the war is on.
Peking would loudly claim
that the Russians and Ameri-
cans were conspiring against
Ho Chi Minh.
The State Department has
little taste for the McNamara
mission. Its officials are wary
of interlopers in East-West
negotiations. They argue that
Malinovsky, McN a m a r a 's
counterpart in Moscow, is not
a member of the Politiburo so
he would not be meeting with
the leaders who will make the
decision.
But Kosygin told Thompson
that his government is pre-
pared to hold discussions on
the issue and perhaps in the
course of these, McNamara
will have the opportunity to
make his case.
w 1967
Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300090040-2