WE COULD DETECT SPACE BOMB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300080043-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: December 15, 1966
• Content Type: NSPR

We Covuld
Bo
By Charles Nicodemus
Of Our Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON - Ameri-
ca's sophisticated intelligence
systems will "almost certainly"
be able to detect, in advance,
any Soviet nuclear weapon
put into orbit in violation of
the newly proposed "outer
space" treaty.
That will he the State De-
partment's answer to any criti-
cism from Capitol Hill that the
new treaty-widely hailed by
the administration--in reality
has no "teeth" for enforce-
ment.
State Department officials
acknowledged Thursday t h a t
---although it's been little noted
in the public acclaim that met
the treaty-the space pact has
no provision for inspection of
orbiting satellites or space sta-
tions.
So there will be no d i r e c t
method of telling whether the
treaty's key prohibition, against
orbiting "weapons of mass de-
struction," is being faithfully
observed or not.
There have been r e c e n t
rumblings that this point will
be made in Senate debate.
ALSO UNNOTICED has
been the fact that the treaty-
while barring military tests and
operations on "celestial bodies"
such as the moon-includes no
such ban in space itself.
This means there is nothing
to stop any nation from testing
and perfecting, in space, all
the hardware needed for a nu-
clear weapons satellite bom-
bardment system-as long as
the nuclear weapon itself is not
mounted in the satellite.
In answer, top State Depart
meet officials make these two
points:
variety of highly sophis-
ticated American intelligence
systems" makes it "a virtual
certainty" that Russia c o u l d
not now launch a satellite car-
rying a nuclear weapon with-
out the United States detecting
it.
While details of those intelli-
gence sources are secret, it is
known that they include infor-
mation supplied by America's
secret reconnaissance satellites;
computer analysis of the
"mass"-and thus the probable
content-of foreign space ve-
hicles; information supplied by
radar, and by intelligence op-
eratives monitoring Russian in-
dustrial activity and space
15 DECEMBER 1966 (16)
000
200 1 / e
rev
? This intelligence is so good.
it is said, that Russia could not
even make significant progress
toward a complex satellite-
borne nuclear bombardment
program without the United
States detecting it.
State Department spokes-
men are confident that these
points, and the obvious merit
of the treaty's many far-rang-
ing provisions on co-operation
in space, will win strong sup-
port in the Senate, which must
ratify the pact.
The 17-part treaty, dratted
primarily by he United States
and Russia and approved by
the United Nations' 28-meni-
her Outer Space Committee, is
expected to receive ratification
shortly by the UN General
Assembly - perhaps n c x t
week.
time to
supply supersonic jet planes,
but they did not rule out the
possibility that there rnight be
discussion of purchase of such
aircraft for long-term future
delivery.
WASHINGTON STAR 1'5 DECEMBER 66 (16)
NASA in 'What Next?' Quandry
At this stage of the moon
race, the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration is
like a dog chasing a very slow
car. The dog in time will catch
its quarry, but hasn't the
vaguest idea of what it will do
next.
Two events are in point.
First, the space agency had
a Dec. 1 deadline to report to
a congressional. committee on
its plans for the years after
Project Apollo reaches its
climax in the manned lunar
landing of 1969 or 1969. The
night before the deadline,
Deputy Space Administrator
Robert C. Seamans made a
grudging and rather devious
admission that the date would
:tot be met.
Second, within hours after
Seamans' explanation that "a
long letter" was going to
Capitol Hill in lieu of a poste
Apollo report, newsmen were
notified of a two-day manned
space flight briefing to take
place at Houston today and
tomorrow. Not one syllable out
of 13 hours and 5 minutes of
concentrated talk was sched-
uled on the topic, "After
Apollo, What?"
NASA, like the girl in the old
barroom ballad, is more to be
pitied than censured for this
silence. The agency has been
led down the primrose path by
it big-spending gentleman
from Texas who suddenly
seems to have lost. Pttere ;t in
the now-shopworn ingente.
NASA has no plans because
the big-speiAiing gentleman
has permitted it to make
divided on the need for a lunar
base.
As a contingency plan,
NASA is working out ways to
orbit a ma, n n e d research
laboratory without spending a
lot of new development mon-
ey. However, this plan is open
to criticism on grounds that its
functions will duplicate those
of the military's spy-sky space
station, MOL (manned orbit-
ing laboratory).
By rational standards, the
United States needs two
space station programs about
as badly as the dog needs the
he is chasing-but there
seems a fair chance that both
programs will go ahead.
Fortunately for NASA, the
military program will be clas-
sified so secret that there will
be no way of obtaining a valid
public judgment about the nec-
essity for several billions'
worth of duplication.
Meanwhile, it is likely that
the most promising area of
space research--unmanned
exploration of the universe-
will continue to be starved.
The astonishing results from
Project Orbiter, including that
unforgettable picture of the
cra?.er Copernicus, are being
used for propaganda but
apparently for little else.
A high official on the un-
manned side of the space
program made the point
recently that man is always
"in the loop" during a space
mission. Sometimes he can do
the job best in a spacesuit,
and sometimes best in shirt-
sleeves at a console in Pasa-
d
a
y
erttt.
plans no. come out of the so-called Sr.' o know they often
For more than two years "science" kitty. get wrong answers in their
Space Administrator James E. Astronomers already have experitr:eata because they ask
Webb has been warning that a said they would prefer a large the wry questions. In the
break in continuity in space telaseope in earth orbit to one context of astronaut space
plans could he disastrous. on the moon. The biggest spectaculars after 1970, may-
A a s o c i a t e Administrator enthusiasts for prolonged be the right question is not
George E. Mueller has sound- lunar exploration are the "Aft
ll
"
er
o, What?
but
Approved Fr I@Mt20 ( V*: 74)80083 030008 , Why?"
WASHINGTON STAR 15 E'ECEMBER 66 (16)
Peru Air Force Wants U.S. Jets
Peru was reported today to be;dor Celso Pastor said "their
interested in eventually acquir-'visit is pretty much of a routine
ing for its air force six or seven' matter."
supersonic jet planes-a type of U. S. officials said Washington
aircraft the United States has so I '
l- . ._.._ is not prepared at this
..
u p
America.
Two Peruvian Air Force
generals are headed here to
survey the possibility of such
purchases, but Peru's Ambassa-
Dy WILLIAM HINES
man government-industrial
organization is already begin-
ning to fall apart in the ab-
sence of a firm post-Apollo
program.
In the nature of things, a
post-Apollo program (to
NASA) means something big-
not just more-of-same; some-
thing different. The agency's
advance planners are looking
yearningly at Mars in the
1980s or 1990s, and when men
and Mars are mentioned in the
same breath it means money
-lots of money.
Dr. Jerome Wiesner, the
late President Kennedy's
science adviser, once. publicly
estimated the cost of a
manned Mars expedition-in
terms of both time and money
-as 30 to 35 years and $100
billion. Wiesner was never
particularly sold on space
spectaculars, however, so his
estimate may have been
biased with pessimism.
But even the wildest space
enthusiasts acknowledge that
it would take 15 or 20 years
and $50 billion to $60 billion to
send a landing party to Mars.
To meet the most favorable
launching opportunity in this
century (1986) would mean an
immediate, significant boost
in space spending.
And that- as everyone in the
space business knows-is not
going to happen.
Barring Mars, what looks
interesting after Apollo?
Colonizing the moon comes to
mined, but there are serious
scientific objections to wasting
lunar base-especially when
this money would necess
ril
 F-111'3 ... coAPPr d For Release 2006/01f/30t- CIAO DP 080033., Qrq 0
from Gnum-
possihle reconfiguration of the missile With irdustrv," Swceneti said. "How man's facility in C'alvertun, N.Y. Per-
itself. -I he Navy stated that the studies do von coordinalc major contractor, Iormance and carrier s litahility tests on
were completed and Naze's answer to sshen. you have a contract v,vith each 4 and S will help the Navy decide on
Andrews seems t:; rule out any other We must define more cier:a the area; initial procurement. 1-he P-12 will not
platform for the Phoenix-AMCS than of responsibility of contractors to each he installed on 4 or S, hut is programmed
the F-I11B. other. We rust ne certain that the for No. 6 and subsequent. Along with
In commenting on the weight prob- engine. iii ssile, control sVstem, and air- the added thrust of the 11-12 engine, the
lcm, Admiral Sweeney said that further craft c: pahilities and interface demands Navt believes improvements in the drag
reduction "becomes a matter of cost are contpatihle. If the specifications arc of the airplane will he made.
effectiveness. The aircraft could be definitive and the schedules realistic, I ests of the Phoenix missile on the
operated well at its present weight." He then we h:eve an aircraft that will fly on F-I I 113 have just been initiated with
has testified that the catapults and ar- the target date we shoot for." - "atislactors results. I hose tests will con-
resting gear aboard carters arc capable Many target dates have not been met. time on ttre early F-11 I Bs. This pro-
of handling heavier aircraft ban the Although Sweeney says there has been gram will lead into the tests on airplanes
F-f I I B and that the Navy will have to no one pacing :tern, he does admit to 6 through 9 in 196!; and 1969. These
make no improvements on the deck has ng earlier difficulties in the develop- are the crucial tests, along with carrier
structure to accommodate the plane.
plane. of th-? Phoenix missile system.. suitability trials, which will indicate fleet
Sweeney is impressed by the designed "This i; because we had too compressed operability status.
maintainability of the aircraft and its a schedule. We are really working on an One of the most ideI discussed re
systems. are b rust e and mrnta dvanced system, learning as we de- quirements of the I I I B is its loiter ca-
turization are being used to the maxi- velop. When we discovered the schedule pability. This is of critical importance
mum, as well as built-in self-test. The was too compressed, we opened it up. for it is basic to the nature of the air-
F2A and A6A are complex weapons Last nianih the Phoenix was tested sue- craft needed to fill its multi-purpose
systems by comparison. cessfully from an I-I 1 I h in its first live role aboard an aircraft carrier. The
Management of the development and shot at the Navy's missile test range it June report of the Bird Engineering
production progran-is has been a pt Ivtugu, Calif." Research Associates, Inc., stated that
groundbreaking experience. Sweeney That the planes-the As and the Bs-- that capability has not yet been evi-
participated in the project management are being, built and flying is a man- deuced. Admiral Sweeney counters with
of the F6F, F7F and F8F Navy air- agerial miracle, considering the com- his own opinion:
craft, and was even involved with the plexitics of the contracting arrange "We may not meet all the perform-
13ell P59 Airacomet and Northrop P79 mcnts. It is also indicative of a superbly once parameters we are aiming for but
in 1943 ("1 wanted to tell my classmates cooperative industrial-military team. there is a good probability that the
at CalTech that 1 had seen an airplane 'the Navv, for instance, met with de- F-11113 will provide the specified `time
that had no propellers. I couldn't, teat when it attempted to develop and on station.' I also believe that the
but they wouldn't have believed me pioduc.e similarly the Seahawk project, F-I I IB will he a satisfactory home for
anyway."). which is now officially declared "dead" the missile fire control system and that
The management problems involving (although some valuable research and it will he at good launch platform for the
the F-I I I B are unusual. "We've dis- development was salvaged). Phoenix missile. When one considers
covered so many unique things in this the power and environmental control re-
program that people confronted with Best (Government Contracting? quirements of the missile and its fire
future programs of bi--service develop- As a result of his F-I I I B experiences control system, this is a noteworthy
ment should take advantage of our with fixed price R & D contracts, accomplishment."
experience and examine what we have Sweeney has had some second thoughts What then is the prognosis for the
done." Sweeney operates out of Wright- on government contracting and has re- F- I I 1 B? Congress-particularly Sen.
Patterson with two dozen officers in the discovered it well--known fact: that not John L. McClellan of the Permanent
various offices of the Systems Program all contractors agree on the "proper" Investigations Subcommittee-is not
Office. He also has help in Washington, types of contracts the government wedded to the I'-I11B. The Senate ap-
some 80 officers and civilians of the Air should be awarding. Frequently fiscal proved a rider to the Defense Depart-
and Ordnance Systems Commands, a]- realities force a contractor to delay de- ment's 1967 fiscal appropriation bill
most all of whom are part time workers cision on a given problem until he can which barred the allocation of added
on the F-I lIB. determine the least expensive way of money for the production of the B. The
The Air Force acts as executive meeting specifications instead of using House permitted a miniscule amount
agent for the Department of Defense the most expedient solution, regardless (by comparison) for long lead-time pro-
in administering the overall F-III pro- of cost. in order to get the job done. duction items so that if the aircraft wins
gram contract. The Air Force System This approach has a slowing action on eventual approval there will be no ma-
Command's Aeronautical Systems Di- research and development. or slippage in schedule because of de-
vision, Wright-Patterson. acts as man- There are, too, many problems he- lay'; in development.
ager for both services (Maj. Gen. tween prime contractor and subcontrac- Barring unexpected failure in even-
Zoeckler). tors. "A good prime must he aware of teal performances of the aircraft, the
General Dynamics, through its Fort progress or lack of progress in subcon- F-t I 1 B has the support of Secretary
Worth Division, is F-I I l program prime tracts," Sweeney said. "We should be Nitze whose declarative stamp of ap-
contractor. Grumman Aircraft Engi- aware of problem areas hefore they proval was not voiced loudly until last
neering Corp., as associate and principal develop too tar.- August.
subcontractor, assembles and flight tests The flights of the F- I I is so far have The most persuasive argument that is
the B's. Hughes Aircraft Company of been successful. The military, the con- voiced by Secretary Nitze is: the Navy
Culver City, Calif., produces the Phoe- tractors, and the military/company test does not now have-even on the hoards
nix missile system under a separate pilots who have flown the aircraft are --any aircraft that comes near the ca-
direct contract with the Navy. Pratt delighted with the success of the variable pabilities of the F-1 1113. And this saga-
and Whitney Aircraft Division'
ivision of East sweep wing. A sample comment from hility is urgently needed by the Navy.
Hartford, Conn., produces the TF-30 veteran Grumman test pilot John "The B's Phoenix missile system is
turbofan jet engines for the F-111As Norris: "This is a wonderful way to the most advanced air-to-air weapons
and the early Bs and is developing the build an airplane. It's like sitting on system in the world today," Admiral
P.12 version that will be installed in the front porch of a house, it flies so Sweeney said. He admits that enthu-.
later Bs. P&W develops and produces steady. There is almost no change in siasm for the B throughout the uni--
all engines for the F-11 1 program by noise level flying from subsonic to su- formed Navy is not widespread, nor
direct contract with the Navy. personic. The idea of putting the wings particularly noticeable.
There are 15 other firms under direct where you want them is hard to beat." Still, it is the only such capability
contracts from GD to supply major About a dozen Navy test pilots have that the Navy has and is likely to have
subsystems for the F- l l ls, including flown the F-I I 113; their reactions are in the foreseeable future. And this, if
McDonnell Aircraft Corp. at St. Louis. reported to he uniform: the plane is for no other reason, might dictate the
McDonnell builds the two-man com- ..easy to fl " Navy's acceptance-reluctant or full--
bination cockpit a AfDp tt id Fort-Releasp
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